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1 Introduction
“Perhaps tonight the terrucos will come,” whispers Daniel, a thirty-five year old peas-
ant war refugee from one of the many desplazado settlements clustered round the town
of Tambo and its small, hilltop military garrison. Saying these words causes a slight gri-
mace to form on his weather-beaten face. He stares out his attic window towards the
silhouetted adobe walls of the army fort. It is not yet so late in the afternoon, but
evening’s advancing darkness is already rapidly extinguishing the last vestige of an
Andean November twilight.
Light drizzle patters away erratically on the corrugated tin roof, like fingertips
drumming a dispirited tattoo. The effect is hypnotic and he is soon lost in his own
thoughts, doubtless of the safety of his wife and young children; of this new hut with
its tin roof; of the previous one, burnt to the ground in the jungle by Senderistas; and
of the original family home in his that distant village, which government soldiers
sacked over a decade ago and now lies abandoned. Perhaps he is also anxiously won-
dering if he and his family will once again become refugees on the run—if the 
terrucos come.
Ever since guerrillas boldly entered the nearby provincial capital of San Miguel
three weeks earlier and audaciously executed a policeman right in the police station
itself, local peasant militias in all the neighbouring districts had been on a high state of
alert. Many people believe the next guerrilla strike would fall on Tambo. But when?
“The ronderos won’t get any sleep again tonight,” Daniel murmurs as much to
himself as to me after a lengthy silence.
“If the terrucos (terrorists, Shining Path guerrillas) attack, the ronderos will be the
ones to fight them,” he explains to me, his voice ringing with pride. “The soldiers and
policemen will simply stay within the safety of the fort and the police station until day-
light; they will not come out to fight at night. You see, it’s not really the Army who
protects us. We defend ourselves.”
1.1 Significance of the study and its aims
When in 1980 the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path launched an armed revolu-
tion against the Peruvian State in the name of the peasantry and the proletarian masses,
several scholars engaged in the nascent enterprise of “Senderology” quickly deemed it
a peasant rebellion, and therefore an appropriate case with which to address the ques-
tion of why peasants rebel. But even while the subsequent scholarship on the unfolding
Peruvian civil war was producing an abundance of literature proclaiming its relevance
as an example of peasant revolution, violent confrontations between the guerrillas and
the very peasants they claimed to represent were becoming increasingly frequent occur-
rences. The widespread surprise and bewilderment these clashes caused was perhaps
revealing of the extent to which scholars have long ignored the question of what caus-
es peasants to become actively and violently counter-revolutionary.
Despite the prevalence of rural-based political violence over much of Latin
19
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American for quite some time (Kay 2001), the question of peasant counter-rebellion
has received surprisingly little scholarly attention from regional specialists. Granted,
peasant counter-revolution—or counter-rebellion, as I mainly refer to it in this book—
is a rare phenomenon. Nevertheless, its significance goes beyond the regional confines
of Peru, or even of Latin America; for it is my contention that the phenomenon of
peasant counter-rebellion is a crucial component of the revolutionary equation. As
such, it is something that must be taken into account if we wish to understand the his-
tory of past revolutionary wars and revolutionary regimes, like that of Sandinista
Nicaragua; or conversely, if we seek to better comprehend government counterinsur-
gency strategies that attempt to forge a working alliance with the peasantry, as in the
case of Peru or Guatemala; or where the outcome of guerrilla struggles is still to be
decided, such as in Nepal, or in Columbia where President Uribe has recently stated
his government’s intention to begin organising civil defence patrols. The phenomenon
of peasants or urban poor organising themselves spontaneously in resistance to com-
munist revolutionary forces is hardly unique to Peru. Russian peasants took up armed
rebellion in 1930 in an unsuccessful attempted to resist the Stalinist government’s
plans for the full-scale collectivisation and “dekulakization” of peasant society (Viola
1996). In the mid-1980s, disgruntled rebel defectors and local slum dwellers in the
Philippine province of Davao formed armed anticommunist vigilante groups, which
were rapidly able to wrestle control of this former rebel stronghold away from the
Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People’s Army (CPP-NPA)
(Jones 1989:268-275).
This book attempts to enlarge our academic understanding of the causes, structur-
al forms, and dynamics of violent peasant counter-rebellion by presenting a case study
of peasant self-defence groups in the Peruvian Andean department of Ayacucho, birth-
place of both the Shining Path revolution and peasant counter-rebellion. In addition,
this book also investigates the history of the Peruvian civil war from the relatively neg-
lected perspective of peasant counter-rebellion in an attempt to understand the peas-
antry’s everyday experiences of political violence, and their responses to it. To borrow
the words of Robben and Nordstrom, the emphasis of this book is “...on how people
come to grips with life under siege, on the experience, practice, and everydayness of
violence....” (1995:3).
The central assertion is that peasant counter-rebellion is a form of resistance to
exogenous forces, and its primary motivation is the defence of life, property, liveli-
hood, and autonomous space for action. In recognising, however, that peasant count-
er-rebellion gives rise to larger consequences, and generates new social forms of inter-
action and processes of change, the present study also aims to gain a more detailed
understanding of, firstly, how peasant counter-rebellion has contributed to the State’s
counterinsurgency struggle against Shining Path, and secondly, how these contributions
have generated changes in the social conditions and social position of the Andean peas-
antry. Finally, against the backdrop of civil war, this study explores the ways that vio-
lence, racism, power and domination have shaped changing social relations and cul-
tural identities in Ayacucho and in Peru as a whole over the past two decades.
I will approach the subject in three interconnected ways. First, I attempt to identi-
fy the social, structural, and historical conditions that created the self-defence com-
mittees in the department of Ayacucho. I seek to explain how and why the phenome-
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non developed and proliferated in the department, and to account for the regional and
local diversity in their formation and social manifestation. Second, I examine the sig-
nificance that rural self-defence organisations came to have in the daily life of their
communities. And third, I endeavour to identify the reciprocal linkages that relate self-
defence groups to larger social transformations and patterns of change in the broader
regional and national settings. One of the conceptual assumptions guiding this study is
that the phenomenon of rural self-defence organisations should be understood with
reference to both the local community and the larger society. There exists a vast liter-
ature on various aspects of the Peruvian civil war. But it is only relatively recently that
a few scholarly studies have attempted to integrate more macro-level analysis with an
account of how larger events and social transformations are absorbed into the life of
local communities, and given social meaning (e.g. Palmer 1992; Starn 1995; Degregori
1996a; Del Pino 1996, 1998; Stern 1998).
Peru was selected as the country setting for this study because by the mid-1990s, it
was already becoming clear that peasant self-defence patrols were playing a decisive
role in helping to bring about the demise in that country of a once-powerful commu-
nist insurgency. Furthermore, compared with similar defence organisations in
Guatemala, what appeared to differentiate those of Peru was the extent to which inde-
pendent peasant initiative seemed to be a playing a major part in mobilising the rural
population against Shining Path, notwithstanding a considerable degree of influence
from the military. These, then, were the general indications. What was required was to
research in greater detail the “hows” and “whys” of the phenomenon, and to examine
the precise outcomes it was generating.
1.2 The approach
This book appears in its final form more by result than by initial design. As happens to
most doctoral research projects, this one has undergone a process of substantial mod-
ification along the way. This in itself is merely a reflection of the project’s unfolding,
and was to be expected given the continuously changing nature of my fieldwork expe-
riences, and the various sorts of data I was collecting or processing at different stages
of research. Not surprisingly, the result is a book very different from the one I had orig-
inally imagined I would write.
I did not embark on fieldwork with the purpose of testing a preconceived theo-
retical hypothesis, with its attendant box-and-arrows approach. Nor did I set out with
the explicit intention of contributing to any particular conceptual approach (cf. Ortner
1989:11). Rather, I started this project from the point of view that “theory emerges
from experience” (Robben and Nordstrom 1995:4). First and foremost, I simply want-
ed to know what was happening and what had already happened, to identify the issues
that the people themselves deemed to be important, and to ascertain the meaning that
the things that happened had for them.
Although for the most part this research project was theoretically undirected, it was
nevertheless guided by a particular epistemological approach to conceptualising, observ-
ing , and analysing human social interaction. In this regard I drew inspiration from
Anton Blok’s (1974) analysis of the circumstances that created Sicilian mafia within
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diachronic processes of social change using Elias’s (1969) theory of “configuration.”
What I found attractive about the concept of configurations was that it “emphasizes the
changing patterns of interdependencies in which individuals and groups of individuals
are involved: both as allies and as opponents” (Blok 1974:9-10). It describes social
transformation in terms of shifting configurations, and their interrelationship with
changing events and “structured, historical processes” (ibid.). I was also influenced by
the related approach of “political economy,” as used by Eric Wolf to produce Europe
and the People without History, and by Steve Stern in Peru’s Indian Peoples and the
Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640. Clearly, my personal academic
preference was for social-historical analysis, rather than cultural analysis.
Furthermore, I held specific notions about the dialectical relationship between the
individual and society; or to put it in more theoretical terms, “structure” and “agency.”
Like Blok, I, too, hold that the actions of individuals and groups are influenced by, and
are sometimes dependent upon, particular sets of social, political, and economic struc-
tures and forces. Individuals as never completely autonomous from social-structural
forces. But neither can their responses to structural pressures and constraints be con-
strued as merely reflexive. Actors are also socially creative, innovative, and manipula-
tive, and they compete for valued resources. Moreover, they are always confronted by
choices and alternatives. In addition, having grown up in western Canada as a Filipino
immigrant, I knew from my personal experience of discrimination and racism that
power, resistance, violence, and empowerment have many guises, and must be looked
for as much in subtle body movements and verbal utterances as in social systems and
institutions.
Had I been more familiar with theoretical paradigms outside of my social anthro-
pological background, I might have theorised my ideas about the relationship between
individuals and society in terms of Giddens’ (1984) “Structuration Theory.” Had I
been less conditioned by a graduate education steeped in dated Durkheimian struc-
turalism, and more familiar with current anthropological developments, I might have
conceptually framed this research within “Practice Theory,” which draws on the works
of Giddens (1979), Bourdieu (1977), and Sahlins (1981) (see Ortner 1989:11—17).
Instead of Blok’s configurations, I could just as well have chosen Norman Long’s
(1992) “Actor-Oriented” approach. The fish tank was indeed large, and I confess that
in the end I pragmatically fashioned my epistemological approach out of an eclectic
mix of theories which appealed to my own subjective understanding of the world
around me.
1.3 Methodology
The fieldwork for this project was carried out in two trips. The first period was in 1997
and lasted eight months. The second was in 2000, and was carried out over four
months. Most of the 1997 trip was spent doing fieldwork in the district of Tambo,
although I took every opportunity to travel to as many other areas of the department
of Ayacucho as I could. In 2000 I spent the majority of my time in Huamanga, the
departmental capital, conducting participant observation in the midst of an unfolding
political crisis. I also used part of that time for research in various libraries and gov-
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ernmental institutions in Huamanga. The wide space of time between the two field-
work periods permitted me to place many of my early observations into a broader his-
torical context of process change. By spacing my fieldwork periods far apart, I have
been able to make use time’s passing in order to digest and to reflect on the material I
had gathered, thereby gaining a clearer understanding of the data that was not possi-
ble at the time the fieldwork was being done.
The material for this book comes from three principal sources. First, from struc-
tured and semi-structured interviews and impromptu discussions with common peo-
ple, as well as with local and regional decision makers. My informants included dis-
placed peasants, some of whom at the time were active militia members; local- and
regional-level militia commanders, both active and retired; peasant community author-
ities, incumbent and retired mayors of Tambo, and the district governor in 1997; high-
school students in Tambo and Huamanga; members of the district’s Club de Madres;
workers at the children’s orphanage (aldea infantil) in Tambo; children of Tambo town
and some of the surrounding refugee settlements and rural communities; the staff at
the hospital in Tambo; Peruvian military officers, members of the police’s regional
counterinsurgency unit (DIVICOTE), and ordinary policemen; imprisoned guerrillas;
directors, researchers, and workers of NGOs and various research institutes in Lima
and Huamanga; civil servants at the Ministry of Agriculture in Huamanga; and aca-
demics at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga.
I also collected data as an observing participant, while engaged in such activities as
civic actions, accompanying army patrols and military inspections of peasant militias
in various rural districts, and visiting remote returnee communities with NGO work-
ers or hospital staff. I joining numerous pro-government peasant rallies in Huamanga
in 1997 and 2000, and anti-government urban marches in 2000, and used these oppor-
tunities for engaging participants in illuminating conversations.
The material for this book also derives from archival and other documentary
sources published and unpublished. Of these, among my most original and important
sources of information are the personal war diary of Tambo district’s militia com-
mander, the complete archive of Tambo district’s central self-defence committee
(CCAD), and various documents from the DECAS civil defence organisations of the
Apurímac River Valley. Other primary sources of printed material include reports,
pamphlets, survey data for Tambo district’s rural communities, maps, quantitative and
other statistical data. Secondary sources included books, pamphlets, newspaper and
magazine articles.
Realising that documents can be embellished and that memories can be selective
and self-serving, I tried whenever possible to check the validity of the data by “trian-
gulating” the different kinds of information I had collected; cross-checking interviews
with written documents, for example (see Hammersley and Atkinson 1983:198-200).
That is to say, when conflicting stories arose, I attempted to corroborate the informa-
tion in question using other sources. If I felt I was unable to resolve discrepancies, I
presented all the conflicting versions of events.
There was a significant qualitative difference in the type of information I was able
to gather during each separate period of fieldwork period owing to profound changes
in the political situation. In 1997, Ayacucho was still under a military state of emer-
gency. For this reason, although I was able to elicit testimonies from particular inform-
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ants once I had gained their trust and promised to guard their anonymity, it was oth-
erwise virtually impossible for me to obtain official documents pertaining to the peas-
ant self-defence organisations. Even militia commanders I was beginning to forge
friendships with were careful not to put themselves and their families at risk by pro-
viding me with documents that the military might otherwise regard as restricted. By
2000, however, the political situation had changed substantially. The state of emer-
gency was lifted at the start of the year, and many of communities had already taken
the initiative to begin disbanding their local militias since the end of 1998. Apart from
this, guerrilla violence had virtually disappeared in most parts of Ayacucho, and peo-
ple claimed they were no longer afraid to talk. In fact, as though it were a form of
catharsis for them, many people actually wanted to talk about their violent experi-
ences, to relate local histories of war, to tell even outsiders like myself what had hap-
pened to them, their families, their communities. This situation made it easier for me
to fill in some of the gaps in my interview data from 1997. Importantly, I was finally
able to obtaining hitherto classified documental evidence.
It was during my second research period that I discovered the underlying multi-
level historical “narrative” that not only interconnected, and so made sense, of the
numerous sketchy and disjointed patches of empirical data I had collected in 1997.
This was due mainly to the diverse sorts of archival data I was fortunate enough to
obtain mainly through the trusting friendship of one of my key informants (Walter
Ramirez Echacaya alias Comando Zorro), and the generosity of a fellow researcher
(Roberto Córdova) with access to hard-to-get classified documents from the DECAS.
Consequently, in the course of researching and writing this book, my analytical
approach became more historical and less ethnographical, and more concerned with
analysing dynamic processes from a wider perspective, than with conducting a local-
level anthropological investigation, which was my original research proposal.
1.4 Between rumours and rifles: doing fieldwork 
in a Peruvian military zone, 1997
This was my first time in Peru, my first time in Latin America for that matter. Given
where I was going—the veritable epicentre of the civil war—I naturally had reason to
be a little anxious for my safety. I was aware that in the early 1990s, Peru was in the
top of Amnesty International’s list of countries with the worst human rights record (see
Amnesty International 1991). Furthermore, although the capture of most of the
Shining Path’s leadership in 1992 was being widely trumpeted in Europe, North
America, and Lima as the defeat of the rebels and the end of the war, the reality was
that five years on the organisation was still very much alive, and still carrying out acts
of violence.
I made my first trip to the Andean city of Huamanga (also known by its more mod-
ern name of Ayacucho) in mid-June. Upon my arrival I was immediately confronted
with mixed impressions. I expected to find a central plaza fortified with sandbags,
machine-gun pits, and teeming with armed men in camouflaged fatigues. Yet apart for
the scattered presence of soldiers and policemen, coolly cradling their automatic rifles
as they sauntered around the plaza or drove through the streets in their green or white
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vehicles, what struck me most was the liveliness and apparent joviality of daily life in
the city. Tourism had all but disappeared in the 1980s and much of the 1990s, for this
was considered a dangerous destination. I was therefore a little surprised to find a
sprinkling of Western tourists in the city, sipping coca-leaf maté and nibbling light
breakfasts in restaurants along Jirón Cuzco, where the cheaper and more popular
hotels are located. For the sellers at the busy central market, the terrifying days of
Shining Path’s paros armados (armed strikes), when most people were scared even to
walk in the streets, probably seem like a distant nightmare. As I discovered later, how-
ever, these scenes of normality belied the deadly low-intensity civil war that continued
in the surrounding countryside. In fact, even before the end of my first week in
Ayacucho (which is Quechua for “corner of the dead”) at least three armed guerrilla
actions had already been reported. Nevertheless, the fact that there weren’t bombings
or firefights breaking out all the time gave me hope that I would be able to conduct
fieldwork in relative peace.1
Finding a Place for Fieldwork. Much of my first month in the militarised zone was
taken up waiting for a letter of authorization from the supreme military authority. In
the meantime, I orientated myself by discussing my research project with knowledge-
able people of diverse backgrounds: military officers, academics, NGO workers. I also
thought it prudent to try and affiliate myself with a local NGO as part of my “identi-
ty making.”
I had initially intended to do ethnographic fieldwork in Chuschi, a peasant com-
munity about which there exists a rich body of ethnographic information (e.g. Isbell
1978). However, due to the difficulties I encountered in attempting to gain entry into
what was apparently a very suspicious and closed society, I gave up on Chuschi and
decided instead to do fieldwork in the district of Tambo, La Mar province. The choice
seemed logical and practical to me. As far as my topic was concerned, there was 
hardly any better setting than Tambo; for not only had civil war grievously affected the
entire province, it was also an area where the rural militias (officially called comités de
autodefensa, or more popularly rondas campesinas) continued to play an active and
important role in the social life of local communities. Moreover, what was working in
my favour was the fact that I had already been invited to carry out my investigations
there by its amiable district mayor, whom I had met earlier through my NGO contacts.
The town of Tambo is the capital of a district which the same name. There are in
the order of fifty-three rural communities in the district, of which approximately thir-
teen are refugee settlements situated round the town of Tambo. A military fort, gar-
risoned by about forty conscripts, sits on top of a small hill overlooking the central
plaza.
Joined later in my fieldwork by my Dutch partner Jenny, we chose to live in the
town itself. We reasoned that it would be much safer for us and the data I would col-
lect if we lived in the town rather than in one of the outlying rural communities, which
could at any time be attacked by guerrillas, or visited by a military patrol which might
mistaken my fieldwork data for “subversive” material. Though the chances these days
of being “disappeared” were slim, we didn’t want to take the risk. Apart from this prac-
tical consideration, another reason for staying in the town was that most militia activ-
ities in the district were coordinated and initiated there because prior authorisation for
any militia activity always had to be obtained from the local military commander.
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Presentation and Identity. Obviously, the extent to which people trusted us was
directly related to their first impressions of us. Upon arriving in Tambo, our identity
was immediately the subject of a variety of rumours: we were government agents,
human rights agitators, pishtacos. We heard people occasionally mutter the quechua
word pishtaco when we passed them in the streets or in the market, especially during
our first weeks in Tambo. According to some local schoolgirls we spoke to, pishtacos
are always tall, pale strangers who murder people in order to suck out their body fat.
In order to try and dispel some of these rumours, Jenny and I intentionally cultivated
and displayed a multi-faceted identity, using ambiguities to our methodological and
practical advantage. Tambino society has its share of intrigues and personal animosi-
ties, antagonisms and rival factions. For practical reasons, we tried to remain amicable
to all individuals and social groups—an attitude that was also influenced by my objec-
tive of investigating and analysing social interaction in terms of “social configurations.”
Not wishing to make the same mistake as Isbell (1978:224-236), who made enemies
of Chuschi’s mestizo teachers by purposely affiliating herself exclusively with the peas-
ants, we made a conscious effort to keep from closely associating with any one group.
We graciously declined the district mayor’s generous offer to live in his home, and
chose instead to rent a room in the basement of one of the restaurants. As a popular
meeting place, it proved to be proved to be a neutral location. It later turned out that
our decision to live under the restaurant instead of in the mayor’s house was a prudent
one, for it subsequently became apparent that there was enmity between him and oth-
ers, such as the police, some of the townspeople, and even many of his own aldermen
who were resentful of his alleged habit of making important decisions without first
consulting them.
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I presented myself to people as a history student, and said I was studying Tambo
district’s history, culture, and society. This made it easier for us to explain our inquis-
itiveness and need to collect information. Obviously, presenting my project in this way
was less threatening than candidly stating that I was studying militias and the local his-
tory of political violence. Moreover, despite the fact that the then rector of the uni-
versity in Ayacucho (UNSCH) was himself an anthropologists, there was nevertheless
a popular belief among policemen and military officers that most anthropologists are
Shining Path sympathizers,2 or otherwise involved in subversive activities.3
Contrary to conventional anthropological wisdom, we though it better to empha-
sise our obvious “foreign-ness,” rather than trying to diminish it.4 Our status as for-
eigners afford us a measure of personal security in precarious situations (harassing for-
eigners, unlike locals, could get policemen into trouble). Furthermore, we later found
out that the current climate of fear and suspicion generated by the civil war was such
that many people distrusted fellow Peruvians more than they did foreigners.
It was to my advantage to be seen in Jenny’s company. She fits the stereotype of
Dutch women—blond, fair complexion, relatively tall, so obviously foreign. I, on the
other hand, as a Filipino-Spanish mestizo was often mistaken for an urban Peruvian,
and therefore a possible secret police agent. When I was with Jenny, however, people
were more inclined to see me as also “holandés,” and so were less suspicious than they
would have been had I been alone or with a Peruvian assistant.
I intended at first to hire a local guide/translator who could introduce us to the
inhabitants and whose companionship might elicit more trust from the people. But
anthropologists sometimes forget that guides, too, have reputations in their own com-
munity. As it turned out, my unfortunate initial choice was reputed to be a thief and a
disorderly drunkard.5 Luckily, I learned of this before further association with him could
damage my image in the community. As for using a translator, I thought it would make
a better impression if I represented myself, and spoke with my own voice. This, of
course, presented problems when trying to communicate with monolingual Quechua
speakers. In any case, such individuals were often too suspicious to even speak with me.
Had I used a Quechua interpreter for interviews, I would also have found it too diffi-
cult to ascertain the accuracy of their translations and interpretations. Moreover, in light
of the climate of distrust, and given some of the topics I wished to address, using a
Peruvian or local translator would undoubtedly only have caused interviewees to hold
back certain information (perhaps more than they were already doing).
Primarily for reasons of personal safety, we never ventured to the remote country-
side communities on our own. When we went into the countryside, it was always in
the company of NGO workers, or a nurse from the hospital. As a result, people came
to see us as members of those aid institutions; and the trust they bestowed on those
workers was also imparted to us.
My fieldwork in Tambo came to abrupt end when guerrilla activity nearby made it
too dangerous for us to stay. Jenny and I therefore relocated to Huamanga in early
November 1997, where I continued to meet and interview Tambinos when they came
to visit CEPRODEP, a local NGO. I was pleased to discover that outside Tambo, away
from the prying eyes of their neighbours and in the privacy of my hotel room, my
informants were more relaxed and therefore more candid in talking about sensitive
issues.
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1.5 Outline of the book
Briefly, the structure of this book is as follows. Chapter 2 traces the genesis and devel-
opment of Shining Path. It is concerned with showing how Shining Path’s Mariategista-
and Maoist-inspired understanding of the socioeconomic characteristics of the Peruvian
peasantry and the nation’s agrarian structure shaped the premises and objectives of its
revolutionary strategy. This provides us with a backdrop against which to view Shining
Path’s subsequent behaviour towards the peasantry, adding to our understanding of why
Shining Path cannot, in spite of its claims, be viewed as the vanguard of a peasant rev-
olution, but rather as the object of peasant counter-revolution.
Chapter 3 begins with Shining Path’s initiation of armed struggle. It then proceeds
to examine the early effects of Shining Path’s military tactics and strategy, not only on
the peasants but also on other social actors, like the police. It is here that we see the
first ruptures in Shining Path’s relations with the peasantry as it pushed ahead with its
quixotic adventure to transfigure Andean reality—by any means necessary, and with
total indifference to existing Andean cultural values, peasant survival strategies or
structural relations—into the “hyper-reality” envisaged by its rigid brand of Maoist-
Mariáteguista dogma. Through its actions, Shining Path would provoke disaffection
and resentment that would eventually lead to the outbreak of peasant counter-rebel-
lion in certain sierran areas of Ayacucho. Nevertheless, it is also shown that when the
military unleashed a “war of attrition,” they also took an active role in encouraging or
coercing peasant communities to form civil defence patrols. Against the larger back-
drop of the Belaúnde government’s approach to counterinsurgency, the structural and
functional characteristics of these early peasant civil defence patrols are analysed, and
their effectiveness assessed. The underlying argument in this chapter is that a consid-
eration of the range of organisational frameworks of varied peasant communities, and
their connections with larger economic and political fields, offers a starting point for
trying to understand the diversity of peasant responses to contemporary political vio-
lence in the south-central Peruvian highlands. The creation of self-defence committees
is but one kind of peasant response to political violence.
In Chapter 4 the story moves to the Apurímac River Valley where, owing to a num-
ber of circumstances specific to the region and to the dynamics of the political violence
that unfolded there, the most sophisticated and effective of counterinsurgency mili-
tias—the DECAS—were born. Against the backdrop of both guerrilla violence and the
military’s “dirty war” repression (first under the government of Belaúnde, and then
later of García), this chapter looks at how the DECAS sought to survive by shifting
alliances, and by defending or carving out spaces for autonomous action in relation to
the guerrillas, the army, the police, and the drug traffickers. In addition, this chapter
traces the rise and fall of Comandate Huayhuaco, a legendary militia leader who not
only helped to develop the DECAS’ sophisticated tactics, but also came to stand for the
“dark side” of the peasant militias. Also important in this period was the debate on
whether peasant militias in general should be given firearms by the State in defence of
themselves and the State, which would turn them into yet another “armed actor.”
Archival data provides us with insight into how the DECAS functioned as an armed
force in the field. This information reveals that they were far from being simply a mot-
ley group of “thugs” or “cannon fodder,” as stereotyped by a number of outside
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observers. The DECAS’ military firepower (made possible by drug money), its distinct
organisational structure, and the diverse strategic alliances it managed to forge with
other powerful local actors (such as the narcotraficantes and the Marine Infantry)
would, in the end, prove decisive in contributing to the pacification of virtually the
entire Apurímac River Valley. The larger sociopolitical landscape is provided by the rise
and fall of the García regime, and how a political crisis partially caused by his unortho-
dox economic policies precipitated a crisis in counterinsurgency, and in militia-military
relations.
In chapter 5 the story returns to the Ayacuchan sierra on the wave of DECAS
expansion, which was achieved by dispatching elite groups of militiamen to highland
communities where they provided local patrols with training and instruction on
DECAS strategies, organisation, and tactics. The focus here is on the expansion and
institutionalisation of the peasant militia phenomenon as it developed and was experi-
enced by the inhabitants of Tambo district. Another significant development described
in this chapter is the rise of Alberto Fujimori to president. In particular, attention is
paid to the symbiotic relationship that developed between Fujimori, the army, the intel-
ligence service, and the self-defence committees, which served to underpin the gov-
ernment’s new approach to counterinsurgency. The war diary of Comando Zorro pro-
vides the narrative current throughout this chapter. In conjunction with other sources
of information, the vivid detail contained in the diary helps us to see the sociopolitical
violence in human terms, as the people suffered and lived it. This chapter also attempts
to address often neglected, intangible issues pertaining to the dynamics of the self-
defence phenomenon, such as the fragility of the morale upon which rested the will to
continue resisting. Moreover, the chapter also examines the profound developments
and transformations within the revolutionary movement in the late 1980s and early
1990s, focusing as much on rifts, disputes, and conflicts within Shining Path as on
resilience and continuities. Based on data from various important unpublished studies,
and my own interviews with captured rebels, this chapter gives insight into what every-
day life was like for Shining Path guerrillas, and the peasant masses under their con-
trol, in remote rebel-dominated areas of Ayacucho’s northern provinces. The annihi-
lation of an important rebel column towards the end of 1993 closes this chapter, and
symbolises the dawn of a new period of precarious peace in this sub-region of
Ayacucho department.
Chapter 6 exhibits a different tone and pace. It deals primarily with the processes
of refugee returns, reconstruction, and development. Its main argument is that because
humans seek to re-establish some degree of normality in their everyday lives even in
adverse situations, we should therefore recognise that socioeconomic reconstruction
takes place even in the midst of war. This chapter examines the role and contributions
made by self-defence committees to the process of reconstruction, and considers their
possible future contributions to the process of development.
Chapter 7 is based on my personal observance of the chaotic and serious political
situation that engulfed the country during the controversial 2000 presidential elec-
tions. It was, as the title suggests, a time of unexpected endings. Not only did the
Fujimori regime and its secret intelligence apparatus collapse only a few months after
Fujimori “won” a third term in office, the state of emergency was also finally lifted
almost everywhere it had been imposed, and with this the self-defence committees
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were also officially deactivated. In fact, however, throughout much of Ayacucho, peas-
ant communities had, by their own initiative, already begun to disband their self-
defence committees since the end of 1998, when it was generally perceived that paci-
fication had been achieved, and there was no longer much risk of guerrilla violence. In
this context, it was no longer self defence—which in itself also constituted a financial
drain on time and material resources—but rather recuperating and reactivating neg-
lected agricultural and other livelihood activities, which took precedence as the peo-
ple’s principal concern.
Chapter 8 attempts to enter into a theoretical analysis and discussion on the pre-
ceding chapters. Generally speaking, the main points of discussion are the phenome-
non of peasant counter-rebellion and its relation to state counterinsurgency, the signif-
icance of peasant militias in civilian-military relations, and the phenomenon’s impact
on the interrelated problems of democratic consolidation, nation-building, and citi-
zenship.
1.6 Writing style and presentation
The style in which I have written this book was influenced by the sort of data my field-
work yielded. Given the kind of material I was able to collect, and my desire to tell the
story of real people instead of treating them as faceless subjects absorbed into abstract
themes, a narrative account of the peasant militias seemed to me to be the best way to
present the phenomenon in human terms. Like other anthropologists who have tried
to write a narrative account of their subject, however, the main problem I had to con-
front was how to combine a narrative story with analysis. Ortner, who herself has
come up against the same difficulty, captures the essence of the problem when she
writes, 
[t]he two forms of writing and thinking kept getting in each other’s
way. The story would have a certain momentum of its own, and it
often seemed awkward and artificial to break into it and “do some
analysis”....The secret of the problem, of course, is that what I though
of at that point as “analysis” was essentially static, a matter of under-
standing what things mean and how they hang together, rather than a
matter of understanding how things generate other things, or derive
from other things, and so forth (1989:11).
Ortner finds her solution to the problem in the bosom of “practice theory.” I found my
inspiration in Clifford Geertz’s style of descriptive analysis which he called “process-
analysis.”6 Process-analysis presents an attractive model for combining description and
analysis of social change, and Geertz’s illustration of it has served as an example for
me in writing this book. In contrast to what Geertz does, however, my own approach
to writing descriptive analysis contains little cultural analysis, and can therefore per-
haps best be described not as “thick description” but as “thick history,” to borrow a
phrase from Dirks et al. (1994:17). In addition to Geertz, however, I also looked for
examples and guidance by reading Latin American literature7 and well-written history
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books (particularly narrative histories of Rome),8 and in writing styles of anthropolo-
gists like Orin Starn and Carlos Iván Degregori.
The style in which this book has been written can thus be described as narrative
history, interspersed throughout with shorter pauses for “process-analysis” of issues
immediately rising from the narrative. A theoretically-orientated summarisation of the
main themes of the book is left until the final chapter so as not to disrupt the narrative
flow of the story. The intention was to show, in form as much as in words, that this
research has not been hypothesis driven, but rather that the theoretical issues stem
from the preceding empirical description.
The logical sequence of the chapters follows the story of the emergence, develop-
ment, and proliferation of peasant self-defence patrols in Ayacucho, as I came to
understand it; and the movement of this story is from sierra to selva, and from selva
back to the sierra. The shifting developments in the history of peasant counter-rebel-
lion (each of which is depicted in a separate chapter) corresponded more or less with
periodic changes to civilian government, and with each new administration’s particu-
lar approach to counterinsurgency and national economic policy. Each separate peri-
od, then, provides the setting for the individual chapters that make up this book.
In writing this book, what was also pertinent to me was the question of voice. I
wanted to give an account of the phenomenon which allowed the voices of the actual
participants to be heard. For as Robben and Nordstrom rightly underscore, “[w]ar,
rebellion, resistance, rape, torture, and defiance, as well as peace, victory, humor, bore-
dom, and ingenuity, will have to be understood together through their expression in
the everyday if we are to take the issue of the human construction of existence in
earnest” (1995:6). Yet to attempt to give “voice” to those we study raises its own set
of problems.
Various thinkers have drawn attention to the fact that dominant interpretations of
the past are products of dominant sociocultural structures and dominant modes of
expression and conceptualisation (Gramsci 1967, 1971; Foucault 1977; Guha 1994).
A reciprocal influence exists among these various factors. In such a context the voices
of subaltern groups are sometimes unarticulated, ignored, marginalized, or uninten-
tionally dominated by the agendas and interests of hegemonic groups, or by the dom-
inant mode of expression. The voices of subaltern groups are at times even appropri-
ated by those who purport to speak for them—academics, foreign journalists, the mil-
itary, Sendero Luminoso, the government, politicians. It is therefore morally impera-
tive, as Taussig (1987) insists, that we use what power and influence we have through
our academic writings to confront injustice, inequalities, and oppression. On the other
hand, Spivak (1988) urges anthropologists to question their own motives, and to
reflect on their place within power relationships and networks of privilege, when
anthropologists (or anyone else for that matter) try to speak for others. Spivak con-
tends that our representation of those we study will always be weighed down by our
own tacit, inescapable Western assumptions.
Then there is the question of authenticity and validity. The problem is whether, by
transforming observations of chaotic and complex empirical phenomena into ordered
and reasoned narrative accounts, we do not distort and lose the very qualities that we
wished to convey in the first place (Robben and Nordstrom 1995:12).
I do not attempt, nor do I have the erudition, to resolve these dilemmas, if ever
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they could be. Perhaps it is as Robben and Nordstrom say, that these dilemmas are
“part and parcel of anthropology as a research tradition that straddles cultures and
hierarchies” (ibid.:12). My strongest justification for attempting to convey a story
“through the eyes and voices” of the participants themselves is that this is what those
who have offered me information for this project also wanted. Many people in Tambo
expressed their desire that I write down their history, in their own words, to write
down the names of the dead so that they and their sacrifices and accomplishments
would not be forgotten by the living. Nor should the reader assume that I believe that
what I have written is the history of the peasant self-defence phenomenon. Like
Geertz, I believe that despite what we would sometimes like to think, what we are in
fact doing as social scientists is not revealing the truth, but merely giving our own spe-
cially informed interpretation of the ontological world we observe—and more often
than not, we are giving interpretations of interpretations of the truth. I think it was
Bruce Lee who put it best when he said words to the effect, “Do not mistaken the fin-
ger pointing the way to the moon for the moon.”9
This is a history of peasant counter-rebellion and civil war in late twentieth-centu-
ry Peru.
Notes
1. In their seminal book on the experience of doing “fieldwork under fire,” Robben and Nordstrom
(1995) and their various contributors raise numerous crucial points of a theoretical and practical
nature with regard to conceptualising political violence, and how anthropologists have gone
about studying it.
2. In my discussions with military officers and policemen, they often referred to Osmán Morote, a
former anthropology graduate of the university of Huamanga and one of Shining Path’s impor-
tant early leaders, in order to justify their prejudice against anthropologists. Apart from this, the
blatantly Maoist-Marxist orientation of anthropological research at the University of Ayacucho
(UNSCH) is evident from a brief glance at the sorts of anthropological dissertations that were
produced by its students during the 1970s and 1980s.
3. Billie Jean Isbell, an American anthropologist who conducted research in the Andean community
of Chuschi in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was shocked to hear the false rumour that she,
another foreign anthropologist, and a group of Peruvian students, although ostensibly conducting
research in the Pampas River area, were in fact revolutionaries encouraging peasants to take over
the land of a neighbouring estate by force. It was even rumoured that “the group sold machine
guns to villagers” (Isbell 1978:236).
4. All non-Tambinos, including the non-local Peruvian civil servants who travel from Ayacucho to
work at the municipality in Tambo, are regarded to by the locals as “foreigners” or “strangers.”
5. The NGO workers recommended him to me in good faith because he had been a competent
worker for them in the past.
6. Geertz provides an eloquently illustration of this approach by applying it to the case of a chaotic
Javanese funeral gone wrong (1973:142-169).
7. The novels of Isabel Allende and Mario Vargas Llosa have been very inspirational to me, particu-
larly in the way they can describe and get to the heart of complex situations without turning the
story into stale bread.
8. In particular, Michel Grant’s (1978) History of Rome, and Peter Salway’s (1981) Roman Britain. 
9. From the film “Enter the Dragon.”
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2 Shining Path and the Peasantry
To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the
needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must
start from...the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy
they need.
Mao Tse-Tung, “The United Front in Cultural Work”
Other than Power, all is illusion!
PCP-Sendero Luminoso, “Desarrollemos la Guerra de Guerrillas”
It was early in November 1997, during my final week of fieldwork in the district of
Tambo, that a peasant friend came to my lodgings late one evening with the most
intriguing news. Fifteen heavily armed guerrillas had entered the village of
Asnapampa a few nights earlier, where they herded the terrified inhabitants into the
square. But rather than holding a people’s trial and executing various so-called “class
enemies,” like they almost always did on such occasions, they began to announce to
the bewildered villagers that Shining Path guerrillas were no longer going to kill peas-
ants, as they had done in the past. Instead they promised to limit their future armed
actions to attacking only military and police personnel, and ronderos actively work-
ing against them. They ended the assembly by shouting slogans in praise of the pro-
letarian revolution and President Gonzalo (nom de guerre of Abimael Guzmán,
Shining Path’s founder and paramount leader), and then spent the rest of the evening
attempting to recruit some of the younger villagers before finally marching off into
the darkness shortly after midnight.1
I would later learn from Tambo’s militia commander that over the past two
months, other communities in the province of La Mar had been visited by the rebels
and told the same thing.2 That some of Shining Path’s remaining armed forces in the
field, under their new leader Oscar Alberto Ramírez Durand (alias Camarada
Feliciano), were keen to let peasants know that they had changed their ways even
came to be the focus of an article written by a correspondent for The Economist, who
suggested that a resurgence in propaganda and guerrilla activity at the time was most
likely “part of a two-year plan to win back lost ground” (Scrutton 1997:82). Be that
as it may, what was obvious was that by putting out this message, Shining Path was
not only attempting to win back disaffected peasants and so stem the relentless and
irresistible advance of the village defence militias. Also implicit in the message was the
Party’s willingness to admit for the first time that it had committed the fatal mistake
of turning violently on the very people for whom it claimed to be waging armed
struggle—an error that might well have cost them the victory they once seemed close
to achieving. As it turned out, Shining Path’s pledge to stop killing peasants (which it
never honoured) fell on a generally incredulous audience. As one displaced peasant
told me, “The terrucos deceived us once before into supporting them; they can’t fool
us a second time.” For the remainder of the decade, the village-based comités de
autodefensa continued to proliferate while guerrilla forces steadily diminished, and in
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so doing apparently sealed the fate of the so-called People’s War.
If we are to understand why peasant villagers in the department of Ayacucho
came to resist Shining Path—often by way of village-defence militias—then it is first
necessary to try and comprehend why Shining Path militants were apparently pre-
pared to butcher peasant men, women, and children for the sake of their glorious rev-
olution. It is in order to shed some light on this paradox that this chapter addresses
such issues as (a) Shining Path’s political objectives with regard to the peasantry, (b)
its doctrinal understanding of the motives, values, and revolutionary significance of
the peasantry, and (c) the relationship between the revolutionary movement and the
peasantry, and the conditions and factors that led to initial popular support for the
revolution. As such it does not attempt to cover in any detail the genesis, strategy,
actions and fortunes of Shining Path; that has already been extensively and much
more capably done by others.3
2.1 Ayacucho: Anachronism and social change
The Communist Party of Peru—Shining Path (PCP-SL) was born not in the rural coun-
tryside but in the departmental capital of Ayacucho, within the walls of the
Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH). And the revolution
that it was eventually to launch was conceived not by poor peasant villagers, but by
its leadership of urban, middle-class university academics.
Founded in 1677 as the second oldest university of the viceroyalty, the university
was closed down in 1855 due to the ensuing crisis in the aftermath of the War of the
Pacific.4 Its reopening as a national university in 1959 marked a watershed in the his-
tory of an Andean region whose features seemed the very inspiration for José Carlos
Mariátegui’s essays. Predominantly illiterate and monolingual Quechua-speaking, a
large proportion of the department’s rural population still lived an oppressed and
exploited existence under the weight of a slowly decaying “semifeudal” regime, dom-
inated by a class of clerics and large landowners on the wane. As Peruvian historian
Jaime Urrutia described Ayacucho department at that time:
The northern provinces [of Huanta, La Mar, and Huamanga] were
territories almost exclusively of haciendas, although this name includ-
ed everything from the largest latifundios of the ravine of San Miguel
or of the punas, to the small fundos of the valley adjacent the city of
Ayacucho. In this sea of haciendas navigated some of the largest com-
munities of the region, converted at [the birth of] the Republic into
district capitals and sources of manpower...and of conflict for the
large estates: Vinchos, Socos, Quinua, Huamanguilla. To the south,
from the highlands of Pampa Cangallo to Sarasara, there predominat-
ed the communities with altoandian resources and of [the] Quechua
zone, untroubled by the haciendas, even though some existed in all
areas (Urrutia et al. 1988:430).5
Apart from Huamanga’s thirty-three churches and several handsome stone mansions,
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Ayacucho’s “golden age”6 was, by the mid-twentieth century, just a distant, dusty
memory. Even so, at a time when man-made satellites were already circling the earth,
anachronistic and humiliating relations of servitude and exploitation endured in
Ayacucho and many other parts of Peru.7 For instance, up until the end of the 1960s
the tenant farmers and herders of the high-altitude hacienda Uchuraccay, besides hav-
ing to pay their rent in kind, were also obligated to perform numerous labour servic-
es (predios rústicos) for their patrón, regularly and without pay. These included farm-
ing the hacendado’s fields, or tending his herds a certain number of days a week, con-
struction work for the benefit of the hacendado’s estate, household services
(semanero) in the casa-hacienda, and so forth.8 The relationship between the mestizo
hacendado of Uchuraccay and his indios feudatarios was a paternalistic one, whereby
the social segregation and subjugation of the latter was justified by the racist convic-
tions of superiority of the other.
As in other parts of the developing world, education and literacy in the twentieth
century, along with labour migration, have offered peasants in this department (for
decades considered to be one of Peru’s very poorest and underdeveloped) an avenue
of escape from relations of dependency and domination, social discrimination, and
from “the harsh existence of subsistence agriculture and herding” (Isbell 1978:70). In
Ayacucho department those with the most education were also the ones who tended
to leave. Degregori argues that given the “total poverty” of the region, the educa-
tional effort seems part of the “solución hacia afuera”; a means of escape that leaves
behind the less educated in the department (1990:40). Small wonder, then, that the
reopening of the university was as much regarded by urban workers and more pros-
perous peasants as offering hope of upward mobility for their children without their
having to leave the department, as it was viewed in the first instance by Huamanga’s
dominant families as bringing to the city a reinvigorating breath of respectability and
prestige. Most peasants equated education with “progress” and “modernity”; and,
conversely, ignorance was associated with the vices that keep the peasant downtrod-
den—alcoholism, coca chewing, and tobacco smoking (Degregori 1990:13-14).
Educated individuals—particularly secondary and university students and educa-
tors—commanded a great deal of respect from the inhabitants of the campo (rural
countryside). In short time, the university proved to be the single most important
political and economic force spearheading “progress” and change in the region. As
Degregori observed, “in a region like Ayacucho...the modernising element was not an
economic agent (mining, industry, commercial agriculture), but fundamentally ideo-
logical: a university” (1990:17).
Within a few years of reopening its doors, the UNSCH became caught up in the
political radicalism that, at the time, was sweeping universities throughout the world,
particularly in the wake of the Cuban revolution, and the international craze being
generated by China’s Cultural Revolution of 1966-67. At the UNSCH, young men
and women of rural origin came in contact for the first time in their lives with excit-
ing, inspiring, radical, new ideas. Politically active students were drawn to the writ-
ings of Karl Marx, V.I. Lenin, and Mao Tse-Tung, as well as to those of home-grown
indigenista socialist thinkers like J.C. Mariátegui. For many of these young students,
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist analysis and doctrine provided them not only with a power-
fully convincing explanatory framework within which to articulate their own experi-
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ences and observations of social injustice, but also with a blueprint for achieving the
triumph of social justice even against overwhelming odds. In their personal lives, their
exposure to radical, new ideas and theories would eventually create a generation gap
of knowledge, thoughts, and aspirations between themselves and their peasant elders,
which would often create friction and occasionally produce conflict.
Few individuals epitomised the generation of young, educated Ayacuchanos who
dreamed of helping to bring about a just society better than the now-legendary female
guerrilla commander Edith Lagos Saez. Of Lagos’s years as a secondary school stu-
dent, shortly before she joined Shining Path, a former neighbour recalled:
Edith’s family lived in the flat below ours. She was like an older sister
to me, and I often chatted with her from the window of my bedroom.
She was always so polite, and very considerate. She sometimes argued
with her mother, who at times could be selfish and ungenerous. Once,
in the middle of a hot summer when there was a water shortage, many
families in our neighbourhood had no running water for many days
due to insufficient water pressure in the pipes. Being on the ground
floor, however, Edith’s house could still receive some water. In spite
of this, her mother told everyone in their household not to share their
water with the neighbours. Edith didn’t agree, and so one day after
her mother had gone out she invited all the neighbours to come over
with empty buckets, which she then filled with water from their tap.
When her mother came home and found out what Edith had done,
she became so angry. But Edith didn’t seem to care. She knew that
what she did was right.9
Years later, after she had been killed by policemen in Andahuaylas on 3 September
1982, thousands of mourners—some estimate as many as 30,000—packed the streets
of Huamanga to pay their last respects to one who had already become something of
a legend by her nineteenth birthday. It would certainly be grossly misleading to say
that most of those who took part in the procession that day were Shining Path sup-
porters. Rather, the vast majority of mourners had come simply to bury one of their
own, a Huamanguina who, in spite of how the control mechanisms of the Party had
eventually transformed her, continued in their hearts to symbolise their own collec-
tive desire for enduring social justice. Although her coffin was draped with a red flag
stamped with the hammer and sickle, it is revealing that her epitaph would not be a
Marxist slogan, but rather passages from one of her own hauntingly beautiful poems;
one that reveals that she had always expected her chosen path as a guerrilla to be a
lonely and tragic road, yet a journey that was to be of momentous and lasting impor-
tance to humankind though she herself may be forgotten at the end of day.
Yerba silvestre, aroma puro,
Te ruego acompañarme en mi camino.
Serás mi bálsamo y mi tragedia,
Serás mi aroma y mi gloria.
Serás mi amiga cuando crezcas sobre mi tumba.
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Allí, que la montaña me cobije,
Que el cielo me responda.
Y en piedra lápida toda quedará grabado.
For others, however, the lure of Marxism-Leninism lay in its promise to transform
such moral sensibilities into rational, systematic, scientific thought and action. But the
daunting jungle of Marxist dialectical materialism necessarily required a leader with
an enlightening, guiding hand; an intellectual caudillo, so to speak, to interpret the
bewildering ideology and jargon, and so lead those who seek it to the ultimate “sci-
entific truth.” For young, radicalising Ayacuchanos like Edith Lagos, such a guide
would come in the person of Abimael Guzmán Reynoso.
2.2 Formation and fragmentation of the Peruvian Maoists 
and the genesis of Shining Path
Raised in a middle-class family in the aristocratic highland city of Arequipa, Abimael
Guzmán came to Huamanga to take up a university appointment as professor of phi-
losophy in 1962. The reticent yet charismatic Guzmán always came across to those
around him as the quintessential Peruvian professor: a creole (white-skinned) with
thick-framed glasses who always dressed in a dark-coloured jacket and was rarely seen
without a book in his hand. “At a boarding house on Pukacruz Street, later known to
local pundits as El Kremlin, Guzmán delivered long talks on dialectical materialism
and scientific socialism, and earned the nickname of Dr. Shampú for his ability to
‘brainwash’ listeners” (Starn 1995:404). Brainwashed or not, Guzmán had the ability
to instil an intense sense of loyalty and dedication among his disciples.
One of the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet rift of 1961 was to split the Partido
Comunista del Perú (PCP) into a pro-Soviet and a pro-Chinese faction. The rupture
took place in January 1964. The latter assumed the name PCP-Bandera Roja (Red
Flag), and came away with a little more than half of the former PCP’s members.
Saturnino Paredes Macedo, legal advisor to the Confederación Campesina del Perú
(CCP), was elected as its secretary general. Guzmán, being an affirmed Maoist and
leader of PCP’s Regional Committee in Ayacucho since 1963, naturally sided with
Bandera Roja. “But the alliance was not whole-hearted, because almost from the
beginning Guzmán had created with his most resolute lieutenants [a group] denomi-
nated as “fracción roja,” which began to operate cohesively [and clandestinely] with-
in Bandera Roja” (Degregori 1990:18).10 The following year marked an important
juncture in the history of the Maoist movement in Peru, for it was at the V National
Conference that the PCP-Bandera Roja characterised Peruvian society as “semifeudal”
and “semicolonial.” Moreover, it was also then that the Peruvian Maoists rejected
Khrushchev’s “revisionist” line of peaceful transition to socialism through electoral
politics. The necessity of armed struggle through a rural-based “protracted people’s
war,” with the peasantry as the chief force of the revolution, was a fundamental prin-
ciple that was also reaffirmed at the Conference.11 Shortly after this, Guzmán left
Ayacucho, to visit China among other reasons, but not before successfully establish-
ing hegemony over the Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER) and the Federación
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Universitaria (FUSCH).
During Guzmán’s absence, fierce internal polemics continued to rage within
Bandera Roja as dissatisfaction with Paredes intensified. It was soon after his return
to Ayacucho in 1968 that a sector of the Communist youth within PCP-Bandera Roja
broke away and established a rival party—PCP-Patria Roja. Just before the split,
Guzmán had been asked by the youthful conspirators if he would lead them. He
turned them down, choosing instead to bide his time. And so the inevitable con-
frontation within Bandera Roja between Guzmán and Paredes loomed ever closer. It
was Paredes who fired the first shot by launching a national offensive aimed at “clos-
ing off ” the Party to Guzmán and fracción roja. In the internal “guerra sucia” that fol-
lowed, Guzmán faction was eventually defeated and finally expelled from Bandera
Roja in February 1970. Bandera Roja shattered soon after into a number of splinter
groups, thus leaving it a mere shell of its former self. Undaunted by the turn of events,
Guzmán proceeded to reconstitute, from within his stronghold of Ayacucho, “a new
Maoist alternative: Sendero Luminoso” (Degregori 1990:169).12
While Bandera Roja’s internal political struggle of will and words intensified over the
first half of 1969, a more lethal struggle convulsed the cities of Huamanga and
Huanta, which saw civilians and police clashing violently in the streets. At the root of
this social unrest was the decision by the Revolutionary Government of the Armed
Forces, headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75), to put an end to free
secondary school education in the country.13 In its place, the government promulgat-
ed Decreto Supremo 006-69/EP on 4 March 1969, which stipulated that each student
must pay a monthly fee of S/.100—a “sufficiently high figure, especially for the
fathers of families from the rural Andean zones” (Degregori 1990:51). Given the
poverty of the majority of Ayacucho’s population and the importance that education
had in their lives, it was hardly surprising that frustrated and angry secondary school
students at Huanta decided to stage collective walkouts and protest meetings at the
beginning of June, when the Ministry of Education in Lima showed utter indifference
to the formal complaints made by parents’ organisations.
As word of these actions quickly spread to other towns and cities—Huamanga,
Huancayo, Cuzco, Huancavelica, and Cangallo—popular support for the students
grew, and thousands of protesters began to pour into Huanta and Huamanga
(Degregori 1990:64-5). Likewise, police reinforcements also began to arrive. In an
attempt to break up the ensuing demonstrations, the police resorted to using teargas
and firearms. The intensification of police repression merely provoked more and
more violent brawls with enraged protesters in streets and plazas throughout the two
cities. Whereas it was clearly the secondary students who took the lead in protest
actions in Huanta, at Huamanga direction for the demonstrations came principally
from the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho (Defence Front of the People of
Ayacucho), a collection of popular organisations that had already become the depart-
ment’s most influential and important broad-based front, and would continue to be
so for years to come. In an attempt to quell the escalating demonstrations, the police
in Huamanga tried to decapitate the protest movement by rounding up nearly all of
the leaders of the Defensa del Pueblo in the early hours of the morning of 21 June,
including a number of known militant lecturers and students from the university.
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Among those arrested, and subsequently incarcerated for a few months in Lima, was
Abimael Guzmán. But the capture of these leaders did nothing to dampen the unrest.
The demonstrations intensified, with virtually the entire popular sector of the city
eventually taking part. The city was completely paralysed. “The protest [escalated]
until it took on the characteristics of a popular rebellion” (Degregori 1990:69).
The following morning, more than ten thousand peasants from the valley (includ-
ing a small number of puna highlanders marching in front) advanced en masse
towards the Plaza de Armas in Huanta. They were still angry from the recent news
that the police had secretly transported to Lima all the peasant federation leaders they
had arrested some nights earlier. As they entered the outskirts of the city, they were
greeted with a volley of teargas. The vast sea of bodies wavered for a moment. But it
managed to regroup and advance again, this time with the women marching at the
fore, linked arm in arm. A lone, unarmed elderly peasant woman walked ahead of the
crowd, obviously intending to parley with the police. “It [was] a moment of tension
and silence. With her arms raised in the air the peasant woman [advanced], but a
machinegun burst [knocked] her down” (Degregori 1990:71). The peasants
unleashed their fury on the policemen with a hail of stones from their slings.
Reinforced soon after by the arrival of a large number of local students, the peasants
clashed violently with the police in the streets. By mid-afternoon the policemen had
been were driven back as a group into the central plaza. Fighting every step of the
way, the peasants and students closed in, very likely with the intention of finishing the
policemen off. The situation for the policemen seemed grave, for they were rapidly
running out of ammunition. But just when it seemed they would be overwhelmed, the
sudden arrival of the Sinchis saved them.14 Rushing to the aid of their beleaguered
comrades, the relief column of around two-hundred Sinchis fired indiscriminately
into the crowd, causing numerous injuries and deaths. The peasants and students scat-
tered. They fled down the streets, closely pursued by policemen shooting madly after
them.
With vicious and brutal efficiency, the Sinchis quickly suppressed the demonstra-
tions, first in Huamanga and then in Huanta. Order was restored through terror, and
the streets were cleared of people. A curfew was imposed and anyone wandering on
to the streets risked being summarily shot. Over the following days, more arrests were
made of suspected instigators.
Stunned by the degree of popular resistance to D.S. 006, the military government
repealed it that very same month, but not before at least eighteen people (including
two children and the elderly peasant woman) had been killed by the police, and many
more wounded in the demonstrations.
The movement of ‘69 in defence of free education would pass into local legend,
and was by far the largest and most important social movement to occur in Ayacucho
between 1960 and 1980. For many of the secondary school students who would go
on to become the backbone of Shining Path a decade later, the ordeal served as their
baptism of fire: it was their first experience of mobilising a truly spontaneous mass
movement, and their first taste of what it is like to confront the “reactionary forces”
of the State. Moreover, they had united with and witnessed for themselves the for-
midable “revolutionary” violence and valour of an otherwise disorganised and
unarmed peasantry. In the minds of many of these students, their military defeat
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owing to the superior weaponry of the Sinchis confirmed what Mariategui had recog-
nised earlier, that “To triumph, the people need arms, a programme and a doctrine”
(Bandera Roja 1969:9 in Degregori 1990:238). The vicious repression unleashed by
the Sinchis was branded into the collective memory of the Ayacuchanos, instilling an
enduring, popular hatred for the police, on which the Shining Path would later capi-
talise during the years of people’s war.
It was not Guzmán’s Regional Committee, but rather the secondary students of
Huanta who were the protagonists of the struggle, a fact which partly explains why
the students in Huamanga were slow in taking up the fight (Degregori 1990:170-
171).15 Preoccupied with their own struggle within PCP-BR, Guzmán and fracción
roja had initially shown little concern for the tempest that was brewing in Huanta.
They were thus astonished by the independent initiative exhibited by the masses of
Huamanga in organising and mobilising themselves. As Degregori noted, fraccion roja
in particular, and Bandera Roja in general, would subsequently recognise that “per-
haps they were not sufficiently present in the struggle for free education” (Degregori
1990:179). But even though they were not at the forefront of the uprising, most of
the Regional Committee’s members were nevertheless participants, as a result of
which many were arrested and eventually imprisoned by the authorities on suspicion
of having instigated the riots in Huamanga. Even so, the subsequent enrolment of
many of these Huantinos at the UNSCH during the next decade, combined with
Shining Path’s rising hegemony within the Frente de Defensa, would eventually result
in the impression of Shining Path as “the depository of the experience of 1969”
(Degregori 1990:186).
Expelled from the PCP-Bandera Roja, and with many of his followers (himself includ-
ed) in the Frente de Defensa captured by the police on the eve of the uprising in
Huamanga, Guzmán was left with a battered power base reduced to only regional
importance. Moreover, that Paredes retained, at least for the time being, a dominat-
ing influence within the Confederación Campesina del Perú meant that any political
headway that Shining Path could make into the peasant movement at the national
level was limited. Shining Path’s response to these setbacks was to retreat to its strong-
hold of the UNSCH. It attempted to turn the university into an “anti-fascist little
Yenan” against the military government, leaving it up to the rest of the Peruvian left
to “go to the masses” (Degregori 1990:185). Till now, the quality and degree of
organising work done by Guzmán and his followers among the peasantry had been
fairly limited (Degregori 1990; Coronel 1996:42-43; cf. Strong 1992:34-35). In prac-
tice, their activities tended to be concentrated mainly in Huamanga, at the university,
rather than in the countryside. However, in 1969, the Regional Committee dis-
patched Osmán Morote, one of Guzmán’s most important and trusted lieutenants,
and a small group of militants to investigate conditions of servility and exploitation
among Huanta’s high-altitude communities. On the basis of this research, Morote
went on to write his undergraduate thesis in anthropology (Coronel 1996:42). His
arrest in 1970 on charges of attempting to sabotage the Agrarian Reform would lead
to yet another arrest of Guzman, and the both of them would spend a number of
months jailed up in Lima. According to anthropologist José Coronel, a native of
Huanta, this latest setback paralysed the work being carried out by Guzmán’s follow-
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ers in the province until about 1975. In the meantime, they maintained only very lit-
tle contact with the peasantry (Coronel 1996:42).
With the bitter experience of the internal power struggle in Bandera Roja still
fresh in their minds, Shining Path’s leadership embarked on the task of achieving con-
formity in the Party’s political thought by purging its ranks of “revisionists.” This
process would take up most of the first half of the 1970s, resulting in little political
work being done in the countryside. In so far as it was imperative that the Party be
prepared for its historic mission—its “destiny,” as they saw it—as the organised pro-
letarian vanguard of the imminent revolutionary war, priority was placed on preserv-
ing and protecting the integrity of the Party, its leadership, and the orthodox politi-
cal line (Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung Thought). A “profound study” of the intel-
lectual works of José Carlos Mariátegui—the socialist, indigenista thinker of the early
twentieth century and founder of the Socialist Party of Peru in 1928—would provide
the point from which to begin the reconstitution of the PCP. It was in order to glean
the wisdom and guidance of this venerated “proletarian intellectual” and, more
importantly, “to continue advancing theoretically what he masterfully began,”16 that
Guzmán and his cadres formed the Centro de Trabajo Intelectual Mariátegui in the
early 1970s. In addition, Guzmán and his cadres took advantage of their control or
influence over the administrative and pedagogical apparatus of the UNSCH between
1969 and 1973 by utilising the university as their primary means of recruiting and
indoctrinating the Party’s core support base of university students. For instance, as the
university’s Director of Personnel during this period Guzmán was able to install his
followers in key positions within the institution. Antonio Díaz Martínez, renowned
author of Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza (1969) and a senior Shining Path leader,
held the office of Director of Student Welfare, which put him in contact with the
poorest provincial students at the university. Moreover, the hegemony of Shining
Path’s personnel at the UNSCH was such that they were able to influence the very
curriculum of compulsory introductory courses (ciclo básico) that were to be taught
to all first-year students. In this manner, impressionable freshers with limited life
experiences received an academic diet of Shining Path’s political vision, passed off as
scientific and therefore the only “correct” interpretation of Peruvian reality. “Soon
the course on Historical Materialism replaced the Introduction to the Social Sciences,
Dialectics of Nature the Biological Sciences, Dialectical Materialism monopolised the
classes in Philosophy including those of Physics (matter and movement). Rapidly, sim-
ilar courses presented themselves in the different study programmes, especially in
Social Sciences and Education” (Degregori 1990:186). In addition, Shining Path’s
control of the teacher training programme throughout the 1970s provided a crucial
means (via posted teachers) of disseminating its doctrine and recruiting secondary
school students in Huamanga and Huanta, and in various other rural districts and
provincial capitals in the provinces of Cangallo, Víctor Fajardo, and Vilcashuamán. In
these areas, Party-affiliated teachers came to acted as its eyes and ears, gathering
information and looking out for the Party’s local interests.
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2.3 The Peruvian peasantry as interpreted by 
Mariátegui and Guzmán
What, then, was Shining Path’s understanding of the political economy of peasant
society, and its revolutionary significance? Why did it regard the Peruvian peasantry
as the “principal force of the national-democratic revolution,” the “principal contin-
gent” of the People’s War?17 And what were to be the relations of power and author-
ity between the peasantry and the Party? Answers to these questions lie in Shining
Path’s understanding of what the fundamental characteristics of Peruvian society
were, and of the peasantry’s condition in particular. In this regard, Guzmán drew his
conclusions principally from José Carlos Mariátegui’s analysis and interpretation of
“Peruvian reality.”
Fragmented and dogmatically divided though it was by the end of the 1960s,
there is little doubt that the Peruvian Marxist Left as a whole continued generally to
endorse Mariátegui’s position: (1) that “[it] is impossible to understand Peruvian real-
ity without searching for and discovering the economic factor,” and (2) that “the fun-
damental problem of Peru, that of the Indian and the land, is most of all a problem
of the Peruvian economy” (1925:59). Or stated more specifically,
Any treatment of the problem of the Indian—written or verbal—that
fails or refuses to recognize it as a socio-economic problem is but a
sterile, theoretical exercise destined to be completely
discredited....The socialist critic exposes and defines the problem
because he looks for its causes in the country’s economy and not in its
administrative, legal, or ecclesiastic machinery, its racial dualism or
pluralism, or its cultural or moral conditions. The problem of the
Indian is rooted in the land tenure system of our economy. Any
attempt to solve it with administrative or police measures, through
education or by a road building program, is superficial and secondary
as long as the feudalism of the gamonales continues to exist
(Mariátegui 1971:22).18
Mariátegui perceived the condition of Peruvian society to be fundamentally
“semifeudal” and “semicolonial” in so far as its economic forces were dominated and
dictated to by imperialist foreign powers (like the United States and Great Britain),
and its national politics and its majority indigenous population were controlled, sub-
jugated, and exploited by the country’s seigneurial class. He described the land tenure
system of his time as “feudal,” characterised by the existence of the latifundio and by
the servitude of the indigenous population to the gamonal. The gamonales were the
hacendados, the owners of large landed estates (haciendas or latifundios) and ranch-
es (estancias) in the sierra. Ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, pow-
erful gamonal families had been carving up the administrative and economic territo-
ry of the highlands for themselves, and in the process controlling access both to
indigenous labour and to public offices at local and provincial levels (Poole 1994b:5;
Rénique 1994:230). They not only “exerted their influence, power, and authority
mostly by the traditional means of paternalism and clientelism [sic]” (Klarén
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2000:324). In the sierra, gamonales also utilised brutal violence to inscribe and rein-
force relations of social and racial domination between themselves and the indigenous
peasantry. In so doing, they produced a cultural system of violent exploitation known
as gamonalismo.19 For much of the twentieth century, the geographical remoteness of
Andean regions in relation to Lima placed much of the sierra out of reach of the cen-
tral government’s effective control and intervention, which permitted gamonales to
assume regional dominance. Gamonales not only exercised power directly on their
estates; they also exerted influence and hegemony over the functions of the bureau-
cratic, legislative, judicial, and executive organs of the state. Thus, says Mariátegui,
gamonales exploit and cause harm both to the indigenous population and to the
nation as a whole. Gamonal feudalism, he argued, is an anachronistic, economically
non-productive, and parasitic condition which hampers the full use of existing pro-
ductive forces, thereby impeding the possibilities and processes of economic (partic-
ularly capitalist) and political development in the country.
Mariátegui maintained that the special character of the agrarian problem in Peru
was manifest in “the survival of the Indian ‘community’ and [in] elements of practi-
cal socialism in indigenous agriculture and life” (1971:33). Mariátegui was convinced
that the Incan ayllu, whose modern manifestation he considered to be the Indian
community, could “gradually convert itself into the basic unit of a modern socialist
state” (1927b:86). The building of a new nation and social order on these “Indian
foundations” would, in his view, serve once and for all to incorporate and assimilate
the “Indian” into Peruvian society, thereby resolving the indigenous problem. He con-
cluded that the “problem of the Indian” and the “problem of land” are fundamental-
ly one and the same: indigenous emancipation in Peru could be achieved only with
the total liquidation of feudalism and of gamonalismo; and this can only be done by
abolishing the gamonal’s source of power—the latifundio.
Recognising the weakness of the Peruvian bourgeoisie and its close ties with the
latifundistas, however, Mariátegui argued that they could not be relied upon to elim-
inate feudal relations in the countryside, and thereby resolve the agrarian question in
the interest of the indigenous peasants. That task, he said, must fall to the revolu-
tionary indigenous masses themselves, under the guidance of the socialist workers’
vanguard: the Socialist Party (Mariátegui 1929:107-108). Before he could see his rev-
olutionary ideas and aspirations put into practice, however, his life was tragically cut
short by illness just one and a half years later, after which the Socialist Party soon
submitted to the hegemony of the Stalinist-led Comintern and changed its name to
the Communist Party. Yet despite the transitory existence of Mariátegui’s Socialist
Party, it is nevertheless to his lasting credit as the distinguished founder of Peruvian
Marxism that every organisation that has subsequently taken the name “Partido
Comunista del Perú” (including Shining Path) considers itself the direct descendant of
the party which he founded.
Why were Mariátegui’s works so appealing to Guzmán? For one thing, because
his approach to interpreting Peruvian society, his theoretical and analytical orienta-
tion, so easily accommodates Mao Tse-tung Thought, which in turn merely strength-
ened its relevance to Guzmán’s own doctrinal interpretations of Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism. Mariátegui wrote first and foremost as a revolutionist whose primary pur-
pose was to identify and denounce the perceived evils of his day in Marxist language.
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Mariátegui’s interest in the indigenous community focused mainly on the extent to
which it represented for him the “communistic” productive unit upon which a future
socialist Peruvian state could be founded.20 He firmly held the romantic idea that the
“practical socialism” of indigenous agricultural life formed the essence of the “Indian”
(Mariátegui 1971:34-35). His analytical treatment of the indigenous community
reduces indigenous society to its barest economic essentials, and (inadvertently) prac-
tically consigns the rural masses to a life of farming. This is clearly illustrated in the
agrarian policy he envisaged, whereby in his opinion “[State] action...should be
directed toward the transformation of the agricultural communities into production
and consumption cooperatives....The state should organize agricultural education for
its maximum diffusion among the rural masses through rural primary school and
practical agricultural schools, etc. The education of the children of the countryside
should have a clearly agricultural character” (1927b:86-87. My emphasis). That
future generations of the rural populace might develop ambitions, motives, goals, and
interests that depart from the agricultural activities of their parents and grandparents
appears not even to have been considered in his writings.
Peasant communities are not slaves to social structures and cultural traditions—
certainly not to presumed primeval sentiments—but instead are made up of individ-
uals who have goals and interests of their own. In spite of external pressures, peas-
ants are nevertheless able to exercise initiative and a degree of agency. But even
though Mariátegui recognised that peasant communities do adapt to transformations
in their larger social environment, it is astonishing that he did not consider such
processes as seasonal labour migration, market penetration in the Andes, and the
numerous emerging avenues for social mobility (e.g. increased education and diversi-
fication towards commercial activities)—all of which were already evident in his own
lifetime—were not only transforming peasant communities and changing the aspira-
tions and social identities of its members, but also providing alternative, less radical
avenues for escaping extreme poverty and feudal domination. Nothing could quench
his conviction that only a radical socialist revolution can achieve indigenous emanci-
pation.
Although many of Mariátegui’s observations about of the country’s semifeudal
and semicolonial conditions, and about the feudal exploitation of the indigenous
peasantry by the gamonales remained accurate and valid for many parts of Peru even
well into the 1960s, when it came to Andean peasant culture and society he seemed
to focus mainly on aspects which enabled him to develop a particular line of argu-
mentative interpretation that was invariably directed towards class struggle, the main
emphasis of his thought. For instance, he maintained that the Peruvian peasantry com-
prised an economic class (the “agricultural proletariat,” he called them), yet he did
not consider how local antagonisms, competition and internal stratification, based on
economic and social differences between different categories of Andean peasants,
might have diminished or stifled the existence or the emergence of a “peasant” class
consciousness. Instead, he chose to emphasise the exploitation and subjugation of dis-
parate populations by gamonales—as though commonly shared domination were a
sufficient criteria to create a collective consciousness of kind, a class consciousness.
Mariátegui was also silent about the importance of other identities—ethnic and
paisanaje,21 for instance—which cross-cut class differences, and as such work against
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the emergence of a broad peasant class consciousness. Even today, the majority of
Andean peasants define themselves certainly not as “Indians,” nor even primarily as
members of the peasantry, but rather according to their own local community identi-
ty, which is displayed with cultural markers (such as distinctive clothing styles, differ-
ent dialects), and is sometimes socially reinforced through endogamous marriage.
In addition, Mariátegui also romantically depicted the comunero (villager) as
endowed with “an established habit of cooperation” as far as common labour is con-
cerned (1929:106-107). In fact, however, there is no evidence that collective labour
in Andean communities has ever been automatically inspired or actualised by an
inherent, harmonious spirit of “natural communism.” Rather, one’s ability to obtain
labour rests on the capacity to utilise reciprocity networks based on and determined
by the strength and extent of one’s kinship relations (Isbell 1978; Mitchell 1991;
Stern 1982; Nuñez 1995). And while he waxed eloquent with admiration for a com-
munist spirit which he imagined existed in peasant communities, Mariátegui offered
no recognition or meaningful analysis of the normative principle of popular democ-
racy that regulates Andean polities—something that in fact is often of greater social
importance for Andean peasant communities than the degree of economic collec-
tivism. Economic conditions and relations of production may have changed dramati-
cally since the turn of the century. But today as in Mariátegui’s time, local authorities
are still elected at a general assembly by all adult members of the community. (There
was a break in this practice during military rule in the 1970s, when all bureaucratic
positions were appointed.) Village leaders derive their legitimacy and authority large-
ly on the support and consensus received from other village members, and on the
extent to which they are able to fulfil their obligations and duties towards the com-
munity. Even today, communal property is still administered and watched over by
elected authorities organised into a Comité de Administración and a Comité de
Vigilancia, and matters of general community interest are ordinarily discussed and
decided at community assemblies by a general democratic vote (see Isbell 1978;
Mitchell 1991; Nuñez 1995).22 One might say, in short, that rather than economic
collectivism, it is democratic participation and decision making that are the major
normative principles regulating Andean peasant polities. Even bureaucratic govern-
mental officials—the representatives of the State at the local level—cannot wield
power despotically, for their actions and the extent of their authority are, in princi-
ple, defined and limited by Peruvian law, and indigenous standards of justice and legit-
imacy.23 Indeed, the ethnographic and historical records clearly show that Andean
communities attempt to preserve a measure of sociopolitical autonomy and self-
determination by constantly trying to resist outsider interference in local affairs (Isbell
1978; Mitchell 1978; also Stern 1982). Democratic representation and participation,
and the defence of autonomy and self-determination, are important sociocultural
vales for Andean communities that were also lost on Shining Path. This, as we shall
see, was to have grave consequence on Shining Path’s relations with Ayacuchan peas-
ant communities, particularly when it attempted to impose its new totalitarian order
in the countryside.
In the fifty years since Mariátegui’s death, the characteristics of Peruvian society
has been transformed dramatically, and the wealth of ethnographic data collected
since then has increased the general scholastic understanding of the dynamics of
45
Shining Path and the Peasantry
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 45
Andean peasant society. That many of Mariátegui’s conclusions regarding peasant val-
ues has since been shown to be problematic by more contemporary ethnographic data
has had no effect on Shining Path’s own doctrinal understanding of peasant society.
In fact, Guzmán has dismissed this scientific evidence altogether as “false,” as “lies”
trafficked by “bourgeois supplanters (“superadores”).”
What do these individuals do? They have the habit of accumulating
data: that typical intellectual richness of the bourgeoisie....They
believe that the more data one has, the better interpreter one is,
...which of course it is absurd....[But the problem]...is not a matter of
accumulating data...the problem lies on the interpretation, and
Mariátegui called it “Seven Essays of Interpretation,” not seven essays
of data accumulation. And the problem of interpretation is a problem
of class position, of proletarian ideology and of dialectical materialist
method....The problem with these individuals is that they lack unity
of thought....They may have a great intelligence, great wit, but they
lack a base. It is a like building a house that has a roof but lack of a
foundation. They lack class position and that is why they cannot go
further.24
For Guzmán, then, Mariátegui’s observations remained valid sources of inspiration
and instruction, and continued to offer guidelines for the true interpretation of
“Peruvian reality.” It is almost certainly for this reason that Shining Path so blatantly
disregarded decades of “empirical social change,” and instead maintained that the
fundamental Mariateguista interpretation of Peruvian society as “semifeudal” and
“semicolonial” remains valid and historically consistent.
Following the doctrinal path of Mao and the interpretations of Mariateguista,
Shining Path arrived at a strategic appreciation of the peasantry as the principal force
of people’s war by virtue of, firstly, their being the numerically largest class in the
country, and secondly, of the fact that it was their class interests that were most direct-
ly and acutely at odds with those of the gamonal landlord class. “The peasantry is the
basis of the people’s war,” declares an official publication of the Party. “This is a peas-
ant war or it is nothing.”25 Furthermore, in so far as peasant communities are under-
stood, according to Mariátegui, to be intrinsically communistic units of production,
the Party would come to view them as natural support bases for guerrilla forces.
Even so, in Shining Path’s scheme of things it would not be peasant leaders but
rather the proletariat—or more precisely the proletarian vanguard, which is the
Communist Party—that would politicise, control, direct, and lead the irresistible rev-
olutionary force of the peasantry. “The peasantry [is] the main force in our society
while the proletariat [is] the leading class, and...the road we must follow [is] from the
countryside to the city,” Guzmán once declared.26 Shining Path’s claim to the leader-
ship of the revolution was based, of course, on its conviction (typical of all Marxist-
Leninist parties) that only the Party has a clear understanding of the “line of march,”
both political and military. Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, its members were
convinced that only they who were capable of determining and defining what the true
interests of “the people” are, of laying down what is true or false, valid or invalid in
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every field of knowledge. All other conflicting opinions were to be disregarded on the
basis of a failure to understand, as Guzmán himself ordained when he stated: “Society
is governed by laws, but those who do not follow Marxism cannot understand those
laws.”27 As Starn points out, “[in] this hierarchical...view of party supremacy, the poor
majorities figured as the malleable objects of revolutionary truth....” (1995:408). As
would become evident in subsequent years, Shining Path, just like any other Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary party, never intended to conduct a revolution based on the
democratic participation (both in action and in thought) of the peasant masses. There
would be orders instead of discussion; unquestioning obedience in place of reflective
criticism; and brutal force would increasingly be relied upon, rather than persuasion,
to keep the masses in line. Of course, Shining Path’s “vanguardist” orientation was by
no means unique as far as communist parties go (see Geschwender 1983). But it is this
persistent tendency found in all communist parties to exhibit patronising, authoritar-
ian, totalitarian behaviour that has often led them to misread or to stubbornly disre-
gard the people’s actual historical necessities, and in so doing to alienate themselves
from the masses.28
Shining Path’s official references to the peasantry have been almost exclusively
rhetorical. When commenting about the peasantry, Shining Path’s exclusive concern
is to expound on its oppressed condition, its conflicts with the landlord class and
bureaucratic capitalism, and about the peasantry’s historical importance as a revolu-
tionary force. It makes no mention, for instance, of the peasantry’s various adaptive
livelihood strategies, of the importance of migrant labour as a supplement source of
livelihood to their primary activity of subsistence agriculture. Nor do Shining Path
documents mention a place for Andean culture within the vaguely defined “New
Democracy” that the guerrilla group aims to create through armed revolution.
Among the Party’s stated goals, the revindication of Andean culture or of indigenous
ethnic nationality are certainly not among them (cf. Strong 1992). The word ayllu is
absent in all major PCP-SL documents, and it is obvious from reading these that it is
not the indigenous community, but rather the Party’s own “generated organism” that
are intended to constitute the foundations of the future Senderista state.29 Andean
peasant economy was assumed to be fully capable of self-sufficiency, yet whose prob-
lem was that it was being held back by the exploitative demands of the landlord and
bureaucratic-capitalist class. The Party viewed the Andean peasantry’s intensive inter-
action with the external market as characterised by subservient dependency, and
regarded peasant culture as encumbered by cultural practices and traditions that are
merely rooted in economic foundations and relations of domination.30 Shining Path’s
moral code condemned coca and alcohol use, and denounced the ritualistic observa-
tion of religious cargos as a “wasteful” anachronistic practice that serves only the
interests of the hacendados, the “parasitic” traders and shopkeepers, and the Church.
The Party therefore aimed not only to demolish bourgeois and feudal culture. It also
set itself the task of separating peasants from what it regarded were the superstitious
and conservative aspects of their culture—a culture which the Party deemed as doing
nothing more than to serve a feudal class that has dominated and to a great extent has
shaped peasant thought, culture, and world view. Thus Guzmán himself declared the
need to “transform the feudal-fatalist mentality” of the peasantry by replacing it with
a “philosophy of struggle,”31 a process which, when necessary, involves “pounding the
47
Shining Path and the Peasantry
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 47
ideas [of People’s War] into the minds of [the peasant masses] with compelling deeds”
(PCP-SL 1988:IV in Degregori 1989a:24). This almost certainly explains why Shining
Path has shown such indifference to and outright contempt for “traditional” Andean
culture.
In order to sweep the old order completely away, the peasantry must be har-
nessed, says Shining Path, as the principal force of an armed revolution waged under
the leadership of the proletarian vanguard. In 1970, however, the onset of Shining
Path’s “People’s War” was still a decade away. In the meantime, one of the paradoxi-
cal ironies of Peruvian history was about to take place. For while the plethora of rad-
ical Marxist organisations merely talked of revolution, the dismantling of the large
estates and the nationalisation of industry was already being carried out by the very
institution Marxists regard as the pillar and “reactionary arm” of the bourgeois
state—the armed forces.
2.4 The revolutionary government of the armed forces and 
its land reform
In the early hours of the morning of 3 October 1968, the Gobierno Revolucionario
de las Fuerzas Armadas (GRFFAA) calmly seized power through a bloodless coup.
Fernando Belaúnde Terry, the deposed civilian president, was irreverently ushered out
of the Presidential Palace, still in his pyjamas. Within a few hours he had been placed
on a flight and exiled to Buenos Aires. Thus began twelve years of military rule, the
first half of which would be a turbulent period of “revolution by decree” (Kruijt
1994).
The reasons behind the coup were twofold. Firstly, to prevent the likely elec-
toral victory of an increasingly conservative APRA party, whose political machinations
in Congress and its “convivencia” (coexistence) with the old oligarchy were obstruct-
ing the structural reforms deemed by progressive military officers as necessary in
order to check the dangerous political advance of the radical Left. Secondly, to over-
throw a discredited civilian government tainted by mounting corruption and scandal,
and clearly failing in its efforts to bring off the promised reforms needed for achiev-
ing national development (Kruijt 1994.:25-26; Klarén 2000:323-338). The coup
reflected a growing progressiveness within the younger faction of the officer corps
which, ever since the early 1960s, placed ever-greater importance on the concept of
promoting internal security through national development, especially in the light of
the failed guerrilla insurgencies of 1965.32 In view of the apparent ineptitude of the
civilian government to make progress in implementing urgent reforms, this officer
corps grew “increasingly confident that they had the will, the civic responsibility, and
the expertise to carry out the transformation of the country” (Klarén 2000:337:
Kruijt 1994:26). Within a small circle of progressive army officer conspirators under
the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, an ambitious programme of pro-
gressive social and economic reform was drawn up shortly before they launched their
coup. Its name was Plan Inca. “The reforms, conceptualized as a coherent anti-pover-
ty strategy, were to prevent another guerrilla uprising in the future” (Kruijt
1996:243).33 Plan Inca proposed major structural reforms in the areas of government,
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taxation, industry, and banking; but forming its centrepiece was a sweeping land
reform.
Table 2.1: Distribution of landholdings in south-central sierra and the rest of the
country (1961)
Prior to the military government’s agrarian reform, most of the country’s land
was owned by a very small elite, just as Mariátegui had described it (see Table 2.1).
Various reformist schemes had already made motions towards a more equitable redis-
tribution of land from as early as the 1920s. But landed interests, represented by an
oligarchy that continued to dominate Congress far into the 1960s, consistently hin-
dered the advancement of comprehensive agrarian reform in the country—so much
so that it did not even become a matter for serious governmental consideration and
debate until the late 1950s (Lowenthal ed. 1975:27). The rare and scattered instances
in which land reform actually took place, like the modest one attempted by the mili-
tary junta of General Ricardo Pérez Godoy in 1962-63, and the hacienda expropria-
tions decreed by Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1964, were disappointing in their scope.
For the most part, they “were limited to the geographical area actually suffering acute
unrest” (Lowenthal ed. 1975:28). Certainly, no prior attempt at agrarian reform was
as vigorous in scope and intensity as the one implemented by the military junta
between 1969 and 1975, under Decreto Legislativo No.17716. On 24 June 1969,
General Velasco pronounced the agrarian reform legislation in a televised speech that
was meant to raise the hopes and dreams of poor and landless peasants, while simul-
taneously sounding the knell for landlord power in Peru:
Today, for the Day of the Indian, the Day of the Peasant, the
Revolutionary Government honors them with the best of tributes by
giving to the nation a law that will end forever the unjust social order
that impoverished and oppressed the millions of landless peasants
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South-Central Sierra* Rest of Peru
Hectares Productive Hectares Productive Hectares
units % % units % %
0-4 87.5 7.8 79.3 5.8
5-9 6.6 2.7 11.4 3.3
10-19 2.5 1.0 4.6 2.9
20-99 1.9 4.6 3.5 6.2
100-499 0.5 8.5 0.7 7.2
500+ 0.4 60.7 0.2 65.4
communities 0.03 13.1 0.03 8.8
99.43 99.4 99.73 99.6
Source: after Cotler 1994:24
* The South-central sierra region referred to here consists of the departments of Ancash, Apurímac,
Ayacucho, Cuzco, Huancavelica, and Puno.
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who have always been forced to work the land of others....Today, Peru
has a government dedicated to conquering the country’s development
with the definitive cancellation of old social and economic structures
that no longer have any validity in our times.....Peasant: the Master
will no longer feed off your poverty! (quoted in Starn et al. 1995:265-
6, 269)
In addition, Velasco also decreed that the class-based term “campesino” (peasant) was
henceforth to be used in place of the explicitly derogatory and racist label “indio”
(Indian). Quechua was proclaimed as the second national language.34 Peasant com-
munities saw in D.L. 17716 a welcome opportunity to recover lands illegally seized
in the past by encroaching latifundios (e.g. Rénique 1994). On the other hand, for-
mer workers and “serfs” (colonos or feudatarios) of sizeable estates looked forward to
acquiring for themselves the plots of land which they previously had been renting or
holding in usufruct. Furthermore, the reformist political and legal atmosphere that
existed in the first half of the 1970s offered hope to peasants that they might finally
receive a favourable ruling from courts that in the past had almost always adjudicat-
ed land disputes in favour of the landowner.
Obviously, the agrarian reform failed in its aim to prevent another insurgency.
Still, one cannot deny that it drove the last nail into the coffin of a feudalistic lati-
fundio regime that had, in any case, been rapidly declining in most parts of Peru ever
since the beginning of the 1950s.35 Yet even so, the project and the bureaucratic infra-
structure that it gave rise to also exacerbated or created conflicts and contradictions
that would later fan the flames of a revolutionary war (Kay 2001:748-749; Kay
1982). In terms of land distribution, the military’s agrarian reform appears to have
dashed many more expectations than it satisfied. According to Klarén, “[a]t the end
of the reform period, only a quarter of the rural population had gained access to the
land, which still...ranked Peru, along with India, as having the worst man-land ration
in the world (only 0.18 hectares of crop land per person). Moreover, the reform did
little to alter the poverty of peasants in the poorest parts of the country, such as in
Ayacucho, where the Shining Path insurgency would emerge a decade later”
(2000:348). But undoubtedly the greatest shortcoming of the agrarian reform in
Ayacucho was that it simply was of little socioeconomic and political relevance to the
vast majority of peasant households in the department (see Table 2.4). The reason for
this was that the fragmentation, sale, or abandonment of hacienda lands as a conse-
quence of the failure of Ayacucho’s hacendados to modernise had been gradually tak-
ing place since as far back as the beginning of the twentieth century (Degregori
1990:103-104). From about 1940 onwards it was already possible for feudatarios and
comuneros in many parts of the department to purchase land from haciendas without
having to resort to land invasions, the general practice being to purchase large parcels
of land jointly and afterwards to receive usufruct rights individually (ibid. 1990:104,
fn.31).36
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Table 2.2: Total arable land Department of Ayacucho (1981, 1996)
The brief appearance of the guerrilla group Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in
La Mar in 1965, and their subsequent execution of the gamonal Carrillo brothers,
merely quickened the pace at which the hacendados were abandoning their estates
(Degregori 1990:104). Even in the hacienda-dominated punas of Huanta and La Mar,
the most important peasant mobilisations in the 1960s took place not in demand for
land—which they eventually obtained through Velasco’s agrarian reform anyway—
but rather in protest of relations of servitude and various other forms of exploitation
practised by the hacendados (Coronel 1996:35). In the end, it was primarily in the
hacienda-dominated punas of La Mar and Huanta provinces that the agrarian reform
would have any significant impact on the lives of the local inhabitants (ibid.:38;
McClintock 1989; Kay 1982).
Thus the struggle for land never became a central political issue of peasant mobil-
isation in Ayacucho during the 1960s and 1970s, as it did in other Peruvian depart-
ments, like Cuzco. By far the largest and most important social movement to take
place in Ayacucho during the period between 1960 and 1980 was not the struggle for
land, but rather the defence of free education, described above.
Table 2.3: Total number of rural families. Department of Ayacucho (1972, 1981)
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Total surface area of department of Ayacucho 4,418,104 ha.
Total area of land under cultivation 211,000 ha. (1981)
212,122 ha. (1996) 
Irrigated 75,000 ha. (1981)
67,746 ha. (1996) 
Un-irrigated 136,000 ha. (1981)
144,376 ha. (1996) 
Source: INE 1983b:x; Huamaní Oré 1996:15-16 
1972 1981
Families* Individuals Families* Individuals
74,507 306,904 74,544 319,704 
Source: INEI 1983b:xxix ; Huamaní Oré 1996:25
* These are rough approximations, calculated from census data on the rural population and the number
of homes (hogares) for 1972, 1981.
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Table 2.4: Impact of Agrarian Reform. Department of Ayacucho (1976) and Peru (1979)
Juridical status of land Area affected Number of families benefited
A AWARDED 96,723.13 ha. 8,427 
B UNDER CONSIDERATION 228,333.80 ha. 4,809 
C PENDING ADJUDICATION 235,223.13 ha. 14,927 
D EXEMPT FROM ADJUDICATION 28,165.13 ha.
AYACUCHO TOTAL (A+B+C) 560,280.06 ha. 28,163 
PERU, 1979 8,599,253.00 ha. 399,576
Total expropriated 27% of Peru’s
rural families benefited
Source: after Degregori 1986:219; McClintock 1984:65
For the hundreds of peasants who, just days before, had risked their lives for the
sake of their children’s future by clashing with policemen in Huanta, the
Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces must indeed have seemed capricious
that it would promulgate the Agrarian Reform law on the very same day that it
repealed the hated D.S. 006. The introduction of the land reform law at the same
time as the people of Ayacucho were still mourning for those who had fallen in the
defence of free education did nothing to ingratiate a population which had only
recently been brutally repressed by the coercive forces of the government. In the light
of these events, it would be accurate to say that the overwhelming mood of most
Ayacuchanos (particularly its popular classes) towards the State was one of deep mis-
trust and suspicion.
In spite of the military government’s best intentions and modest achievements, it
had become apparent by the middle of the decade that the reform structures and eco-
nomic policies it had put in place were frequently at odds with the priorities of the
peasants communities and peasant groups (Kay 1982, 2001). The government’s deci-
sion to create state-controlled agricultural and livestock cooperatives (empresas aso-
ciativas), “rather than to restore the land in the form of individual or communal hold-
ings” (Rénique 1994:225), caused widespread disillusionment and resentment among
peasants towards the official land reform and its administrators (see Deere 1990:234-
261, Nuñez 1995:35-36, Berg 1992:87-90). As Rénique observed, “[by] taking the
‘associative’ option, the government sought to preserve the administration and assets
of the expropriated estates while at the same time defusing and controlling peasant
demands for land. What actually happened, however, was that old tensions [i.e., peas-
ant-hacendado tensions] were transferred to the new units, where an administration
concerned with maximizing profits clashed with peasant communities that wished to
use the pastureland for their own production” (1994:227). In many instances, the
peasant response to the state-organised cooperatives imposed on their communities
and lifestyle was simply one of non-cooperation. In 1977, for example, of the 127
families that comprised the Cooperativa Agraria de Producción (CAP) “Gervasio
Santillana” in the province of Huanta just ten worked regularly, and twenty-three
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only occasionally (Coronel 1978).37
Over time, rampant corruption and the exploitation of managerial positions with-
in the agrarian reform organisations merely fuelled the resentment and growing dis-
trust felt by the rural population towards self-serving state officials, particularly the
cooperative administrators. Land conflicts would eventually also arise between agrar-
ian cooperatives and adjacent peasants communities, with the latter coming to resent
the cooperatives for functioning as a new form of hacienda. By the beginning of the
1980s, for instance, many peasant communities in the department of Huancavelica
were already convinced that the reform had not been of benefit to them.
Consequently, peasant communities in areas like Huancavelica continued to struggle
for the consolidation and protection of their communal lands from cooperative
appropriation (Toro Quinto 1982).
Rural tensions in the south-central highlands were further exacerbated when the
commercial vacuum caused by the demise of the haciendas came increasingly to be
filled by petty entrepreneurs, and by a small number of middle-class and rich peasants
who had made money working on the coast or in the jungle. The emergence of a small
class of richer peasants led increasingly to polarised differences in wealth in many vil-
lages. This, in turn, inflamed social tensions, particularly when prosperous peasants
would attempt to disregard reciprocity relations with their neighbours or relatives, or
to cease partaking in rituals that had traditionally served to redistribute surpluses in
the village, like the civic-religious cargo system called varas (Mitchell 1991; Isbell
1978).38 In many instance, richer peasants also changed their religion from Roman
Catholicism to Evangelical Protestantism for the primary reason that the latter better
suited their new economic interests and activities by freeing them from the burden of
sponsoring costly Catholic-inspired festivals. Economic rationalisation by richer peas-
ants, however, was often interpreted by poorer neighbours as expressions of greed
and selfishness. That richer peasants commonly ceased to participate in traditional
social relations, yet continued to retain and, indeed, use their new wealth to accu-
mulate additional land in their villages, merely exacerbated popular resentment
towards them. Such individuals were regarded by poorer villagers as “explotadores”—
even as new gamonales—who refused to participate in the local moral economy but
nevertheless continued to enjoy and exploit the scarce resources of the village (Berg
1992:96-97; Mitchell 1991). By the mid-1970s, then, “the hacendados were gone but
the same relations of exploitation were reproduced by the new class of rich peasants,
the new state bureaucrats who replaced the old officials, and on ex-haciendas by the
administrators of the new state cooperatives” (Isbell 1988:63). In this way, it came to
be widely believed by peasants that local gamonal power endured, albeit transformed
into new expressions by new social actors, in spite of the demise of the landlords. In
the next chapter, we shall see how Senderistas were frequently able to use anti-
gamonal rhetoric, which many rural inhabitants of depressed regions like Ayacucho
still regarded as a valid frame of reference for their everyday experiences of injustice,
in order to capitalise on local class tensions and a popular distrust for agrarian reform
administrators and other state bureaucrats. (This is the essence of Guzman’s thesis of
“bureaucratic capitalism,” which is known within the Party as “Gonzalo Thought.”)39
In spite of its problems and shortcomings, the reformist military regime never-
theless helped to create social, economic, and political conditions which enabled a
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greater number of rural people to climb the social and economic ladder, perhaps more
than ever before. Even so, the military’s reforms did little (or could do little) to erad-
icate poverty; and the new prosperity and upward mobility of a minority of peasants
merely exacerbated class tensions, or created new ones (Isbell 1978; Mitchell 1991).
Though in some ways social and economic conditions had generally improved as
compared with a decade earlier, historically neglected departments like Ayacucho
remained poor and relatively underdeveloped. In 1972, Ayacucho held the undistin-
guished title of Peru’s second poorest department, after Apurímac, on the Central
Bank’s “Mapa de Pobreza del Perú.” A decade later, its position on the list had not
changed. “Among the ten poorest provinces in the country three are from Apurímac,
one from Huancavelica and two are Ayacuchan: Cangallo in the second poorest place
and Víctor Fajardo in the seventh....” (Degregori 1990:32.). Nevertheless, even
Marxist-Leninist theory recognises that people are hardly ever driven to militancy by
poverty alone. Impoverished, uneducated, and un-politicised peasants who are accus-
tomed to a life of poverty will not spontaneously seek to change their situation; for
they know no other life, and change always brings uncertain consequences for an
already precarious existence. What appears to have been a more significant motivat-
ing factor for young people to join Shining Path, or one of the other radical Marxist
groups in the 1970s, was the fact that expanded opportunities for higher education,
which the military’s reform made possible, also awakened expectations which it failed
to satisfy, above all in depressed departments like Ayacucho and Huancavelica.
Expectations rose but opportunities lagged and advancement was blocked for most
students and graduates of the UNSCH. Over the years, their frustration and anger at
their increasing insecurity fed a growing radicalism which amounted to nothing less
than a wellspring of potential support and opportunity for Shining Path.40
2.5 Drawing strength from defeat: 
Shining Path’s political setbacks in the 1970s 
For the heterogeneous Peruvian Left as a whole, the experience of the Velasco years
had a profound sievelike effect in so far as it separated those who critically support-
ed the military regime’s reform policies (like the PCP-Unidad and the labour union
Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú), from those who rejected and
opposed the military government altogether (Hinojosa 1998:68-69). Largest and
most prominent in the latter camp was Patria Roja, and among the smallest and most
obscure was Shining Path.
Initially, many leftist organisations feared being overtaken and made redundant by
a military regime “that seemed to preempt [sic] the Left” (ibid.:69). They regarded
the government’s project of agrarian reform as a “demagogical mechanism” designed
to confuse, mislead, and eventually win over the masses (Degregori 1990:189). In
time, however, the junta’s increasing shift to the Right and its unabashed willingness
to exercise a heavy hand, especially after a gravely ill Velasco had been deposed and
replaced by the more conservative General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-
1980), vindicated the ultra-Left’s uncompromisingly belligerent attitude towards
what it described as a “fascistic” regime. It was during this so-called “second phase”
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of military rule that the national economy went into a tailspin, precipitating what
would become the worst Peruvian economic crisis since the War of the Pacific, and
unsurpassed until the crisis of the late 1980s. The nation’s GNP per capita dropped
by almost 10 percent between 1974 and 1980, while inflation rates rocketed from 24
percent in 1975 to 68 percent by 1979 (Figueroa 1984:102). Average incomes
declined substantially for all wage-earners while underemployment rose in urban cen-
tres. It was also in the second half of the 1970s that many of the reform programmes
faltered and degenerated as many state bureaucrats became progressively more inter-
ested in asserting their bureaucratic control than accomplishing the aims of agrarian
reform.
The loss in real income and increased poverty hit urban workers and the urban
poor much harder than it did the peasantry, who at least could adjust their consump-
tion habits while continuing to grow food for their basic subsistence needs.
Nevertheless, the peasantry were also affected to some degree by the economic crisis
in a number of ways. Contrary to the common belief that peasants are, for the most
part, outside the market and therefore relatively immune to national economic crises,
various studies have shown that most peasant families in Peru are, in fact, deeply inte-
grated into the national market system (Figueroa 1984; Mitchell 1991; Cotler 1994).
Far from being completely self-sufficient, peasant families must participate in the mar-
ket economy in order to procure basic consumer products, such as kerosene, cooking
oil, metal tools, sugar, salt, rice, noodles, coca, flour, alcohol, candles, yarn and cloth-
ing. Therefore, when hyperinflation began to outstrip the income peasants gained
from the sale of their commodities and labour, their purchasing power correspond-
ingly decreased. Consequently, “relative prices moved against peasants during the
inflation period” (Figueroa 1984:102). In addition, hyperinflation and higher prices
in urban centres meant not only that the remittances rural migrants could afford to
send back to relatives and families in the countryside became smaller, but also that the
very activity of labour migration to the cities itself became a increasingly unappealing
option.
When growing levels of popular discontent exploded in a spate of strikes and
protests that reached its climax in the national strike of 19 July 1977, the military again
responded with repression. With deepening socioeconomic crisis and growing popular
protest threatening the stability of the nation, it is hardly surprising that as the turbu-
lent decade drew to a close, Abimael Guzmán would take these cumulative difficulties
and steadily sharpening contradictions to be incontrovertible proof that the situation
and the masses were both ripe for armed revolution. It was much less certain, howev-
er, that the peasants of Ayacucho felt the same.
Shining Path withdrew into itself during most of the early 1970s, absorbed with its
own “aventura del pensamiento” (“philosophical adventure”) (Degregori 1990:185).
The UNSCH as a whole, however, could hardly have remained a cloistered bastion
impervious to the profound socioeconomic transformations taking place around it.
When, after having resolved most of its internal doctrinal conflicts, Shining Path
turned its attention once again to political work among the masses, it discovered that
the political terrain of Ayacucho was heavily contested ground. It was “now occupied
and disputed not only by the old fragments of [Bandera Roja], but new political actors
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like the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and Vanguardia
Revolucionaria (VR), which established beachheads particularly among the new social
contingents that arrived at the university and in the region. Moreover, advancing
through that variable social geography, hoisting new banners, was the odious State”
(Degregori 1990:187-188).
The rising influx of state bureaucrats, technicians, university lecturers and stu-
dents from other parts of the country was rapidly changing the complexion of
Huamanga, turning it from an sleepy, urban provincial backwater into a modernising
city. Unfortunately for Shining Path, however, these demographic changes also
brought political changes and rivals that would result in its loss of hegemony in vari-
ous popular organisations—most significantly, within the university itself. Among the
reasons for this, according to Degregori, was that “[in] the majority of cases, SL was
not able to respond to the political and ideological aspirations of those new sec-
tors...and the only thing they felt was the Senderista oppression within the
UNSCH....In less than one year, between 1972 and 1973, the opposition became mas-
sive, for as much at the level of students as of professors the division between SL and
anti-SL appeared like a confrontation, to a certain degree, between Ayacuchanos and
foreigners” (1990:191). Shining Path suffered a series of political defeats at the uni-
versity that began in mid-1973 with their eviction, after a gigantic scuffle with anti-
Sendero students and staff, from the very student residences which had previously
been their bastion at the university. This ultimately led to their losing control of the
university’s student movement. What followed next was their loss of power first in
the university lecturers’ union (SUTE-UNSCH), and then in the executive council of
the university in March 1974 (ibid.:192). It was a testing time for Shining Path, for
in addition to its troubles at the UNSCH, it continued to suffer political defeats on
other fronts as well. Quite significantly, its efforts to establish an influential presence
in the peasant sector was foiled by rival Marxist parties, like BR and VR, which were
the dominant political forces in all the major established peasant federations. Shining
Path’s subsequent attempt to found a new Confederación Campesina Peruana (CCP)
in 1975 ended in utter failure: “...not a single important peasant base in the country
attended. Since then, SL disappeared from the trade-union organisation of the peas-
antry” (Degregori 1990:195). By mid-decade, widespread sociopolitical opposition to
Shining Path in Huamanga had risen to such a point that its every effort to maintain
or gain control of established popular organisations, or of the many newly emerging
ones, ultimately failed. Contrary to the Party’s version of history, it was not victori-
ous advance but rather general retreat that best describes its political struggles for
control of Ayacucho’s mass movements and popular organisations throughout the
1970s.
For all the defeats and setbacks it suffered, however, the Party never lost control
of its two most vital seedbeds for cadres and recruits—the university’s Education pro-
gramme, and the school teacher’s union (SUTE-Huamanga) (Degregori 1990:192,
fn.70). In fact, the demographic characteristics of student enrolment in the Education
programme ran counter-current to student enrolment in the university as a whole:
Owing to the demographic explosion that began in 1968, the per-
centage of Ayacuchano students at the UNSCH diminished substan-
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tially. But whereas the university as a whole opened up, the percent-
age of Ayacuchanos studying Education remained constant and even
rose slightly: from 60.9% in 1968 to 63% in 1973 and 61.1% in
1976....Among the Ayacuchanos, the highest proportion of those who
orientated themselves towards a teaching career came from Cangallo
and Víctor Fajardo, the poorest provinces, where SL would initiate its
armed actions (ibid.:192).
Moreover, the Party did not necessarily perceive its loss of hegemony in estab-
lished mass organisations as strategically catastrophic, or even politically damaging.
For even before it had been decisively overthrown at the UNSCH, Shining Path’s cen-
tral committee had already decided to begin creating what it called “organismos gen-
erados” (“generated organs”). And while it seemed to be just another one of
Guzmán’s “extremes of suspended common sense”41 that the Party should describe
these entities as “the very movements [themselves] as organisms generated by the pro-
letariat in the different labour fronts” in spite of their very small membership, the
underlying principle by which these organisations would claim to be the true repre-
sentatives of the mass movements was, once again, that of communist “vanguardism.”
For Shining Path’s militants, it did not matter that they were always the numeri-
cal minority. As the “vanguard,” they continued to lay claim to the leadership of the
masses based on their conviction that only they knew and held the true interests of
the majority. And as Lenin saw it, the prime objective of the revolution is first to seize
power, and then only once that is done to strive to win the support of the majority of
the workers, and ultimately that of the majority of the masses. Guzmán himself says
as much:
The Communist Party [of Lenin] was small, some claimed it had ‘two
or three hundred,’ that is what a Communist Party is; ... we don’t
want a broad party, this is an election-mongering party (quoted in
Gorriti 1999:59).
The Party is not a mass party, though the Party has a mass character.
It has a mass character in the sense that while being a select organisa-
tion—a selection of the best, of the proven...—being numerically
small in proportion to the broad masses, the Party defends the inter-
ests of the proletariat....But since other classes that make up the peo-
ple also participate in the revolution, the Party defends their interests
as well, in accordance with the fact that the proletariat can only eman-
cipate itself by emancipating all the oppressed....The mass party, of
which so much is said today, is nothing but an expression, once again,
of rotten revisionist positions. Such parties are parties of followers, of
officials, organizational machines. Our Party is a Party of fighters, of
leaders, an instrument of war like the one Lenin himself would
demand....How many Bolsheviks were there when the October revo-
lution triumphed?: 80 thousand in a country of 150 million inhabi-
tants.42
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From the smouldering ashes of each political defeat, Shining Path forged its corps
of cadres, small in number but ideologically hardened and organically cohesive. One
may even go far as to say, as Degregori does, that prior to launching its armed strug-
gle, the Party had achieved the most in developing itself at the level of cadres, rather
than at the level of the popular masses. Commenting retrospectively on the state of
the insurgency at the end of the 1980s, Degregori noted that “in almost ten years of
war SL has not returned to being the protagonist of a movement as massive, enthusi-
astic and voluntary as that of Ayacucho and Huanta in 1969. That time it participat-
ed in a mass movement, today it directs a war of ‘cadres’” (1990:199). Having found
itself blocked out and unable to dominate existing institutions and popular organisa-
tions, Shining Path embarked on constructing its own society, its own mass organisa-
tions, its own version of history. If indeed it was to be a war of the flea, then it was a
measure of Shining Path’s characteristic audacity that it should presume not only to
lead the dog, but, failing that, to take its very place.43
What the evidence suggests, then, was that instead of working to expanding its
size and mass support base (as the rival Patria Roja communist party was doing), what
Shining Path was actually bent on doing in the second half of the 1970s was to close
its ranks and become increasingly more clandestine. In contrast to the rest of the
Peruvian Left, Shining Path shunned involvement in the open mass protests, and as
Hinojosa noted, “[its] distance from, and scant influence in, the mass movement was
such that Shining Path was not even persecuted. In contrast with the other organisa-
tions, not one Shining Path leader was deported” (1998:71). While its rivals were
busily engaged in strikes, marches, and other open and relatively peaceful forms of
mass protests against the military dictatorship, Shining Path was intensely and secret-
ly preparing for something altogether different.
By the mid-1970s, Guzmán was already determined to prepare for armed
struggle, despite the fact that not everyone in his party was as yet of like mind.
Nevertheless, Guzmán forged ahead with transforming the Party into a paramilitary
machine along the lines prescribed by Lenin. Much of the preparation was, of course,
done in secrecy. But from 1977 onwards, military intelligence reports began to men-
tion small groups of young people conducting exercises in the handling of weapons,
and even the occasional seizure of dynamite crates (Gorriti 1999:45-54). Other intel-
ligence reports suggested that clandestine “grassroots schools” were being set up by
Shining Path in the urban shantytowns of Lima and in Cuzco in order to “raise the
consciousness of the people in preparation for popular war.”44 It was also at this time
that the Party started to dispatch political cadres into the countryside with the task of
conducting grassroots schools among the peasants, although these appear to have
been little more than impromptu, ad hoc chat sessions. Still, they served the purpose
of spreading the word of Shining Path’s intention to fight for social justice, and in the
process win widespread sympathy and occasionally even recruits from among local
adolescent students. It was in this manner that the Party prepared itself for what it
envisaged would be a “guerra de campesinos,” a “peasants’ war.” 
Even so, hardly any of Shining Path militants (not to mention its leadership), were
peasants, and not one of its senior or middle-level leadership was even of peasant ori-
gin. In terms of its social complexion, Shining Path was still very much an organisa-
tion of predominantly urban-based students and educators, and a few middle-class
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professionals. It was this sector of society that would continue to be its principal
source of recruits in decades to come. In his study of the social profile of individuals
convicted of terrorism between 1983 and 1986, Chávez de Paz found that the major-
ity of them were young, single and childless, often members of the Andean, provin-
cial urban “elite,” though they often came from among the nation’s poorest and most
underdeveloped provinces. A significant portion of these convicts were illiterate, yet
more than one third of the entire group possessed a university education, and over
half had a minimum of secondary education. Surprisingly, “it is in the group of
women and those older than 25 years of age where one finds the highest proportion
of those who have managed to get a university education and have obtained their aca-
demic degree and professional qualification” (1989:44-45). Students constituted the
highest number (24.6 percent) of individuals convicted of terrorism, with peasants
and agricultural workers being the second largest group (between 11.5 and 15 per-
cent).
Of course many of Shining Path’s recruits during the 1970s were of rural back-
ground, and in this regard it was these individuals who constituted the crucial link
between the Party and peasant society. Students and teachers of peasant parentage
enjoyed a certain degree of prestige and political influence in their home communi-
ties, and it invariably was the more educated comuneros who occupied the official
posts of local governance. Such individuals therefore served as crucial facilitators in
securing Shining Path’s access, and subsequent expansion, into local peasant society.
For example, one military-commissioned “agent report” about “subversive activities”
in Vilcashuamán in October 1979, noted: “Sute [sic] teachers are the main educators
on political matters because of their relationship with the parents (community mem-
bers) and students as well as the community labor they also participate in without
exception” (quoted in Gorriti 1999:49). Be that as it may, one must not exaggerate
the ability of local teachers to garner local support for Shining Path, however. For
even in areas where schools and students were numerous, teachers were not always
integrated into the communities where they lived and worked. For instance, American
anthropologist Billie Jean Isbell discovered in the 1960s that in the community of
Chuschi—where the first flames of the Lucha Armada would literally be set alight—
the teachers comprised a class apart. “Chuschino society,” she writes, “is polarized
into two social groups: the comuneros, or communal members of the village, who
participate in the prestige hierarchy, wear traditional dress, and speak Quechua; ver-
sus the vecinos , or qalas (literally, peeled or naked ones), who are Spanish speaking,
western dressed, foreign nonparticipants in communal life....Very little interaction
occurs between the two groups” (Isbell 1978:67,226). In such instances, comuneros
may resent the attempts of radical teachers (or any “foreigner” for that matter) to
influence local politics. Moreover, Shining Path was not the only leftist political
organisation with a presence in the Ayacuchan countryside at the time. In rural com-
munities there were also many activists, students, and teachers, who belonged to
other (and in certain areas more popular) Marxist groups, such as Bandera Roja,
Patria Roja, Vanguardia Revolucionaria, and the MIR. With democratic elections
approaching, it was not uncommon for Shining Path’s militants to engage in punch-
ups with its political rivals.
But in 1978-79, open and violent conflict between Shining Path’s militants and
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the peasants themselves was still a thing of the future. I have spoken to many peas-
ants who say that until the end of 1982, Shining Path enjoyed the Ayacuchan peas-
antry’s widespread sympathy. Shining Path’s cadres went from village to village
preaching a war to end exploitation and poverty. It is hardly surprising that almost
everywhere they went they found an approving audience. And if they did not exact-
ly win over many converts at these spontaneous meetings, Shining Path’s young, artic-
ulate and charismatic cadres nevertheless always managed to draw curious (though
also often sceptical) crowds of spectators. Pompeyo Rivera Terres, a former primary
school teacher and native of Tambo district, recalls the general excitement caused
when Edith Lagos came to talk to the comuneros of Huayao.
It’s hard to imagine now, but it’s true. When the mythical guerrilla
leader Edith Lagos commanded Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho, the
movement generally enjoyed much acceptance, and received all man-
ner of assistance from the peasants themselves. Soon after I had just
been transferred to teach at the primary school in Huayao, I remem-
ber coming home one evening and my aunt saying to me, “Nephew,
this evening we have a meeting at about eight o’clock, in the school,
because Comandante Edith Lagos has just arrived.”
I was surprised. “A woman guerrilla commander?” I asked.
“Yes!” she replied. “A woman who they say speaks splendidly. And
they also say she is fighting for the poor!”
So here was my aunt, an uneducated woman who couldn’t have
filled half a sheet of paper with all the writing that she knew, going
off to a political meeting. She really wanted to meet Edith Lagos, so
she set off at seven o’clock carrying a bowl of toasted maize in one
hand, and a pot of barbecued beef strips in the other, all for Edith
Lagos.45
At the time, many older peasants regarded the zealous young militants as well-
meaning but fairly harmless teenagers. Subsequent events would prove them wrong
on both accounts. It was only much later, say the peasants, that they realised they had
been deceived (engañado).
2.6 Towards armed struggle
By decade’s end, two divergent trajectories had at last reached their targets: one was
the nation’s return to democratic civilian government; the other, Shining Path’s initi-
ation of a protracted People’s War. 
Mired in economic crises and beset by a growing tide of popular protest against
it, the armed forces decided to salvage what was left of their dignity and tattered rep-
utation by handing back the reigns of government to a civilian administration, and
returning to the barracks. After a turbulent decade of military rule, the prospect of
returning to democratic government brought renewed hope and optimism. For all its
shortcomings, one could not deny that the revolutionary government of the armed
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forces had “brought the demolition of old hierarchies, the elimination of historical
flaws, and the incorporation of vast majorities long kept on the peripheries of nation-
al life” (Gorriti 1999:8). Most significantly, in the coming elections an amended con-
stitution would allow universal suffrage for the first time in Peru since the Pierolista
congress made literacy a requirement for voting back in 1890, and so effectively
excluded the vast majority of the nation’s peasants from political participation
(Mallon 1995:275).
The resumption of democratic elections in Peru—first in 1978 for the Constituent
Assembly, and then again in 1980 for a new president—brought the Marxist Left as
a whole to a historic crossroads. Many of those groups that entered the world of elec-
toral politics justified their actions according to Lenin’s directive to utilise a combi-
nation of legal and illegal means to capture power and insure victory. Just as infiltra-
tion into the key positions of trade unions and citizen’s groups is crucial for turning
such auxiliary organisations into transmission belts for Party influence, so too must
elections and the organs of “bourgeois” government be exploited for the purpose of
fanning discontent with the status quo into blazing hostility. The irony, however, was
that most Peruvian leftist parties that took the step of participating in the electoral
process ended up, as Hinojosa noted, “trapped within the very system they had hoped
to transform (or even to destroy)” (1998:71).
“By 1978 the period of clandestine structures and leaders began to draw to a
close, giving way to the era of public campaign offices and electoral candidates”
(ibid.). To be sure, not all the radical parties set off down the path of electoral poli-
tics at the same time. Many of the larger, more influential leftist parties like Patria
Roja boycotted the Constituent Assembly elections. But as the presidential elections
drew nearer, even Patria Roja, which a short time earlier seemed by its political rhet-
oric to be on the verge of launching an armed insurrection, opted to take up ballots
in place of bullets. Patria Roja would go on to form a short-lived electoral coalition
with other “radical” parties, including the MIR and the VR, under the banner of the
Alianza Revolucionaria de Izquierda (ARI), which could not manage to stay together
for even two months. The “moderates,” with the PCP-Unidad and the Partido
Socialista Revolucionaria (PSR) foremost among them, organised themselves into a
rival leftist coalition known as Unidad de Izquierda (UI) (ibid.:73). And yet others,
principally pro-Maoist parties, coalesced into the Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria
(UNIR), while the heterodox left came together in the Unidad Democratica del Perú
(UDP) (Gorriti 1999:10). In the end, bitter polemic differences and personal rivalries
not only to shatter coalitions, but also divided and so undermined the weight of the
leftist vote. Nevertheless, although none of these parties ever formally renounced
armed struggle, the very fact of their participation in the elections was taken by many
as a sign that they were at last “abandoning violence and embracing legality” (ibid.).
Those leftists who would find themselves elected to the posts of national and local
government came to have a stake, and so a vested interest, in preserving the state
apparatus and defending the constitution, if only in the hope of change it for the bet-
ter.
But not all the militant Marxist groups jumped on the electoral bandwagon. Some
of the smaller, more obscure organisations with little, if any, influence outside their
immediate surroundings, continued to advocate revolutionary insurrection. Most
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would eventually disappear, while others came to pursue armed struggle within the
ranks of Shining Path or, from 1984, as members of the Movimiento Revolucionario
Túpac Amaru (MRTA). Despite Shining Path’s many open declarations that it was on
the threshold of initiating armed struggle, few people, even among the Left, took
them seriously, if in fact they even noticed the ominous warnings. Viewed as a small
and insignificant provincial party, most other leftists who knew about Shining Path
believed that they neither had the capacity nor the nerve to “go beyond painting graf-
fiti” (former UDP leader Juan Granda quoted in Gorriti 1999:13). I once spoke to a
former president of one of Huamanga’s barrios who recalled that Shining Path’s
young militants were so naive about how to start an armed revolution that their
incongruently accompanying bravado seemed more comical than intimidating.
It was at the end of April 1980, at a barrio meeting which a mixed
group of young men and women had called that they told us their
party was about to start a “people’s war.” I asked how they expected
to go up against the army without weapons. “The people are able to
make their own weapons,” they replied. “We will use huaracas
[slings], lances [by fastening knives to the tips of long poles], and we
will hurl stones and pots of boiling water.” It was ridiculous what they
were saying, of course, and they became very annoyed when I sug-
gested that they wouldn’t stand a chance against policemen and sol-
diers armed with guns. One of the women came forward and gave a
short sermon on the ability of the people to overcome all obstacles on
the strength of their will and revolutionary spirit. “Once we begin our
revolution, we will annihilate those corroding detractors, those pes-
simistic doubters who serve only to poison the minds of the people.
And we’ll start with YOU!” she roared, thrusting a menacing finger
towards me. Only later did I realise that this woman who threatened
me was Edith Lagos.46
Shining Path advocated a boycott of the elections on the grounds that the people have
nothing to gain from them, and risked being misled and “stultified by bourgeois legal-
ity.”47 It branded those Marxists that had entered the electoral process as “parliamen-
tary cretins”, and denounced them as “revisionists.”48 In fact, Guzmán regarded the
Peruvian Marxist Left’s extraordinary turn towards legal parliamentary politics as
symptomatic of the growing “cancer” of revisionism worldwide, whose principal cen-
tres were the Soviet Union and China. With the triumph of Deng Xiaoping over the
Gang of Four, Guzmán must have believed that the torch had now passed to him (and
perhaps to less than a handful of other orthodox Maoists like José Maria Sison,
founder of the Philippine Communist Party (PCP) to keep and defend the faith
against the rising hordes of revisionists. “[Our] Congress has declared that we must
wage a relentless and uncompromising struggle against imperialism, revisionism, and
reaction worldwide,” he announced in 1988. “[We’ve] continued fighting revision-
ism, not only here, but beyond our borders as well.”49 Clearly, Guzmán considered
Shining Path’s armed struggle in Peru to be just one theatre in a larger revolutionary
war of global proportions. And so it can only be by first realising that Shining Path’s
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discourse, diatribes, and actions are purposely also made in reference to this larger
context of “world revolution” that we may begin to understand those seemingly pecu-
liar, exotic, enigmatic “public messages”—hanging dogs, graffiti hurling insults at Den
Xiaoping and his mother, etc.—that in the minds of some observers “appeared to be
incongruent and anachronistic, imported from other times and other worlds” (Kruijt
1996:248).
As the rest of the nation counted down the final two months to election day,
Guzmán was absorbed in making a reckoning of his own. In March 1980, those mem-
bers of the Political Bureau who still harboured doubts about beginning armed strug-
gle were denounced by Guzmán as “right opportunist revisionists” and defeated in a
series of spirited and decisive internal debates at the Central Committee’s Second
Plenary Session (see Gorriti 1999:21-28). The Party would later depict this crucial
confrontation on the eve of battle not as a critical rupture, but rather as a natural and
expected manifestation of the inevitable “two-line struggle” inherent in all revolu-
tionary parties; an internal struggle that, in the end, is essential for strengthening
party unity and achieving unanimity.50 Even so, the vanquished “right opportunists”
could not expect to be so easily forgiven for their dissidence. They first had to be
made examples of, rhetorically humiliated and forced to engage in heavy doses of self-
criticism as penance for their sins. This episode, the demolition of revisionism with-
in their ranks, ingrained the important lesson in the minds of the Party faithful that
revisionism, treason, and all other threats of counter-revolution must be stamped out
where they are found, without hesitation or mercy. “Targeting revisionism as the main
danger,” Guzmán once declared, “is the best way the Party can ward off and prevent
the emergence of a right opportunist line, which would be a revisionist line.”51 In
addition, the occasion served to underscore the cardinal principles according to which
all members must henceforth abide as the Party prepared to enter the vortex of class
war. Namely, that they must be bound not only by an iron-clad discipline in action,
but also by conformity in thought to the “correct” political line of the Central
Committee (as defined principally by Guzmán, of course). Finally, the two-line strug-
gle brought clarification to divisive ideological issues, and its conclusion signified an
end to further debate or criticism of the political line.
Now that the decision to launch the armed struggle had at last been “unani-
mously” approved, the one remaining important point of preparation was to conduct
the Party’s First Military School. This was inaugurated on 2 April and lasted seven-
teen intensive days. Much of the time was devoted to relating military actions to polit-
ical objectives, and engaging in extended sessions of criticism and self-criticism, main-
ly for the benefit of the repentant “right opportunists” of the Central Committee
(Gorriti 1999:29-36). The details of what took place need not be repeated here as it
has already been superbly described and discussed by Gorriti. In so far as they are rel-
evant to the theme of this book, however, I will briefly comment on some of the sig-
nificant features of that unique occasion that will help us to understand the group psy-
chology of the Shining Path militants, and their subsequent behaviour towards peas-
ants in general and peasant self-defence organisations in particular.
Consider, firstly, the exercise of criticism/self-criticism, which, as Gorriti writes,
“has become one of the most efficient methods history has known for the control of
groups and individuals, especially strong and motivated ones, since the first years of
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the Stalinist hegemony” (1999:30. My emphasis). It should also be pointed out that
criticism and self-criticism, particularly when employed primarily for the purpose of
rooting out latent sentiments of “revisionism” and weaknesses of revolutionary char-
acter, can also break down individuality, and with it a person’s moral conscience. In
the process, an ideological framework is strengthened whereby flesh and blood
human beings are transformed into abstract, doctrinal categories; and moral sense is
replaced by the mechanical ability simply to identify what conforms to the correct
political line on the one hand, versus revisionist opportunism or reactionism on the
other. There is perhaps no better illustration of this shedding of all moral responsi-
bility in the interest of class struggle than Guzmán’s own reactions to the 1983 mas-
sacre of dozens of peasants—including women and children—at the Andean village
of Lucanamarca. Looking back on that incident with all the human compassion of a
master dog trainer in action, this is what he had to say about it during the famous El
Diario interview of 1988:
In the face of reactionary military actions and the use of mesnadas
[goons], we responded with a devastating action: Lucanamarca.
Neither they nor we have forgotten it, to be sure, because they got an
answer that they didn’t imagine possible. More than 80 were annihi-
lated, that is the truth. And we say openly that there were excesses, as
was analyzed in 1983. But everything in life has two aspects. Our task
was to deal a devastating blow in order to put them in check, to make
them understand that it was not going to be so easy. On some occa-
sions, like that one, it was the Central Leadership itself that planned
the action and gave instructions....[The] principal thing is that we dealt
them a devastating blow, ...and they understood that they were dealing
with a different kind of people’s fighters, that we weren’t the same as
those they had fought before. This is what they understood. The
excesses are the negative aspect....This has been explained by Lenin
very clearly. Excesses can be committed. The problem is to go to a cer-
tain point and not beyond it, because if you go past that point you go
off course. It’s like an angle; it can be opened up to a certain point and
no further....[What] we needed was for the waters to overflow, to let
the flood rage, because we know that when a river floods its banks it
causes devastation, but then it returns to its riverbed....[This] is how we
understand those excesses. But, I insist, the main point was to make
them understand that we were a hard nut to crack, and that we were
ready for anything, anything.52
He depicts his victims as the dull-witted lackeys of reactionism, who needed to be
taught a lesson “by means of powerful actions that drive home the point.” Yet he fails
to take into account that what had driven them to rebel in the first place was Shining
Path’s decision to ban fairs and local markets, the consequence of which was to put
their livelihood and their very survival into jeopardy (see chapter 3). What had led
Shining Path to ban peasants from engaging in commercial activities was its distorted
ideological view of peasant economy as fully capable of self-sufficiency, and therefore
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having no need of “parasitic” commercial relations with urban centres and no use for
capitalist-manufactured goods. It was through the intensive process of political edu-
cation combined with constant self-criticism, such as took place at the Military
School, that these ideas and attitudes were embedded into the minds of the militants.
A related point has to do with the principle, borrowed from Mao and taught to
the young militants at the Military School, that “the Party commands the gun, and the
gun must never be allowed to command the Party” (Mao 1967:55). Although in this
regard Shining Path’s organisational discipline exhibited a “civil-military” chain of
command that would be the envy of many of the world’s governments that find it a
challenge keeping their security forces subordinated to civilian governance, it did not
make the Party any less prone to pursuing paths of extreme violence and terror. This
is because Shining Path’s political leadership had completely subordinated morality to
the interests of class struggle, and the principal goal of its armed struggle was the con-
quest of political power. To this end, its political leadership was prepared to employ
military force so as to ensure success at all cost, no matter how excessive—and espe-
cially so when confronted with the “counter-revolutionary” mutiny of the masses.
The absolute and automatic obedience of its military arm to political command posed
the grave danger that even insensitive and counterproductive military tactics pre-
scribed by higher political authorities would continue to be practiced because all
moral controls have been supplanted by the paramount interest of class struggle, and
the overriding objective of conquering political power. As such, the armed wing of the
Party was not permitted to question the long-term impression that its strategies and
armed tactics had on the population, only to assess its immediate objective military
effectiveness and impact. Consequently, by blindly trusting their ideology above all
empirical evidence or even their own personal experiences, the Senderistas ultimate-
ly failed to recognise that their military strategy was counterproductive in as much as
it was turning the masses against the Party. Instead, they would carry on in their belief
that despite any opposition along the way, final victory was already guaranteed by his-
tory. In fact, through the various mechanisms of social and psychological control
employed by the Party collective, most of the militants would have already shed any
empathic ability they had to appreciate real human suffering. Driven by a resolute
fanaticism stemming from an initially laudable desire to obliterate all forms of social
injustice, yet also conditioned to see human compassion as a sign of weakness, Shining
Path’s militants were eagerly prepared to sacrifice their own lives “heroically” for the
sake of the revolution and the deliverance of mankind. And they expected no less from
the peasant masses. “In order to annihilate the enemy and to preserve, and even more
to develop our own forces we have to pay a price in war, a price in blood, the need
to sacrifice a part for the triumph of the people’s war,” Guzmán once declared.53
But would the masses support armed action, and were they prepared to incur the
sacrifices expected of them by the Party? Guzmán was more than convinced they
were, insisting that “[the] people clamor to organize rebellion” (quoted in Gorriti
1999:28). “Ties between the party and the masses exist and are developing, particu-
larly in the countryside.... [The incorporation of the masses] is resolved through a
long process, as the armed struggle develops and the new state forms” (ibid.:24).
In the process of incorporation, the Party will inevitably come up against dis-
sention, criticism, and disagreement from the peasant masses themselves. How, then,
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was it to explain and to deal with these contradictions? “The Party...must investigate
the classes so as to define who are friends and who are enemies,” declared a Shining
Path publication.54 This Party precept clearly draws inspiration from Mao’s own sharp
distinction between two antagonistic categories—“the enemies” and “the people.” As
Mao explained, “[at] the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes,
strata and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of socialist con-
struction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups
which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construc-
tion are all enemies of the people” (1967:25. My emphasis). In other words, any dis-
sention or criticism of the Party and its political-military line—even simple non-coop-
eration—must be regarded as counter-revolutionary, and the act of an “enemy.” As
Poole noted, “For Guzmán,...all contradiction is conceived as a mutually exclusive
antagonism” (1994c:257). “People’s War” defined according to this criterion is ren-
dered both universal and exclusive: universal in that everyone, every class, will be
drawn into its flames; exclusive is so far as every individual must fall into only one of
two great hostile camps—the People or the Enemy. As far as Shining Path’s militants
were concerned, there was absolutely no room for neutrality or for diverse alterna-
tive positions in a “People’s War.”
We have already seen that in Shining Path’s turbulent formative history and
Guzmán’s own personal political life, both have weathered numerous instances of
what they might describe as “betrayal” or “treason” from within the group, or from
trusted colleagues. I would argue that this is the primary reason why Shining Path
chose during the second half of the 1970s to become even more clandestine that it
already was. Furthermore, these instances of perceived betrayal not only convinced
Shining Path leaders of the danger and futility of forging cooperative relations with
“revisionist” political parties, they also underscored the imperativeness of iron and
unquestioning discipline within the Party, and of rooting and stamping out all forms
of “counter-revolution.” All “counter-revolutionaries,” no matter what their class
background, were by definition “enemies of the people,” and must therefore be piti-
lessly dealt with in the appropriate manner. This obstinate and unyielding devotion
to punishment helps us to understand why it is that Shining Path eventually turned
their violence so ruthlessly against peasants communities, especially those which,
through their own initiative or the pressure of others, had formed civil defence com-
mittees. In the way it has chosen to deal with “counter-revolutionaries,” Shining Path
has admittedly taken to heart Lenin’s affirmation that in revolutionary war, “excess-
es” are inevitable and permissible in order to preserve the integrity and security of the
Party. Here, then, is an explanation of the motivations and justification behind
Shining Path’s seemingly senseless attacks on peasant villages—vicious cruelty that
would eventually drive peasants to rise against them in counter-rebellion.
On April 19, the last day of the Military School, Guzmán addressed those who were
to be the vanguard of People’s War with one of his most famous and impassioned
speeches, entitled “We are the Initiators.” It summarises the historical vision and doc-
trinal tenets of the Party, while also reminding those militants gathered that they are
the protagonists of what Guzmán promises will be a “magnificent epic of world his-
tory.” 
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We are the initiators. This first Party Military School is both a seal and
a breach, it concludes and begins. It concludes the time of peace and
opens the time of war. Comrades, our tasks with unarmed hands have
concluded, and today our armed words begin: Let us uplift the mass-
es and peasants under the unfading flags of Marxism-Leninism Mao
Tse-tung Thought. One period has ended and the preparations for the
new one have concluded. From here, the past deeds are sealed and we
open the future. The key of the future is determined by actions, the
objective is power. This we shall do, history demands it, the class
urges it, the people have foreseen and want it. We must accomplish it
and it will be accomplished. We are the initiators.....
The masses have been exploited, subjugated.... But through all this
time, [they] have always resisted, because they have no other senti-
ment than the class struggle....But the laws of history that came about
as a result of the development of the class struggle have generated one
last class: the international proletariat....The reaction has the hyena’s
dreams of blood. Convulsive dreams shake their somber
nights....They arm themselves to the teeth but they cannot prevail.
Their destiny is weighed and measured.... 
It has befallen on us to live in an extraordinary epoch. Thus it is
written, mankind never had such a heroic destiny. To the people of
today, to those people who breathe, struggle, and fight, has befallen
the task of sweeping reaction from the face of the earth, the most
illuminating and magnificent mission given to any generation....
Reaction, which unleashes its bloody claws tearing the flesh off the
people, continues to sow discord, embroil, and seeks to sate itself with
the blood of the people....Comrades, reaction will not prevail in any
form. The hour has sounded, the revolution will triumph....Victory is
ours. The masses will prevail, the peasants will arise, the working class
will lead, the Communist Party will command and the Red Flags will
be raised forever....Comrades, in this country we are embarking upon
a third epoch. The third epoch is a battle between armed revolution
and armed counter-revolution, which are prepared for
violence.....The masses tremble, the flood tide rises, and the storm
approaches.... Comrades, revolution and counterrevolution are also
contending forces in our country....The reactionaries are armed and
concentrated, defending the metropolis and capitals. We are rooted in
the countryside, in small villages, with the masses, especially with the
poor peasants, with the force of the people, among their disorganized
force in order to organize it into a powerful army....Nevertheless, the
fight will be hard, long, difficult and cruel. We need to steel our spir-
its, be strong, vigorous, fearless and confident in our victory....
The Party is a Party of a new type. The purpose of this Party of a
new type is to seize power for the working class and the people of this
country. The Party can not be developed more but through the use of
arms, through armed struggle....Having stated this point, we have
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three conditions: First, we embark on the strategic offensive of world
revolution. That is our situation. The revolutionary tide is on our side.
Second, the people set out to seize power with arms. The future will
be decided through the advancement of People’s War. Third, the Party
begins to develop through the armed struggle. Thus, the Party will
become the powerful Party which the revolution needs, and since it is
needed it must be forged.
Comrades, the armed struggle will be born fragile and weak because
it is new, but its destiny will be to develop through change, from the
variation of fragility like a tender plant. The roots we plant at the
beginning will be the future of a vigorous State....[The] Party will be
transformed into a powerful and recognized vanguard of the Peruvian
working class, and the legitimate centre of the Peruvian revolution....
This First Military School is historic....It concludes our unarmed life
and begins our People’s War....Comrades, the last meeting...has
burned and annihilated what among us and inside of us could have
opposed. We have raised up optimism and are filled with enthusi-
asm....In this manner, arming the cadres and leaders for basic effec-
tiveness, we have obviously entered the general political mobilization.
Remember what Chairman Mao said: the key is to mobilize the
cadres. That has been accomplished....
We are the initiators....On this 19th of April, history will state,
“standing upright they expressed their declaration of revolutionary
faith, with their hearts burning with an inextinguishable passion, with
firm and resolute wills, and with clear and bold minds, assuming their
historical obligation of being the Initiators. What they decided on
April 19th took shape in autumn with boycotts and the harvest, fol-
lowed through with actions against the reactionary power, aiming at
local authority, continued with land seizures and with the peasant
masses in rebellion the guerrillas were raised up. The guerrillas gen-
erated the powerful army we have become today, and the State based
on it. Our country is free...” That is what they will say, comrades....
We will become the protagonists of history, conscious, organized
and armed. Thus, the great rupture will be open and we will become
the makers of a definitive dawn....
The future is in the barrels of the guns! The armed revolution has
begun!
Glory to Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse-tung Thought!
Long Live the Communist Party of Peru!
Initiate the Armed Struggle!55
Shining Path’s First Military School was to its militants and leaders the long-awaited
“breach” into a “new epoch.” Similarly, the majority of Peruvians viewed the presi-
dential election of 18 May 1980, and the definitive return to democratic government
that it symbolised, with equal optimism as the dawn of a new era in the nation’s his-
tory—one that would perhaps be less elitist and more just than those which had pre-
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ceded it. Little did the nation suspect, however, that on the other side of a seemingly
calm horizon there was a tempest brewing.
Notes
1 Author’s interview with Eusebio (surname withheld by author), long-time resident of
Ccarhuapampa, about the history of his settlement, on 16 November 1997.
2 Information provided to author by Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and
Comando General of Tambo district’s Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo.
3 A veritable cordillera of material has been written about this topic over the past two decades. Two
of the very best works of general analysis of Shining Path’s emergence and formative development
remain Carlos Iván Degregori’s (1990) El Surgimiento de Senero Luminoso, and Gustavo Gorriti’s
(1990) classic Sendero: Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú. One of the best early investiga-
tions of Shining Path is Lewis Taylor’s (1983) Maoisms in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the
Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru. An excellent recent analysis of the military strategy
behind Shining Path’s “protracted people’s war” is Carlos Tapia’s (1997) Las Fuerzas Armadas y
Sendero Luminoso: Dos estrategias y un final, and an equally fine thematic and multidisciplinary
study of Shining Path can be found in Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995,
a comprehensive collection of essays edited by Steve J. Stern (1998).
4 The Universidad de San Cristóbal de Huamanga was founded by Bishop Cristóbal de Castilla y
Zamora, son of the Spanish king Philip IV, on 3 July 1677. It enjoyed the distinction of being the
second-oldest university of the viceroyalty (Degregori 1990:41).
5 This and all subsequent translations from the Spanish are mine, unless otherwise noted.
6 It its heyday, the colonial city was surrounded by relatively prosperous, tribute-paying indigenous
societies, and served as an important crossroad for commercial traffic between Lima, Cuzco, and
the fabulous mines of Potosí, Castrovirreyna, and Huancavelica (Degregori 1990:27, fn.4; Stern
1982:36).
7 As the victorious conquistadors turned from plunder to the task of consolidating imperial rule,
Pizarro began to confer encomiendas of specified indigenous groups upon some of his privileged
fellow adventurers, in the name of the Spanish Crown. Native vassals were required to provide the
encomendero tribute (typically goods, money, and household service) and labour for his basic neces-
sities and private enterprises (Stern 1982:27-50). In exchange, the encomendero lord was obligat-
ed to promote and to protect the military and political interests of the Spanish Crown in the
colony, in addition to protecting and caring for the material needs of his indigenous wards while
they were becoming Christianised and “civilised.” The natives were to be regarded and treated as
Spanish subjects, not slaves. In practice, however, this system of exploitation easily led to wide-
spread abuses and harsh labour conditions. With a mentality typical of the encomenderos through-
out the rest of Spain’s New World possessions at the time, for instance, the twenty-five or so
encomenderos who settled in Huamanga “saw the local Indian societies they hoped to rule as a
source of labour and plunder” (ibid.:28). The home government could rarely enforce its protective
regulations in its distant colonies, and encomenderos often treated the estate and the workers as
personal property, hiring out their labour and sometimes even selling those who they were intend-
ed to protect (ibid.:34).
8 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta Province, on 26 May 2000. Similar information is also described in Coronel 1996:34.
9 Author’s interview in Huamanga with Mercedes de Vivanco, former next-door neighbour of the
adolescent Edith Lagos, on 27 May 2000.
10 “By fraction [fracción], what is meant is what Lenin taught: ‘A section in a party is a group of like-
minded people formed for the purpose primarily [of] influencing the party in a definite direction,
for the purpose of securing acceptance for their principle in the party in the purest form. For this,
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real unanimity of opinion is necessary” (PCP-SL, “Desarrollar la guerra popular sirviendo a la rev-
olución mundial.” Ediciones Bandera Roja, May 1986. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement
(MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
11 Armed struggle, according to Mao’s interpretation of Marx, is the highest form of class struggle. In
this regard Mao writes: “The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war,
is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution
holds good universally, for China and for all other countries” (from “Problems of War and Strategy
(November 6, 1938), quoted in Mao 1967:34). Although Karl Marx recognised the possibility of
non-violent revolution, he nevertheless held the basic belief that “in most countries on the
Continent the lever of [socialist] revolution must be force; it is force to which we must someday
appeal in order to erect the rule of the labor” (from “The Possibility of Non-Violent Revolutions,”
a speech delivered at Amsterdam on September 8, 1872, reproduced in Tucker 1978:523).
12 Degregori 1990 is my main source of information in this section regarding the genesis of Shining
Path. The Party’s name is taken from the FER’s slogan, “Por el sendero luminoso de Mariátegui.”
Like the vast majority of Peruvian leftists, Guzmán appreciated Mariátegui’s thought as “the polit-
ical expression of the Peruvian working class” (PCP 1975:1).
13 For a detailed history of this significant event in Ayacucho’s history, see Degregori 1990. 
14 The government sent in the Sinchis—the elite counterinsurgency battalion of the 48th Division of
the Civil Guard, notorious for being particularly brutal—to quell the unrest.
15 A number of the Huanta students were members of the PCP-BR’s Local Committee “Lenin,” which
functioned autonomously from Guzmán’s Regional Committee.
16 Abimael Guzmán, “To Understand Mariátegui.” Conference at the Universidad Nacional de San
Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1969. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New
Flag (http://www.blythe.org). 
17 PCP-SL, “El Problema Campesino y La Revolución.” Ediciones Bandera Roja No. 46, August 1976.
Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
18 In his discussions of Mariátegui’s works, Guzmán replaces the term “Indian” with the class label
“peasant” (campesino), which is further evidence that “Indian revindication” has never been a goal
of the Party, contrary to what some Western journalists in the 1980s and early 1990s (like Strong
1992) would like us—and themselves—to believe. The Party’s official documents reject Andean
culture as “folklore” and bourgeois manipulation, and scornfully make it clear that Shining Path
does not consider itself to be an “Indian” movement—an indigenista one even less (Degregori
1990:206-207, Poole 1994b).
19 “The term gamonalismo does not only designate a social and economic category that includes the
latifundistas and large landowners. It signifies a phenomenon. Gamonalismo is not represented
only by the gamonales themselves. It includes an extensive hierarchy of functionaries, intermedi-
aries, agents, parasites, etc....The key factor in this phenomenon is the hegemony of the giant semi-
feudal landowners in the politics and machinery of the state” (Mariátegui 1927b:85).
20 Mariátegui and other indigenistas were convinced that “hardy and stubborn habits of cooperation
and solidarity still survive [from Inca times] that are the empirical expression of a communist spir-
it. The “community” is the instrument of this spirit” (Mariátegui 1971:58).
21 A Paisanaje relationship exists between “compatriots” from the same socio-geographical area. For
example, two persons from the province of Cangallo, though they might not be more than casual
acquaintances, might nevertheless consider themselves paisanos by virtue of the fact that they both
come from the same area.
22 The manner of creation, composition, and authority of these two committees are clearly described,
for instance, in the Estatuto del Grupo Campesino Huaychao, Disposiciones Generales, 8 de
Diciembre de 1979. Archivo del Ministerio de Agricultura de la Región ‘Libertadores Wari
[Ayacucho]. Acta de Aceptación de la Modalidad de Adjudicación del Predio ‘Uchuraccay.’ 13 de
setiembre 1973.
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23 For example, the 1970 Community Statute legislated the creation of the General Assembly, the
Executive Council, and the Supervisory Council for the purpose of regulating the administrative
regime of peasant communities. According to Nuñez, “[the ] Statute also established the grounds
for cases of dismissal from or vacancy in communal offices: improper disposal of communal goods,
unlawful use of land, and improper use of power were among these” (1995:38). When the munic-
ipal mayor of Chuschi caused trouble for anthropologist Billie Jean Isbell and a local Chuschino in
1974—by trying to levy bogus taxes, threatening to have her killed, and refusing to issue legal
papers to her Chuschino compadre so he could travel to the provincial capital to register his new-
born son, among other things—the commanding police officer in Pampa Cangallo urged her to file
a formal complaint against the municipal mayor. “My compadre, having been threatened with jail,
refused traveling papers, and denied a birth certificate for his new-born son, also filed a complaint”
(Isbell 1978:235).
24 Abimael Guzmán, “To Understand Mariátegui.” Conference at the Universidad Nacional de San
Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1969. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New
Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
25 PCP-SL, “El Problema Campesino y La Revolución.” Ediciones Bandera Roja No. 46, August 1976.
Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
26 Abimael Guzmán, “Entrevista del siglo. Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio.” El Diario, 24 July,
1988. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag
(http://www.blythe.org).
27 Abimael Guzmán, “To Understand Mariátegui.” Conference at the Universidad Nacional de San
Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1969. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New
Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
28 An apt illustration of this is the huge political blunder committed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) when it decided to boycott the presidential election of 1986 held between the
incumbent president Ferdinand Marcos and the popular opposition candidate Corazon Aquino.
Aquino was swept into presidential power on a wave of “People Power,” the dictator Marcos was
ousted and fled to Hawaii with suitcases full of money plundered from the national reserve, and
the CPP was left politically isolated by the Executive Committee’s stubborn and dogmatic refusal
to participate in the election. For details, see Gregg R. Jones (1989).
29 This is especially apparent in more recent Party literature, such as “Linea de Masas,” n.d..
Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
30 PCP-SL, “El Problema Campesino y La Revolución.” Ediciones Bandera Roja No. 46, August 1976.
Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
31 These statements were made by Abimael Guzmán during a conference in the auditorium of the
Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga in June 1973, and are quoted in Coronel
1996:46.
32 See Ministerio de Guerra (1966) for the official assessment of the emergence, organisation, opera-
tion, and repression of the MIR, ELN, and Túpac Amaru guerrilla movements, and the significant
issues they raised for the armed forces. For insight into the guerrilla experience, see Bejár (1969).
For an excellent theoretical analysis of the outcomes of these Cuban-inspired guerrilla insurgencies,
see Wickham-Crowley (1992).
33 Kruijt (1994) offers a detailed and authoritative account and analysis of how the military reforms
were initially conceived and directed during the Velasco years.
34 To this day still it is still considered an insult to call an Andean peasant an indio, and it is for this
reason that I intentionally omit using the word Indian in this book. Besides which, Peruvian peas-
ants themselves derive no sense of ethnic or class identity from the term Indian (see Degregori
1999c; Remy 1994). The word “Indian” is routinely used by many Westerners as an exotic image
or a convenient shorthand in reference to Peru’s Andean peoples, without perhaps realising the
pejorative connotations it has for the people themselves.
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35 For a discussion of the decay of the latifundio system since the 1950s, see Harding (1975). See
Deere (1990) for the Cajamarca example.
36 The soil in Ayacucho’s sierra region is generally poor; and the rich lands of valley floors were not
only scarce (except for the remote Apurímac river valley), but also unsuitable to sustaining prof-
itable commercial agriculture on a large scale. The rich landowners therefore preferred the more
profitable enterprise of ranching over labour-intensive commercial agricultural farming, and it is
for this reason that one finds the largest estates in the department of Ayacucho situated in the high
punas. 
37 For an examination of the impact of agrarian reform in Huanta, see Coronel 1979.
38 Anthropologists consider such cultural practices to be “levelling mechanisms.”
39 PCP-SL, “El Problema Campesino y La Revolución.” Ediciones Bandera Roja No. 46, August 1976.
Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
40 Chávez de Paz found, for instance, that 85.8 percent of those convicted of terrorism between 1983
and 1986 had an income lesser than the legal minimum wage, despite the fact that among these
individuals, more than half possessed secondary education, and a third were even university grad-
uates (1989:44,45,48, 55). His conclusion is that “the expectations of that group—privileged in
relation to their environment—contrasts with the type of work and income of their initial occupa-
tion” (ibid.:57).
41 Hinojosa (1998:65) has borrowed this wonderful phrase from Josep Fontana.
42 In Abimael Guzmán, “Entrevista del siglo. Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio.” El Diario, 24
July, 1988. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag
(http://www.blythe.org).
43 The War of the Flea is the title of Robert Taber’s classic (London: Paladin, 1970).
44 SIN Report 3219, 28 December 1977, quoted in Gorriti 1999:47. 
45 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
46 Author’s interview with J.R.C., former president of barrio ‘La Libertad,’ Humanga, on 22 May
2000.
47 Abimael Guzmán, “Entrevista del siglo. Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio.” El Diario, 24 July,
1988. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag
(http://www.blythe.org). See also PCP-SL, “¡Elecciones no! ¡Guerra popular sí.!” Ediciones Bandera
Roja, May 1990. Also reproduced by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 PCP-SL, “El Problema Campesino y La Revolución.” Ediciones Bandera Roja No. 46, August 1976.
Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org). 
55 Abimael Guzmán, “We are the Initiators,” 19 April 1980. Translated by the Peru’s People’s
Movement (MPP) and The New Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
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3 Early counter-rebellion
Donde la sangre del pueblo
¡ay! se derrama,
ahi mismito florece,
amarillito flor de retama
– Ricardo Dolorier Urbano, “Flor de Retama”
3.1 Revolutionary war and initial peasant responses to 
Shining Path: 1980-83
The democratic elections of 1980 were intended to symbolize Peru’s return to civil-
ian governance and democracy after more than a decade of military rule. But Sendero
chose the very eve of the election to initiate its revolutionary war against the Peruvian
state by burning ballot boxes in the rural town of Chuschi, Cangallo Province,
department of Ayacucho. The seventeenth of May would thereafter be celebrated on
the revolutionary calendar as the Inicio de la Lucha Armada (ILA); but the decision
to embark on the path of guerrilla war had already been made in 1979, at the Central
Committee’s IX Expanded Plenum.1 With this first act of war, Shining Path embarked
on a series of vigorous, nation-wide operations that aimed at the disruption of public
life by dynamiting buildings and sabotaging national infrastructure. Its actions were
also directed at making dramatic symbolic statements (like blowing up Velasco’s
tomb, hanging dead dogs from lampposts, and painting political slogans on walls),
and at building up its weapons arsenal by robbing dynamite from mining camps and
seizing firearms and uniforms from police stations and policemen. 
The death toll during the first two years of the insurgency was extremely low: six
policemen and seven civilians, none of whom were peasants (DESCO 1989:43). At
first, the government of President Belaúnde did not take these acts seriously, and
merely dismissed the militants as “infantile terrorists,” “petty livestock-rustlers,” and
“bandits.” Consequently, the responsibility for confronting the guerrillas in the first
three years of the insurgency was placed exclusively in the hands of the police. During
this period, the President expressed repeatedly that he was reluctant to commit the
armed forces to suppressing the rebellion. Nor did he deem it a necessary measure.
Even so, the political crisis eventually worsened to such an extent that the govern-
ment saw no alternative but to declare a state of emergency over the entire depart-
ment of Ayacucho on 3 March 1982.2
As armed clashes between the rebels and the police escalated between 1981 and
1982, it became painfully obvious that the police were unable to come to grips with
the small, mobile columns of guerrilla fighters. By late 1982, Shining Path detach-
ments were even able to occupy the city of Huanta for twenty-four hours, and to
overrun the police station at Vilcashuamán. Practically helpless to prevent surprise
attacks on stations in cities let alone on small posts in outlying villages, the police
became increasingly frustrated and demoralised. As a matter of practicality, the Civil
Guard eventually decided to abandon their more remote rural posts, withdrawing to
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reinforced garrisons in major towns (Gorriti 1999:164). “Consequently, by the latter
half of 1982 Sendero became the only effective authority (apart from the traditional
peasant community leaders) over large areas of Ayacucho, with the police restricting
their activity to non-too-frequent, heavily armed day-time patrols” (Taylor 1983:32).
Why was Shining Path able to flourish and expand its field of operations in the
Ayacuchan countryside so quickly? It is often noted in the literature that, in terms of
guerrilla warfare, the Senderistas were more than a match for the poorly trained and
motivated policemen. This disparity in motivation and capability is hardly surprising,
given that for most being a policeman was simply a matter of employment, while for
the guerrillas being a Senderista was a matter of zealous conviction. But besides the
apparent inability of the police to suppress the insurgency, another reason appears to
have been that Shining Path enjoyed a great degree of sympathy (if not actual com-
mitment or active support) from the rural population, at least in the beginning.
According to Berg, “the movement of the guerrillas was said to be facilitated by a net-
work of safe houses, sleeping spots and sources of supply. The guerrillas also received
food, although opinions varied as to whether this was given by sympathizers or by peo-
ple frightened into assisting” (1992:92). In the rural district of Tambo, I asked people
to describe for me their first encounter with Sendero. “At first the Senderos came,”
recalled Daniel, a displaced peasant from Huancapampa now living in one of Tambo’s
desplazado settlements.
At first the Senderos came and told us: ‘We’re going to do this and
that, we’re going to work together. If you don’t have animals, you’ll
get some. Let’s kill those who have lots of animals—these we’ll give
to the poor. And we’ll all have [animals] equally.’ Everyone believed
what they said. In this way they fooled us, and the people had
believed that that all this would come true.3
Others gave different explanations. Pascual Quispe Vargas, a displaced person and
former rondero who was just a young teenager in the early years of the insurrection,
insisted that apart from a few students and teachers, most people in Tambo town and
the surrounding rural villages cooperated with the guerrillas only “through fear,” for
they were initially powerless to resist or to defend themselves.4 Whatever the reasons
behind the active assistance given, there is little doubt that the guerrillas enjoyed a
large measure of sincere public sympathy. Consequently, in the first three years of the
insurgency, the guerrillas proved themselves to be the proverbial fish in water—mov-
ing fluidly through the countryside, striking targets when and where they pleased,
cunningly eluding the police with ease.
Shining Path’s field of operations in Ayacucho department initially encompassed
the provinces of Huanta, La Mar (especially in the districts of Tambo and San
Miguel), Huamanga, Cangallo, and Víctor Fajardo (DESCO 1989). The last two are
poor provinces where recognised peasant communities are prevalent, and schools are
in abundance. Given that teachers and students have always been the core aficiona-
dos of Shining Path in Ayacucho, this choice of operational setting was thus a strate-
gically prudent one. In Huanta Valley, the movement gained active assistance from the
young students and passive support from their peasant parents, particularly the estab-
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lished smallholders (Coronel 1996:45). From 1980 until the end of 1982, villages in
Huamanga Province and in the Huanta and Pampas river valleys were frequently vis-
ited by guerrilla groups preaching the message of “a new life; a government of the
people, of the peasants; a New Democracy in which there would be no more exploita-
tion or corruption, a society without the rich” (Coronel and Loayza 1992:524).
Whereas Shining Path’s vague yet passionately vitriolic rhetoric of a sanguinary
class struggle to usher a new utopian social order was something that held great
appeal for frustrated and discontented youths with some degree of education, the
measure of sympathy they initially drew from the older, less-educated peasantry can
perhaps be attributed to a number of their early concrete actions, rather than to their
ideology. In particular, their daring clashes with the police received enormous popu-
lar approval. Of the various representatives of the State, the police are particularly
reviled by Ayacuchanos. People in Huamanga, Tambo, Chuschi, Uchuraccay, and
practically everywhere else I travelled in the department in 1997 and 2000 told me
that they thought of most policemen as corrupt and exploitative, frequently abusive
and inconsiderate, and often disrespectful towards civilians, particularly peasants.
The stereotype is not without foundation. On the road from Huamanga to Tambo, I
observed on numerous occasions the rough way in which they searched through the
belongings of travellers: ripping open sacks, nonchalantly scattering items on the
dusty ground, thrusting metal probes with serrated tips into bags and boxes piled on
the tops of vehicles in search of cocaine paste, never asking first if they contain live
chickens or guinea pigs. At random checkpoints on secluded roads throughout the
emergency zone, policemen toting Kalashnikovs and wearing sunglasses so large as to
obscure their faces would stop and circle menacingly round the parked vehicles, bark-
ing questions in an intimidating tone that suggests immediate suspicion. Their
anonymity—and therefore their potential to enact abuse or violence with impunity—
is made complete by the absence of nametags on their dark-green uniforms. It is also
common at their checkpoints for them to refuse to let a vehicle through unless the
driver first pays them a small bribe. Policemen in the highlands are rarely from the
area where they are posted, and often not even from the department. The majority
are criollos or mestizos who do not speak much Quechua, if at all, and their short
posting period of about three to four months in any one place means that they rarely
have the opportunity—nor do they often have the desire—to form intimate relation-
ships with the populace. A policeman in Tambo once told me that he would be there
for only three months, and so he was not interested in taking the time to know the
history, culture, and customs of the locals. 
The peasants’ dislike for the police is also based on the historical fact that “all
across Peru, the police have been the point men for the state in containing campesino
mobilisation. They evict land invaders, break strikes, and keep constant tabs on peas-
ant leaders” (Starn 1989:66). Some Ayacuchano communities, like Chuschi, have
even incorporated vilified and comical caricatures of the police into their ritualised
celebrations.5 Others had gone so far as to resist police posts being set up in their
locality, or even to evict existing ones from their community, as happened in the
1960s and again in 1978-79 in Cangallo, Vilcashuamán, Pomacocha and Vischongo
(Degregori 1987:42; Gorriti 1999:46-53). Clearly, the historical relationship between
Ayacuchanos and the police has periodically been marked by violent confrontation. A
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bitter memory for many older Ayacuchanos today is the brutality with which the
police quelled the movement for free education in 1969 (see chapter 2). Of the vari-
ous branches of the police, the Sinchis had a particularly notorious and fearsome rep-
utation that was to be underscored (and not for the last time) on 26 December 1982,
when they burst by surprise upon a community assembly in Huancaraylla (Víctor
Fajardo province), firing their weapons indiscriminately into the crowd. Eight peas-
ants were killed (DESCO 1989:90). Small wonder, then, that in the early years of the
revolution, Shining Path militants had the passive acquiescence—and sometimes even
the active encouragement or assistance—of many of the rural inhabitants of Ayacucho
in attacking police posts.6
Sendero Luminoso also boosted its initial popularity by distributing confiscated
goods, such as the livestock of wealthy individuals and merchandise plundered from
stores in rural villages. On one occasion in November 1982, they also executed in
Pacucha (Apurímac department) at least two unpopular storekeepers who were gener-
ally disliked for their wealth, and were perceived by the locals to be exploiting the local
peasants (Berg 1992:93). At other times militants have even stopped lorries on roads
and distributed their cargo to local peasants (e.g. DESCO 1989:89). State-run agrari-
an and livestock cooperatives, and abandoned haciendas awaiting adjudication by the
agrarian court, became particular targets for the guerrillas. After invading a coopera-
tive, the guerrillas sometimes distributed its land and livestock for collective usage to
neighbouring peasant groups, or to the cooperatives’ peasant members. The expensive
machinery on cooperatives would often be destroyed, and their despised or corrupt
administrators executed or chased away (Coronel 1996:45; Taylor 1983:28). In
August 1982, Shining Path orchestrated the land invasion of Allpachaca, the UNSCH’s
experimental farm.7According to the testimonies collected by Isbell, more than 2,000
peasants took part in the invasion, and afterwards sowed the fields communally. The
farm’s valuable experimental stock of cattle were butchered for meat or taken away
(see Degregori and López Ricci 1990a:332). “People claim that the fields were never
harvested because the military arrived in full force [the next year] and prevented them
from returning,” writes Isbell. “Nevertheless, the Allpachaca invasion and communal
planting of the fields have taken a place in the mytho-history of the short period of
support given to SL activities” (1992:67). Widely approved though these actions were,
the main losers in the sabotage and destruction of a cooperative and its machinery
were, invariably, the peasant or proletarian members of the cooperative, for it was they
who ultimately had to pay for the damage out of their own pockets (Taylor 1983:28).
Ironically, these were also the very people Sendero hoped to recruit as its “mass base.”
But of all Shining Path’s tactics, the one that was to prove as socially divisive in
the long run as it was disturbingly popular among Ayacuchano villagers in the first
instance was the practice of liquidating those who in Maoist jargon were labelled as
“enemies of the people,” or “shensis malvados” in Senderista-speak (González
1984b:17; Degregori 1987:45). At first this category corresponded neatly with the
archetypal villains of Andean society: bandits, thieves, and livestock rustlers. Such
individuals are loathed throughout the Peruvian Andes, for they are commonly
believed to prey on poor peasants by stealing their scarce resources. In the northern
Peruvian department of Cajamarca, for instance, many rural villages spontaneously
organised rondas campesinas—peasant vigilante patrols—in the mid-1970s to tackle
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the problems of robbery, petty thievery, and cattle rustling (see Gitlitz and Rojas
1983; Starn 1989, 1999). By declaring the eradication of thieves, rapists, bandits, and
the like to be among its objectives, Shining Path managed to strike the right chord
with the peasantry. Within a short while, however, its severe administration of justice
came to run the whole gamut of transgressions, from “antirevolutionary” offences to
breaches of the Party’s strict Maoist-inspired moral code. As a measure of Sendero’s
increasing attempts to exercise a pervasive control over the minutiae of the daily lives
of peasants, “enemies” or “bad people” came to designate all sorts of persons: petty-
gamonales, wife beaters and adulterers; drunkards, alleged homosexuals, and per-
ceived extortionists and exploiters. The accused would first be tried by a “people’s
court” before invariably receiving a sentence of either corporal punishment (e.g. flog-
ging, head-shaving) or death by public execution. When they could, the guerrillas
exploited and exacerbated age-old animosities between antagonistic villages, such as
when they executed Chuschi’s first “enemies of the people” in September 1982. On
that occasion the accused were cattle-rustlers from Chuschi’s traditional rival, the
neighbouring village of Quispillaccta. The two communities have had an number of
serious (and sometimes violent) land-related disputes over past centuries, and their
legendary rivalry is known throughout Ayacucho (see Isbell 1978, 1992). Evidently,
it was also known to the guerrillas.
As Sendero intensified its moralisation campaign, executions and castigations
became more frequent and more arbitrary. Eventually, every peasant came to be at risk
from denunciation, and villagers soon realised that they did not so much have to fear
Sendero as what their neighbours might tell Sendero, or the Sinchis. Denunciation to
one or the other armed actor thus became for peasants a new means with which to
settle old scores. Criminality, spying and informing for the police, or otherwise pro-
viding assistance to other “enemies of the people” all served as pretexts for executing
common peasants. But, as people in Tambo have told me, personal vendettas and
rivalries, land disputes,8 a squabble over inheritance, or just plain jealousy were, more
often than not, the real motives behind many of the denunciations between neigh-
bours and even between relatives.9 Towards the end of 1982, the political violence
had generalised to such an extent as to engender a climate of fear, distrust, and inse-
curity that began to tear apart the social fabric of communities. A circle of communal
vengeance gripped many districts of Ayacucho, like Tambo. By attempting to exploit
the chaotic spiral of violence for their own personal advantage, peasants inadvertent-
ly contributed to the escalation of violence. But worse was yet to come; for once the
armed forces entered the fray, peasants would find themselves engulfed in violence of
such catastrophic proportions as to become known as “manchay tiempo”—“a time of
fear” (Starn et al. 1995:339).
3.2 Growing peasant resentment towards Shining Path 
In the second half of 1982, Sendero Luminoso’s “protracted people’s war” entered a
second stage that called for the encircling of Ayacucho’s major urban centres. (We
should bear in mind, however, that Shining Path was also extremely active in the
cities.) The aim was to cut off their supply of rural produce and labourers (Tapia
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1997:85-86). Known as Plan II: “The Campaign to open guerrilla zones and advance
bases of support,” the strategy required the peasantry to sever its economic ties with
the market and the monetary economy. In addition, the rebels would block off roads
in an attempt to isolate guerrilla-controlled areas from the rest of country. Peasants
were henceforth to produce only for subsistence. And in order to break what Sendero
viewed as their dependency on capitalist urban centres, peasants were discouraged
from travelling to towns and cities. Within their zones of influence, Sendero even
tried to ban the weekly local markets and fairs, which it considered to be nests of cap-
italistic exploitation. In so doing, Shining Path merely created the extra burden of
increasing transportation costs for many peasants, who were now forced to travel to
more distant places where they could sell their goods and procure basic commodities
(González 1983b:20). Furthermore, its attempt to restrict traffic to urban centres
merely caused disruption and harm to peasant household economies, for whom
labour migration provided an important source of income. It comes as little surprise
that their strategy for “starving out the cities” met with the general disapproval of
most Ayacuchan peasants, for whom commodity exchange, labour migration, and
participation in the cash economy played a vital part in their production strategies
and consumption practices.
The problem was that while Shining Path exhorted peasants to make a funda-
mental change to their adaptive strategy by breaking relations with the national mar-
ket, they made no attempts to offer viable alternatives. The Party was content simply
to state that peasants should strive to become self-sufficient. But how? For in the
words of one peasant woman from Chuschi, “We could not let them close the mar-
kets. Where would we get our salt and matches?” (quoted in Isbell 1992:66). Such a
question, however, was irrelevant to Shining Path, for it took it upon itself to rede-
fine the basic needs of the peasantry, which according to them was simply to serve the
Party and its revolution. Yet the fact remains that whereas Shining Path constantly
preached the ideal of economic self-sufficiency, in fact they did very little to facilitate
its practice. In most of the instances when they organised collective agriculture, the
Senderistas subsequently appropriated the entire harvest for themselves, as a “contri-
bution to the revolution,” instead of dividing it up among the workers (Coronel
1996:46; Degregori and López Ricci 1990a:332-333). According to one former
Sendero cadre, “What was planted was no longer for the community, but to supply
the comrades in the field....” (quoted in Degregori and López Ricci 1990a:332). By
attempting to reorganise peasant modes of production to make them conform to the
autarkic economy it aspired to create, Shining Path merely imposed additional hard-
ships on precarious rural livelihood strategies, thus worsening what were already dire
economic conditions for the Ayacuchan peasantry. Furthermore, the Party’s assump-
tion that the peasantry would be willing to put up with the long-term economic sac-
rifices demanded by their “protracted armed struggle” was also out of sync with the
pragmatic interests of the majority of peasants, which were to satisfy the basic caloric
minima requirements and replacement needs of their households, and to minimise
insecurity and risk in their daily lives (see Wolf 1966:6). Moreover, by confiscating
the fruits of communal labour entirely, the Senderistas were not only blatantly violat-
ing Andean cultural principles of reciprocity; they were also directly contradicting
their earlier promise to create a “New Democracy” free of exploitation (Coronel and
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Loayza, 1992:524). (In contrast, even the capitalists and merchants ordinarily paid
peasants for the products of their labour.) Actions like these showed Senderistas to be
not so different from the very gamonal exploiters whom they enjoyed repeatedly
denouncing.
The transformation of the peasantry that Shining Path sought to achieve was not
meant to be confined just to economic practices. The objective was also to ensure a
revolutionary redefinition of Andean culture. To this end, a moral campaign to pro-
hibit fiestas, drinking, and the use of coca was initiated by its fervent and puritan-
minded militants in the early years of the revolution, although enforcement of this
would become rather lax as time went on. Nevertheless, its initial consequence was
to embitter an already increasingly disaffected peasantry, for it was a course of action
that was insensitive to the fact that fiestas are important for the reproduction of com-
munity life by marking crucial stages in the agricultural cycle and reaffirming shared
community beliefs and values (see Isbell 1978:197-220; Mitchell 1991). The mili-
tants’ restrictions simply revealed their unfamiliarity with, or perhaps blatant con-
tempt of, Andean rituals and exchange relationships in which coca and alcohol con-
stitute the indispensable symbolic components. For all these reasons, it can be argued
that Shining Path began to lose whatever degree of peasant support and legitimacy it
had gained when its demands and the consequences of its actions ceased to corre-
spond with the needs, interests, and goals of most peasants in Ayacucho.
As part of Plan II, Sendero militants also began to “batir el campo.” This involved
eradicating all remaining vestiges of the state in the countryside while simultaneous-
ly forming Comités Populares, which were the administrative organs of Senderista
government. In the words of Abimael Guzmán himself, to batir el campo meant “to
scour the countryside, to ignite it: to sweep away all authorities; that they may be
routed from the countryside and that the ground may be cleansed on top of which
the bases of revolutionary support shall be moved and shall be built” (quoted in
González 1984c:19). The public adjudication and execution of state representatives
did not receive equal acceptance in all parts of the department, however. One vivid
illustration of this was when Bernardino Chipana, the governor of Chuschi, was cap-
tured by the guerrillas and paraded naked through the village streets in July 1982.
The insurgents intended to kill him in the plaza, but when they asked the crowd to
decide the man’s fate, they received an emphatic reply of “No, don’t kill him” (Isbell
1992:67; DESCO 1989:83). Clearly, not all people who Sendero regarded as “shen-
sis malvados,” or traitors and informers, were viewed in this way by their fellow vil-
lagers (see González 1983a, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c). Even so, by the end of the year,
most state authorities at the district level and below had either fled or renounced their
posts, leaving an absence of formal government in many rural areas (Berg 1992:93).
It was also in this period that Shining Path began to repudiate peasant authorities,
like community presidents and traditional authorities called varayoccs, “threatening
them with death if they refused to renounce their post” (Coronel 1996:47). By fre-
quently attempting to replace local peasant authorities with its own cadres, the Party
gave the impression that it was trying to limit the degree of peasant leadership in the
revolution, in direct contradiction to their earlier pledge to create “a government of
the people, of the peasants” (Coronel and Loayza 1992: 524). Furthermore,
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Sendero’s increasingly violent authoritarianism simply replicated the traditional struc-
tures of power and domination that many peasant communities, like those in the high
Andes of Huanta, had for decades been struggling to escape. “Shining Path had sim-
ply transformed the power structure with itself at the top and with the peasant mass-
es, whom it considered in need of leadership and instruction, at the bottom” (Isbell
1988:72. My emphasis). (See discussion of “vanguardism” in chapter 2.) Using terror
as its primary weapon, Shining Path came to occupy the place of the traditional
Andean patrón, imposing a strict moral code and distributing its own brand of justice.
Hence, by the end of 1982 many Ayacuchano peasants had already grown disen-
chanted with Sendero Luminoso.10 Alongside the other aforementioned grievances,
the growing numbers of common peasants and peasant authorities being killed by the
guerrillas caused deep and widespread resentment, particularly among the victims’
kin (see Degregori and López Ricci 1990a:332).
3.3 Early peasant counter-rebellion against 
Shining Path in Ayacucho
Through the cold and drizzly morning of 21 January 1983, an armed column of seven
guerrillas marched into Huaychao, a village in the high Andes of Huanta Province. It
was not the first guerrilla visit to Huaychao. Just five and a half months earlier, anoth-
er group of Senderistas had passed through the village. On that occasion they adjudi-
cated and summarily executed Eusebio Ccente and Pedro Rimachi, Huaychao’s presi-
dent and lieutenant governor respectively (Coronel 1996:48). But this time the
encounter would be different. A congenial reception from the comuneros put the seven
young men at ease—and off guard. Perhaps they did not realise they were gradually
being encircled by the villagers, whose faces had turned grim; and they probably failed
to notice the knives, staves, and stones that slowly slid out from under their ponchos,
until it was too late.
In this, the second year of Shining Path’s revolutionary war, the targeted killings
of peasant authorities and commoners by guerrillas had become more frequent over
the past six months. But never until now had campesinos in the department of
Ayacucho, the epicentre of the insurgency, ever resorted to violent means to defend
themselves. The news from Huaychao astounded the entire nation, which was of the
general though erroneous opinion that Shining Path enjoyed near-unanimous accept-
ance among the Ayacuchano peasantry. Various newspapers in Lima, including
Peruvian president Fernando Belaúnde Terry himself, immediately praised the com-
munity for its resolute bravery in standing up to the guerrillas. Within five days’ time,
however, Huaychao would be all but forgotten, overshadowed by the tragic report
that eight Lima journalists and their guide, who had been trying to make their way to
Huaychao to verify the astonishing news of the week before, had been mistaken for
guerrillas and massacred by peasants in the neighbouring community of Uchuraccay,
some seven kilometres away.11 The tragedy riveted world attention on the political
violence that was spinning out of control in this remote part of the Peruvian Andes,
one of nation’s poorest and most neglected departments. However, the tragedy at
Uchuraccay should not cause us to lose sight of the significance of what had happened
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in Huaychao. For it was at Huaychao that peasants demonstrated for the first time
their determination to defend themselves, their scarce resources, and their way of life
from guerrilla claims and attempts to dominate them.
José Coronel, a Huantino anthropologist at the UNSCH and a leading scholar on
the subject of village defence committees in Ayacucho, suggests that it was Shining
Path’s repudiation, attempted substitution, and subsequent assassination of peasant
authorities in the villages of Huaychao and Ccarhuahurán in August 1982 that drove
Huanta’s high-Andean communities to respond to Shining Path with physical vio-
lence. In the eyes of their communities, these murdered men were not criminals or
corrupt government functionaries, but legitimate and respected indigenous authori-
ties who were regarded as the embodiment of community values, order, and tradition
(Coronel 1996:38-40). But what was more, they were also kinsmen. A strong prefer-
ence for endogamous marriage was commonly practiced in these thirty or so high-
Andean villages, bound together by blood into a distinct ethnic group commonly
referred to by outsiders as the Iquichanos. For this reason, Shining Path’s execution
of a single individual in one Iquichano village created wider ripples of anger in neigh-
bouring villages. For instance, Eusebio Ccente, the community president of Huaychao
killed by guerrillas, had many relatives in Uchuraccay.
But even prior to the killings, it seems that the young rebels had already sown the
seeds of discord among the Iquichanos. “Before the violence, we lived tranquilito,”
recalled Elías Ccente, Uchuraccay’s current community president and a kinsman of
Eusebio Ccente.
We had lots of animals [livestock] and enough food. Then the terror-
ists came in 1982. At first we provided them with provisions and lodg-
ings, and approved of their aim of fighting injustice. You could say
that our initial response to them was curiosity and sympathy. But soon
we saw that what they said was not what they did. They behaved ter-
ribly. When they demanded provisions, they always took the best,
even our local girls, some of whom they got pregnant.12
Six months after the guerrillas first appeared in the highlands of Huanta, the
Iquichanos decided to resist them by forming village defence committees modelled on
the existing comités de administración and comités de vigilancia of each community.
But why did the Iquichanos initially choose the path of violent resistance, instead
of some other form of response? And why did organised, collective resistance to the
guerrillas begin in this sub-region and not in other parts of Ayacucho? I would argue
that an attempt to explain disparate responses to the violence of Shining Path must
consider not just the experience that individual peasant households and peasant
groups have had with the wider world and the kinds of socioeconomic resources
available to them, but also the circumstances in which responses were made, espe-
cially as regards the intensity of guerrilla presence in a specific area.
At the start of the revolution, most rural hamlets in the department of
Ayacucho—principally those of the lowlands and the valleys—already exhibited a
high degree of class stratification. The members were commonly differentiated not
only on the basis of wealth, but also by other factors such as level of education and
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bilingualism, the experience of labour migration, and the strength of personal, infor-
mal networks in the urban world (see Mitchell 1991). Furthermore, private owner-
ship of land, together with class differentiation and a weakening of traditional author-
ities whose role it had been in the past to mediate conflicts, resulted in frequent dis-
putes and squabbles among villagers in the majority of Ayacucho’s rural communities.
As McClintock points out, 71 percent of Ayacuchan peasants in 1961 were small-
holders, of which “as of 1971, 71 percent of Ayacucho’s [smallholders] were engaged
in boundary disputes—one of the highest percentages in the country” (1984:74). This
condition undoubtedly also owes itself to existence of what Wolf calls the “partible
inheritance” of land. That is to say, within a parental domestic group there is usually
left more than one heir, and “they subdivide the established unit so that each succes-
sor receives a combination of resources weaker than the one managed by the depart-
ing head” (1966:73). It is not difficult to imagine how this could easily lead to con-
flicts over land, even between relatives, as I have been told is precisely what happened
in Tambo district.
By contrast, at the start of the 1980s almost everyone in the Iquichano commu-
nities was still a monolingual Quechua speaker (see Table 3.1, below). Complete illit-
eracy was practically universal, and the vast majority of the villagers had little or no
experience of having lived as migrants in towns, cities, or any other part of Ayacucho
or Peru for that matter. A very few, however, had worked as itinerant labourers in the
Apurímac River Valley. Unlike in other communities in Ayacucho, hardly any of the
men in the Iquichano communities had done compulsory military service, the remote-
ness of the villages almost certainly serving to insulate them from being drafted or
press-ganged into military service.13 On occasion, they attended the fairs held in urban
centres like Tambo or Huanta to sell their highland produce and livestock, and to pur-
chase basic supplies. Otherwise, they hardly participated in the cash economy.
Instead, barter was their preferred mode of exchange. Furthermore, no long history
of land disputes existed within the Iquichan communities because all the land they
inhabit used to belong to haciendas.14 Prior to the land reform of the 1970s, the
Iquichanos were feudatarios (hacienda serfs), not parcelarios individuales (individual
parcel holders) as they are today. Consequently, the inhabitants of Iquichano villages
remained relatively egalitarian and free of land disputes, and exhibited a strong sense
of communal solidarity and ethnic identity that differentiated between insiders and
outsiders, rather than along class lines.
Table 3.1: Percentage comparison of monolingual Quechua-speakers in valley and
puna of Huanta, 1979
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Community Location % Monolingual Quechua speakers 
Chacco Valley 30.5
Durazno Valley 48.5
Pata Valley 41.5
Pampachacra Puna 95.0
Culluchaca 
Source: after Coronel 1996:39
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And so whereas in many other Ayacuchan localities the presence of social cleav-
ages and social stratification provided Shining Path with ample opportunities to cre-
ate so-called “enemies of the people,” in the Iquichano communities, by contrast,
greater egalitarianism and less history of land disputes between members meant fewer
cleavages for Shining Path to manipulate or aggravate. I would argue, then, that the
more economically stratified and internally differentiated a village was, the more
prone its inhabitants would have been to factional conflicts and cleavages, thus mak-
ing collective resistance to Shining Path all the more difficult to organise. In such
cases, responses to guerrilla violence were often made in individually ways, rather
than collectively. A family’s particular resources—like social and kinship networks in
towns and cities, skills, education, cash savings etc.—presented possible alternatives.
For this reason, many peasant groups in Ayacucho adopted various paths of response
and resistance to Sendero Luminoso other than forming village defence groups. Their
wider options included fleeing to relatives and friends in cities, or to the pre-war
migrant settlements in urban centres, where they could enter the burgeoning “infor-
mal economy” (see De Soto 1986).
In some cases, those who opted to remain in the rural village were the poorer
peasants, while their wealthier neighbours tended to leave (see Coronel and Loayza
1992; Flagg 1998). As a result, poorer villagers sometimes came to assume the lead-
ership roles that previously had been held by richer peasants. Whereas the prior het-
erogeneity of a village might have prevented it from effectively organising communal
defence as an initial response, Sendero’s selective killings and the subsequent exodus
of the terrified richer peasants must have had a homogenising effect that later made
it easier for the remaining poorer villagers to organise in defence of their lives and
their resources. This is what occurred in the village of Cochas, Luricocha district, near
the Huanta valley (Coronel and Loayza 1992:527-528). (Even if parents decided not
to leave their rural community, it was nevertheless common for them to send their
children to urban centres for safety.)
The Iquichanos, on the other hand, had less options for responding to guerrilla
violence because they had fewer resources available to them. One response could have
been to flee, but it seemed a difficult and unappealing one. The vast majority of
Iquichanos lacked social networks and contacts in urban centres, and were deficient
in skills, education, and other resources (e.g. bilingualism, literacy, cash etc.) neces-
sary for life in urban society.
There were two other important explanations why, in the end, the majority of
Iquichanos chose to fight. One was that they were fiercely protective of their land and
their resources for the simple reason that they had only relatively recently acquired
them through agrarian reform. Agrarian reform in the ‘70s offered former hacienda
peons, like the Iquichanos, the opportunity to buy the estates on which they had lived
and worked for countless generations. And so it was through this process known as
compra-venta (buy-sell) that the inhabitants of Uchuraccay obtained their land in 1973,
and the villagers of Huaychao gained theirs in 1979.15 At the time of adjudication, the
peasants of Uchuraccay strongly opposed being turned into a peasant cooperative, with
property held in common. Instead, they chose to become an associative enterprise
whereby each family would receive individual parcel holdings.16 It is therefore not sur-
prising that just a few years later, Shining Path’s rhetoric of communist collectivism led
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the Iquichanos to fear that the guerrillas intended to take and collectivise the very land
they had only recently obtained, through much effort and sacrifice.17
The second important reason why the Iquichanos decided to stay and fight was
that they really believed they could take on and defeat the guerrillas. “The first ter-
rucos [terrorists] we met were young, scrawny teenagers,” Elías Ccente told me.
“They were few in number and not very well armed. We thought it would be easy to
annihilate them with our lances, slings, knives and stones.” It would appear, then, that
the Iquichanos did not realise what they were dealing with, which may partly have
been the fault of the Sinchis. The Sinchis had visited them by helicopter on a number
of occasions, encouraging them to kill or capture any Senderistas they encountered.
But they failed to warn the peasants of the size and military capabilities of this Maoist
organisation. Consequently, that the Iquichanos underestimated Shining Path would
disastrous. “After we had managed to kill a few of the terrucos, their comrades
responded by using heavy firearms and explosives,” said Ccente. “Many more
arrived, and then they began to kill more peasants. There was nothing we could do
to save ourselves and our families but to abandon our communities and go far away.
We lost everything else.”
It is also important to consider the specific circumstances in which peasant
responses to Shining Path were made. For instance, the intensity of guerrilla presence
in the Pampas River Valley and in the Iquichan highlands (two separate Ayacuchan
sub-regions in which communities nevertheless exhibited structural similarities) dif-
fered markedly. In the Pampas villages of Chuschi, Quispillaccta, and Canchacancha,
there were large numbers of students and teachers, most of whom openly sympa-
thised with Shining Path. Indeed, they constituted the very nucleus of Sendero’s “one
thousand ears and one thousand eyes,” making the task of organising community
defence all the more difficult. A similar situation prevailed most everywhere else-
where in Ayacucho department. Describing their initial efforts to organise self-
defence militias in the district of Vinchos (Huamanga Province) in the early-1980s,
for instance, militia president Juan Pardo recalled: “Among the communities we had
organised a meeting but secretly because the Senderos were present in these zones....”
(quoted in Starn 1993:43).
In contrast to the circumstances in most villages in the provinces of Huamanga
and Víctor Fajardo, or in the valleys of Huanta and the Pampas River, the lack of stu-
dents and a virtual absence of teachers within the Iquichano villages meant that imme-
diate pro-Sendero vigilance was largely absent in these highland communities. And
whereas the communities of the Pampas River Valley were constantly visited and
sometimes even occupied by guerrilla columns in the first two-and-a-half years of the
insurgency, Shining Path had comparatively little contact with the Iquichano villages.
Hence, it can be argued that in contrast to the circumstances surrounding the
Iquichano communities, in most other districts of Ayacucho the strong and near-
ubiquitous presence of Shining Path guerrillas or its sympathisers precluded the exis-
tence of the autonomous space of action necessary for planning and mobilising armed
community resistance to the guerrillas.
It is important to realise, however, that the Iquichanos’ decision to defend them-
selves was not an inevitable one. It was a response influenced by a variety of factors—
their ability to mobilise themselves, and the relative intensity of guerrilla pressure in
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the area being the most important. Had the guerrillas attacked them in 1982 as
severely as they later did in 1983 and in 1984, there is little doubt that the Iquichanos
would have immediately chosen to flee rather than to fight.
Like the Iquichanos, though, many Chuschinos had had enough of guerrilla pres-
ence by the end of 1982. When the security forces entered Chuschi in December that
year, the guerrillas who had occupied the community took to the surrounding hills;
and with them evaporated any remaining credibility they had among the local inhab-
itants. Their refusal to wage pitched battles against superior military forces in defence
of rural villages is a standard Maoist principle of guerrilla warfare, and the Shining
Path guerrillas resorted to this tactic time and again.18 However, it was invariably the
defenceless villagers who were then left behind to suffer the wrath of the soldiers.
Consequently, rural villagers who had once trusted the guerrillas to defend them
began to feel increasingly disillusioned, exasperated, and betrayed. As one perplexed
and indignant Chuschino woman put it,
Why do they not protect us, they have put us in this problem and they
don’t protect us; they have to protect us, they must defend us. Why
have they told us that they were going to fight in front and we were
going to go behind them? Where are they? Now one can’t see any sign
of them, they put us in this mess and they pull out, this can’t be!
(quoted in Degregori 1987:46).
The soldiers became angry when they could not find the guerrillas in Chuschi, though
they suspected that everyone in the community was a sympathiser. Before setting off
to continue their search for the insurgents elsewhere, they blew up an elderly peasant
man with a home-made guerrilla explosive in an attempt to intimidate the comuneros
(Isbell 1992:69).
The Senderistas returned to the community soon after the soldiers left and tried
to organise a victory celebration, but they were rebuked by what was now a disaf-
fected population. They retreated once more into the hills. A couple of months later,
white flags symbolising rejection of the revolution were flown in Chuschi, birthplace
of Sendero’s armed struggle. The Chuschinos requested that a military post be estab-
lished in the community (ibid.).
3.4 The army unleashed
On 29 December 1982, the Peruvian armed forces were ordered by President Belaúnde
to enter Ayacucho and crush the Maoist rebellion. Just the previous day, his Minister
of War, General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, had made the optimistic statement to the
press that “the only thing I can assure you all is that in 1983 Ayacucho will be calm”
(quoted in DESCO 1989:90). What in fact followed were two years of unadulterated
violence; two years during which indiscriminate and brutal military repression was
repaid in kind by Shining Path, with terrible vengeance. To make matters worse, peas-
ant populations also began to attack each other in vicious reprisals for supposed
denunciations made either to the guerrillas or to the security forces. Witch-hunts aimed
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at rooting out presumed terrucos were unleashed on rival villages and adjacent dis-
tricts.19The result was a “dirty war” that left a multitude of orphans and widows, and
a grisly trail of mutilated corpses, abandoned villages, and mass graves that continue
to be discovered more than a decade later.
The fundamental problem with the military’s intervention was that Peru’s system
of national defence was designed to confront military threats from its international
neighbours; it simply was neither informatively nor organisationally prepared to han-
dle an insurrection (Tapia 1997:29; Kruijt 1996). Nevertheless, the Army anticipated
a swift counterinsurgency campaign of two months (DESCO 1989:91). Not realising
that they were dealing with an adversary which operated according to a revolution-
ary strategy that was altogether different from anything they had seen before, the mil-
itary expected to defeat the Shining Path insurrection in exactly the same manner as
it had the Cuban-inspired foco guerrilla movements in ’65 (Tapia 1997:27-32; see
Wickham-Crowley 1992).20 Consequently, General Clemente Noel Moral,
Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division and newly-appointed Chief of the Political-
Military Command (Jefe del Comando Político-Militar) in what was now a military
emergency zone,21 concentrated exclusively on the military aspects of the expedition
while neglecting to prepare any corresponding humanitarian measures with which to
attempt to win over the “hearts and minds” of the population (Tapia 1997:32). For
one thing, the force assembled was made up of conscripts from coastal departments
like Lima, Ica, Huánuco etc; it conspicuously excluded individuals from the emer-
gency zone itself. As Tapia observed,
This was a grave error, as would be demonstrated later. Military per-
sonnel who did not comprehend Quechua and less the culture and
idiosyncrasies of the inhabitants of the zone were not the most suit-
able to win the support of the population. The armed forces seemed
almost a foreign occupational force and in most cases acted as such
(1997:31. Emphasis in the original).
The absence of Ayacuchanos in the ranks of the military units that were dis-
patched to the region was a precaution taken not only because the armed forces
feared a massive infiltration (Tapia 1997:31), but also because the army’s mental atti-
tude towards the Ayacuchano population at the time was one of “presumption of sub-
version.” Indeed, it was widely believed in Peru that most Ayacuchanos—young and
old, male and female—were already either Senderista militants or, at the very least,
fervent sympathisers.22 There is ample evidence of the military’s strong prejudice
against the Ayacuchanos, and its erroneous assumptions about Shining Path, at the
most senior levels. For example, General Jorge Fernández Maldonado, co-founder of
military intelligence, once described Shining Path as having “[come] up among the
peasants” of Ayacucho (quoted in Kruijt 1994:55. My emphasis). It was mistaken and
distorted notions, such as these, about the origins and composition of Shining Path
that a few years later would lead one Sub-Lieutenant Telmo Hurtado Hurtado to
order his army patrol to massacre of 69 villagers (including women, children, and
elderly people) at Accomarca, on 14 August 1985. In the enquiry that followed, he
justified his actions to the investigative commission thus:
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As to the decision I have taken, I consider it to be correct....You do
not go through the actions of war that we live here [in Ayacucho]. You
do not have experience, nor see the situations that we endure
here....One can not trust a woman, an old man or a child....[The
rebels] begin to indoctrinate them from two years, three years, carry-
ing things,...little by little, by means of deceit, by punishments, they
win them over to their cause” (DESCO 1989:128. My emphasis).
Moreover, the long-established stereotyped image of Ayacuchanos as temperamentally
bellicose and inclined to rebellion certainly did nothing to dispel doubts about their
patriotism.23 What the military chiefs feared was that once Ayacuchanos were con-
scripted and armed, there would be nothing to guarantee that they would not turn
their weapons against their fellow soldiers and the State.
What would also prove to have significant future consequences was the fact that
neither President Belaúnde nor his successors ever issued a Presidential Directive pro-
viding guidelines for the conduct of the counterinsurgency forces.24 Hence, through-
out the entire period of Belaúnde’s presidency, each political-military commander was
left to decide for himself the character of the counterinsurgency campaign (Tapia
1997:32)—and the only thing to guide them was the knowledge that the President
and his military chiefs in Lima wanted to see military results. Given such unbridled
latitude of action, successive Jefes del Comando Político-Militar and field command-
ers between 1983 and 1985 directed a brutal campaign of indiscriminate repression,
in which tortures and massacres and disappearances were simply considered “part of
the cost” of restoring peace and order. Little concern, if any, was initially paid by the
fuerzas del orden (forces of order) to respecting human rights—as evidenced by the
dramatic rise in the number of civilian casualties in the first two years of armed forces
intervention.25
From the moment they set foot in the region, the Peruvian Marine Infantry
proved particularly vicious. The majority of these soldiers were criollos and mestizos
from coastal towns, and many of them regarded the men and women of Ayacucho’s
rural and popular urban classes with unabashed racist contempt, derogatorily calling
them cholos and cholas, which at the time was akin to calling an African-American a
“nigger.” Being the cream of the armed forces, the Marines were given the most chal-
lenging tasks and dispatched to areas presumed to be veritable “zonas rojas,” namely
the provinces of Huanta and La Mar, and the Apurímac River Valley. They proceed-
ed to wreak such terror and havoc on the civilian population in those areas as to cause
population displacements on a massive scale never before seen in the region.
If the guerrillas were the proverbial fish in water, then the Marines sought to
drain the pond. In some parts of the designated “red zones,” they compelled the
inhabitants of dispersed villages to relocate to strategic district or provincial capitals
(usually those in which a military base had been established), threatening to kill any-
one who defied this order by remaining in the countryside. Reminiscent of the logic
behind the American tactic of “strategic hamleting” in Vietnam, the Marines warned
that any persons staying in the hills would be regarded as terrorists and shot (see
Degregori 1996a). This tactic—which in effect amounted to a forced urbanisation—
was designed to deprive the guerrilla columns of any logistical support they might
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otherwise have received from the rural population. It also transformed the country-
side into a “killing zone.” The idea of a “killing zone” was that upon emptying the
campo of its inhabitants, anything found moving in it thereafter could be treated as
legitimate targets and wiped out, thus making field operations less complicated. The
problem was that many of the inhabitants of remote villages were understandably
reluctant to leave their humble homes and fields, for without them they had nothing
else in the world. Others were too old or otherwise unfit to travel. Furthermore,
orders to relocate to the strategic hamlets were not always conveyed to distant com-
munities, and the boundaries of any “killing zone” were always vague and shifting.
3.5 “Caught between the wall and the sword”: 
Tambo district, 1983-1984
As in other parts of La Mar and Huanta, when war came to Tambo district hundreds
of frightened villagers rapidly depopulated the countryside and flocked to the district
capital. “Caught between the wall and the sword,”26many fell victim to either guer-
rilla or military violence (see Appendix A). In the course of a decade, the number of
people living in Tambo’s rural countryside would drop from around 12,912 in 1981
to 7,090 in 1993. Conversely, the population living in and adjacent to the district cap-
ital would soar from 2,409 to over 4,770 inhabitants as hundreds of displaced peas-
ants poured in from the campo (INEI 1983b:54; INEI 1994b:623). Furthermore, a
comparison of the census figures suggests an overall decline of 23 percent in the dis-
trict’s total population between 1981 and 1993, as many town and country people
fled to other places of refuge in the country. The combination of military repression—
in 1983 and again in 1985—and intensifying guerrilla attacks in Tambo district com-
pelled its once-scattered rural population to concentrate in a small number of popu-
lation centres, especially around the district capital and in some of the larger villages
along the Tambo-San Francisco highway.
The small rural town of Tambo, capital of the district which shares the same
name, occupies a site that ever since pre-Inca times has served as an important gateway
and resting point for traffic between the ceja de la selva or la montaña (the high jun-
gle region, literally meaning “eyebrow of the jungle”) of the Apurímac River Valley and
the central region of Ayacucho. Situated at an altitude of 3,219 metres, the villa of
Tambo forms the hub at which the three main highways from San Miguel, Ayacucho,
and San Francisco converge.27 The town’s prosperity and importance grew during the
1960s and 1970s when the tropical valley of the Apurímac River became the only eco-
nomically buoyant part of the department of Ayacucho, producing and exporting com-
mercial crops such as fruits, coffee, cacao, nuts, and coca to neighbouring regions
(Degregori 1990:31). The district has historically been dominated by large landed
estates, of which there were as many as twenty-two in 1961 (Vilchez 1961:21-22). By
the end of the 1960s, however, most of these had been sold or abandoned by their
owners, who deemed sierra landholdings to be economically unprofitable and so con-
centrated instead on acquiring lucrative plots of commercial-agricultural land in the
Amazonian selva (Villacorta et al. 1984:58-59). During the 1970s, the agrarian reform
expropriated the few remaining large estates in the district, and their fields were dis-
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tributed either to neighbouring hamlets, or to the former peons who lived and worked
on them. By 1980, the majority of agriculturalists in the district, as indeed in the
province of La Mar as a whole, were small parcel holders.
When the Marines arrived in the district of Tambo in February 1983, they imme-
diately proceeded to round up scores of suspected terrorists in the district capital.
Many townspeople, particularly youths of high school age, were arbitrarily detained
by the Marine Infantry and the Guardia Civil on the flimsiest grounds, such as being
unable to produce identification, or having in their possession seemingly “subversive”
literature.28 “Most of those people were innocent civilians,” Raúl Palacios Hernández
told me in 1997.29 Don Raúl, as he is commonly called, is a former mayor of Tambo,
and one of the last pre-war townspeople still residing in Tambo. “The guilty ones, the
real Senderistas, they would have already escaped once they heard the soldiers were
coming.” The severe treatment they received at the hands of the military drove the
majority of Tambo’s urban families to flee to cities like Ayacucho, Ica, Huancayo, and
Lima. “They left Tambo in search, shall we say, of better refuge,” is how Don Raúl
described it. “They were replaced by the people who came down from the alturas,
and the product of their arrival were the pueblos jovenes.”
During the months of September and October 1983, the Marines conducted a
massive sweeping operation through the western half of the district. Platoons of heav-
ily armed Marines carefully combed the countryside, moving steadily in a northwest
direction towards the highlands of Iquicha, which armed guerrilla columns were
known to be routinely using as a vital corridor through which to move fighters and
supplies between the provinces of Huanta and La Mar. What makes it likely that this
military operation was part of a larger one aimed at impeding rebel activities in these
highlands was that just a few weeks earlier, Marine Infantry officers in Huanta dis-
trict began to reorganise the original Iquichano village defence groups there, which
had already existed since the end of 1982, into comités de defensa civil (Coronel,
1996:51). As the soldiers passed through the western half of Tambo’s rural country-
side they ransacked villages and set fire to homes.30 They also ordered the terrified
peasants to relocate to the district capital. Over the course of this military operation,
peasants caught fleeing in the direction of the punas of Huanta were immediately sus-
pected of being “terrucos” and summarily executed, though it is impossible to say
how many may have been killed. When sporadic killings turned into wholesale mas-
sacres, the trickle of terrified and dazed peasant arriving in the district capital turned
into a flood as most of the western half of the district was rapidly depopulated (see
Appendix A).31 The exodus from the countryside culminated on the morning of 29
November, 1983, in a huge crowd of frightened peasants gathering on a small pampa,
a kilometre to the west of the town. A few had animals or some other possessions
with them, but most had come with only the wet clothes on their backs. As light driz-
zle fell on the cold and hungry crowd huddling together tightly for warmth, the com-
manding officer of the Marine Infantry detachment occupying the district capital,
whose name some remember as Capitán Lagarto, swaggered up the hill towards them.
He cast a look of contempt and disgust at the multitude for some minutes before sud-
denly bellowing in Castellano:
You shits! If you want to live, if you want to remain alive, build your
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houses here. Stay right here. I don’t want any of you shits to escape
from me because you’re all terrorists, damn it! If you’re not terrorists,
then I want to see you all gathered together here, if you want to live,
if you love your families. But if you’re terrorists, if you want to die,
then run off to the hills and there I’ll hunt you down. And with my
rifle, damn it, I’ll kill you all!32
Made to choose between life and death, the desplazados that had gathered there from
ten separate rural communities set about constructing a new settlement that very day.
From these miserable beginnings was founded the district’s first multi-community
desplazado settlement of Ccarhuapampa.33 Over the coming months and years, the
population of Ccarhuapampa would swell with the arrival of newcomers from high-
land communities as far away as Uchuraccay and Iquicha.
According to the testimonies of various locals, it was soon after Ccarhuapampa
was built that Capitán Lagarto ordered its inhabitants to form a comité de defensa
civil (civil defence committee, CDC)—the very first one in the district. Although it
was created at the behest of the military, it was nevertheless the inhabitants of
Ccarhuapampa themselves who elected the committee members in a general assem-
bly. Once the committee members had been chosen by the populace, Captain Lagarto
endorsed the authority of the committee.34 Among the various CDC authorities were
eight comandos, each of whom was in charge of organising the defence of his own
separate sector of the settlement and its perimeter.35 It was a prudent measure, for
once Ccarhuapampa had created a comité de defensa civil it was only a matter of time
before the settlement began to incur Shining Path’s brutal reprisals.
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In 1985 a new spate of killings in the district’s northeast corner resulted in a new
wave of rural displaced persons. This time the perpetrators were Army soldiers, and
they were more selective in choosing their victims. Unlike what took place during the
Marine military operation two years earlier, however, on this occasion the soldiers did
not order the rural inhabitants to relocate to the district capital. They were mainly
interested in looking for arms caches and suspected militants. Consequently, but for
a handful of rural hamlets near the Ayna-Tambo border, few other villages in the dis-
trict’s central area were completely abandoned. Nevertheless, the violence meted out
by government troops in this instance was no less vicious than the first time round.
Consequently, some peasant families moved to one of the larger rural hamlets in the
district, while others sought refuge in the district capital, where they founded new
shantytowns (called pueblos jovenes), like Vista Alegre. In later years, they would be
joined by households from some of the villages in the central and eastern parts of the
district, seeking sanctuary this time from guerrilla violence.
Guerrilla attacks have been the other causal factor behind forced migrations in
Tambo district (see Appendix A). In contrast to the effects of military violence, spo-
radic guerrilla incursions on rural hamlets generally resulted in population displace-
ment not to the town, but rather to nucleated settlements in the rural countryside itself.
Guerrilla violence in the district peaked in 1984, and then diminished somewhat
between 1985 and 1986 before intensify once again after 1987 (see DESCO 1989,
Vol.II). From 1984 onwards, fear of attracting savage retribution from the security
forces resulted in a growing reluctance among rural communities to render assistance
to the rebel columns that routinely passed through the district. This merely exacerbat-
ed the frequency and intensity of guerrilla attacks against peasants. The growing num-
ber of village defence groups that were being created also provoked guerrilla incur-
sions. Rather than be displaced, however, many rural communities in the central and
northeast parts of the district decided to resist Sendero, and for this reason are today
commonly referred to as resistente communities. The populations of these nucleated
resistente communities literally swelled in size overnight as displaced villagers from
neighbouring communities relocated to these larger villages for mutual protection.
It soon became painfully obvious to these resistente communities that they could
not always rely on the security forces to protect them. In fact, guerrilla incursions in
the district continued despite the periodic military operations and patrols that were
carried out in the area. Acco Nuevo, a rural pueblo located just 3.5 km from the dis-
trict capital, was attacked three times in 1984, causing 30 of its 120 inhabitants to flee
to Tambo town. And at Challhuamayo, situated some 15 kilometres north of Tambo
town, three guerrilla attacks in the space of a week in September 1984 left over 50
peasants dead. Even the establishment of a military base in the district capital in 1987
failed to deter the guerrillas from continuing to attack outlying hamlets. The rugged
terrain and the poor state of the few dirt roads in the district meant that the guerrilla
fighters had sufficient time to attack a village and then get safely away before the sol-
diers or the police could arrive on the scene. Narrow footpaths and numerous precip-
itous drops to deep valleys also posed the danger of making it very easy to ambush mil-
itary or police relief columns. The security forces realised this and accordingly left
remote communities to their fate. Even if they could hear the sound of gunfire just a
short distance away, the soldiers in Tambo’s army base always feared being ambushed
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in the dark, and so rarely took the risk of venturing out to assist a beleaguered com-
munity at night. Rural resistente communities thus realised that any chance they had of
survival lay either in grouping together for mutual protection and organising comités
de defensa civil, or, alternatively, in cooperating with the guerrillas and accepting them
in their midst.
3.6 Strategic errors and changing patterns of political violence
The military’s ferocious and indiscriminate counterinsurgency campaign of 1983-84
dealt severe blows to the armed contingents of Sendero’s Comité Regional Principal.
The military repression even managed to dislodge Senderistas from some of their self-
declared “guerrilla zones.” According to Guzmán himself, the security forces managed
to kill around 1,800 of his followers during this period (Guzmán 1988). Yet despite
their high rate of kills, the security forces often made the mistake of failing to con-
solidate their gains in the countryside. By setting up counterinsurgency bases only in
provincial capitals and a few strategically important district capitals like Tambo—this
was a practical constraint dictated by a shortage of manpower—they unwittingly left
vast areas of the countryside unattended and, in effect, open for the guerrillas to
reassert their control. What frequently happened was that after security forces had
left an area, the guerrillas invariably returned and imposed themselves once again on
the population, punishing “collaborators” in the process (Tapia 1997:33-34). Thus in
spite of the heavy casualties inflicted by the security forces on the rebel rank and file
over 1983-84, the evidence actually suggests that they failed to effectively reduce
Shining Path’s scope of operations. In fact, guerrilla activity succeeded, for instance,
in disrupting the 1983 municipal elections, and even prevented elections from taking
place in 52 Ayacuchan districts—a phenomenal expansion from the original 19 dis-
tricts in which General Noel reckoned the rebels had a strong presence in December
1982 (Tapia 1997:34-35).
In addition, the harsh counterinsurgency measures applied by the security forces
were to prove counterproductive in one essential respect. Namely, the brutal repres-
sion alienated the civilian population from the security forces, and so dissipated the
anti-Sendero sentiment that was already growing among the peasantry even before
the arrival of government troops in the department. The consequence of this was to
effectively preclude or at least to delay the emergence of a popular backlash against
Sendero for most of the 1980s.
A change in the political-military commander in 1984 brought a corresponding
change in the direction of the counterinsurgency strategy, though only very briefly.
The new military chief of the emergency region was General Adrián Huamán
Centeno, a Quechua-speaking officer from Apurímac. Endowed with greater respect
for the local population and with a more sophisticated insight into the socioeconom-
ic complexities of the insurgency problem than his predecessor, General Huamán
advocated a new approach to counterinsurgency which placed more emphasis on
humanitarian aid and development—the “winning hearts and minds” style of coun-
terinsurgency—and less on armed repression. He explained the philosophy behind his
strategy thus in a personal interview with Dutch professor Dirk Kruijt:
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The government had ordered a curfew. That meant that people should
be at home from ten o’clock on. ‘For what reason?’ I asked myself.
One of the first things I did was to get back to normalcy. People want
to have the perspective of music, of dance, of a fiesta. Not of control.
What they want is confidence restored. Well, if I give them confidence
and security, I begin winning the war.36
During his short time as Jefe del Comando Político-Militar, he regularly dispatched
troops for “civic action” duty. In addition, he was particularly preoccupied with
organising civilian defence patrols, and made it a point to foster any spontaneous
local anti-insurgency initiatives. Consequently, the army’s civil defence project
received such popular support in the districts of Vinchos, Ocros, and Concepción that
on 4 August, as many as eight thousand peasants gathered in Vinchos to meet with
General Huamán, and to show that they had organised rondas campesinas in support
of his counterinsurgency strategy. The General declared to the press that these rondas
campesina and montonero groups had neither been assisted nor organised by the secu-
rity forces, and that “they have the right to defend themselves from the assassins
[Senderistas] with the arms they have in their hands” (quoted in DESCO 1989:110).
Five days later, twenty thousand peasants in Ocros and Concepción produced a doc-
ument stating that they had organised a Frente de Defensa Civil, a Civil Defence Front
(DESCO 1989:110). Both these massive demonstrations were precipitated by a series
of massacres perpetrated by guerrillas in these districts earlier that year.37 By the end
of 1984, Shining Path’s presence in Vinchos, Huamanga province’s largest district,
had been effectively neutralised owing to the existence of village defence patrols
(Tapia 1997:35).
For all its benefits and advantages, however, Huamán’s strategy was economical-
ly costly, and with the national economy in crisis the Belaúnde government was in no
financial position to adopt it (Obando 1998:389). A frustrated Huamán publicly crit-
icised the Joint Armed Forces Command and the government for seeming to prefer a
counterinsurgency plan that consisted simply of indiscriminate repressive force
against Ayacucho’s civilian population, particularly the peasantry. “The solution is not
a military one,” he declared in a television interview, “because if it were simply mili-
tary, I could resolve it in minutes....But that is not the solution” (quoted in DESCO
1989:111). The purely military approach, he argued, had already shown itself to be
counterproductive ever since the end of 1983, for it resulted only in the alienation of
the populace. In his view, the rebellion was a symptom of fundamental socioeconom-
ic problems that went deeper than politics.
What has Ayacucho gained from Independence and the Battle of
Ayacucho? What has it gained? The only thing that has been gained is
that Lima can be Peru and that in Ayacucho the people should die of
hunger. The solution for me is to correct the situation that
exists....The people understand perfectly when I request assistance.
And it is something positive, if we take seeds, fertilisers to them....
(quoted in DESCO 1989:112).
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He thus urged the government to come up with a counterinsurgency strategy that
included concrete measures to alleviate the poverty and improve the living conditions
of people in the war zones. Valuable and accurate though his critical insights were,
General Huamán’s public statements nevertheless caused embarrassment to a govern-
ment that was already under fire from the international community for the flagrant
abuse of human rights by its armed forces. A furious President Belaúnde sacked
Huamán on 18 August, after just eight months on the job, and replaced him with his
more conservative and conformist second in command, Colonel Wilfredo Mori Orzo.
Almost immediately, the disappearances and military massacres of civilians resumed
apace. Huamán would never again assume so senior a position of command. But his
enduring legacy has been to initiate a serious rethinking of counterinsurgency strate-
gy among senior commanders and subsequent civilian governments (Tapia 1997).
In 1985 the Marines were finally withdrawn from most parts of the department.
They were replaced by the conscript soldiers of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division,
many of whom were Quechua-speaking youths of humble rural backgrounds from
other Andean departments. In time, relations between the civilian population and the
military would begin to warm up, as the latter shifted their military strategy to a much
more selective repression. By the middle of the 1990s, the military’s new motto
would be “Más Desarrollo, Menos Represión.” But that was still in the future. In the
meantime, more blood had to flow under the bridge.
The brutal violence unleashed on the civilian population by the military was not
one-sided, however. For it was also in 1983 that guerrilla-perpetrated killings began
to take on a new pattern. Unlike the selective assassinations which were the trademark
of guerrilla violence in previous years, indiscriminate mass killings now became their
principal way of punishing “collaborators” and “treasonous” communities that
refused to cooperate, or had committed the supreme counterrevolutionary crime of
forming a village defence group. The first of these massacres took place on 3 April,
when guerrillas butchered forty-five comuneros at Lucanamarca (among them ten
children) and thirty-five in Huancasancos, Víctor Fajardo Province (DESCO
1989:99,856). In the space of just two months, similar mass killings of peasants were
carried out by Senderistas in Juquisa (Cangallo, 18 killed), Carhuanca (Cangallo, 11
killed), Llusita (Víctor Fajardo, 28 executed), San José de Secce (Huanta, 70 to 80
massacred), Uchuraccay (Huanta, 20 to 25 slaughtered), and so on (see DESCO
1989:99-101). These atrocities succeeded in intimidating most peasants into believ-
ing that cooperation with the guerrillas was the only way to survive. But for others,
such mass killings were tantamount to a declaration of war. Unable to rely on the
security forces to always protect them, a growing number of rural communities in cer-
tain areas of Ayacucho began to heed the army’s call to form civil defence groups.
3.7 Organisational structure and function of the peasant militias
Rondas campesinas. Comités de defensa civil. Montoneros. Defensa Civil
Antisubversiva. The multiplicity of names by which these groups have been called has
caused some confusion. Furthermore, Starn makes the important point of distin-
guishing between the original vigilante groups of northern Peru and the defence
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groups of the emergency zone, since both share the name “rondas campesinas” but
have completely distinct origins and missions (see Starn 1993:5-8). Why have the civil
defence groups in Peru’s emergency zone come to be known by the same name as the
rondas of the north? One possible explanation put forth by Starn and others is that
various high-ranking government and military officials, having been stung by allega-
tions from human rights groups of coercing peasants to participate actively in the
counterinsurgency project, consequently thought to re-baptise the Comités de
Defensa Civil with the name rondas campesinas in an effort to impart on them the
same aura of grassroots spontaneity and organisational autonomy that characterised
the northern peasant vigilante groups, which first emerged in Cajamarca in 1976
(ibid., Starn 1998:235-236). Be that as it may, the name has stuck is now part of the
counterinsurgency vernacular of the peasantry in Ayacucho, who are themselves well
aware of the differences between the two types of organisations. “Montoneros” is also
a popular label adopted by many of the village defence groups that have sponta-
neously emerged in the Mantaro Valley and the ceja de selva of the Apurímac Valley.
This is not so surprising given that from the La Breña campaign in the War of the
Pacific to the peasant uprisings of 1923 in La Mar, “montoneros” is a name that
armed peasant bands in Peru’s central highlands have commonly come to call them-
selves (see Mallon 1983, 1995; Cárdenas López 1982:83-84).
When, from 1984 onwards, the army began to take an active role in forming new
village defence groups, or assuming authority over existing ones, they gave all such
groups the official title of Comités de Defensa Civil Antisubversiva (CDCs), in un-
official recognition of the role they were expected to play in the counterinsurgency
struggle. The labels Ronderos and Montoneros continued to be used in reference to
the individual members of the civil defence groups. As we will see in the next chap-
ter, however, various military commanders have at times found the idea of civil
defence groups utterly distasteful, and have even actively opposed or hindered them.
Their right to exist would not be assured until the following decade, when the gov-
ernment would pass a law officially recognising them.
The manner in which defence groups were created has been influential in the
degree of voluntary cooperation between individual civil defence committees within a
given area. Where civil defence groups were created by force and imposed on reluc-
tant local populations, interpersonal or group conflicts and disputes have sometimes
subsequently arisen between distinct committees. In many instances, the counterinsur-
gency struggle—or, conversely, the revolutionary war—has served as a convenient
excuse for civilians to settle private vendettas violently, and often with impunity. In
such circumstances, broader inter-communal cooperation in the tasks of vigilance and
mutual defence were practically impossible, with the result being that the civil defence
groups of rival communities would patrol only within their own communal bound-
aries, occasionally crossing over to neighbouring districts only to attack each other. But
in strategic areas of the emergency zone, like Tambo, where the idea of village defence
had generally come to be accepted by the inhabitants, and where the common neces-
sity of self-defence has been able to supersede local conflicts and myriad cleavages, the
military has made efforts to encourage greater coordination and mutual support
between the civil defence groups of separate villages. Furthermore, in places where
military base were located, the amount of moral and military assistance provided by
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the soldiers to the local CDCs greatly influenced the extent to which there was local
enthusiasm and support for the civil defence project. Later chapters in this book pro-
vide clear illustrations of these points.
The basic level of organisation for the civil defence committee was the rural vil-
lage. A civil defence committees at this level is called a comité de base. Each comité
de base was directed by a junta directiva whose members, at least in the early years,
were often directly appointed by the local military commander. This was done either
to ensure that trustworthy local individuals were leading the militia, or simply to pick
leaders from reluctant villagers, none of whom would otherwise have volunteered for
the job. At other times and in other places, the junta directiva of the defence com-
mittee was democratically elected by the populace, and its authority status within the
community endorsed by the local military commander, as in Ccarhuapampa.
Although in later years the rural defence groups would come to achieve a sophisti-
cated degree of sub-regional coordination, for most of the 1980s they were neither
coordinated nor did they function beyond the district level.
In my interviews with various militia commanders and ordinary peasants in
Tambo district, I was often told that in the early years of civil defence in the district
it was the men who normally did the patrolling, while the women and the elderly
more commonly performed auxiliary tasks like food preparation, cleaning, tending
animals, sewing clothes etc.38 When a settlement was attacked by guerrillas, however,
every member—man or woman, old or young—who was able to wield a makeshift
weapon was expected participate in defending the community. Men, women, the eld-
erly, and even older children had to make do with anything that could serve as a
weapon—farming tools, sticks, stones, anything. Peasant women were even known to
use slings with devastating accuracy, carrying their ammunition of stones in the folds
of their skirts.39 But even in the hands of courageous individuals, such primitive
weapons proved no match against the modern arms of the guerrillas. Confrontations
between guerrillas and ronderos often resulted in a staggering loss of life for the lat-
ter. In addition, the leaders of the comités de defensa civil and their families were
specifically targeted for assassination or cruel torture by the guerrillas as an example
to the rest of the community. Militarily speaking, therefore, the majority of CDCs in
Ayacucho’s sierra region remained weak for most of the decade owing primarily to
the ineffectiveness of their homemade weapons, and little support from the army. It
was for much the same reason that village defence groups generally restricted them-
selves to mainly defensive actions. Although the army pushed CDCs to make
patrolling part of their daily activities, many ronderos were reluctant to do so for fear
of being ambushed. Instead, they preferred to wait for an attack behind the fortified
walls of their settlements, where they stood a better chance of fighting off the enemy.
3.8 The creation of Comités de Defensa Civil:
consent and resistance
We have already seen that in places like the Iquichan uplands of Huanta and the dis-
tricts of Vinchos, Ocros and Concepción it was the local population itself that spon-
taneously created their own village defence forces, without influence from the mili-
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tary. Once the military had established themselves in the emergency zone, however,
they began to press rural communities into organising comités de defensa civil, sub-
ordinated to and working in coordination with military command. The Marine
Infantry were particularly zealous in this regard. Even pre-existing village defence
groups were transformed into CDCs, which is what the Marines did when they
arrived at the nucleated Iquichano community of Ccarhuahurán in August 1983
(Coronel 1996:50-51; Coronel 1993:49). Each of the eight distinct communities that
were grouped together in Ccarhuahurán “maintained their own authorities—presi-
dent, secretary, treasurer, and spokesmen, as well as their own respective Comité de
Defensa Civil—which coordinated with those of Ccarhuahurán’s, and these, in turn,
with the officers of the military base” (Coronel 1996:51).
Yet in spite of the forceful impetus provided by the army, the expansion of the
civil defence groups in Ayacucho proceeded very slowly during the 1980s. For vari-
ous reasons, the idea of communal defence encountered either extensive opposition
or limited, lukewarm compliance in many parts of Ayacucho. This was especially so
in the neighbouring department of Huancavelica. In the Huanta Valley, the emergence
and growth of a civil defence apparatus was strongly resisted by the population up
until 1989, owing to the estranged relationship between the civilian inhabitants and
the army arising from the military repression brutally carried out in the valley during
1983-84 (Coronel 1993:49). Nor has the civil defence phenomenon really taken hold
in the Pampas River region, which is an area characterised by long-established inde-
pendent peasant communities. Fiercely keen to assert their independence from State
authorities, the majority of Pampas communities appear to have focused instead on
rallying around their established community authorities and traditional social institu-
tions, rather than adopting civil defence committees dominated by the army. In many
other parts of Ayacucho, though, the main reason for local reluctance to form civil
defence groups simply boiled down to the fear of attracting savage guerrilla reprisals
for doing so. With nothing to fight with except literally sticks and stones, many com-
munities simply lacked conviction that they could actually repulse guerrilla attacks
(see Coronel and Loayza 1992:528-529). It was therefore better not to attract them
in the first place. As we shall see, this attitude changed a few years later when subse-
quent Peruvian governments began to provide the rural civil defence groups with
firearms.
Of course, initial local opposition to the creation of civil defence committees did
not deter the security forces from trying to coerce rural villagers into forming them.
Occasionally accompanied by the militias of neighbouring communities, military
patrols have been known to pressure recalcitrant villages using tactics of violence and
terror (Degregori 1997:49; Isbell 1990:11-12; Americas Watch 1992:9). Neutrality
was neither permitted by the military or by Sendero, and sometimes not even by
neighbouring peasant communities. Any reluctance to organise community self-
defence was interpreted taken by the security forces as tacit support for Shining Path
(Isbell 1990:11-12; Americas Watch 1992). Some peasant communities therefore
decided to organise a village defence force if only to relieve the pressure of military
repression. Communities that were obliged to form self-defence patrols would some-
times try to forestall guerrilla reprisals by purposely avoiding confrontations with any
Shining Path columns that routinely passed through their territory. The Maoists, on
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the other hand, were not interested in coming to terms with the civil defence patrols,
and it was the communities which had organised such groups that Shining Path guer-
rillas specifically targeted for pitiless annihilation. 
3.9 Counterinsurgency advantage lost
The military’s ferocious counterinsurgency offensive of 1983-84 forced Shining
Path’s forces in Ayacucho into a general retreat, often over the borders into neigh-
bouring departments. But the situation was to change again over the next four years,
resulting in the greatest crisis the civil defence movement would ever face. In fact, the
momentum gained during the period of harsh and indiscriminate repression would
eventually be lost owing to a steady worsening of strained relations between the
armed forces and the new APRA government of Alan García.40 The ensuing political
crisis was such that as the civil war dragged on unrelentingly into its eighth year, the
Peruvian government seemed no closer to crushing the insurgency than when it had
entrusted the task to the military in the final days of 1982. From the original handful
of provinces in Ayacucho that were placed under a state of emergency in October
1981, seven years later the emergency zone had grown to nearly eight departments,
wherein the constitutional freedoms and guarantees of nearly nine million Peruvians
remained indefinitely suspended (DESCO 1989:347-362).
The events that were to lead to an almost complete paralysis of the counterinsur-
gency struggle began with the inauguration of a new national president on 28 July
1985. When Alan García Pérez put on the presidential sash, he was determined to re-
establish the primacy of civilian authority over the armed forces, for civilian author-
ity had become greatly eroded during his predecessor’s term in office. “[García] did
not wish to fall into the same trap as Belaúnde in being seen to abdicate responsibil-
ity to the military in counter-insurgency and other matters. On the contrary, he pub-
licly sought to assert that authority [in his constitutional role as commander-in-chief
of the armed forces]” (Crabtree 1992:109). Moreover, while he affirmed his govern-
ment’s commitment to defending democracy against terrorism, he also solemnly
pledged to end the “guerra sucia” (dirty war) and to respect human rights—even those
of the “terrorists.” To this end, he specifically called on the military to respect human
rights and warned that those found guilty of violating them would not go unpunished.
It is important to point out that while the election of an APRA government may
have caused some concern among a few conservative officers in the armed forces, on
the whole the reception that the new government received from the military was pos-
itive. “The old military antipathy for APRA was a thing of the past, being effectively
buried with the reforms of General Velasco and the subsequent collaboration between
Apristas and the military during the transition to constitutional rule” (Crabtree
1992:108). The straining of relations did not take long in coming, however. One of
the first triggering factors was the discovery of mass graves at Accomarca
(Vilcashuamán province) and Pucayacu (Huanta province) in August 1985. The mili-
tary’s subsequent attempt to cover them up provided García with the opportunity to
make good his pledge to crack down on any human rights violations perpetrated by
his security forces. A government investigation into the massacres resulted in the sack-
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ing of high-ranking military officers, namely Generals César Enrico Praeli (President
of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces), Sinesio Jarama (Chief of II Región
Militar),41 and Wilfredo Mori (Political-Military Commander of the Emergency Zone)
(DESCO 1989:124-126). In reference to these incidents, President García declared in
a speech before the United Nations on 23 September 1985 that “barbarity must not
be fought with barbarity” (quoted in DESCO 1989:130).
Alan García’s government sought to tackle the insurgency problem by adopting a
strategy that emphasised socioeconomic development rather than military repression.
This approach initially found substantial support among military officers, as it did
when attempted by General Adrian Huamán back in 1984. “As of September 1985
the military started to hold back on military operations and more attention was given
to military public works programmes” (Crabtree 1992:110). Yet the coherent, com-
prehensive counterinsurgency strategy which the government promised to present to
the military never materialised. As time went on, the government’s “desarrollista”
(“developmentalist”) approach to counterinsurgency came to naught, and had in fact
already petered out by the start of 1987 due to a lack of sufficient financial support
from the central government.
Furthermore, the military eventually came to see itself faced not only with an
indifferent and unsupportive government that seemed intent on tying their hands in
the fight against subversion, but also with a President that showed no qualms about
expressing what appeared to be outright sympathy for the insurgency. García’s
attempts to court and to appease radical leftists—meeting, for instance, with captured
MRTA leader Víctor Polay, and a delegation from the FMLN—merely incensed sen-
ior military officers (Tapia 1997:41). And the distress they increasingly felt with the
President’s apparent flaccid determination to fight the insurgency was simply height-
ened by his expressions of personal admiration for Sendero Luminoso’s “mystique,”
as García declared at the VII Congreso Nacional de la Juventud Aprista held in
Ayacucho in 1988.
I believe that we must look at this entire phenomenon that is centred
here and that from here emerged. We must look at it so as to value the
good that it has, not just to insult or to confront it....Wrong or not,
criminal or not, the Senderista has that which we do not: mys-
tique....These are people who deserve our respect and my personal
admiration because they are, whether one likes it or not, compañeros,
they are militants. Fanatics they call them. I believe they have mys-
tique and this is part of our self-criticism, compañeros, to know how
to recognise, mistaken or not, that whoever submits to death, whoev-
er surrenders life is one who has mystique (quoted in DESCO
1989:173-174).
Relations between García and the military soured yet further when he decided to
merge the military ministries of the three branches of the armed forces—Navy, Air
Force, Army—into a single cabinet post within the Defence Ministry.42 The possibili-
ty of ending up with a civilian minister in control of the armed forces was regarded
by the military as not only a threat to their autonomy, but also as an attempt by the
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government to apristizar the military. “The Defence Ministry issue therefore rekin-
dled old anti-Aprista animosities, and prompted the question of whether or not the
government was seeking to alter the relationship between the civilian authorities and
the military, as established in 1980” (Crabtree 1992:112).
Although García’s actions and policies did nothing to win the love of the armed
forces, his popularity among common Peruvians nevertheless remained high during
his first two years in office. For one thing, he was initially successful at reducing infla-
tion. A boom in the demand for food in the cities, caused to a large extent by the mas-
sive influx to urban areas of war refugees from the highlands, helped to stimulate
national food production. Although the sharp rise in prices for basic food crops, like
potato, had little to do with the Agriculture Ministry’s price support schemes, the
APRA government was nevertheless able to benefit from the positive public opinion
generated by an improvement in rural incomes and economic conditions.
Furthermore, his populist, anti-imperialist political style charmed a population look-
ing for an external cause on which to blame their misfortunes and miseries (Tapia
1997:40). His policy of “zero-interest” loans to the poor peasantry in the emergency
zone,43 in addition to the short-lived rimanacuy meetings with peasants to discuss
their most pressing needs, were innovative new steps designed to steer the counterin-
surgency strategy away from a purely military trajectory. Moreover, the marked
reduction in the total number of political victims during his first two years in office
brought him widespread praise, both internationally and at home. Although it may
have appeared that the lower death toll in the early years of the APRA government
was in correspondence to a concomitant rise in GNP, in fact it had more to do with
the winding down of the military’s hitherto brutal and indiscriminate counterinsur-
gency campaign that with the coincidental general improvement in economic condi-
tions (Tapia 1997:40).
It should not be forgotten that a high percentage of the total number of deaths in
the period of high political violence in 1983-84 can be attributed to government
forces. Hence the subsequent drop in the number of civilian victims between 1984
and 1985 was actually a reflection of the curtailment of state repression, rather than
of a diminution of guerrilla violence. Actually, the number of recorded guerrilla
attacks increased nationwide between 1985 and 1988, particularly in Lima and in the
departments of Junín and Puno (see DESCO 1989:24-29). And the number of sol-
diers and policemen killed by Shining Path actually rose over this period, as did the
total number of local authorities murdered.
The apparent decline in guerrilla activity in the northern provinces of the depart-
ment of Ayacucho (previously the epicentre of Shining Path’s operations) was a natu-
ral consequence of guerrilla expansion to other parts of the country. As Tapia notes,
owing to the Senderista retreat to other zones of the country, where, for the lack of
military presence and a combination of other factors, they managed to develop them-
selves counting on ample freedom of action and without the need of bloody con-
frontations. In this way, during those years SL began to establish itself in the depart-
ment of Junín and the Huallaga Valley, although also in Puno and the sierra [region]
of the departments of La Libertad and Ancash; to a lesser degree, in Piura, Cajamarca
and the provinces of the department of Lima (1997:40).
In contrast to the relative economic and political stability achieved by the García
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administration in its first two years in power, 1988 saw a dramatic reversal in the gov-
ernment’s fortunes as the country began to spiral into economic and political chaos
for which there would be no respite until the early 1990s. Although the opportunity
had existed to generate greater benefits for the agricultural sector by capitalising on
the demand-led boom for food in 1986, “the problem,” as Crabtree points out, “was
that lack of detailed policy coordination, coupled with the lack of forward planning
for agriculture and for the economy as a whole, meant that the boom proved impos-
sible to sustain” (1992:57). As demand for basic foodstuffs began to outstrip supply,
the government feared a food shortage in the cities and responded by increasing
imports. This policy not only “contributed directly to the balance of payments diffi-
culties which surfaced in 1987,” but also helped to weaken domestic production by
deepening the country’s dependence on imports (Crabtree 1992:57).
By decade’s end the country’s cash reserves were less than zero; uncontrolled
hyperinflation soared, peaking at 7,649 percent in 1989 (Klarén 2000:423); wide-
spread resentment and public mistrust towards the APRA government was growing.
And whereas at first his popular “zero interest” financial loans to the peasantry
seemed an effective non-military way to counter the insurgency, in the end it may
actually have assisted rather than harmed Shining Path. According to the militia leader
known as Comandante Huayhuaco, 
The Agrarian Bank started to give money to the peasants at zero inter-
est. But then what happened? Sendero said in the first instance, said
to the peasants, ‘Nobody may take money from the bank! It’s a strat-
egy of the dying reactionary government.’ But then later Sendero said
‘Take the money, but give one part to Sendero [as a revolutionary
tax].’ So they took the money indiscriminately, in an excessive way.
And in this way the terrorists themselves came to be moneylenders!
The government’s money lending scheme became a failure....”44
As we shall later see, it would take a new President, new political rules, and a new,
radically different economic policy to drag the country out of the quagmire which
was partly of the APRA government’s making.
Most disturbing, however, was the fact that in 1988 Shining Path decided to sig-
nificantly escalate its armed struggle in order to force a military stalemate with the
armed forces—an objective which they now appeared to be on the verge of achiev-
ing. Not only had the momentum in the counterinsurgency campaign been lost when
García swung to an almost exclusively desarrollista approach. Increasingly strained
relations with what the military perceived was an unsupportive (and even antagonis-
tic) APRA government also led them to relax their crackdown on the insurgents
between 1986 and 1988.45 In many volatile areas of the emergency zone, the military
reduced their patrols in the countryside, and were reluctant to engage the rebels.
Afraid, perhaps, that any action on their part might be construed by the politicians as
a violation of human rights, the soldiers literally withdrew to their barracks and bases
(del Pino 1993:82). “The military,” observed Tapia, “felt that the government was
indicating to them what things they should not do, without receiving the indispensa-
ble directives that might define the strategic orientation of their action” (1997:39.
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Original emphasis). Amidst the political chaos, the morale of the armed forces plum-
meted, which precipitated mounting desertions (see Strong 1992:158-160). Shining
Path took advantage of the lull in the pressure to consolidate their presence in other
regions of Peru, and to win back lost ground in strategic areas of the south-central
highlands (del Pino 1993b:82). It was the civil defence committees in particular that
bore the brunt of intensified guerrilla violence in the immediate years after 1987 (see
DESCO 1989, Vols. I & II). By 1988, the nation faced a seemingly bleak and uncer-
tain future. Yet unbeknown to the majority of Peruvians and foreign observers, impor-
tant developments were taking place in the Apurímac River Valley, the repercussions
of which would change the entire course of the civil war.
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For primary examples of these kinds of disputes, see the references to archival documents for the
peasant community of Challhuamayo, cited at the end of this book.
9 Evidence of land disputes between kin is presented in this book in References, Archival Sources,
Archivo del Ministerio de Agricultura de la Región ‘Libertadores Wari’ [Ayacucho], esp. 1950.
10 This was consistently repeated in the testimonies and opinions given to me in 1997 by Rubén Rojas
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22 “We were accused of being terrorists in a very dismissive way by Lima people,” explained Cesareo
Ayala, a returnee from Huambalpa, Ayacucho, who had lived as a refugee in a shantytown in Lima
(quoted in Kirk 1995:357).
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Comisión Especial de Pacificación del Senado (Comisión Bernales) places the death toll at 8,662
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least four of  these communities—Balcón, Polanco, Unión Minas, and Yuracc-yacu—had already
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34 Author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
General of Tambo district’s Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo, on 31 May 2000. This
information is also based on author’s interviews with Eusebio and Felix, longtime residents of
Ccarhuapampa on 16 November 1997.
35 Author’s interview with Eusebio and Felix on 16 November 1997.
36 Quoted in Kruijt 1991:109. 
37 Massacres took place in Ocros on 20 April 1983 (18 peasants killed), on 17 January 1984 (15 peas-
ants killed), and again on 3 February 1984 (17 killed); and in Vinchos on 28 March 1984 (30 assas-
sinated), and once again on 2 June 1984 (4 killed) (see DESCO 1989:100-107).
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39 Information from interview with District Committee of Club de Madres of Tambo, on 16 October
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40 For a sound assessment of the performance of the APRA government of President Alan García in
the light of the problems which it inherited upon assuming power in July 1985, see Crabtree
(1992).
41 The II Región Militar comprised the departments of Lima, Ica, Ancash, Ayacucho, Huancavelica,
Cerro de Pasco, Huánuco, and Junín (Tapia 1997:29).
42 Shortly after becoming president, García also initiated a reorganization and unification of the var-
ious branches of the police force, “involving the dismissal of senior police officers suspected of cor-
rupt activities” (Crabtree 1992:109).
43 With respect to these loans, Crabtree points out that “[the] benefits of low-cost finance to agricul-
ture tended to be more evenly dispersed than the programme of subsidies, reaching a wider range
of producers....[But while] large sums were devoted to expanding rural credit, much of it contin-
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44 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
45 In an interview with the magazine Oiga (No. 315, 2 March 1987), Army General Luis Cisneros
Vizquerra, the Minister of War during the Belaúnde administration in the first half of the 1980s,
once said of García’s management of the counterinsurgency struggle: “I notice a duality between
the government and the party in government with regard to the subversion problem. So as not to
lose votes, so as not to lose popularity, so as not to clash with the Left, I notice that there is a
political desire to coexist with the subversion, of not putting an end to them definitively” (quot-
ed in DESCO 1989:611).
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4 The DECAS and the struggle for the 
Apurímac Valley
Owing to its Amazonian terrain and agricultural richness, the valle del río Apurímac was
for Sendero Luminoso a region of immense strategic and economic value. Yet it was not
given up freely by its inhabitants. The inevitable result was that it became one of the
bloodiest contested grounds in the entire emergency zone. Apart from this, the Apurímac
River Valley would also be the birthplace of what was to become the most developed and
effective form of peasant resistance to guerrilla domination: the Defensa Civil
Antisubversiva or DECAS. The DECAS were the first militias to achieve a truly coordi-
nated network of defence that encompassed an entire region. They were also pioneers in
developing highly sophisticated and effective counterinsurgency tactics with which to
beat the Maoist guerrillas at their own game. In addition, their control over an econom-
ically productive region of marketable cash crops provided them with the unique ability
to acquire potent firearms and other modern weapons of war, as well as to financially
support (at least in part) the eventual expansion of their organisation into other regions
of Ayacucho. This chapter describes and examines the deadly struggle waged for control
of this strategic region, and the development of an organisation that would ultimately
prove crucial in turning the tide of civil war.
4.1 Migration, colonization, and class conflict 
in the Apurímac River Valley
In 1981, the population of the Apurímac Valley was approximately 40,000. By decade’s
end, however, the inhabitants of the valley numbered well over 85,000 (del Pino
1996:122). The vast majority of these people were refugees displaced by political vio-
lence from the Andean areas of Huanta, Tambo, and San Miguel. It really was not sur-
prising that they ended up in this sub-tropical river valley, where the borders of the
departments of Ayacucho, Junín, and Cuzco converge. Many of them already owned
small plots of cultivated land in the ceja de selva, or had worked at least once in their life
as a peón (itinerant labourer) on a plantation.
Coca, which grows well in the Apurímac Valley, has for centuries drawn people from
other parts of Ayacucho and Peru to this region. During the colonial period, the lucra-
tive coca market among the indigenous population did not pass unnoticed by Spanish
entrepreneurs, who tried to secure a hegemonic position in its production and trade.
“Already since the founding of Huamanga [in the first half of the sixteenth century], the
Indians, they chewed coca; and so, the Spanish, Huamanguinos and residents of the cejas
de las montañas of Tambo and Huanta cultivated coca....” (Vilchez 1961:44). And for
most of the first half of the nineteenth century, peasants from the punas of Huanta pos-
sessed extensive coca fields in the Apurímac Valley and were important and influential
coca traders in the Ayacucho region (see Mendez 1996, O’Higgins 1953). But it was not
until the beginning of the twentieth century, with the intensification of the cash-crop
economy, that the large-scale colonization of the Apurímac Valley began. 
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Source: after del Pino 1998:165
The first highland colonists to arrive in the valley in the second half of the nine-
teenth century came from Huanta province. Their stay in the valley was usually tem-
porary, and the colonists maintained social and cultural links with their highland com-
munity of origin. “The migrants, above all the men, continued linkages to their rela-
tions and to their communal obligations, conserving their cultural concerns” (del Pino
1996:124). Large landowners also began to establish themselves in the Apurímac
Valley at about the same time. They started to claim huge tracts of land for their com-
mercial plantations and, in the process, often ended up dispossessing and creating
conflict with the peasant smallholders, and with the valley’s original native Asháninka
inhabitants. Del Pino tells us that on these plantations “the workforce basically com-
prised of peons transferred from the sierran haciendas, since in many cases the own-
ers of transferred haciendas in the valley maintained their properties in the heights of
Huanta and Tambo” (ibid.).
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Demand for aguardiente (cane alcohol) prompted a sugar cane boom in the
1920s. Aguardiente, along with coca, was commonly used by hacendados of the sier-
ra as a form of payment to their peons. Stimulated by international market demands,
the valley experienced other booms in subsequent decades. Cube, from which is
extracted a chemical substance used in industrial insecticides, became the important
export cash crop during the 1940s and ‘50s. The coffee boom of the 1960s brought
a high demand for labourers, which consequently accelerated and intensified migra-
tion from the highlands to the valley. Until 1983, the valley’s most important and
extensively cultivated cash crops were cacao, coffee, fruits, peanut, cube, and coca.
The completion of the Ayacucho-Tambo-San Francisco highway in 1964, and the
construction of two airstrips the previous decade on the haciendas Teresita and
Luisiana, greatly improved access to the valley and enhanced its links to external mar-
kets, vitalizing the economy yet further. Del Pino notes that “The highway not only
influenced the formation of new population centres and in the multiplication of the
fairs, but that it generalised monetary exchange in replacement of barter. There
arrived accompanying the first cars a multitude of petty traders and merchants”
(1996:125). From about the 1950s onwards, the Apurímac River Valley became the
unique dynamic hub of agriculture and commerce in what was otherwise one of the
poorest departments in Peru (Degregori 1990:31). As such, it has long been one of
the most important destinations for thousands of highland migrants in the depart-
ment of Ayacucho.
Prosperity in the valley, however, was limited mainly to the elites: the large com-
mercial landowners and the rich intermediary merchants and traders. Indeed, built
where they were—on an hacienda—the airstrips brought substantial benefits only to
the hacienda’s owners and their business associates, but not the to general population.
Living conditions were poor, and basic services were virtually non-existent. In fact,
there existed only one rural hospital and one doctor for the entire valley up until the
late 1970s (Degregori 1989b:28).
Not surprisingly, the rival interests of various competing economic actors has,
over the past decades, stirred up class tensions and conflicts. For instance, wealthy
merchants who had migrated to the valley from Ayacucho, Junín, and Lima in the
1960s would frequently provide cash loans to peasant smallholders in exchange for
the exclusive right to purchase the debtor’s harvest. The creditor would, of course,
later set his own low buying price. The peasants and peones suffered other injustices
at the hands of the merchants and the large landowners. They were routinely paid low
prices or wages for their produce or their labour, and often cheated at the weighing
scales. Violence was at times even used by middlemen to pressurize the peasants to
sell their produce at below the normal market price (del Pino 1996:126). Class enmi-
ty would later play into the hands of Shining Path, making it easier for them to gar-
ner supporters and sympathisers among the peasants in the Apurímac Valley. But as
we shall see below, these long-standing class animosities would also feed the flames of
violence as antagonistic groups tried to enlist the help of either the guerrillas or the
security forces in settling private vendettas.
Organized peasants formed three agrarian cooperatives between 1970 and 1971:
the Unión Selvática, the Río Apurímac, and El Quinacho. Although at their peak the
cooperatives came to have approximately 3,600 members between them, they appar-
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ently ultimately failed to meet peasant demands and expectations. “For that reason,
starting from 1980 the farmers preferred to return to selling their products to partic-
ular merchants, whose power resurged” (del Pino 1996:126). The Federación
Campesina del Valle del Río Apurímac (FECVRA) was formed in May 1976. During
its relatively short existence, it would grow to become one of the largest and most
influential peasant organizations in the entire department, uniting more than 100
peasant unions (Degregori 1990:196). FECVRA helped to destroy the commercial
monopoly of the wealthiest and most powerful cube merchants in the valley in 1982.
More than just a labour organization, it also responded to government neglect by
embarking on projects aimed at fostering local socioeconomic development. “The
unions constructed communal areas, schools, first aid posts, repaired bridges and
roads, offered training lectures, solved disputes between husband and wife. They fre-
quently also had to confront police abuses” (Degregori 1989b:28).
When the political violence that was sweeping through the Ayacuchan sierra spilt
into the Apurímac Valley, FECVRA found itself attacked from both sides—by securi-
ty forces and as well as by Shining Path militants. Caught between these two hostile
forces, the federation rapidly began to fall apart. Shining Path took to destroying the
property of its members and threatening their lives when it found itself unable to seize
control of the organisation from within. By the end of 1982, guerrillas had already
murdered two FECVRA leaders (del Pino 1993b:56). For their part, the police—tra-
ditional allies of the large landowners and wealthy merchants—constantly harassed
FECVRA members, often accusing them of being involved in drug trafficking. When
Shining Path militants and their peasant supporters burned down the store belonging
to Edmundo Morales, the largest cube monopolist in the small town of Santa Rosa,
on 29 October 1982, the merchants pinned the blame on FECVRA’s leadership. As a
result, some were incarcerated by the police, despite lack of evidence (Degregori
1989b:28). But it was soon after the federation’s president, Julio Orozco Huamaní,
was disappeared in August 1983—witnesses claimed to have seen the Marines take
him to their headquarters at Luisiana—that FECVRA dissolved completely (Degregori
1989b:28). By the end of the year, many of FECVRA’s leaders had been murdered,
imprisoned, or had fled in fear from the valley.
4.2 Revolution, repression, and the seeds of counter-rebellion
The first Shining Path militants arrived in the Apurímac Valley in the middle of 1982.
Numbering less than a dozen political cadres at first, their primary objective was to
establish links between Shining Path’s forces in the highlands of Huanta and La Mar
and the valley’s local population, which the Party was determined to transform into
its “mass support base” (del Pino 1996:132). They fanned out through the valley,
preaching revolution and trying to enlist peasant support. By the end of the year, they
were joined by guerrilla fighters arriving from the sierra. The Senderistas lost no time
in embarking on an aggressive campaign of bombing and burning property, and assas-
sinating local government officials, trade union leaders, and anyone else they deemed
to be impeding the advance of the revolution. In the jungle hamlet of Mongoy
(Chungui district), for instance, rebels publicly executed three uncooperative local
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authorities in December 1982, replacing them afterwards with their own commis-
saries (del Pino 1996:137). What is more, the Senderistas encouraged the population
to break off all relations with the external market, to stop growing commercial crops,
and to produce solely for subsistence in what Shining Path called “economía de guer-
ra” (del Pino 1993b:55). “For Sendero, the production of coffee, cacao, barbasco, etc.
only enriched the ‘people of wealth’” (ibid.).
Over the next two years, unimaginable terror gripped the valley. When the
Apurímac Valley fell within the scope of the declared emergency zone, security forces
arrived and promptly unleashed their own wave of terror. “Bodies in varying states of
decay floated daily down the river” (del Pino 1995a:377). Caught between two fires,
the valley’s peasants became the main target of indiscriminate violence. House-to-
house searches and arbitrary arrests, abductions and summary executions became
commonplace. War touched not only the adults. In the town of Santa Rosa, the inhab-
itants were powerless to stop the periodic forced recruitment of their children by
Shining Path’s armed columns (del Pino 1996:139).1 “The confusion of the popula-
tion was immediate; but they were left with no other option than to continue collab-
orating for fear of the Senderista terror” (del Pino 1993b:57).
On the other hand, the onslaught unleashed by government forces in the emergency
zone halted temporarily the rapid expansion that Shining Path had been enjoying ever
since 1980. Rebel forces in Ayacucho were put to flight from many of their self-declared
“liberated zones,” but Shining Path was far from beaten. Retreating guerrilla forces sim-
ply sought refuge in other regions where weaker military presence allowed them to
nurse their wounds and recuperate their strength in tranquil secrecy. From the Apurímac
Valley, rebel columns did not have far to travel for safe haven from the Marine and
Army patrols that regularly combed the valley. For within the valley, the borders of three
highland departments converge. Yet not all of these departments were at the time under
a state of emergency. While the breadth of military operations was limited by the bor-
ders of the emergency zone, the movement of guerrilla forces was not.2 And so in order
to find rest and sanctuary, rebel columns in the valley needed only to cross the Apurímac
River into the neighbouring department of Cuzco, which at the time did not fall with-
in the ambit of the emergency zone. “And there the Senderistas took refuge,” militia
leader Hugo Huillca pointed out (quoted in Starn 1993:44).
Government troops arrived in force in the southern portion of the valley in the
first months of 1983, operating in and around the districts of Chungui and Anco in
particular. As in other areas of the emergency zone, the mind-set with which they came
had a profound influence on their conduct towards the local civilian population. The
military arrived in the Apurímac Valley already suspecting the “cholos” there (as in the
rest of Ayacucho) of being potential subversives, and accordingly embarked on a cam-
paign of brutal and indiscriminate repression. Yet the extremity of the military’s reac-
tion towards the Andean populace of Ayacucho can not be explained solely as a man-
ifestation of costeño racist prejudice. Their indiscriminate acts of brutality were often
also the result of their frustration at being unable to get to grips with their elusive
enemy. As Gorriti tells us,
[In the beginning the] military could only conceive of guerrillas in
terms of a classic Castro-style movement. The symptoms it looked for
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were the presence of strangers wearing olive drab uniforms, training
camps, arms deposits. It could not imagine a different style of guer-
rilla war; and when these guerrillas were literally under the noses of
the military, it had no way to see them. It was not a case of physical
blindness—all the basic information was there, it had been recorded—
but intellectual blindness (1999:52).
Indeed, government forces soon realised to their dismay that the guerrillas were play-
ing by other rules—and playing well! Even General Sinesio Jarama, Commander of II
Región Militar, once sardonically observed that “while Mr. Guzmán is playing a game
of chess, we are playing a game of tennis.”3 Unable to see their prey amongst the for-
est of civilian inhabitants in the valley, it was regrettable though hardly surprising that
frustrated officers (lacking sophisticated counterinsurgency training and in the
absence of a higher directive) would begin to lash out blindly, ordering indiscriminate
acts of violence against the local population. In fact, even before the army was sent in
to quash the insurgency, General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, the then Minister of War,
already seemed to realise that in fighting the Maoist guerrillas, the security forces
would be reduced to using brute, indiscriminate force. In an interview with the Lima
magazine QueHacer in 1982, Cisneros Vizquerra candidly stated:
The Police Forces know not where the Senderistas are nor their num-
bers, they do not know when they are going to attack. In order that
the Police Forces may be successful they would have to start killing
Senderistas and non-Senderistas, for that is the only way they would
be assured of success. They kill 60 people and at best there are 3
Senderistas... and surely the police will say that the 60 were all
Senderistas” (in Gonzalez 1983a:50).
In spite of their arrogant confidence in their own “professionalism,” the military
would find itself eventually having to resort to the same tactics as the police. Rather
than the conventional style of combat and clash of armies for which the soldiers had
been trained, they instead found themselves in a war of shadows, up against what
seemed an invisible enemy. A militia commander once described to me the great agi-
tation and desperation felt by the soldiers when confronted by Shining Path’s guerril-
la tactics. 
In a synchronised and simultaneous manner, Sendero carried out its
ambushes. That is to say theirs was a strategy of silence [and it] threw
all the soldiers into a terrible state of desperation. [The soldiers] did-
n’t know what to do. Therefore, in their desperation, in their impo-
tence, they killed savagely, torturing the innocent, the peasants.
Therefore I will say to you that in the beginning...Sendero had an
extremely positive [i.e. successful] strategy that the forces of order
had not been able to restrain.4
In fact, Shining Path welcomed and, indeed, purposely sought to draw the full weight
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of State repression on the population, for they had calculated that it would drive the
masses into the ranks of the revolutionary movement. The Shining Path document,
entitled “Let’s Develop the Guerrilla War!” explained how State repression strength-
ens, rather than weakens, the revolution:
What [do] the anti-subversive operation[s] show? Plainly and simply
that the masses reject and resist aggression; that reactionary brutality,
arrogance, and violence did not dishearten them, but rather it so
aroused their just class anger that they even confront with their bare
hands the armed aggressors protected by the structure of the
state....The police operations and all the repressive actions only con-
firm that the war is gaining in strength and developing, and that if we
pay with our sweat, suffering, and blood, this is no more than our
quota for having risen in arms in a just and necessary rebellion for the
class and the people.5
When faced with superior force, the guerrilla columns faithfully adhered to Mao’s
precept of preserving one’s own forces by falling back and avoiding direct confronta-
tions with the soldiers. Rebel forces in the valley temporarily moved to the area north
of Santa Rosa, or east across the river, into Cuzco Department.
According to del Pino, this brief retreat of rebel forces from the southern portion
of the valley gave villagers there sufficient space for action (1996:137). Overcoming
their initial fear of Shining Path, communities in the districts of Anco and Chungui
(La Mar province) began to meet in council to discuss what response they should
make to the acute threat posed by escalating political violence to their personal secu-
rity and livelihood. By now, Shining Path had managed to arouse widespread disaf-
fection, resentment, and disenchantment among the population. The rebels had come
promising to improve the lives of the people, to help and to protect them. Instead
they brought only death and economic hardship. On the other hand, the peasants
were also bitterly frustrated with the inability of the security forces, when they were
not also killing peasants, to provide protection from guerrilla attacks. In the end,
many peasants concluded that they had no choice but to defend themselves. “We rose
up when it appeared as though our lives would be extinguished progressively” a for-
mer inhabitant of the village of San Antonio told me in 1997. “We rose up because
the subversives of Sendero Luminoso began to kill to the brink. In the end we asked
ourselves, ‘Are we going to wait our turn or are we also going to defend ourselves?’
And the people cried, ‘No!’ with one voice. ‘One has to die fighting, defending our
lives!’”6
It has often been said that the cruel, indiscriminate repression applied by govern-
ment security forces surpassed even the cruel violence meted out by Shining Path. If
this was true, then one wonders why the peasants took the side of the government
rather than of Shining Path. Far from having been a foregone conclusion, the evidence
suggests that in some communities the inhabitants actually deliberated whether to
back the government or whether to throw in their lot with the Shining Path.
“Definitely, the way was free for them to go to Sendero,” said Hugo Huillca, a ronda
leader from the Apurímac River Valley. “It was said in an assembly...[that] one must
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decide. Are we for defending what is ours...or are we with Sendero?” (quoted in Starn
1993:45). Indeed, anyone who wished to follow Shining Path could have tried to
make their way to the nearby rebel strongholds of Sello de Oro and Viscatán. But no
large-scale civilian exodus to those areas ever took place. There is little doubt that
most peasants in Anco and Chungui perceived the armed forces to be more powerful
than Sendero Luminoso, and therefore more likely to be the future victor in the war.
This must have lent a moral boost to their resolve to resist Shining Path’s increasing-
ly arbitrary abusiveness. In the Apurímac Valley as in the sierra regions of Ayacucho,
local people interpreted the “tactical withdrawals” of Shining Path forces as a sign of
weakness, rather than as standard Maoist guerrilla tactics. One might even argue that
the State’s capacity for terror and the use of violent force was so apparently over-
whelming (and, conversely, Shining Path’s ability to respond, let alone to defend local
populations, so obviously limited) that the inhabitants came to fear the security forces
much more than they feared Shining Path. That the military might of the State
appeared as the greater of the two evils, that is to say the one whose wrath struck
more fear into their hearts, was doubtless one of the reasons why many peasants pru-
dently sought a pragmatic alliance with the perceived stronger party—the security
forces.
Nevertheless, intimidation and coercion on the part of the military can only ever
be a partial reason why the peasantry would choose to actively support the state. For
the alliance to have been as fruitful as it was, there must also have been a genuine will
on the part of the people to assume a dynamic role in the counterinsurgency struggle;
for in battle there is nothing more obvious than if one lacks the will to fight (see
Keegan 1978). Even when it resorted to heavy-handed tactics, the armed forces did
not always get its way. In some instances when people steadfastly refused to take an
active part in the counterinsurgency campaign, no amount of pressure from the mili-
tary could make them comply. We have already noted this in the previous chapter,
particularly in the Pampas region of Ayacucho and throughout much of Huancavelica
Department. Coronel notes that when the military tried to compelled the inhabitants
of the Huanta Valley to form civil defence patrols in the first half of the 1980s, the
valley’s independent smallholding peasants successfully resisted the pressure. It was
only in 1990, after a reconciliation had more or less been achieved between the mil-
itary and the peasants of the valley, that the inhabitants there finally consented to
form civil defence committees (1996:49-63). In the Apurímac River Valley, pragmat-
ic considerations were not the only things that explain the peasantry’s decision to side
with the State. Widespread grievances and resentment—and herein lies the underly-
ing motivation—against Shining Path were also very real and apparent. The frequent
assassinations, the increasingly common abduction of youths, the imposition of an
austere “economy of war”—the cumulation of all these abuses convinced people that
what was under threat was not only their way of life, but the very safety and integri-
ty of their families.
As the years of civil war dragged on inconclusively, what became clear was that
while most peasants had sympathised with Shining Path’s ostensible goal of creating
a new society devoid of exploitation and inequality, few peasants had imagined, or
were willing to accept, the full extent of the hardships and self-sacrifice that only
Shining Path’s hardcore militants yearned to incur along the way.7 When widespread
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disenchantment with the “lucha armada” threatened to unravel Sendero’s control
over the rural population, the Party resorted to more drastic measures in order to
bring disobedient peasants back into submission. In doing so, however, Shining Path
unwittingly misunderstood and misjudged completely the capacity of the peasantry to
organise and to mobilise for its self-preservation against external threats.
4.3 Guerrilla retreat and the emergence and proliferation 
of the Montoneros
“¡Hay montoneros, montoneros, montoneros!”8 This was the cry that spread north-
wards through the valley like a bushfire in the early months of 1984, fanned by the
first concrete actions against Shining Path at the villages of Anchihuay and
Chiquintirca, in the district of Anco.9 According to del Pino, these communities had
already begun to assemble bands of fighters—“montoneros”—from as early as the end
of 1983 (1993b:59-63). Soon other villages in the area started to follow the their
example, organising local defence groups of their own. The inhabitants of these set-
tlements were resolved to prevent future rebel incursions into their communities, and
to protect their authorities. They were determined not to cooperate with Shining
Path. “Thus, when SL wanted to return to the south of the valley, they were not able
to do so because since various villages had organised to defend themselves. Its only
option was to try to enter with blood and fire” (del Pino 1996:138).
The emergence of montoneros in villages south of the town of Santa Rosa appears
to have been influenced by conditions similar to those that were conducive to the
appearance of self-defence groups in certain parts of the Ayacuchan sierra at around
the same time (see chapter 3). For one thing, the temporary retreat of rebel forces
from the southern portion of the valley gave the villages there “space for action.” Of
the seventeen officially reported guerrilla actions in the valley in 1983, nine took
place in settlements north of Santa Rosa and five in Santa Rosa itself, but only three
in the southern communities of Palmapampa and Chungui (see DESCO 1989).
The social organisation and structural relationships characteristic of the valley’s
southern peasant communities appears to constitute a second important factor in
facilitating the appearance of montoneros. Del Pino (1996:146) and Sala (1995) tell
us that the southern portion of the valley was colonised by comuneros from La Mar,
whereas the northern part was populated largely by independent peasant smallhold-
ers from the Huanta Valley. In the province of La Mar, the majority of legally recog-
nised peasant communities (“comunidades campesinas”) are to be found in the dis-
tricts of Chungui and Anco. Of the sixteen recognised peasant communities in exis-
tence in 1983, four were in Anco and four in Chungui (INDEC 1991:196). Indeed,
the peasant community of Anchihuay has been legally recognised and in possession of
a land title since 1952. The same is true for Chiquintirca ever since 1951, and for
Chungui since 1956 (INDEC 1991:196). One of the distinguishing features of recog-
nised peasant communities which sets it apart from other forms of peasant social
groupings is the existence of a junta directiva comunal, responsible primarily for dis-
tributing communal land among the community’s members, and settling border dis-
putes between them.10 Del Pino argues that the organisational experience of
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comuneros in this southern region was helpful in coordinating and organising resist-
ance to Shining Path, which was otherwise initially difficult for the dispersed inde-
pendent smallholders living north of Santa Rosa to achieve (1996:146). Roberto
Córdova, an Ayacuchano researcher from the Apurímac Valley who has spent almost
eight years studying the history of the DECAS, offers a more explicit explanation of
the dynamic relationship between structure and action. He asserts that it was the jun-
tas directivas of these peasant communities that were responsible for having brought
dispersed community members together at general assemblies in which montoneros
were organised and leaders were elected.11 Furthermore, given the fact that their posi-
tions of leadership meant that they were especially targeted for assassination by
Shining Path, many local authorities also began to take a vested interest in organising
village defence as a means of ensuring their own survival.12 The community’s junta
directiva served as the organisational model for the village defence committees, which
consisted of the following posts: (1) president, (2) vice-president, (3) secretary of acts,
(4) treasurer, (5) organisational secretary (also called “comando operativo,” opera-
tional commander), and (6) security officer (“sub-comando”). According to one mili-
tia commander, The “base,” or general membership, of the defence group was made
up of the able-bodied adult population of the community, all of whom were expect-
ed to participate in the tasks of community defence.13
From its early beginnings in Anchihuay and Chiquintirca, the self-defence move-
ment began to expand throughout the valley, organising other villages one by one
through a process of “village hopping.” In this way the montoneros of Anchihuay
helped to organise those of San Martin. San Martin helped to organise San Antonio,
which organised Monterrico, which in turn helped in organising Palmapampa; and
Palmapampa came to organise Pichihuillca, and so on.14 Anchihuay and Chiquintirca
are peasant communities, whereas settlements like Palmapampa and Pichihuillca are
pagos [hamlets] consisting of independent peasant smallholders. In the process of
organising themselves, these pagos were assisted not only by the montoneros of other
villages. They were also aided by an experience which many of these independent
peasants shared in common: prior participation in FECVRA.15
The evidence strongly suggests, therefore, that the conception of village defence
groups in the Apurímac Valley can not be credited to military think-tanks, nor can
their creation and proliferation be attributed to coercive pressure on the part of gov-
ernment forces, as many commentators (including Shining Path) had assumed over
the years (e.g. Degregori 1989b:29-30, Amnesty International 1991:21-22, Americas
Watch 1992:9, Isbell 1990:8-13). As to what served as their organisational model, it
would seem that the inhabitants of the valley drew from their own organisational
forms and experiences.
The spontaneous emergence of anti-Sendero sentiments in the valley, which even-
tually resulted in active counter-rebellion, happened at about the same time as in
other parts of Ayacucho. Similar to what Coronel observed among the Iquichano
communities of Huanta’s uplands, del Pino also noted that it was peasant communi-
ties which were less integrated into the market and characterised by strong commu-
nity solidarity, where Shining Path had few significant linkages, that were the first to
rebel against Shining Path in the Apurímac Valley (1996:147).
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4.4 The role of the armed forces in the creation and expansion 
of CDCs in the valley 
Although the will to organise the first village defence groups in the southern
Apurímac Valley may have been a spontaneous one from the comuneros themselves,
the growth of the self-defence militias throughout the rest of the valley was a process
that was assisted and facilitated by the military. In places where peasants had organ-
ised self-defence groups on their own initiative the military’s suspicion of the peas-
ants was lessened, and repression was consequently slackened. This was evident in the
favourable reaction to communities like Anchihuay and Chiquintirca shown by a cer-
tain “Major Rick,” who arrived in the valley early in 1984 at the head of a special
Army unit assigned the task of organising the civilian population against Sendero
Luminoso. In the process, Major Rick and his team baptised the montoneros with the
new name “Comités de Defensa Civil (CDCs)” and assisted their expansion north-
wards (del Pino 1996:139). Settlements between Pichihuillca and Santa Rosa that had
not yet organised themselves were visited by Major Rick and his underlings and given
fifteen days in which to form a militia (ibid.). In such cases, the military routinely reg-
istered everyone in the community, and then appointed local authorities entrusted
with the duty to organise a local defence force. Apparently, communities which had
formed militias of their own accord were granted the privilege of electing their own
authorities.
As happened in the sierra, it was not only the military that compelled unorgan-
ised peasant villagers to form CDCs. The CDCs of other communities have also been
known to pressurise reluctant populations. In particular,
[those] of Pichiwillca continually invaded disorganised population,
accusing them of collaborating and assisting Sendero. They arrived
and maltreated [the locals], as happened on more than one occasion
in Quimbiri, without anyone being able to intercede for them, neither
the soldiers nor the policemen that one finds concentrated in front of
the river, in San Francisco. They entered houses at night, masked in
balaclavas, and abducted young people supposedly linked to Sendero,
those same ones who in days were discovered murdered, thrown into
the river or displayed in the open air (del Pino 1993b:78).
That many settlements would initially have been disinclined to form a militia is under-
standable. Shining Path had vowed to show no mercy to the “yanauma”—a Quechua
word meaning “black head,” which is what guerrillas called militia members, most
likely in reference to the black balaclavas many of them wore. Militia leaders and
their families throughout the zone of conflict were especially targeted by Shining
Path, and routinely put to death with exceptional cruelty so as to serve as a warning
to the rest of the community. To assume to post of CDC commander was obviously a
very hazardous undertaking that not only exposed oneself but also one’s family to
danger. Naturally, few men willingly aspired to take on such a responsibility. Villages
that refused to organise community defence risked harsh punishment at the hands of
the military. It is probably correct to assume that what peasants intended by forming
117
The DECAS and the struggle for the Apurímac Valley
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 117
a local militia was to curtail brutal military repression as much as to defend them-
selves from the violent incursions and authoritarian domination of Shining Path. The
grim reality, as rondero Hugo Huillca explained, was that “in the midst of war, one
is not permitted to be neutral, one must show oneself to be in agreement and once so,
form their organisation....In this zone [of the Apurímac Valley] no one can neutral.
They have already killed all those who were neutral” (quoted in Starn 1993:45).
With the help of the army, the CDCs were able to expand and to push Shining
Path out of most of the southern section of the valley during 1984-85 (del Pino
1993b:64). Their subsequent expansion into territory lying north of Santa Rosa was
facilitated by the growing presence of government forces in that area, once military
bases were established in Santa Rosa, Sivia, and Llochegua in 1984.
4.5 The demographic and economic impact of political violence
One of the most evident consequences of political upheaval in the department of
Ayacucho has been the displacement of thousands of people from their homes. As vio-
lence mounted, most of the valley’s large landowners and wealthy merchants fled to
distant Peruvian cities. From the opposite direction came hundreds of displaced high-
land peasants from Huanta, Tambo, and San Miguel. They flooded into the Apurímac
Valley in 1984-85, believing that it still offered a zone of refuge from the violence that
was ravaging the sierra. Yet within the valley itself, political violence was causing
extreme disruption to settlement patterns and livelihood activities. Despite the influx
of refugees from outside the region, many established villages within the valley were
depopulated or even completely abandoned, usually in the aftermath of an attack by
one side or the other. In the case of Santa Rosa, for instance, only about 540 of the
original 3,500 inhabitants in 1981 residents remained at the end of 1985. The major-
ity of these people had fled in search of safety elsewhere in the department or the
country. Santa Rosa’s drastic population decline was certainly caused by the high
number of guerrilla attacks suffered by the town over this period. In 1984 alone, it
was reported to have been attacked no less than eleven times—the highest number of
incursions recorded in the entire valley that year (see DESCO 1989:882-916).
Under these conditions, the naked vulnerability of outlying rural villages and scat-
tered homesteads became painfully evident. Consequently, fortified nucleated settle-
ments, like those that appeared in various parts of the Ayacuchan sierra at about the
same time, also began to emerge in the valley. Santa Rosa’s reduced population was
replenished by displaced persons grouping together from fourteen separate hamlets,
bringing the number of Santa Rosa’s inhabitants up to more than 3,590 (del Pino
1996:141). Eight dispersed hamlets merged at Anchihuay, and at Palmapampa, four.
The initiative to create these so-called “bases civiles antisubversivas” (“civilian coun-
terinsurgency bases) sometimes came from local populations themselves, and at other
times from the military. For the army, such clustered multicommunity settlements
offered a number of advantages. One was that it simplified the task of monitoring
what they continued to regard as a potentially hostile population. Another was that it
helped to avoid a repetition of the tragedy that occurred near San Pedro:
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Fed up with all the arbitrary acts, the hamlet of San Pedro refused to
collaborate and threw out the Senderistas. On 1 August 1984 the
inhabitants organised into a CDC and on their own initiative decided
to congregate and spend the nights in the settlement. On 15
September, an armed [guerrilla] group attacked the settlement, leav-
ing a total of nineteen peasants dead. Word of the massacre reached
the ears of the Republican Guard (GR), established in Luisiana. Along
the way to San Pedro, the GR mistook for subversives the peasants of
Wanchi, who had also been on their way to help their brothers in San
Pedro, killing twenty of them (del Pino 1996:141. My emphasis).
So as to avoid mistaking friendly peasants for insurgents in the future, the army sub-
sequently decided to resettle outlying villages, situated on the slopes of the valley, into
newly formed “bases civiles antisubversivas” within the valley itself. Frequently forced
to leave their homes at moment’s notice by military patrols, many of these desplaza-
dos had no choice but to leave most of their possessions behind, often to be looted
afterwards by the soldiers. Despite its ostensibly altruistic intention, this resettlement
policy simply added to the massive dislocation of peasants in the region. In addition,
by agreeing to live in clustered settlements and organising civil defence patrols, these
displaced peasants were making an unequivocal declaration of which side they chose
to be on. As such, these desplazados knew that they would not be able to return to
their own fields while Sendero controlled their home areas.
A number of displaced peasant, particularly those from the districts of Tambo and
San Miguel, already owned small parcels of land in the valley, and so had the means
to sustain themselves. On the other hand, those who did not, or whose fields became
inaccessible owing to the dangers of travelling to them, were faced with more serious
difficulties, and so had fewer options. If he were lucky, a desplazado might find work
as a peon for a local smallholder. Those who had some money could try to rent land
from local landowners. For the rest, survival was precarious at best. “The desperation
grew among families overwhelmed by the lack of food and the epidemics that ravaged
mainly the infant population” (del Pino 1996:141).
As daily life became more and more centred on the task of village defence, peo-
ple came to have less time to devote to cultivation. Some parts of the valley were
being patrolled virtually round the clock. The farming of the valley’s traditional cash
crops—whose prices had already been dropping to unprofitably low levels ever since
the beginning of the decade—was now being widely abandoned as agricultural pro-
duction rapidly became almost exclusively orientated towards subsistence cultivation.
When the spectre of famine became all too real, some of the desplazados of hamlets
that were nucleated at Santa Rosa decided to return home, where they founded new
“bases civiles antisubversivas” nearer to their own agricultural fields (del Pino
1996:142).
With the flight of the prosperous landowners and important merchants from the
Apurímac Valley, the responsibility for civil defence fell exclusively to the local peas-
ant smallholders and to the refugees from the sierra, namely men between the ages of
17 and 50. Historical class tensions and conflicts were undoubtedly diminished by the
departure of valley’s dominant stratum, which may have made the task of organising
119
The DECAS and the struggle for the Apurímac Valley
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 119
local civil defence easier. But the departure of the elites did not put an end to local
rivalries and conflicts. Not only were unorganised settlements often bullied by those
which had organised patrols, but clashes also sporadically erupted between the civil
defence patrols of rival villages. For instance:
26 December 1984: In Rosario, located in the Apurímac River Valley,
some 70 kilometres from Ayacucho, a fight broke out between groups
called “comités de defensa civil” (montoneros or ronderos) that left ten
dead. The clash culminated a discussion over who had greater control
in the zone (DESCO 1989:116).
29 December 1984: Some 22 peasants from various communities in
La Mar, in Ayacucho, are killed by those called rondas or anti-
Senderista paramilitary groups. The victims are ronderos from Paccle,
Pacere, Machente, Aentabamba and San Francisco (ibid.:117).
Whether they were essential to the safety of the locals or not, the militias had become
just another predatory force, alongside Shining Path and the military. Rather than
bringing security and tranquility to the inhabitants, the proliferation of armed actors
in the valley seemed only to make the violence accelerate and spiral uncontrollably
away.
4.6 Crisis and the counteroffensive of the CDCs 
By the end of 1985, the CDCs of the Apurímac River Valley had managed to wrest
control of a wide swathe of the valley from Shining Path, thus depriving guerrilla
forces in the region of a strategically important theatre of operations. This success had
been achieved with the vital support of the military, and through a ruthlessly straight-
forward strategy of “pursue, capture and eliminate Senderistas” (del Pino 1993b:76).
But the advance of the militias would falter in the second half of the decade. For rea-
sons which have already been discussed in the previous chapter, mounting political
tensions between the new president, Alan García, and his armed forces chiefs finally
culminated in the military literally refusing to fight the guerrillas. Consequently, the
counterinsurgency campaign faltered and then generally deteriorated into inactivity,
or its sporadic and cautious, half-hearted actions on the part of the army. Having pre-
viously drawn much of their moral encouragement and military backing from the
active presence of government troops in the region, it was only natural that civilian
militias in the Apurímac Valley and the adjacent sierra districts of Tambo and San
Miguel were quickly dismayed and demoralised by the military’s effective resignation
from its leading role in the “war against terrorism.” That the military had already
begun withdrawing to the sidelines in La Mar province since the beginning of 1987
is apparent in the considerable drop in the number of skirmishes between military
patrols and guerrilla columns from the previous year (see Table 4.1). In contrast to
the thirty-three armed clashes between soldiers and guerrillas recorded for La Mar in
1986, none was reported between May 1987 and May 1988.
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Table 4.1: Reported Instances of Armed Clashes between Military Patrols and
Guerrilla Columns, La Mar Province (1984-1988)
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Armed Clashes 12 9 33 14 12 
Source: DESCO 1989:882-1076
Furthermore, the notably sharp drop in the number of rebel losses during the latter
half of the 1980s, as compared to its highest point in 1984, was a further reflection
of the relative idleness of the security forces, particularly over the period between
1986 and 1988 (see Diagram 4.1).
Diagram 4.1: Deaths Attributed to Political Violence, 1984-1988
Source: DESCO 1989:36-46
In previous years, soldiers frequently patrolled the valley alongside ronderos.
Military officers in the Apurímac Valley even occasionally gave the ronderos of the
area limited training in the use of modern weapons of war, such as hand grenades.
They also regularly provided the ronderos with ammunition for their home-made
guns (“tirachas”) and hunting shotguns, even though civilians were prohibited by law
from wielding firearms without a licence.16 Hence the withdrawal of military support
for the CDCs had near catastrophic consequences for the movement, for it cut the
defence militias off from vital protection and munitions hitherto provided by the sol-
diers. “The number of assaults on the self-defence bases multiplied,” noted del Pino.
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“The ronderos demanded that the soldiers come out to fight, to defend
them....[Shining Path] butchered [the ronderos] in places and settlements right next to
the military bases, and still, [the soldiers] did not come forth to fight” (1993b:83).
According to the testimonies of ronderos, military officers in the valley even allowed
themselves to be fêted by the guerrillas, who brought them gifts in return for freeing
Senderistas captured by the CDCs.17
The decline of the civil defence movement was most evident among the settle-
ments in the area north of Santa Rosa. These CDCs were among the last to be organ-
ised in the valley, and were therefore not as deeply established in their communities
as their counterparts in the south. Shining Path was thus able to reinstate its presence
in more than seventy villages, from the Samugari river to the town of Rosario (del
Pino 1993b:85). The rebels killed any CDC authorities who refused to renounce their
posts. In addition, they also began to infiltrate the militias in order to undermine
them from within.18 The return of large numbers of desplazados to the highlands at
the time may have contributed to the weakening of the defence movement among the
valley’s northern settlements. Larger population centres, such as Santa Rosa, San
Francisco, Pichari, Sivia, and Llochegua—the latter are all located along the river,
north of Santa Rosa—had been important reception centres for war refugees from the
highlands and the ceja de selva from 1984 onwards. When State repression subsided,
and guerrilla activity temporarily waned as Shining Path fanned out to other parts of
the country, the brief period of relative calm that descended on the Ayacuchan sierra
in 1985 prompted the first significant instances of refugee returns in the department.
Given that their survival conditions were so dire, a significant number of the valley’s
landless, destitute, and malnourished highland desplazados decided to return to their
homes in the sierra, where they at least had their own land on which to grow food.
It is therefore quite likely that the departure of these refugees from the valley’s north-
ern settlements left many of the CDCs there undermanned, and thus weakened in
their capacity to perform vigilance and defence duties.
Faced with a resurgence of Shining Path forces in the valley, and given that Army
units seemed to be holding back from taking any action against a renewed guerrilla
offensive, many peasants understandably choose to give in to the rebels. Most settle-
ments, especially north of Pichihuillca, were willing to forsake the CDCs and any
other counterinsurgency activity if, in return, Sendero would let them be, would let
them live.19 In the absence of countervailing military repression, numerous peasants
came to accept this new modus vivendi with the guerrillas, precarious though it clear-
ly was right from the start. Bereft of any assistance from the military, those inhabi-
tants who chose to continue resisting Sendero Luminoso were forced on the defen-
sive. Patrols were drastically reduced as ronderos opted to wait behind their fortified
bases civiles antisubversivas for the terrifying guerrilla assaults, which inevitably came.
One of the most important moments in the history of Ayacucho’s comités de defensa
civil unfolded on April 13, 1988. It had been raining heavily for three days and three
nights. When the downpour finally ended, the rain clouds parted to reveal the faint
light of a waning crescent moon suspended in a glittering mantle of stars. On the
ground, forty heavily armed guerrilla fighters accompanied by over four hundred
peasants drafted for the job from settlements throughout the valley, burst out sud-
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denly from the darkness of the jungle to attack the CDC’s principal base at
Pichihuillca. Led by one Camarada Benjamin, leader of the Comité Popular “Sello de
Oro, the assault was intended to break the back of the CDCs in the Apurímac River
Valley once and for all (del Pino 1993b:85). They undoubtedly would have succeed-
ed had it not been for the valiant and stubborn defence put up by a hundred out-
numbered ronderos, armed with home-made firearms, a few antiquated hunting shot-
guns, and a small number of hand grenades that had earlier been left behind by a mil-
itary patrol. Their indomitable leader was Antonio Cárdenas Torre, alias Comandante
Harry (de Althaus and Morelli 1989:5). Upon hearing that Pichihuillca was under
attack, hundreds of ronderos from the CDC base at Anchihuay rushed immediately to
the aid of their comrades, accompanied by a platoon of Marine Infantry that coinci-
dentally had bivouacked nearby. The sudden arrival of these reinforcements took the
guerrillas and their peasant foot soldiers by surprise. In the terrible firefight that
ensued, “blood flowed like water” (del Pino 1993b:85). Overpowered and out-
gunned, the Senderistas broke their attack and fled into the jungle, leaving behind
their peasant conscripts and twelve guerrillas dead. But the ronderos and their Marine
allies were not satisfied with victory on the battlefield. For the next fifteen days and
nights they pursued and succeeded in nearly wiping out what was left of the guerril-
la column. The successful defence of Pichihuillca marked a turning point in the strug-
gle for the Apurímac River Valley. “From that occasion, the actions of the rondas
gained importance and vigour once again. The victory in the confrontation with
Sendero permitted them to revitalise themselves and to initiate the counteroffensive;
inaugurating a new stage in the history of the war and in the development of the
Comités de Autodefensa” (del Pino 1993b:86).
4.7 Comandante Huayhuaco 
After repulsing the guerrilla attack on Pichihuillca, the counterattack immediately
launched by the combined force of militiamen and soldiers gained momentum and
eventually managed to recover twenty-seven other hamlets from the clutches of
Shining Path. Among the masses of people “liberated” was one Pompeyo Javier Rivera
Terres, the man who would later perhaps become the most influential and controver-
sial militia leader to emerge in the history of the civil defence movement.
It was with the help of the chief editor of the daily newspaper Expreso that I was
able to arrange an interview in central Lima with Rivera Terres, more popularly
known by his alias of Comandante Huayhuaco, in December 1997. My middle-class
Limeño friends expressed their deep concern that I was about to come face to face
with a man generally depicted in most newspapers as a notorious drug trafficker, and
an authoritarian violator of human rights. Whatever his views on the advantages of
“dirty war” tactics—and he certainly was not ashamed to expound for me his views
on the subject—I found the 51-year-old Rivera Terres to be polite, personable, and
calm. He was taller than most indigenous Peruvians, yet his facial features unmistak-
ably reflected his Andean ancestry. He lacked the robust, barrel-chested physique typ-
ical of highland peasant accustomed to labour, and he had mournful eyes. But he pos-
sessed the clear and commanding voice of one used to giving orders. It occasionally
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faltered with what seemed to me to be sincere emotion when we broached sensitive
topics, like his imprisonment in the early 1990s and the fate of the many widows and
orphans of ronderos who had been killed in action. When I asked him to show me the
pistol that former president Alan García had given him, I was surprised that he still
carried it. That pistol almost landed him back in prison for the illegal possession of a
firearm in 1993. But he continues to carry it on his person wherever he goes, with
nostalgic pride—though now he has a valid license for it. He lives in constant fear of
assassination by Senderistas or drug traffickers. Though once fêted by a Peruvian pres-
ident, Rivera Terres has also made some powerful enemies over the years. After fin-
ishing the interview, he kindly offered to accompany us to a taxi, his pistol tucked into
his belt, mindful of the fact that in the reputedly seedy neighbourhood where we now
found ourselves after dark, my conspicuously gringa partner might attract unwelcome
attention.
Rivera Terres was born in the small rural hamlet of Huayao, Tambo district. He
spent his youth between the sierra and the selva, for his peasant parents owned small
plots of land in both Huayao and in a hamlet called Marintari, in the Apurímac River
Valley. Unlike many rural inhabitants of his generation, Rivera Terres gained a level
of education that eventually led to a career as a primary school teacher. He has taught
at various schools in the Apurímac Valley, in the communities of Rinconada Baja,
Manitea, Piriato, and Simariba. Later in life, he also began to work as a dental tech-
nician, though possibly an unlicensed one.
Rivera Terres himself has offered at least two differing accounts of how he became
the operational commander of all the militias in the valley, second in command to
Antonio Cárdenas. In one version, he claims that after the events of Pichihuillca,
Antonio Cárdenas visited the newly liberated hamlets in the vicinity, and reproached
their inhabitants for having collaborated with Shining Path. Cárdenas then invited
them all to join Pichihuillca in fighting against Sendero by organising civil defence.
“We rose up against Sendero on 15 May 1988,” Rivera Terres told me.
I started off just as a simple foot soldier. It is true that at that time oth-
ers were leading [the CDC] organisation. There was Antonio
Cárdenas. It was General Jorge Sánchez Manrique, Chief of the
Political-Military Command, who designated [Cárdenas] supreme
leader of civil defence in the Apurímac River Valley. Next there was
Comando Susy, Delio Gavílan, Chomba, and many others. These were
among the principal figures. Unfortunately, these compañeros did not
have much education. They did not have preparation of any type.
They had studied up to the first grade, and though they had the best
intentions, could not go further. And after initiating actions against
Sendero Luminoso, it was on the battlefield itself, during an operation
in the area known as Sello de Oro, that these leaders came together
and said, ‘Fine, here is a person who can lead us. He knows more than
we do, and so he could be our leader, our “guide.”’ They decided this
amongst themselves, and then they called me and nominated me as
general coordinator of antisubversive actions in the Apurímac River
Valley. And as president there was, then, Antonio Cárdenas.20
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At other times, particularly after having bitterly fallen out with other militia lead-
ers like Antonio Cárdenas and Jorge Choque, he claims to have ended up as a militia
leader through an entirely spontaneous and independent way. In 1996, for instance,
he told the newspaper El Sol that he had first decided to oppose Shining Path after
finding out that they intended to conscript him, along with other men from the ham-
let of Rinconada Baja. In the meantime, he secretly met with a small group of young
local men, all of whom had also been marked out for recruitment and therefore try-
ing to come up with a plan to organise the local population against Sendero. “We only
need a person who can direct us and we think that you are such a person, professor,”
they purportedly told him (quoted in Alvarado 1996:9A). According to Rivera Terres,
they then pooled together some money, which he claims to have taken to Lima and
used to buy shotguns and pistols from clandestine weapon stores in the Surquillo dis-
trict, and along Jirón de la Unión (ibid.). Hiding these firearms in large cushions, he
furtively transported them back to Ayacucho by Ormeño coach.21 He claims that with
these weapons, he and the other conspirators began their counter-rebellion. “The first
combat was on 15 May 1988, precisely when [the Senderistas] were due to arrive in
his community to take away the new recruits” (ibid.). The figure of Antonio Cárdenas
is conspicuously absent in this version of the story.
Rivera Terres is not a licenciado; that is to say, he has never done military service.
He told me that he acquire most of his knowledge regarding the use of firearms and
military tactics while at secondary school and enrolled in a training course known as
“Pre-Military Instruction” (IPM). 
During IPM I demonstrated my capacity. I won shooting competitions
using the Mauser rifle. I was a champion. And, well, I learned about
ambushes, some tactics, the handling of firearms. So, when they elect-
ed me maximum leader of the rondas of the Apurímac Valley, I select-
ed the best of the ex-soldiers [licenciados], with whom I shared this
sort of military knowledge, and similar beliefs about how to fight the
terrorists. Gradually, through the practical experience of battle, I
learned how to handle all existing manner of firearms.22
Del Pino, however, suggests that like a number of other ronda leaders, Rivera
Terres was, in fact, a “terruco arrepentido” (a repentant terrorist) who had once held
an official post within Shining Path (1996:149, fn.27, also 1998:169). This might
explain Rivera Terres’s intimate knowledge of Shining Path’s guerrilla tactics and
organisational structure. If this is true, then he had to have been a Shining Path mem-
ber before 1983, or (perhaps again) in 1987. The reason is that Rivera Terres was
caught in possession of one-and-a-half kilos of cocaine paste on 7 February 1983 (La
República 1990:13). He languished in police custody for two years, another victim of
the notoriously sluggish Peruvian legal system, before being convicted and sentenced
to ten years imprisonment at San Pedro de Lurigancho prison, on 20 December 1985.
(It is quite possible that he came in contact with Senderista inmates at Lurigancho
and, if he was not already a prior member, recruited and given political education and
instruction on guerrilla warfare while still in prison. It is a well known fact that
imprisoned Shining Path members often tried to recruit other prisoners.) He was
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released on 14 March 1986, however, on condition that he pay by instalments an
exorbitant fine of two million soles while serving the remainder of his sentence at a
halfway house in Lima for former inmates (El Nacional 1990:16-17). River Terres
broke his parole in 1987 and made his way back to the Apurímac River Valley, where
he apparently resumed work as a dental technician before bursting on the scene as
Comandante Huayhuaco in 1988. He acknowledges having treated Senderistas for
dental problems, and openly admits that prior to his joining the civil defence move-
ment in May 1988, he had “compañeros senderistas” as clients in Rinconada Baja. But
he flatly denies ever having taken part in Senderista politics, insisting that “during my
conversations with [my Senderista patients], I went along with what they said so as
not to make any problems for myself ” (quoted in Alvarado 1996:9A).
Whatever the truth of how Rivera Terres came to join the civil defence move-
ment, or his past relations with Shining Path, what is certain is that soon after join-
ing, he rapidly rose to a position of senior leadership within the organisation. By
December 1989, Rivera Terres had even managed to win the support and sympathy
of President Alan García himself. The name of Comandante Huayhuaco had first
reached the ears of President García after the Expreso, a Lima newspaper, published
an interview in which Rivera Terres boldly declared “Denme 500 fusiles y libero
Ayacucho en un año”—”Give me 500 rifles and I will liberate Ayacucho in one year”
(see de Althaus and Morelli 1989:5-6). The article made Huayhuaco both a national
celebrity and a target for hostile, scathing criticism. His expressed approval for the
earlier heavy-handed counterinsurgency approach of Belaúnde and General Noel
appalled the sensitivities of many Peruvians, leaving them with the repugnant impres-
sion that the man was nothing more than a brazen promoter of “dirty war.”23 Yet the
news that dozens (and eventually over a hundred) of villages throughout the
Apurímac Valley were joining together under the leadership of men such as
Huayhuaco, forming DECAS and forging a truly regional defence network, greatly
impressed García—a president whose term in office was marked by a general failure
on the counterinsurgency front. In his final months in power, García took it upon
himself to support this form of popular resistance to Shining Path in whatever way he
could.
4.7.1 HUAYHAUCO’S STRATEGY AND TACTICAL INNOVATIONS
We have already seen from the discussion thus far that the existence of a certain
degree of mutual assistance between CDCs in the Apurímac River Valley already
existed prior to 1989. Even so, it was during the leadership of Comandante
Huayhuaco, however, that the CDCs achieved a regional level of coordination under
one central command (Sede Central), with headquarters located at Pichihuillca. From
that moment on, the goal of civil defence in the valley would no longer just be the
protection one’s own village, but the security of an entire region. In addition, the
CDCs would come to assume a new name: Defensa Civil Antisubversiva—the DECAS.
The defeat of Shining Path at Pichihuillca marked a watershed in the history of
the civil defence movement in this region. What now unfolded was the so-called
“reorganisation” of the entire Apurímac River Valley by the DECAS. This reorgani-
sation advance steadily northwards along the valley, and had the backing of the
Marine Infantry. In the district of Santa Rosa the DECAS were quickly able to reor-
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ganise the rural villages and hamlets. But they met stiff resistance from the CDC pres-
ident of the town itself, who stubbornly refused to affiliate his organisation with the
DECAS. According to Roberto Córdova, what then happened was that DECAS intel-
ligence agents went to the commander of the Marine Infantry garrison at Santa Rosa
and informed him that this president was secretly conniving with Shining Path. It was
because of this that he refused to participate in the general reorganisation of the val-
ley—or so they claimed.24 According to Córdova’s sources, this denunciation subse-
quently led to this CDC president being disappeared. According to witnesses, the man
was paid a visit one night by a small group of Marines, who proceeded to drag him
out of his house. They stuffed him into an empty oil drum, and although there was
some commotion, few of the neighbours came to see what was going on. By now the
people were used to assassinations and disappearances, and were wise enough not to
intervene. The few onlookers were told by the soldiers to shut their doors and win-
dows, and to forget what they had just seen. The drum was then loaded on the back
of a pickup truck and taken by the soldiers to Rinconada Baja, “tierra de Huayhuaco”
(Huayhuaco’s territory), as the village had come to be popularly known. The man was
never seen again. The kidnapping and disappearance of this CDC president opened
the way for Antonio Cárdenas and Huayhuaco to enter Santa Rosa, and to reorgan-
ise its militia. From there, the DECAS expanded north to San Francisco, and then on
to Sivia. Though most communities voluntarily chose to reorganise their militias,
those which refused were coerced into compliance. Once again, neutrality was not
permitted. The militiamen were prepared to do what it took, no matter how dirty and
underhanded, to get the job done; and they justified their actions as the unfortunate
yet necessary and inevitable costs of eradicating “terrorism.” As Comando Zorro, the
militia leader of Tambo district once admitted to me, “So that a zone will organise
itself, one must always use a little force; in order to get information [out of someone],
we have to use a little bit of force. In such cases, perhaps, we have probably commit-
ted some abuses. But not much, not much.”25
The expansion of the DECAS north of Santa Rosa proceeded under Huayhuaco’s
direction. In his capacity as its very first operational commander, he was to have a
profound influence on the development of DECAS strategy and tactics during the
organisation’s formative period. In contrast to the predominantly defensive posture
of the earlier CDCs, under Huyahuaco’s guidance the DECAS initiated a relentless
strategic offensive. As he saw it, “the constant and immediate persecution, day and
night, of Sendero so as to neutralise its actions until the very end is the only way to
overcome the subversion.”26 Huayhuaco’s early operations employed hundreds of
ronderos, mobilised from dozens of communities and deployed en masse to comb the
valley in search of guerrillas, infiltrators, and collaborators. But he eventually came to
recognise that this strategy of “persecution,” utilising massive numbers of ronderos,
was far from efficient. Years later, Rivera Terres admitted to me the folly of his early
tactics, and explained how he eventually changed them:
At first I was mistaken with the tactics I employed. I began by throw-
ing into battle huge quantities of men, in suicide fashion. I lacked
experience then. I used to assemble 2,700 to 3,000 men, many of
whom often lacked training. Sometimes there were mishaps with
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firearms, and some of my own ronderos were killed by the accidental
discharge of their comrade’s weapon. I therefore said to myself, ‘this
strategy of persecution isn’t working.’ So instead I began to make a
careful selection of individuals, as they do in the special forces. I
selected 400 men instead of 3,000, of which I placed 200 on active
duty and the rest in reserve. I constantly trained these 200 on active
duty, and they were never left idle. I would deploy them as a group
under the cover of darkness, and positioned them in places where
Sendero routinely passed. In this way we dispensed with the need to
hunt them down in the mountains. Instead we just waited to ambush
them in their haunts, which gave us a greater chance of liquidate them
completely. And laying in ambush we often remained for four, five, up
to eight days, with nothing but cold rations. All that was required was
for the terrorists to present themselves, and we’d cut them down. It
was war, really war.27
It was the Expreso that was largely responsible for turning Comandante
Huayhuaco into a national celebrity, depicting him as a humble yet battle-savvy strate-
gist, the leader of hundreds of valiant campesinos fighting and dying to cast off the
yoke of Senderista oppression in defence of democracy. President García himself
would come to describe the counter-rebellion of the peasant militias as “insurrección
democrática”—democratic insurrection. Rivera Terres’s brief fame, particularly
among the popular classes, encouraged Expreso to publish a prolific stream of articles,
editorials, and personal interviews through which he was given the chance to air his
own counterinsurgency blueprint.
Huayhuaco’s strategic objectives were twofold: first, the conquest of the so-called
“liberated guerrilla zone” of Sello de Oro, in the province of La Mar; second, the
eradication of Shining Path in the entire department of Ayacucho.
His idea for conquering the Sello de Oro called for the formation of an elite mili-
tia unit, and the creation of a “mobile militia base” that would advance as militia
forces pushed forward, thereby providing required security in the middle of a hostile
territory for both the ronderos and for peasants returning to areas liberated by the
DECAS. He envisaged this elite militia unit as being made up of all the licenciados in
the sixty-two or more organised communities in the valley. The group, according to
Huayhuaco, would be at Luisiana, where it could coordinate its operations with the
Marine Infantry headquarters stationed there, in addition to receiving military train-
ing and logistical support.
He intended this elite militia unit to spearhead the “liberation” of the Sello de
Oro. But for it to become the effective military force that Huayhuaco imagined, he
argued that its members required “armamentos de largo alcance” (high-powered
rifles) for use during field operations. To this end, Rivera Terres would spend a con-
siderable amount of time appealing to the government to distribute firearms—name-
ly Mauser rifles—to the militias. The weakness of the ronderos, said Rivera Terres, lay
not in their bravery but in their weaponry. Armed at the time mainly with hunting
shotguns and home-made single-shot firearms, the DECAS had little choice but to
develop close-combat tactics which placed the ronderos at great risk, and often result-
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ed in heavy casualties. This was one important reason why ronderos preferred to be
accompanied on their military operations by a platoon of Marines. Their serious dis-
advantage in weaponry also explains why the early DECAS operations needed to
mobilise as many as 3,000 men. Such huge concentrations of ronderos would be divid-
ed into separate task groups, each of which was then deployed to pre-determined
locations. When contact with the enemy was made, the ronderos resorted to the dare-
devil tactic of first pinning down their adversaries, and then provoking them to shoot
at them so to use up their ammunition. “We didn’t approach them but rather encir-
cled them,” Huayhuaco explained (quoted in de Althaus and Morelli 1989:6). It was
only when the enemy appeared to have expended their ammunition that the ronderos
moved in to finish them off with their .16-calibre hunting shotguns, which were rea-
sonably effective weapons in combat at very close-quarters.
Were the DECAS to receive the high-powered rifles he requested, it was
Huayhuaco’s intention that they be placed under the strict control of the Marine
Infantry commander at Luisiana. “In no way are we seeking that they give us arms to
be freely used as we please,” he told Expreso. “What we want is that a military base,
in this case the Marine Infantry, [be put in charge of issuing] the arms we need when
carrying out operations. Nothing more. Our arms would be issued to us and at the
end of the operation the arms would be returned. Moreover, we don’t want to oper-
ate alone, but with them” (quoted in Expreso 1989a:3). Huayhuaco argued that apart
its military advantages, creating an elite unit of militiamen armed with high-powered
rifles would permit him to do away with having to mobilise huge numbers of men for
field operations. The rest could then go back to focusing on agricultural work, which
is their main source of livelihood. “By having firearms we wouldn’t need to mobilise
3,000 men but a smaller quantity of people instead....In that way, we would be able
to save because mobilising 3,000 men for 8 days costs a lot of money and economi-
cally we in the zone are almost worn out” (quoted in Expreso 1989a:3). An improve-
ment in the socioeconomic condition of the population would, by implication, also
help to enlarge the DECAS’s war chest, for much of the money and the provisions
which sustained the DECAS came from monthly donations given by every family in
every organised settlement in the valley.
As a matter of routine practice, Huayhuaco prescribed the rooting out of Shining
Path’s clandestine cadres from every “occupied” village as the first step the DECAS
should take whenever entering a guerrilla zone (de Althaus and Morelli 1989:6). These
cadres were responsible for informing Shining Path’s “special detachments” who
among the locals collaborated with the security forces, and therefore deserved to be
executed. These “occult” cadres were integrated members of the community, and
therefore difficult to spot. Huayhuaco’s method for uncovering these moles was to
send his own peasant operatives to infiltrate a community. “We are able to infiltrate,
we are native to the environment. Each time we capture a terruco, we interrogate him.
They tell us who are the responsables [Senderista authorities] in each community. The
Marines are sometimes not able to interrogate because they don’t speak Quechua”
(quoted in Expreso 1989b:4). Within the DECAS organisation, Huayhauco pioneered
the use of secret operatives, and was responsible for creating the organisation’s very
own intelligence branch. “The way to break down Shining Path’s organisational struc-
ture is not only with force, but through careful intelligence work,” he told me.28
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Huayhuaco maintained that the eradication of Shining Path in Ayacucho could
only be achieved through a concerted effort made by both the military and the civil
defence organisations, working in close cooperation and coordination. He therefore
called for the creation of “cuerpos especiales” (special corps) composed this time of
both military and militia personnel, inconspicuously dressed in peasant clothes,
whose tasks would be to reorganise districts throughout the entire department of
Ayacucho along the lines of the DECAS, and to provide leadership and training to all
other civil defence militias in the department. The operational methods of such
groups, as defined by Huayhuaco, were to include the following attributes:
(1) They should not have fixed or stable barracks. Theirs must be
mobile bases, (2) Their deployment must be by foot and, generally, at
night and by different routes, (3) The security forces integrated in this
group or force should, preferably, be persons born in the region where
they are operating and should know how to express themselves in
Quechua, Aymara, etc., (4) In the intelligence work, carefully chosen
peasants of both sexes and of different ages have got to take part, (5)
The advance must be gradual, starting from a steering antisubversive
centre functioning in each district (Huayhuaco 1991:23).
Huayhuaco’s calls for greater and more active civilian participation in the counterin-
surgency struggle, and for the forging of closer working relations between peasant
militias and security forces, was aimed not only at making counterinsurgency more
effective. He also believed that closer cooperation between civilians and the military
was the only way to foster greater trust between them, and so reduce the chances of
peasants falling victim to State repression as a result of misunderstandings and mis-
perceptions. He was well aware at the time that most government troops in Ayacucho
still had little rapport with the local people. “A cordial and intimate interrelation
between soldiers and Andean peasants does not exist,” he once wrote in an Expreso
editorial. “Sometimes, the peasants are not well treated and there is a popular idea
that the peasants of the emergency zones are terrorists” (Huayhuaco 1991:23). It was
for these reasons that he maintained that “the alliance of civilians and soldiers would
enable pacification to be achieved with a minimum costs of lives, would preclude
excesses and, in the short and medium term, would attain the yearned-for peace”
(ibid.). Opposed to the civil defence militias being relegated to the sidelines of the
counterinsurgency struggle, Rivera Terres sought to have them firmly placed at the
very centre of it (see Expreso 1989b, 1989c).
4.7.2 OPERATION HALCÓN: THE INITIAL EXPEDITION TO THE SIERRA
According to Huayhuaco’s strategic plan, the logical extension of the reconquest
of the Apurímac Valley was DECAS expansion into the Ayacuchan sierra. This began
on the evening of 9 August 1989, when a group of 203 well-armed DECAS militia-
men set off from the jungle town of Santa Rosa. Code-named Operation Halcón, the
prime objective of this important military operation was “to reorganise in a peaceful
and democratic manner the different villages of the district of Tambo and San Miguel
which according to our secret [intelligence] service are dominated and terrorised by
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the criminals of Sendero Luminoso.”29 Pretext aside, Operation Halcón was also
intended by Huayhuaco to gain an important foothold in the districts of San Miguel
and Tambo, from which the DECAS could expand their unique organisational system
and counterinsurgency strategy throughout the rest of the department.
The evidence shows that this initial foray of the DECAS beyond the borders of
the Apurímac River Valley was not entirely opportunistic, but rather was an action
that in fact had been requested by a number of highland communities. By mid-1989
the DECAS had already made a reputation for themselves throughout Ayacucho and
the south-central highlands as an effective civilian counterinsurgency organisation. It
was therefore not surprisingly that they began to receive urgent appeals for assistance
and protection from districts as far away as Vinchos, in Huamanga Province:
SEÑOR COORDINADOR DE BASE DE DEFENZA [sic.] CIVIL DE RINCONADA
BAJA DE RIO APURIMAC [Comandante Huayhuaco].
The undersigned authorities of the communities that constitute the
Headquarters of the Uprising Against Terrorism of Qasanqay, Vinchos
District—Humanga Province, Department of Ayacucho. Before you
with due respect we present ourselves....;
Firstly. – The undersigned communities: Qasanqay, Ranracancha,
Accomachay, Qasacruz, Huayllapampa, Qanqayllo, [etc.]..., we turn
to your respectable office to solicit on behalf of the jurisdiction of the
District of Vinchos, that you visit our organised communities, to carry
out, [with] the assistance of the [militia] personnel of Rinconada Baja,
the furtherance of the development of the [civil defence] organisation
in the Struggle against Terrorism....
Thirdly. – The aforementioned communities are to be found very well
organised in Civil Defence Committee permanently [engaged] in
nightly and daily Peasant Patrols and we are determined to combat
against these evil Subversive elements, but in moments when we are
attacked the Members of the Civil Defence Committee find ourselves
at a disadvantage counting only on our own arms such as slings, poles,
stones and other simple arms [“armas rústicas”] up against the arms
wielded by these [subversive] elements, and it is for this reason that
we require your personal assistance....
ACCORDING TO THAT WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED:
We ask you, Mr. Coordinator of Civil Defence [i.e. Huayhuaco], to
accept our petition which we hope will be promptly realised for the
sake of the tranquility of the nation—and our native land that is Peru.
Vinchos, 31 July 1989.30
Cramped into nine vehicles, the ronderos travelled along the Tambo-San Francisco
highway throughout the night until they reached the rural village of Patibamba, San
Miguel district, high in the Ayacuchan sierra. The group then divided into four com-
panies designated “Pantera,” “Zorro,” “Tigre,” and “Puma.” Three of these pressed on
to the neighbouring district of Tambo, where they positioned themselves in the villages
of Challhuamayo, Acco, and Millpo. From these dispersed locations, the militiamen
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proceeded on 11 August to create or to reorganise civil defence committees in all the
other communities in the district. This arduous task was completed two days later and
was celebrated with a patriotic civic parade at Patibamba, which was attended by vir-
tually the entire adult population of San Miguel and Tambo Districts. Among the hon-
oured guests were the political-military commander of La Mar Province, the province’s
civilian sub-prefect, the civil defence president of Sede Central-Patibamba, and the new
militia authorities of forty-three communities. Four days later a general assembly was
convened at Patibamba, and a pact was signed between all the local civil defence
authorities and the DECAS commanders which contained three key provisions:
(1) “That the Sede Central of Patibamba may coordinate its actions
with the Sede Central of the Apurímac River Valley, at Pichihuillca,”
(2) “The general reorganisation of the various civil defence bases in
the districts of Tambo and San Miguel, under the Control and verifi-
cation of the Sede Central of Patibamba,” (3) “The Authorities and all
the Presidents of the local civil defence committees of Tambo and San
Miguel solicit the Sede Principal [Principal Headquarters—
Pichihuillca] of the Apurímac River Valley for assistance by way of
breech-loading firearms and .16-calibre ammunition, likewise...that
all actions of a countersubversive character be realised with the
knowledge of the political-military commander of the corresponding
area.”31
After their work in Tambo and San Miguel was done, the four DECAS companies
began the next stage of the expedition—Operation Rastrillo—on 16 August.
Operation Rastrillo was a five-day long combat mission that required the DECAS
companies to make their way back to the Apurímac Valley, on foot, through the
dreaded guerrilla zone known as Sello de Oro. The main objectives were to kill or
capture any rebels they came in contact with along the way.
Later that evening, as the forty militiamen of Comando Vikingo’s company were
preparing to bed down for the night in the village of Suca, they were suddenly star-
tled by the excited cries of a comunero that the village was being surrounded by six
armed subversives. While some of the militiamen manned the fortified towers and
sentry posts, others began a frantic hunt through the undergrowth along the perime-
ter of the village. As a kind of defensive posturing, the ronderos began to shoot indis-
criminately into the air in an attempt to frighten away their would-be attackers by
making it known that they were armed. Everyone eventually realised that it had been
a false alarm. But as the shooting died down, comuneros and ronderos alike were hor-
rified to discover casualties. In the midst of all the shooting, one villager had been hit
in the right forearm, and an eight-month-old child had been killed by a stray bullet to
its head. The local political-military commander was immediately notified and the
following day Comando Vikingo and his entire group were disarmed and appre-
hended by a detachment of Army soldiers. They were held in custody at the Army
base in San Miguel while the case was investigated by both the base commander and
the civilian sub-prefect of La Mar Province. After about six hours, the ronderos were
eventually released and permitted to resume their operation, thanks largely to the vil-
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lage authorities of Suca, who testified that the death of the child had been acciden-
tally caused. However, a number of employees at San Miguel hospital would not let
the issue rest, condemning the killing and demanding that a more thorough investi-
gation be conducted with some sort of punishment for those guilty—namely, the
DECAS militiamen. Comando Vikingo avoided further problems that day by hustling
his men as quickly as possible out of San Miguel.
While the four DECAS companies made their way back to the valley, another con-
tingent of eighty-nine militiamen set out from Sede Central-Pichihuillca on 17
August. The objective of this group was to rendezvous with their returning comrades
at the village of Verde Verde, situated on the border of the ceja de selva, and escort
them safely back to the selva. It was a dangerous assignment, as Comando Cacharro,
the leader of the detachment, explained in his post-operations report to the Marine
Infantry commander at Luisiana, since the zone between Verde Verde and the selva
was regarded as rebel territory 
populated entirely by senderista elements where in addition they have
plantations and considerable stretches of...[crops], and in order to
enter this hazardous zone one has to [engage the enemy] in places
where previously they have caused us many losses, where the senderis-
tas are always accustomed to using high-powered firearms, no-one of
the Civil Defence Patrol dared enter with just breech-loading shot-
guns, on account of which I requested that I be lent the two Fales [FAL
automatic assault rifles] recovered in the Canaire sector..., a petition
[in response] to which the authorities of the Sede Central de Defensa
Civil agreed to lend me [the FALs] for the aforesaid operation.32
As planned, the DECAS companies met up at Verde Verde on 19 August. Comando
Vikingo’s men were all exhausted, and many were also very ill. It was clear they were
in no condition to carry on with the operation. Hence, to Comando Cacharro’s escort
detachment passed the unenviable task of patrolling the extremely dangerous areas of
Carcel Huaycco, Uchuyyunca and Celes Huerta. Unfortunately for them, their guide
proved to be unfamiliar with the area, and they soon lost their way. At one point, after
having marched for hours, the Cacharro’s group discovered to their horror that the
guide had inadvertently led them down a narrow, dead-end valley. Fearfully aware that
they were vulnerable to ambush, the ronderos retreated as fast as they could back up
the way they came. Heavy clouds and fog on the surrounding mountains disoriented
them, and it was not until 21 August that they finally stumbled across the dirt road
leading to the selva town of Machente, and on to San Francisco. But their ordeal did
not end there, as Comando Cacharro explained in his report.
[At] the place known as Ayna we were intercepted by the Army Patrol
of Machente [which] confiscated the two firearms [the “Fales,” FALs]
referred to previously, along with .22-calibre and .38-calibre
revolvers, hand grenades, wristwatches, shoes and cash[.... We] were
also submitted to inhumane punishments that even captured senderis-
tas themselves don’t deserve, on the same day at approximately four
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o’clock in the afternoon they freed the entire Patrol [which arrived] at
San Francisco barefoot and some even without clothes as a conse-
quence of the intervention of the Army of Machente.33
Given the various ordeals they went through, the militiamen who took part in
Operation Rastrillo must have felt a sense of great relief each time they passed
through DECAS checkpoints on the outskirts of villages like San José, Asunción, and
Ciole Puncu, for these reminded them that they were once again in friendly territory.
“On 21 August we arrived at Marintari...[and] reincorporated ourselves later into our
bases of origin.”34
In the entire operation, it was only Comando Tatún’s company that ran into
rebels. At a pass called Punco, Comando Tatún’s patrol skirmished briefly with an
armed column of around thirty guerrilla fighters. They suffered no casualties and
even managed to capture a woman guerrilla, alias Camarada Alina, whom they
retained in their immediate custody for interrogation. We are not told what eventu-
ally became of her. But we do know that it was, by this time, already a customary
practice for the DECAS to “rehabilitate” and eventually give amnesty to repentant
Senderistas, rather than turning them over to the police or the army. This innovative
and alternative method of dealing with captured rebels arose out of the frustration
militiamen felt at having seen many of the presumed Senderistas they had captured
and handed over to the authorities released a short time later by the courts, suppos-
edly for “lack of evidence,” only to rejoin their guerrilla comrades to fight the ron-
deros again another day. “We captured them right in the thick of battle, after they had
been shooting at us!” Rivera Terres told me, choking slightly with indignation. “How
can the judges therefore say there was no proof?”
Ronderos, policemen, and soldiers alike had long shared the opinion that the real
reason why judges routinely absolved suspected Senderistas was fear of reprisals.35
Along with the security forces, the ronderos also maintained that it was not always
possible to fight subversion within the existing law, particularly when the justice sys-
tem in Peru had routinely proven itself to be so incapable of effectively handling cases
of terrorism.36 It is in the light of these problems and concerns that we may view the
DECAS practice of “rehabilitation” and “repentance” as an original and inventive
response to a legal system that they perceived was failing to protect the personal safe-
ty and interests of peasants. Hence, whereas in their frustration soldiers have been
known to summarily execute “presumed terrorists” rather than submit them to the
courts (which they believed would probably free them anyway), an alternative
method followed by the DECAS was to place these so-called “arrepentidos” (repen-
tant rebels) under strict observation and constant supervision until such time as it was
deemed that their repentance was sincere. Like ritualistic tests for new religious con-
verts, the arrepentidos were given opportunities to prove their loyalty and sincerity,
mainly by participating in patrols and military operations. “Of course we would
always put them on point duty in all the operations,” said Rivera Terres (quoted in
Expreso 1989b:4). Indeed, guerrillas captured in battle were generally considered by
the militiamen to be more valuable alive than dead, for it was from the arrepentidos
that the DECAS obtained much of their intelligence information concerning the
strength and movement of guerrilla forces, and, most importantly, the identity of the
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clandestine responsables in each of the rural communities. 
Written by the actual field commanders of Operations Halcón and Rastrillo, and pre-
viously kept as restricted documents in the archives of the Sede Central at
Pichihuillca, the post-operation reports from which the narrative above has been
reconstructed provide us not only with a valuable, detailed description of how the
DECAS’ Comandos Especiales operated and armed themselves, but also a unique
insight into the dynamic configurational interactions between various local actors.37
Aside from the information they contain, however, the very existence of the writ-
ten documents is in itself revealing. Few outsiders would have expected to find these
peasant patrollers engaged in record keeping as they are so often depicted as illiter-
ate yokels. American anthropologist Orin Starn received a similar surprise while
researching the rondas campesinas of Peru’s northern Andes when he discovered that
they exhibited the same obsession with formal paperwork as did the town-based gov-
ernment bureaucrats. “Nothing I had read said much about writing having a place in
village life,” he admitted (1999:125). “These were supposed to be oral, even prelit-
erate cultures” (ibid.). In the case of the DECAS, nothing could be further from the
truth. Imitating official jargon and formalism in writing, these documents, complete
with personal seals and elegant signatures, underscore the deep importance DECAS
leaders ascribed to observing formality, particularly in their official correspondence
with military authorities. Obviously, one reason for adopting the procedures and pro-
tocols of the official system was so as to be taken seriously, for the seal and signature
constituted the symbolic vestiges of legitimate authority. The writing of memos and
reports, aside from the obvious practical purposes of imparting information regard-
ing activities and events, also served as a kind of insurance that not only proved that
one’s activities had prior authorisation from higher powers, but also to ensure the
cooperation and compliance of intermediate authorities. For instance, prior to initi-
ating Operation Halcón, Antonio Cárdenas and Huayhuaco wrote a memorandum to
the political-military commander of La Mar Province, a Lieutenant-Coronel in charge
of the Army battalion garrisoned at the provincial capital San Miguel, detailing the
objectives and logistical details of the intended operation. It also explicitly states that
the DECAS personnel taking part in the operation would be “armed” (with firearms).
Mindful of the hostile attitude of local and provincial Army commanders towards the
DECAS, however, Cárdenas and Huayhuaco were careful to mention that the opera-
tion had already been authorised by none other than the chief of political-miltiary
command of the emergency zone himself, Brigadier-General Howard Rodríguez
Malaga.38
But even after having secured prior authorisation, DECAS operations evidently still
had to contend not only with guerrillas, but also, on occasion, with hostile Army
patrols. The ill-treatment of Comando Cacharro’s men at the hands of the Army patrol
of Machente was particularly shocking. Apparently, the soldiers were not satisfied with
simply robbing and physically abusing the militiamen; they were clearly also intent on
humiliating them, perhaps in order to put them back in their place, especially after
Huayhuaco’s audacious announcements to the national press that the DECAS were itch-
ing to become the “centro piloto” of the counterinsurgency struggle (Expreso 1989c).
Ironically enough, whereas Army soldiers at the time routinely displayed antagonistic
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behaviour towards the DECAS, on the other hand, Marine Infantry detachments in the
valley showed them a genuinely sympathetic attitude. In fact, by 1990, the Marines had
already managed to forge an exceptionally supportive and cooperative working rela-
tionship with the DECAS. In contrast, most of the civilian population of the valley were
already convinced that the Army had effectively abandoned the counterinsurgency
struggle. DECAS units, on the other hand, regularly patrolled and conducted operations
alongside Marine Infantry platoons. It was also with the full knowledge and consent of
the Marines that the DECAS continued to utilise modern military hardware, such as
automatic assault rifles, mines, and grenades. Why the Marine Infantry in the Apurímac
River Valley chose to support the DECAS, while the Army seemed bent on opposing
them, may have boiled down to a difference in the political objectives and attitudes of
these two rival branches of the armed forces. After all, it was not the Navy that had been
humiliated in the political aftermath of the Accomarca and Pucayacu massacres, com-
mitted by the Army. Furthermore, given that General Howard Rodríguez evidently dis-
liked the militias, it is hardly surprising that his Army field commanders would faith-
fully follow their leader’s example. What is also likely was that the Marine Infantry,
being a more professional and less rigidly class-divided institution, was, in contrast to
the Army, less preoccupied with protecting symbolic trappings and prerogatives—such
as the monopoly of the use of arms—and more concerned with the practical matter of
encouraging and actively assisting a general civilian insurrection against Shining Path.
Yet one also cannot but notice that the activities of Operation Halcón were preg-
nant with political symbolism. The general desfile performed at the end of it was
meant to underscore the patriotic, and therefore morally just, nature of the under-
taking. And the attendance of various military and civil authorities confirmed the
legitimacy of the entire venture. The pact signed by the Sede Central of Patibamba
and the Sede Central was intended not only to specify mutual goals and obligations;
it also served to formalise and legitimise DECAS expansion into San Miguel and
Tambo. Having carefully constructed the symbolic aura of legitimacy and popular
endorsement behind its actions, the DECAS were then in a position to denounce any
opposition it ran into as “unpatriotic,” or even downright “subversive.” Returning
briefly to the case of the denunciations made against the militiamen by hospital staff
in San Miguel, Comando Vikingo’s special report to the Marine Infantry command-
er at Luisiana (SCDECAS 1998f) dismisses these complaints as having been 
generated by persons of “subversive” character with “subversive” relations, whose
only purpose for making a fuss was to create unnecessary trouble for the DECAS:
....Although the relatives of the aggrieved girl and of the wounded
man did not seek sanctions against those responsible for the act,
because they understood that it had been a regrettable and uninten-
tional act, there arose from the bosom of the Ministry of Health, from
the Hospital at San Miguel, the family [of] GAVILAN PEREZ who comes
to be the first cousin of Camarada “BETO” called LUIS ALBERTO PEREZ,
son of the Epiphanic PEREZ BENDEZU who owns a commercial estab-
lishment in the Plaza de armas of San Miguel, who in turn visits his
parents as though he were a conscientious and honest citizen thus
mocking the authorities of San Miguel who do not suspect that he is
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a delinquent subversive that to date has caused many deaths and at
present holds the post of Leader (Military Commander) of the
[Shining Path’s] 91st Company in the Sector or Zone of Santo
Domingo and Quiteni (Ene River Valley).
As I have stated previously Sr. Comandante, this demonstrates that
the tentacles of the subversion are infiltrating the different sectors of
the State y from there they defend, shelter the senderistas and in many
cases fulfilling or functioning as ideologues.
This is all I am able to report you Mr. Commander.
COMANDO “VIKINGO” OF OPERATION HALCON”
“Silencing has been a modality of power in Peru as far back as Spanish rule,” writes
Orin Starn (1999:130). This example neatly illustrates how, under conditions of mar-
tial law and in circumstances of political emergency, the accusation of “subversion”
can be a convenient rhetorical cudgel for silencing opposition.
Finally, what do these documents tell us about the process of DECAS expansion,
and in particular the manner and form in which the organisation provided assistance
to districts outside the Apurímac Valley? It appears that DECAS expansion into the
sierra unfolded not by direct “conquest” and “occupation,” but rather through the
process of creating pacts, or alliances, with newly established Zonal Headquarters of
districts reorganised along DECAS lines. In this manner, expansion of the DECAS sys-
tem resulted in something like a confederation of equal and autonomous Sedes
Central. By creating an interlinked regional defence structure between the sierra and
the selva, what the DECAS were managing to create was a considerable degree of
inter-zonal and inter-regional coordination and cooperation in counterinsurgency
operations that was unprecedented, even among the various branches of the police
and armed forces. In fact, for much of the 1980s, “[the] military chiefs in the
Emergency Zones—first Ayacucho, then most of the Andean departments—acted on
their own in the absence of a coherent strategic concept. Most of the local and region-
al activities were carried out without the slightest coordination with other military
chiefs in the regions!” (Kruijt n.d.:9).
The apparent equality between Sede Central Committees was, in this case, indi-
cated by the fact that the pact stipulated that the Sede Central of Patibamba would
receive military assistance—not orders—from the Sede Central of Pichihuillca.
Nevertheless, it was certainly to be expected that Pichihuillca would continue to occu-
py a place of central importance and influence within this vast and expanding net-
work of civil defence. For one thing, the fortified militia base of Pichihuillca func-
tioned as a kind of central armoury for DECAS in general, in charge of dispensing
heavy weaponry, such as grenades and even modern automatic assault rifles recovered
from guerrillas, which in principle should have been turned in to the military. Once
again, Pichihuillca appears to have been given authorisation by Luisiana’s Marine
commander to keep and use these sorts of modern weapons of war. But besides stor-
ing weapons for the organisation, the evidence suggests that the Sede Central of
Pichihuillca was also responsible for providing firearms to local defence committees
in other parts of Ayacucho, with money raised by the villagers of those communities
(e.g. SCDECAS 1989b). Indeed, this was stipulated in the pact as one of Pichihuillca’s
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obligations towards the Sede Central of Patibamba. And as the next chapter will show,
the DECAS would eventually go on to provide direct assistance to sierra districts by
dispatching “special advisors,” and eventually sending detachments of its own elite
personnel, the Comandos Especiales, to live and work in various sierra districts for
extended periods of time. In most of these developments and achievements,
Huayhuaco played a prominent, influential role as both administrator and master-
mind. 
4.7.3 ARMS TO THE PEASANTRY?
To his sympathisers and admirers (like the Expreso), Comandante Huayhauco was
nothing short of a legendary hero; the leader of a popular “crusade” against the vio-
lence and terror unleashed by Shining Path. In the eyes of his critics, however, his pro-
fessed admiration the counterinsurgency strategy of the early 1980s merely reinforced
their view of the man as a repugnant and brazen advocate of dirty war. Many of his
critics also regarded the proliferation of civil defence groups as a sinister step towards
the further militarisation of civilian society.
Whether admired or despised, the important point is that Huayhuaco’s outspo-
ken views, popularised in print and on television appearances, catapulted him into the
very heart of the debate on how to bring Shining Path to heel, just when all other
approaches seemed to have come to nothing. There was one issue that Huayhuaco’s
alternative views on the proper counterinsurgency strategy ultimately raised above all
others: whether or not to arm the civil defence militias.
Where President García stood on this issue was made clear when, on 9 December
1989, in front of numerous Peruvian and foreign reporters, he personally presented
the civil defence committee of Rinconada Baja, Rivera Terres’s adopted village in the
Apurímac River Valley, with two hundred shotguns. The President even went so far
as to declare Comandante Huayhuaco a “public defender of democracy” and his very
own “personal representative” in the counterinsurgency struggle being waged in the
Apurímac Valley (IDL 1989:11). As already mentioned, the President even gave the
militia commander his own pistol as a symbol of this assigned responsibility.
García’s action received the consent of almost all his ministers. Army general Julio
Velásquez Giarcarini, the Minister of Defence, responded immediately to the criticism
of ultra vires, voiced mainly by the legal Left, by pointing out that what the President
had done “constituted an act of assistance to the social classes that are organising in
order to defend themselves from the subversion” (quoted in IDL 1989:10). He added
that “I do not understand any sort of polemic in this respect, since the action was
taken within legal borders. The arms which have been distributed are breech-loading
shotguns that any citizen is able to acquire and use legally” (ibid.). Huayhuaco’s
request for firearms had already been favourably received some months earlier by
Armando Villanueva del Campo, the President of the Council of Ministers, and by
Senator César Delgado Barreto, the Justice Minister (see Expreso 1989a). Support for
García’s initiative was also forthcoming from a broad spectrum of newspapers that
were ordinarily at odds with one another. El Comercio and La República praised all
acts of grassroots defence against Sendero, as did the presidential candidate Mario
Vargas Llosa, who declared that were he to become president he would “support res-
olutely the constitution of rondas campesinas and of organisations of self-defence so
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that the civilian population may be able to collaborate with the Armed Forces in the
fight against extremism” (quoted in IDL 1989:10). But newspapers like El Comercio
also cautioned against increasing civilian participation in the counterinsurgency strug-
gle, insisting that the government must not allow the Armed Forces to retreat or to
relinquish their function and central role in it (IDL 1989:10). La República urged
public vigilance, lest any one political party try to manipulate the civil defence mili-
tias for partisan politics (ibid.). And Justice Minister Delgado Barreto recommended
that the integrity of the intended recipient groups for government-donated firearms
should first be investigated. “We must be certain that these instruments [firearms] are
going to serve a defensive purpose y will not end up in the hands of the terrorists,”
he stated to the press (quoted in Expreso 1989a:3).
Yet Peruvian society was clearly divided on the issue. From other sectors, criticism
was voiced not only at the President’s act of giving out arms to peasant, but also for
the very idea of permitting the peasantry to form defence militias in the first place.
While, on the one hand there was general consensus that that peasants should be pro-
tected, and do have a right to defend themselves, on the other hand, there existed
strong disagreement regarding the manner in which this should be undertaken. Henry
Pease, the presidential candidate for the Izquierda Unida (IU) party, argued that arm-
ing peasant militias was not a realistic measure which will defeat Shining Path. He and
other leftist critics, besides questioning the legal basis of the President’s actions, also
maintained that the only way to defeat Shining Path must be through democratic
political parties and independent popular organisations (e.g. peasant unions), rather
than through peasant militias, which they believed to be directly controlled and
manipulated by the armed forces. It was a viewpoint typically “desde la capital (“from
the capital as a point of departure,” to borrow a phrase from Hinojosa). As such, it
was a view that was out of touch with the realities of the Ayacucho emergency zone
where, because of the political violence unleashed by both the army and Shining Path,
political parties and peasant unions had all but disappeared. It was a perspective that
was also oblivious to a significant sociopolitical development in the country, which
was that by the end of what had been a tumultuous decade, the majority of Peruvians
had already begun to turn away from traditional party politics, and were looking
instead for new, less formal political and organisational alternatives (Palmer 2000). It
is obvious that the IU’s extreme apprehensiveness towards the rondas campesinas or
comités antisubversivas arose from their suspicion that such “paramilitary groups,” as
they referred to them, were often either controlled by rival political parties (particu-
larly by the APRA),39 or in the service of the armed forces, and therefore a potential
danger to their own party members. The IU was certainly justified in regarding the
armed forces with a great deal of suspicion and apprehension, for senior military offi-
cials had often aired in public their distrust of the IU. For instance, retired army gen-
eral Luis Cisneros Vizquerra once declared to the Lima magazine Oiga: “In some
measure, the IU is the legal voice of Sendero and I believe that one must check the
activities of particular leaders of the IU who have demonstrated a primary vocation
in defending Sendero” (quoted in DESCO 1989:611).
Another outspoken early critic of Huayhuaco and the civil defence organisations
was Carlos Iván Degregori,40 who wrote the following retort to the “Denme 500
fusiles” article:
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The experience of Apurímac River teaches us that once the logic of
war is imposed, it is very difficult to reverse it. For that reason what
is crucial is a strategy that takes into account the different regional sit-
uations and that, in those which have not succumbed to runaway vio-
lence, one has as an axis the fortifying of social organisations....In any
case, it would me much more decisive to say: give me five-hundred
independent unions or communities, democratic and with a perspec-
tive of a peace with social justice; return alive Julio Orozco and many
other leaders who have fallen, and then I shall have greater possibili-
ties of defeating the subversion (1989b:30).
It is always a morally admirable approach to seek to defeat subversion—indeed, to
oppose violence in general—by way of social justice, and through the peaceful efforts
of independent, democratic grassroots organisations. But it is can sometimes be a
naive example of wishful thinking; one that expresses idealistic personal convictions
rather than a sobre assessment of harsh realities. For one thing, the conditions in
which such an approach would have had some chance of working—that is to say, a
situation of democratic stability, along with a true civil society—did not even exist in
the country, let alone in Ayacucho. Nor was Shining Path willing to permit it to exist,
or to respect peaceful, democratic opposition. How, realistically speaking, can one
defeat, by peaceful and democratic means, an enemy so committed to violent revolu-
tion, and enemy for whom “Stalin’s position—willing to raze his own land, destroy
his country’s infrastructure, and absorb the most shocking human losses in order to
defeat the Nazi invader—was the example it had to keep in mind”? (Gorriti 1999:27).
Furthermore, as a leading expert on Sendero Luminoso, Degregori must have been
aware that Shining Path was able not only to infiltrate and so control, through vio-
lence, labour unions and independent communities, but also to threaten and intimi-
date into submission, and to eliminate if necessary, even leftist critics of the revolu-
tion. This is precisely what happened in the popular Lima shantytown of Villa El
Salvador (see Burt 1998).
But criticism and opposition emanated not only from the so-called “progressive
camp.” For once, the armed forces in general were of the same opinion as the legal
Left in expressing concerns about the idea of armed peasant militias. In spite of the
Defence Minister’s declared backing for the idea (which was itself in fact a reversal of
his earlier position41), within the armed forces as a whole—and especially within the
Army—the notion of arming the peasant militias was met with strong disapproval. In
fact, from as early as June 1989, Army general Howard Rodríguez had already been
voicing his emphatic opposition to the idea:
We must not fall into the mistake of providing arms to the peasants.
We would be promoting the creation of an army parallel to our own.
Has one thought of the risk signified by giving this type of armament
to the peasant? What would happen if these groups are infiltrated by
Sendero and use the arms that the State has given them to fight against
us? (quoted in IDL 1990:130). 
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But apart from these practical sorts of concerns raised by General Rodríguez, criticism
from the military must have also stemmed from their apprehension for any step per-
ceived as weakening their monopoly of the means and exercise of legitimate violence.
They are, after all, the national institution constitutionally charged with maintaining
law and order, and so in the minds of some senior officers, what was at stake was not
only national security, but also the honour and the constitutional prerogative of the
armed forces. To arm peasant militias “would be to recognise the incapacity of the
State to defend itself,” insisted Rodríguez (quoted in Expreso 1989e:17). For the
armed forces, the wielding of arms and the maintaining of law and order were their
exclusive, constitutionally ascribed prerogatives that must be jealously preserved and
guarded (Fitch 1998; Stepan 1988).
In the end, Rivera Terres did not obtain the 500 Mauser rifles he requested (the
Minister of Defence steadfastly refused to grant this wish). As a political compromise,
however, he received directly from the President a sizeable donation of (albeit less
potent) shotguns and ammunition, some of which may have later been sold to sierra
communities. Most importantly, his lobbying managed to win not only powerful
political recognition and support for the cause of the peasant militias—in particular,
for the idea of providing them the firearms with which to combat and defeat subver-
sion. While there can be little doubt that President García’s gesture of dispensing two
hundred shotguns to peasant militiamen was a strong symbolic indication of his gov-
ernment’s approval of the peasantry’s resistance to Shining Path, it went little beyond
that. No official policy or presidential directive to the armed forces were ever for-
mulated as the acquisition and legal use of firearms by peasant militias was concerned.
However, as the remainder of this chapter will show, the DECAS were never really
entirely dependent on the military or the government for its arms. They had other
sources. What Huayhuaco was really after was an officially recognised, statutory right
for the militias to wield firearms, for the existence of such a law would have enabled
the DECAS to surmount a number of practical problems, of which the routine con-
fiscation of the firearms they already possessed by Army soldiers was foremost. The
way would then have been open for Huayhuaco to put his larger civilian-military
counterinsurgency strategy into practice. Instead of the magna carta he sought, how-
ever, what Huayhuaco got from García was merely a token of his personal endorse-
ment of popular, grassroots counter-revolution. As head of a crisis-ridden Aprista
government in its last months of power, the severe limits to García’s ability to assist
the civil defence movement in any meaningful way was recognised by Huayhuaco. It
was undoubtedly for this reason that he decided to throw his political support (and
naturally that of the DECAS) firmly behind FREDEMO’s presidential candiadate,
Mario Vargas Llosa (see Expreso 1989d:3). Ultimately, though, it was García’s suc-
cessor—not Vargas Llosa but rather Alberto Fujimori—who would come to formalise
armed peasant militias into the “fourth branch of the armed forces” (Kruijt
1996:246), and as such, legally entitled to wield firearms.
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4.8 Autonomy and order under the DECAS
By the end of 1989, the DECAS has succeeded in “pacifying” and reorganising virtu-
ally the entire Apurímac River Valley, from Anchihuay in the south right up to the
Boca Mantaro in the north (del Pino 1996:136, 150). Unlike the military, which was
incapable of providing a sustained presence in most areas of the countryside, the
DECAS, by contrast, were careful to consolidate their gains. This was achieved
through constant patrolling, coordinated defence, and the imposition of strict disci-
pline and authoritarian leadership in the everyday lives of the communities that was
geared towards self-defence.
The pressures and complexities of administering such a vast area led DECAS lead-
ers in 1989 to divide up the valley into nine administrative zones, which they called
“sectors.” Additional zones were created in step with DECAS expansion, such that by
1993, there existed twenty-two “sectors,” from Chungui to the Ene River Valley (see
del Pino 1993b:172-177). Each zone, or sector, was controlled by its own militia
president-coordinator (presidente coordinador), who had autonomous authority over
matters of local and zonal concern. Rivera Terres took control of the comité zonal de
defensa civil of the Luisiana zone, comprising 18 hamlets, each of which had its own
comité de base, or local defence committee. Antonio Cárdenas Torre presided over
the DECAS in the Palmapampa sector, made up of 17 settlements. “Each zone was
autonomous and [it had been agreed that] military intervention between ronderos was
not permitted” (Huayhuaco 1994:22). However, matters of general and common
interest, such as larger-scale operations, continued to be handled by the Sede Central
del Comité Defensa Civil Valle del Río Apurímac, the central headquarters and maxi-
mum authority of the civil defence organization in the entire valley, at Pichihuillca.
Antonio Cárdenas remained the president of the Sede Central, and Rivera Terres con-
tinued to hold the post of Presidente-Coordinador de Acciones Antisubversivas until
shortly before his imprisonment in February 1991. “Antonio Cárdenas was in charge
of the logistical end, of obtaining the necessary materials for the war. I was responsi-
ble for the strategic part, for directly military affairs,” Rivera Terres explained to me.42
Contact and communication between each individual comités de base in this
extensive and complex network was maintained through bugle calls, and a system of
“chasquis,” or runners. It has been claimed that through chasquis, the DECAS were
able to mobilise between one and two thousand ronderos within seven or eight hours
(see de Althaus and Morelli 1989:6).
According to Rivera Terres, the peasant smallholders were generally the ones who
took part in the field operations, not the peons; for it was the peasant smallholders
who wanted to recuperate their lands, and who therefore had a stake in ridding them-
selves of Shining Path domination. A labourer may on occasion, however, take the
place of his patrón in an operation if, for instance, his patrón were ill. But he had to
be well remunerated for it (de Althaus and Morelli 1989:6).
In 1990, each zonal committee began to form special groups of professional mili-
tiamen, called “Comandos Especiales.” These elite militia units—the inspiration for
which can apparently be attributed to Huayhuaco—were specially created to under-
take the organisation’s military operations, thus permitting the majority of peasant
men to rehabilitate their agricultural and other livelihood activities. The Comandos
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Especiales were well trained, well armed, and were paid a monthly salary. (More will
be said in the next chapter about these and similar groups that were to emerge over
the next few years in other parts of Ayacucho.) Nevertheless, every able-bodied mem-
ber of a community was still expected to contribute in an auxiliary capacity to the
logistical needs and financial expenses of the defence organization. Each man who was
fit enough, whether peon or patron, was obliged to take turns guarding the village, and
patrolling the perimeter. “Every evening, every morning the people had to form up,”
I was told by Comando Zorro, who for many years served as a rondero in the
Apurímac Valley. “The comando and the president of the ronderos summoned every-
one to form up with a whistle or a bugle, and everyone would gather: men, adults, chil-
dren, women, everyone. The women had their own commander, apart from the men.
It was a woman, and it was they who controlled the women. The women were com-
manded by women, the men by men. They all had their list of duties, such as vigilance
in the daytime, at night, these sorts of things.”43 Daily routines were governed by rules,
and geared towards a state of constant war. “There were also sanctions, which were
very severe,” recalled Comando Zorro. “In the past, the [DECAS] organisation was
extremely drastic because one had to obey the orders given by the comando and the
president of the civil defence committee. If one did not obey, they flogged you with a
whip. With this whip they could bloody you completely.”44 Access to the valley, and
travel between settlements, also came to be strictly controlled:
Unknown persons were not permitted to enter. Even known individ-
uals couldn’t just come and go as they pleased. One has to have the
appropriate documents, apart from which one had to have family in
the valley. If one is coming to stay for three, two, or one month, they
have to be guaranteed by family members who own land in the selva.
If you need to travel from one community to another, the civil
defence authorities of your community must first issue you with a spe-
cial pass, called an ‘Authorisation of Transit,’ signed and stamped by
the local comando or the president of civil defence. And so you must
travel with this document, and only with this document are you per-
mitted to pass through the control points. All your other documents
meant nothing, not your voter’s identification card nor your military
service card. And so it was. In the selva, the control was very strict.45
Certain zones, like Luisiana and Palmapampa, were even placed out of bounds for the
police and the Army without their patrols having obtained prior authorization either
from the zonal DECAS authorities, or the valley’s political-military authority, which
was the commander of the Marine Infantry garrison at Luisiana.
If push came to shove the DECAS had the military muscle, owing to their access
to firearms, to defend these spaces of autonomy. And there were indeed some occa-
sions when the DECAS clashed violently with the army, the police, even the DEA
(U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency) (see del Pino 1996:169-170). As Comandante
Huayhuaco and Comando Zorro both explained to me, these stringent rules of access
to certain sectors of the valley were intended as security measures to foil guerrillas,
who sometimes disguised themselves as military or police personnel, from gaining
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access into the communities. In addition, they were also aimed at maintaining auton-
omy from the Army, which at the time the DECAS rightly perceived as taking every
opportunity to undermine the civil defence organisation. That the DECAS were able
to maintain this remarkable degree of autonomy in the valley was owes itself partly
to their close association with the Marine Infantry forces in the area, who acted as a
sort of powerful patron, holding at bay the hostile actions of the Army. In some areas,
however, militia leaders were virtually independent even of the Marines by reason of
their alliance with another powerful yet inconspicuous actor, whose influence was
growing steadily in the region—the Colombian-based drug traffickers.
4.9 DECAS and drug traffickers: an alliance of convenience
Although narcotrafico (drug trafficking) has existed in the north of the valley since at
least the early 1980s, it was only towards the end of 1989 that narcotics traffickers and
a small number of civil defence commanders came to forge a symbiotic alliance. The
retreat of the army from the counterinsurgency struggle had left the DECAS largely on
their own and unprotected. It was under these circumstances that some of the civil
defence commanders in the Apurímac Valley began to seek an alliance of convenience
with local narcotraficantes (narcotics traffickers) linked to Colombian drug mafias,
who now emerged as the most obvious source of cash, arms, and supplies.
For centuries, erythroxylum coca—the coca leaf—has been central to both the rit-
ualistic and the mundane lives of Andean peoples. In the late twentieth century, the
innocuous-looking coca leaf has gained international notoriety as the raw material of
cocaine. Soaking coca leaves in vats of petrol or kerosene draws out the plant’s pow-
erful alkaloid stimulant. The leaves are later mashed and then mixed with sulphuric
acid, which acts as a filter, creating a gooey, brown mixture known as cocaine paste.
The cocaine paste is then further refined in special laboratories into the white pow-
dered drug we know as cocaine, whose street value per ounce in the United States is
worth much more than the average Peruvian peasant’s yearly earnings.
For any farmer wishing to make fast dollars and lots of it, cultivating coca held a
number of attractions. Firstly, as compared with the financial return on the sale of
other established cash crops grown in the valley—like cacao, coffee, peanuts, cube,
fruits, etc.—coca remained more profitable than all the rest of these, in spite of the
fact that the price of cocaine paste was far lower by the end of the decade was what
it had been at the beginning of the 1980s, owing to the fall in the world price of
cocaine. The attractiveness of coca farming in areas such as the Apurímac Valley
received an additional huge boost when the international prices of other commercial
crops took a nose-dive in the latter part of the 1980s.
Table 4.2.: Value of Cocaine Paste in Peru, 1980-1993 (US$/Kg)
Year ‘80 ‘81 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 
Value 7,200 6,800 6,800 2,500 3,400 2,700 2,500 2,000 1,200 900 435 615 712 400 
Source: after DESCO 1994a:11
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A second advantage in cultivating coca in the valley was that it required minimal
attendance and, unlike coffee, which can only be harvested once a year, can be har-
vested up to four times annually. Furthermore, coca grows well in the shallow soil of
the high jungle. These agricultural characteristics of the crop made it ideally suited to
the new routine of peasant militiamen who, over this period, had come to spend more
time patrolling than farming. According to del Pino, “only 3 days were dedicated to
working the land and the rest to patrolling” (1996:146).
The notorious sub-region known as the Upper Huallaga Valley, in Huánuco
department, has been among the largest and most important coca-growing zones in
the world, and a major source of income for Shining Path. According to the U.S. State
Department, the Huallaga Valley accounted for almost 40 percent of the world’s sup-
ply of coca (Kawell 1995, fn.3). The second most important, though much smaller,
region of coca cultivation in Peru is the Apurímac River Valley. The significant differ-
ence of social configurations between the two regions is that whereas in the Upper
Huallaga Valley rondas campesinas are absent, and a pragmatic alliance has developed
between narcotraficantes, coca farmers, and Sendero Luminoso, in the Apurímac
River Valley the pact was between the narcotraficantes and the DECAS.46
Until the end of 1983, the centre of narco-trafficking in the Apurímac Valley was
in its more remote northern part, around the town of Llochegua, where the presence
of the police and ENACO (the state-run National Coca Company) was small or non-
existent (del Pino 1996:143). But from about 1985 onwards, the centre of cocaine
paste processing moved steadily southwards down the valley, finally arriving at pre-
viously had been the small, insignificant, and underdeveloped hamlet of Palmapampa.
Narcotráfico’s change of location was possibly induced by the army’s particularly bru-
tal oppression of the inhabitants of the northern towns of Llochegua and Sivia in mid-
1984, which caused a massive depopulation of the area (del Pino 1996:148). Del Pino
argues that the transplantation of narcotráfico to the very heart of DECAS territory
would eventually produce a vital symbiotic relationship whereby the narcotraficantes
would provide “coca dollars,” modern weapons, and various other supplies to the
DECAS in return for armed protection—not just from Shining Path but also from the
police, the military, and anyone else who threatened to disrupt narcotics production
and coca cultivation in the valley. “The ronderos had the obligation to keep the zone
“clean” in exchange for the economic assistance of the drug traffickers” (del Pino
1996:170).
It is important to keep in mind that, for obvious reasons, it is extremely difficult
to collect detailed information about this subject, and is often almost impossible to
corroborate the existing evidence. According to Huayhuaco, the DECAS organisa-
tion’s first contact with the narcotraficantes occurred in 1989, when he sent three
DECAS commanders north to the zone of Canaire, in the Ene Valley, to lend assis-
tance to the civil defence groups there in the aftermath of a guerrilla massacred of
ronderos. While in Canaire, two of the commanders were allegedly recruited by
Columbian drug traffickers looking for protection from Sendero, which had already
eliminated three of the narcotics gangs in the region. Huayhuaco was subsequently
told by these two DECAS commanders that the Columbian narcotráficantes were
offering to provide money for arms in exchange for protection, and wanted to meet
with him. But Rivera Terres claims to have declined the offer. “I never had direct con-
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tact with them [the Columbians], since no sooner did they try to talk with me than
they encountered my intransigent position [not to deal with them]” (quoted in
Expreso 1994:8). Whether this version of events is true or not, what was clear was
that by 1990, some DECAS commanders had already linked themselves to local drugs
traffickers, and as a result were reaping the financial benefits of it. Some of the zonal
militia commanders were regularly seen driving around in new 4x4 pickups. They
also began to buy tractors, and constructing various clandestine airstrips in the jun-
gle. The most infamous of these airstrips was constructed in December 1989 at
Palmapampa, which Rivera Terres is careful to point out is the zone controlled by
Antonio Cárdenas and Jorge Choque. Before it was shut down by the Army and the
Air Force in 1993, light aircraft laden with cocaine paste flew frequently in and out
of the Palmapampa airstrip. According to Rivera Terres, each flight carried a cargo
worth between 6 and 7 million dollars. And according to the former authorities and
ronderos of Palmapampa who were interviewed by del Pino, the DECAS of
Palmapampa charged the narcotraficantes a tax of between 5 and 10 million dollars
on every flight out. “In 1993 an average of five flights were recorded per month.
According to unofficial versions, the money collected was spent on the purchase of
firearms, munitions, food, community works, official trips to Ayacucho and to Lima”
(del Pino 1996:170). For the local population of Palmapampa, drug money made pos-
sible the infrastructural improvements—schools, an electrical generator, etc.—that no
government in the past had ever bothered to provide.
“By 1990, the rondas of the Apurímac Valley had become polarised into pro-
narco- traffickers and those openly against them,” Huayhuaco told me.47 This volatile
situation, and the internal conflict that it was causing, threatened to tear the DECAS
organisation apart. For the time being, Huayhuaco’s influence and overbearing per-
sonality managed to hold the organisation together, and to keep dissention to a mur-
mur. But even he was aware that sooner or later, increasingly strained relations
between himself and some of his zonal commanders would bring matters to a head.
4.10 The fall of Huayhuaco
Fortunately for the organisation, the worsening internal tensions and personal rival-
ries between Huayhuaco and the other DECAS leaders never deteriorated into
internecine violence. External political forces and events intervened to facilitate the
fall of Comandante Huayhuaco, and he would soon find himself ousted from the
DECAS and the Apurímac River Valley.
Interestingly enough, his downfall would begin in Lima. Deeply alarmed by the
proliferation and expansion of the DECAS, leftist congressmen there had begun to
delve into the background of this so-called “Chief of the Rondas Campesinas,” whom
the government had seen fit to furnish with firearms. It did not take them long to find
the skeletons in Huayhuaco’s cupboard. In mid-December 1989, IU and PUM con-
gressmen, following Senator Javier Diez Canseco Cisneros’s lead, made public
announcements to the press concerning Rivera Terres’s past criminal record, ulti-
mately censuring and taking a political dig at Alan García for having armed the “ron-
das paramilitares” of a “convicted drug trafficker” (see La República 1989:4,
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1990a:13). Over the next few years, Rivera Terres would find himself in and out of
prison or police custody, charged with various crimes including breaking the condi-
tions of his parole, bodily assault and murder, abduction, and the possession of a
firearm without a license. But perhaps the most ruinous denunciation against him was
that the peasant militias under his command were involved in the illegal cultivation
of coca, and had become the bodyguards of the narcotraficantes in the region. And
though he has always been absolved of these accusations—for “lack of evidence” iron-
ically enough—or has had charges dropped on account of the intervention of power-
ful political friends, the real damage caused was to his reputation, and eventually to
his standing within the DECAS.
According to Rivera Terres himself, his frequent absence from the Apurímac
Valley between 1990 and 1991 owing to his numerous arrests permitted his rivals
among the zonal militia commanders to plot and to turn the population of the valley
against him.48 This must certainly have been facilitated to a great extent by the fact
that, for some time, Huayhuaco’s power base in the valley was already being eroded
through the arrests or imprisonment of many of his friends and followers among the
militia commanders. That he had made a practice of publicly lambasting the Peruvian
courts and justice system for being their ineptness in dealing with cases of terrorism
had already made him, and the DECAS organisation he represented, a considerable
number of political enemies in Peru’s legal establishment. In the tale of his personal
downfall, bad press did the rest. His many political opponents, particularly among the
legal Left, waged a successful propaganda campaign that helped transform his public
image from “defender of democracy” to “jungle warlord” and “drug-trafficker,” the
very embodiment of all that is sinister about the civil defence movement (e.g. El
Nacional 1990:15,17, La República 1990:13, La República 1991a:27, Starn
1993:44, Starn 1998:241). When, in December 1990, it was disclosed by his fellow
DECAS commanders that he had made off with thousands of dollars worth of donat-
ed funds raised by the people of the valley for the civil defence movement (El Popular
1990:5), he was formally denounced by the organisation and totally discredited in the
eyes of many of the inhabitants of the Apurímac Valley. When later he tried to return,
he was, according to Comando Zorro, “thrown out of the valley by the people them-
selves.”49 However, the high esteem in which he continued, for a time, to be held by
peasants in other parts of the Ayacuchan Andes was vividly illustrated when, in March
1991, more than two thousand ronderos from the districts of Quinua, Tambillo,
Chiarra, Acocro and Vinchos protested in the central plaza of Ayacucho, demanding
that he be released from police custody after having been charged with drug traffick-
ing and assault (Expreso 1991:4). During the demonstration, delegates and represen-
tatives of the DECAS were conspicuous by their absence.
Huayhuaco has obviously been an major figure in the history of the DECAS, par-
ticularly during the formative years of the organisation. His contributions to its suc-
cess and to the stimulation of popular counter-revolution among the peasants of
Ayacucho are undeniable yet, owing to his now discredited image, often also over-
looked or dismissed. Nevertheless, the fact that the organisation did not collapse but
rather continued to flourish even after his departure, is clear proof of its institution-
al resilience and organisational durability. And here lies its greatest strength. Contrary
to the exaggerated claims of the Expreso (which has been his most steadfast apologist
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and political supporter over the years), the rondas campesinas of the Apurímac River
Valley were never “created” by Huayhuaco, or by any other single individual.
Although his story is integral to an understanding of the early history of the DECAS
of the Apurímac River Valley, the existence of the latter was never ever determined
by the fortunes of one individual, no matter how powerful or influential. As we have
already seen, the DECAS (and before them the CDCs) had already weathered many
crises, and had an internal dynamic of its own. Although the scandalous fall of
Huayhauco may have somewhat dented its reputation and hurt morale within the
ranks of the valley’s ronderos, his loss to the organisation appears to have had no ill
effect on the ability of DECAS commanders to pursue their civilian-based counterin-
surgency struggle. There were other, equally capable and less controversial leaders,
like Jorge Choque, to take his place. In fact, as the next chapter will show, the phase
of sustained expansion into the sierra, through a policy of providing direct assistance
to Andean districts, only really got under way after Huayhuaco’s expulsion from the
DECAS.
Notes
1 With regard to the coerced recruitment of the rural youth by the insurgents, del Pino writes: “The
cases of coercive recruitment might occur as much in the communities of the sierra as of the selva.
The sympathetic youth are obliged to joining the struggle. In contrast to the cadres and militants
of the first generation, who assumed the political line as “total subjection”, these new militants, in
many cases, participate under pressure and for fear of the reprisals” (1995b:9).
2 On this point, Tapia writes: “the scope of counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Armed
Forces remained confined to the limits of the respective Zones and Sub-zones of Security. As one
knows, those limits correspond with the limits of the departments. As one understands, the
Senderista action did not respect any of these limits. Still, its columns moved precisely between [the
different zones]....Before, it was enough that a Senderista column from the province of La Mar, in
Ayacucho, should cross over the Apurímac River—for example, from San Francisco to Pichari—so
as to exit the territory declared in emergency corresponding to the II Military Region and find
themselves in the province of La Convención of the department of Cusco, which belonged to the
IV Military Region which had not been declared in emergency” (1997:58-59).
3 Words spoken by General Sinesio Jarama, director of the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares in the
late 1980s. Quoted in Kruijt 1991:104.
4 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
5 Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú (Sendero Luminoso), “¡Desarrollemos la guerra de
guerrillas!” setiembre de 1981/marzo de 1982. (Translated into English, Reproduced and
Distributed by Movimiento Popular Perú (MPP) and The New Flag, on www.blythe.org.)
6 Based on author’s interview with Leoncio, president of one of Tambo’s surrounding refugee ham-
lets and former inhabitant of San Antonio, Apurímac River Valley, on 6 November 1997.
7 According to Gustavo Gorriti, “Guzmán emphasized that only by agreeing to accept for themselves
and especially for strangers to them higher casualties and much more intense level of suffering than
the enemy could the party erase the tactical and material disadvantage it had with the enemy and
forge a “combat machine” able to grow and build itself on the nourishment provided by the old
order’s collapse and destruction” (1999:26-27). In fact, however, there was nothing at all glam-
orous about guerrilla life, exciting and attractive though it may have been for some young people.
According to Julián, a young peasant farmer who often was forced to accompany armed rebel
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columns, “one had to go during one or two entire days to remotes places, sometimes hungry, bare-
foot, we told ourselves that we have to suffer in this way in order to liberate ourselves” (quoted in
del Pino 1993b:74). It is perhaps no wonder that, as the civil war dragged on, many Senderistas
deserted its ranks. For an important examination of the “the quota of blood” demanded by the
Party from its members, see Chapter 8: The Quota, in Gorriti (1999).
8 Based on author’s interview with Roberto Córdova on 22 May, 2000.
9 Del Pino (1996:135-137) appears to have mistakenly situated the communities of Chiuqintirca and
Anchihuay in the district of Chungui, whereas in fact they are peasant communities in the adjacent
district of Anco (see INDEC 1991:196).
10 Other forms of peasant groupings include the pago, which are independent smallholders living in
dispersed homesteads and commonly found in the selva of Ayacucho. Another is the caserío, which
is a hamlet or a clustering of homes; neither of these are administered by a junta directiva comu-
nal. The maximum authority in pagos, on the other hand, is the teniente gobernador. Based on
author’s interview agricultural engineer Elias Palomino at the Oficina de Información Agraria,
Ministry of Agriculture, Ayacucho, on 18 May 2000.
11 Based on author’s interview with Roberto Córdova on 22 May 2000.
12 Based on author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and
Comando General of the Comité Central de Autodefensa, Tambo District, on 6 November 1997.
13 Based on author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and
Comando General of the Comité Central de Autodefensa, Tambo District, on 6 November 1997. 
14 Based on author’s interview with Roberto Córdova on 22 May 2000.
15 Based on author’s interview with Roberto Córdova on 22 May 2000.
16 Evidence that the military provided ronderos with this form of assistance can be seen in the tran-
scription of a letter, written by the Comité de Defensa Civil of the village of Iribamba, formally
requesting more shotgun ammunition and hand grenades from the commander of the Marine
Infantry base at Luisiana, reproduced in del Pino 1996:182, Appendix 2.
17 “In ’86, ’87, Sendero returned to retake the valley with the consent of the army,” said Susy, the
CDC commander at the village of San Agustín, Monterrico. “[They came] as far as Rinconada, ter-
ritory of Huayhuaco. At one time (1986) those from above and those below were already despon-
dent. The army included, they supported the Senderos. [These guerrillas] came with whatever pres-
ent, with affection, [the soldiers] covered up the event and later set the Senderistas free” (quoted
in del Pino 1993b:84).
18 Based on author’s interview with Roberto Córdova on 22 May, 2000, and Walter Ramirez
Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando General of the Comité Central de
Autodefensa, Tambo District, on 6 November 1997.
19 According to Roberto Córdova, Shining Path promised at this time not to kill anyone who was not
actively involved in counter-revolutionary activities, such as informing to the police or participat-
ing in militia patrols.
20 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
21 Ormeño is one of the large and very popular Peruvian coach line companies.
22 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
23 Rivera Terres once told journalists that he would like to adopt the same [“dirty war”] policy as that
of Belaunde and Noel. Obviously taking unlicensed liberty to speak for his fellow ronderos, Rivera
Terres also stated in respect to the Belaúnde government: “how much we would have wanted that
government to return. There was General Noel in Political-Military command in Ayacucho in that
period and there were no longer any Senderistas left” (quoted in de Althaus and Morelli 1989:5).
24 Based on author’s interview with Roberto Córdova on 22 May, 2000.
25 Author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
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General of Tambo District’s Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo, on 31 May 2000.
26 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
27 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
28 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
29 SCDECAS 1989c.
30 SCDECAS 1989a.
31 SCDECAS 1989e.
32 SCDECAS 1989d.
33 SCDECAS 1989d.
34 SCDECAS 1989d.
35 In this regard, it would not be so far-fetched to presume that Rivera Terres’s acrimonious criticism
of the judges, as published in the Expreso, has played some part later on in influencing Fujimori’s
decision to create the controversial “faceless courts.” 
36 In fact, most Peruvians were already fed up with the court’s apparent ineptitude and softness when
it came to convicting insurgent “terrorists. Take, for instance, the case of Osmán Morote, a self-
confessed Senderista and one of the top leaders of the organisation, who was acquitted in 1988.
The newspaper Expreso captured a popular sentiment when it declared: “The unbelievable absolu-
tion of the Senderista Osmán Morote, on the one hand, and the unjust conviction, to say the least,
of two Iquichano villagers for the murders at Uchuraccay, on the other, does nothing except to con-
firm that the Peruvian judicial system is to be found submerged in a profound crisis. Justice in Peru
is not only slow and onerous but also—in the light of these examples—non-existent” (quoted in
DESCO 1989:717).
37 I should like to extend my deepest gratitude to Roberto Córdova for sharing these unique docu-
ments with me.
38 SCDECAS 1989c.
39 As in the case of the Comando Rodrigo Franco (CRF), allegedly linked to APRA. See DESCO
1989:251-258 for a chronological history of this paramilitary group, and its hostile relations with
the Peruvian Left. 
40 Perhaps as a result of finally realising the exaggerated idealism with which he assumed that peace-
ful, independent, democratic, socioeconomic syndicates were sufficient to defeat a ruthless adver-
sary such as Shining Path, it is ironic that some years later Degregori would not only apparently
reassess his moral evaluation of the civil defence militias, but also go on to write a book—Las ron-
das campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso—which celebrates the crucial role they appeared
to be playing in the defeat of Shining Path.
41 Velásquez Giarcarini was initially opposed to the idea, Rivera Terres recalled. “In 1989, on the 14th
of November, I was invited by Alan García Pérez to meet with the entire Council of Ministers in
order to explain and to solicit for the needs of the rondas. I principally requested that the govern-
ment provide us, on loan and under the supervision of the military command that controls the
region, Mauser rifles, which are armaments already considered obsolete, and are no longer used.
There present were General Julio Velásquez Giarcarini, the Minister of Defence, and Agustín
Mantilla, the Interior Minister. They were offended that I, a civilian, would presume to arm myself
as for war, when the army is there present in the emergency zone. Consequently they refused to
grant me these Mauser rifles.” Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias
“Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11 December 1997.
42 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
43 Author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
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General of the Comité Central de Autodefensa, Tambo District, on 31 May 2000.
44 Author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
General of Tambo District’s Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo, on 31 May 2000.
45 Author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
General of the Comité Central de Autodefensa, Tambo District, on 31 May 2000.
46 For detailed descriptions and analysis of the relationship between the narcotraficantes and Shining
Path in the Huallaga Valley, see González (1989), Kawell (1995), Tarazona-Sevillano and Reuter
(1990). 
47 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
48 Author’s interview with Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres, alias “Comandante Huayhuaco,” on 11
December 1997.
49 Author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
General of the Comité Central de Autodefensa, Tambo District, on 31 May 2000.
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5 From Selva to Sierra 
The reaction has two ways to crush guerrillas: (1) to win the masses,
(2) to liquidate the leadership, because as long as it remains, it will
return....1
Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso
5.1 The Comandos Especiales
In September 1991, DECAS militiamen were once again in the district of Tambo. In
the twenty-four and a half months since they first came to the district during
Operation Halcón, civil defence organisation in most of Tambo’s rural communities
had yet again disintegrated. Back in August 1989, Tambo’s rural communities appar-
ently exhibited a common determination to oppose Shining Path. In spite of this,
however, strong guerrilla presence in the district persisted, chipping away at, and so
demoralising, the peoples’ will to resist Shining Path. The periodic armed incursions;
the frequent levies from rural villages of provisions and recruits (including children)
to replenish rebel ranks; the chilling execution of “enemies” and “traitors” immedi-
ately following a “people’s trial” (juicio popular)—all these served as constant, vio-
lent reminders to the peasants of the terrifying hold that Shining Path had on their
daily lives. By mid-1991, most of the villages that had previously reorganised them-
selves with the help of the DECAS during Operation Halcón had once again deacti-
vated their self-defence committees. It had become apparent to them that their
comités de autodefensa not only attracted cruel reprisals from the rebels, but also
were quite incapable of realistically deterring rebel attacks, particularly given their
pitiful weaponry and lack of support from the army at the time. The local army gar-
rison, securely sheltered in a fortified base on top of the small hill adjacent to the
town’s central plaza, showed little interest in engaging the guerrilla columns or risk-
ing themselves in protecting the rural populace. Their nonchalant attitude caused
local resentment and merely heightened the demoralisation of Tambo’s rural com-
munities. Many peasants interpreted the army’s reluctance to fight or to carry out
routine patrol duties during the second half of the García regime not as a political
decision, but as simple cowardice. “The soldiers, they were frightened of the terru-
cos,” was what many peasants in Tambo thought at the time.
Historian Steve J. Stern once wrote, “peasant societies, to survive, are notorious-
ly sensitive to changes in power balances” (1982:30). This certainly held true in
respect of Tambo’s rural peasant communities, especially at this juncture. At the start
of the new decade, Sendero’s strength in most parts of the emergency zone seemed to
be growing, while the army’s appeared to be diminishing. Thus, it was as a matter of
survival that most Tambinos came to the conclusion that it was more sensible to
appease, or at times even collaborate with, the guerrillas, than to oppose them. Only
a very few villages continued to resist Shining Path through self-defence committees,
foremost of which was the multi-community desplazado settlement of
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Ccarhuapampa. For reasons that later are discussed, it was only the civil defence com-
mittee of Ccarhuapampa that had remained solidly organised since it was formed at
the end of 1983.
It was in this context of a general stagnation and demoralisation of the civil
defence movement in Tambo district that the handful of comités de defensa civil that
continued to function there appealed to the DECAS of the Apurímac River Valley for
help. Jorge Choque Quispe, President of the DECAS of Pichihuillca, responded by
sending a detachment of Pichihuillca’s Comandos Especiales to Tambo.
Under cover of night, this elite and well-armed company of fifty-three seasoned
militiamen arrived in the village of Osno on 14 September. From there, they pro-
ceeded, one by one, to reorganise or reactivate the comités de defensa civil of Tambo’s
rural villages. Once the civil defence patrol of Masinga had been reorganised, the
Comandos Especiales reorganised those of Challhuamayo, Mahuayura, and Tapuna.
Then they moved on to Vicos, Huayao, Patapata, and Millpo. “From Millpo we then
entered Qeqra,” Comando Zorro, one of the two Comandos de Operativos in the
group, recalled years later. “Qeqra was the principal support base of Sendero [in the
district]. It was a village where everyone—children, adults, everyone—was commit-
ted [to the subversion]. It was a control centre where they planned and organised
assaults, incursions.”2
Situated in a fertile valley some four kilometres east of Tambo town, Qeqra pre-
sented an ideal base for guerrilla operations in the sub-region. The village is in con-
veniently close proximity to the town, yet distant enough to avoid drawing the atten-
tion of the army garrison or the police detachment. Consequently, Qeqra became for
Shining Path a “principal support base.” Not only did the rebels draw freely from the
material and human resources of the village itself, they also utilised Qeqra as a sort of
central depot for food supplies gathered from surrounding areas. These were then
transported by pack animals along mountain footpaths and used to re-supply guerril-
la forces dispersed throughout the Apurímac and Ene River Valleys, the sierras of La
Mar, Huanta, and Huamanga, even as far away as Huancavelica.3 For these reasons,
the capture of Qeqra became the first important strategic objective of the Comandos
Especiales.
The Comandos Especiales eventually succeeded in dislodging the rebels from
Qeqra, and took control of the village in October. “We drove Sendero out of the
community of Qeqra, and then set ourselves up there, in their very base. This infuri-
ated them, and thereafter we found ourselves harassed every late afternoon, every
evening, for it had been their base and it was as if we had thrown them out of their
own home!” Comando Zorro recalled years later with brimming satisfaction.4 The
Comandos Especiales established themselves in Qeqra, using it as their own base of
operations. Apparently, this early triumph was achieved not so much by a clash of
arms as through careful intelligence work, which had resulted in the capture of spe-
cific individuals suspected either of being the important local Senderista authorities,
and their willing collaborators. This was made possible, according to Comando
Zorro, because the DECAS had their own informants and spies within the rural vil-
lages—“our own ears and our own eyes, just like Sendero” is how he described them.5
It was with the aid of these individuals that the Comandos Especiales were able to
detect and deactivate Sendero’s clandestine political-military cells within Tambo’s
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rural communities.
By returning to the district, it was not the intention of the Comandos Especiales
merely to repeat the transitory success of Operation Halcón. This time, the militia-
men had been mandated by DECAS chiefs in Pichihuillca to remain in the district for
an entire year. This decision was made by DECAS commanders in Pichihuillca in the
light of the fact that the organisational efforts of Operation Halcón had failed to pre-
vent the eventual degeneration of Tambo’s local civil defence committees. They con-
cluded that what was necessary was some form of direct and prolonged presence of
DECAS militiamen in Tambo district, if there was to be any hope of strengthening and
consolidating the civil defence initiative there. To this end, the Comandos Especiales
came fully prepared for the task in hand. The majority of the men in the group were
seasoned fighters, and all were well armed. Should one be killed, a replacement would
be sent from the Apurímac Valley to take his place. Furthermore, arrangements had
been made so that the Comandos Especiales would be financed entirely by the DECAS
organisation of the Apurímac River Valley for the duration of their tour of duty in
Tambo. “The people of the selva who had coca crops—all of them—they gave a
monthly tip [“propina”] of two hundred nuevos soles per person, and we lived on
that,” explained Comando Zorro. In principle, the Comandos Especiales were enti-
tled to this remuneration for one year, if available funds could be made to stretch that
long.6 This impressively sophisticated arrangement owes itself to the fact that, as we
have already seen in the preceding chapter, the DECAS of the Apurímac Valley were
in a unique economic position to finance to a certain extent the expansion of the civil
defence movement in the department of Ayacucho. Their exceptional capacity to do
so was largely made possible by the financial support they received from the narco-
traficantes in the Apurímac Valley. “That money was what we used to finance the
countersubversive struggle in that zone,” Comando Zorro admitted to me.7
5.2 Facilitating conditions for the expansion and institutionalisation of 
Civil Defence Organisations in the Zone of Emergency
The election of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) as the next president of the Republic
initiated a dramatic transformation in the nation’s political situation. For one thing,
it led to a fresh, bold counterinsurgency policy on the part of the government and the
army.8 In Fujimori the armed forces finally found a supportive and sympathetic pres-
ident and commander in chief, determined to do whatever was required—at whatev-
er cost—to defeat the subversion once and for all. Although at first it took some time
before Fujimori and his military chiefs could agree on exactly how to proceed, “some
months after initiating his government, Fujimori accepted the proposals of the Armed
Forces. The positive thing was that he assumed the risks and costs involved in mak-
ing the struggle for pacification one of the central points on the country’s agenda”
(Tapia 1997:61). One of the immediately apparent effects of this change in civil-
military relations was a vigorous resumption of the military’s counterinsurgency
efforts. In the department of Ayacucho, government troops stepped up their patrols
in the countryside, and the persecution of Shining Path guerrillas was renewed.
Significantly, the Army began once again to encourage peasant defence initiatives.
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Despite the changes in their attitude, however, the army discovered that it would
nevertheless take some time before they could gain the trust of the rural population.
During the last two years of the García government, when the military relaxed its
crackdown on Shining Path, peasants were left feeling abandoned and alone to fend
for themselves. Consueqently, anti-Sendero peasant resistance at this time turned to
the DECAS as an alternative source of moral and military assistance. The DECAS
reacted to the many appeals for help from many parts of Ayacucho by rendering aid
similar to that which they provided to Tambo. For instance, Julio Talavera, President
of the Comité de Autodefensa Civil in Ayahuanco, a district in Huanta province,
recalled the effect of when a number of communities in his district banded together
for mutual self-defence:
Sendero attacked even more; they struck in Ayahuanco, later in
Viracochan, also in Qcocchac and in Lamas. In those circumstances
we could no longer maintain ourselves and we communicated with
the Defence of the Apurímac River Selva, which was well organised
and had good arms. We had already seen that the Army was inopera-
tive.... From the selva came more than five hundred men in 1991, and
they reorganised all the communities once again. They removed sev-
eral rebel infiltrators and then things began to calm down. They pro-
vided us with twenty men for each hamlet for eight months (quoted
in IDL 1996:67).
Based on such evidence, then, it would be fair to say that the initial expansion and
consolidation of the civil defence movement in many Ayacuchan provinces between
1989 and 1992 owed itself more to the direct efforts of the DECAS than to any action
on the part of the government or the armed forces.
Even so, for its part the new government turned its attention towards developing
political and legal conditions that would foster the proliferation of civil defence
organisations throughout the entire zone of emergency. By contrast, Alan García had
recognised too late (if at all) the great potential for counterinsurgency that lay in the
peasantry. Apart from his single symbolic gesture of distributing shotguns to
Huayhuaco’s militiamen, there is really no evidence that he even tried to develop any
official policy towards the village defence groups. Granted, it was during his time in
power that the Peruvian Congress passed Ley Nro.24571 (Ley de Reconocimiento de
las Rondas Campesinas) on 7 November 1986, giving official recognition to “the
pacific, democratic and autonomous rondas campesinas...that contribute to social
development and peace” (reproduced in SER 1993:27). The law defined rondas
campesinas as organisations that have as their primary objectives “the defence of their
lands, protection of their livestock and other property, cooperating with the authori-
ties in the elimination of any criminal offence” (cited in SER 1993:27). But by its
wording, however, it is obvious that what the legislators had in mind when drafting
this law were the vigilante peasant organisations indigenous to particular northern
Peruvian departments. As such, the legislation was wholly impractical for the realities
in which the rural civil defence militias of the emergency zone operated.
Unlike García, President Fujimori realised very early on that peasant militias, if
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given adequate government backing and encouragement, had the potential to become
an invaluable instrument for counterinsurgency. Fujimori was convinced that the var-
ious grassroots anti-Sendero initiatives in the country deserved greater government
assistance than they had received in previous years, and he was determined to harness
the counterinsurgency potential of the civil defence organisations. His first step in this
regard was to promulgate Decreto Legislativo No.741 on 12 November 1991, which
gave legal recognition to all accredited rural defence organisations in the zone of
emergency. According to this law, such groups were thereafter to be officially known
by the generic name of Comités de Autodefensa (CADs). Moreover, the preamble of
the legislation revealed that the new government felt a sense of duty to lend moral
and material support to grassroots counterinsurgency organisations, when it stated:
“That numerous sectors of the population, free and spontaneously, come organising
to defend themselves from the aggression and violence of terrorism and drug traf-
ficking, and to defend the validity of the Constitutional State, for which it is appro-
priate that the State favours, assists and equips with the necessary means these afore-
mentioned organised sectors” (El Peruano 1991: 101687. My emphasis).
The reader will probably have already noticed one glaring contradiction in this
sentence: namely, that it disingenuously depicts CADs as generally having been organ-
ised “freely and spontaneously” by the population in defiance of Shining Path.
Preceding chapters of this book have already shown, however, that over the years and
in various parts of Ayacucho, the military has also played a hand in encouraging peas-
ant villages to organise CDCs, even resorting to coercion to force reluctant commu-
nities to comply. In one widely publicised case, the army compelled the comuneros of
Chuschi to form a civil defence committee on 14 March 1991. The community had
initially refused to do so, but complied only after a number of Chuschi’s elected local
leaders were disappeared.9 In spite of detailed cases like this one, the premise from
which the government wanted to begin was that the emergence of village defence
committees of the emergency zone was entirely a voluntary process, the natural out-
come of spontaneous peasant counter-rebellion. The great hypocrisy was that the
emphasis that this piece of legislation placed on spontaneity and voluntarism, as con-
ditions for the creation of CADs, would still not put an end to coercive force being
applied in the creation of new civil defence organisations over subsequent years.
Indeed, as recently as 16 August 1996, CAD commanders at a general assembly of
Central Committees held at “Los Cabitos” army barracks in Huamanga were still
being exhorted by army officers to “re-impel the organisation and Instruction of new
Comités de Autodefensa in those areas where the population has not yet been organ-
ised, particularly in the Department of Huancavelica in order to contribute to the
elimination of the REMAINDER of the Sendero Luminoso terrorist organisation in the
SZSNC-8” (CCAD-SJB 1996:1).10
For the most part, D.L.741 merely perpetuated established relations and prac-
tices, with the crucial difference that they now held the weight of law. For instance,
the decree placed CADs under the comprehensive supervision and control of the mil-
itary, which had the responsibility of accrediting, coordinating, directing, and arming
them:
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ARTICLE 2: The Comités de Autodefensa will be accredited by the corresponding
Military Command, subject to prior expressed authorisation of the Joint
Command of the Armed Forces (ibid.).
ARTICLE 3: Their functioning will be geographically framed under the control of the
respective Military Command (ibid.).
Yet the military’s established authority over the civil defence organisations is some-
thing that has always been taken for granted ever since they were first formed in the
early 1980s. In addition, D.L.741 also gave authorisation to CADs to use firearms,
thus transforming into legislated policy what hitherto had merely been a presidential
prerogative exercised by both García and Fujimori.
ARTICLE 4: The Comités de Autodefensa located within the territorial scope of the
corresponding military authority, will be able to acquire by purchase,
donation on the part of the State or private individuals, hunting firearms
of the 12 GAUGE calibre type, breech-loading, shot for shot version and
munitions of the type double or triple zero, or others subject to prior
authorisation of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces (ibid.).
Although according to the Fujimori government considered, CADs were to be
regarded as transitory organisations, whose principal purpose was to help achieve
pacification, and which would be deactivated once the state of emergency was ended,
critics nevertheless viewed D.L.741 as an ominous move towards the legislated mili-
tarisation of Peruvian society. In fact, some months before the promulgation of the
decree, human rights groups, intellectuals, and leaders of national agrarian organisa-
tions were already voicing deep concerns about what appeared to be an increasing
trend in government policy towards the deepening militarisation of civilian society. In
and interview with the journal Ideele, for example, the National Secretary of the
Confederación Nacional Agraria, Walter Sacayco, stated that in his opinion, that arm-
ing the peasantry was not an effective means of pacifying the country, for it would
only exacerbate the spiral of violence (IDL 1991a:15). “The government must reduce
military expenses and finance agrarian assistance programmes for peasant communi-
ties as a whole,” Sacayco insisted (IDL 1991a:16). To this statement, Juan Rojas,
Secretary General of the Confederación Campesina del Perú (CCP),11 added that in so
far as the comités de defensa civil were controlled by the military, they constituted a
violation of the autonomy of the peasant community (ibid.:15).
In spite such criticism from the various opponents of the legislation, however,
D.L.741 nevertheless came to be revered by many rural people—especially those
whose daily lives were being profoundly affected by violence—as a kind of charter of
CAD rights, and of the state’s obligations and responsibilities towards them and their
communities. For one thing, it settled once and for all the question as to the legality
of the existence of civil defence organisations. Most important for the peasants, it
confirmed the right of peasant communities to defend themselves with lethal force
and with firearms, thus helping to convince many peasants that here was a govern-
ment that was finally interested in helping to give them a real fighting chance against
the rebels. Moreover, the legislation appeared to hold out the promise that the gov-
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ernment would provide material resources and assistance to CADs fighting in defence
of their communities and the Peruvian Constitutional State, or Estado de Derecho.
Consequently, rural people have grown to expect, for instance, that the government
would one day recompense ronderos crippled in the line of duty, and the widows and
orphans of ronderos killed in action. (Whether the government has met its obligations
in this regard is a topic of discussion which we will return to later in the book.)
The decree held other attractions. For young rural men of conscript age, an espe-
cially appealing provision was set forth in Article 6, which states: “The Comités de
Autodefensa, in coordination with the respective Military Commands, will select
young men of military age, so that they may serve in the Comités for a period of one
year, considering this term as completion of the Obligatory Military Service” (El
Peruano 1991:101687). The seventeen to twenty year old members of Los Condores,
Tambo district’s Patrulla Especial, once told me that they supported D.L. 741 because
it gave them the opportunity to discharge their obligatory military service at home,
within their own communities, for the direct benefit of their relatives and friends.
Some of the young men told me that they would not have relished the idea of being
sent off to faraway corners of Peru, or perhaps sent to fight somewhere along the
northern jungle border with Ecuador. For decades, it has been a common practice in
the sierra for roving press gangs of soldiers to “recruit” young men for military serv-
ice by simply abducting them (Erausquin and Escobar 1999:38; see Starn 1999:74).
The unfortunate conscripts would be taken to the local military base, processed, and
then usually posted away from their home region. Sometimes families would not
know for months what had happened to their son. Furthermore, the appalling con-
ditions and the brutal training and treatment of conscript soldiers in the army was
something that was well known in Peruvian society, and widely dreaded. Conscript
soldiers could expect to face a miserable regime of forced labour and maltreatment at
the hands of their NCOs and officers. Moreover, the chronic inefficiency of the
army’s logistical organisation also meant that malnutrition or even near-starvation
were not unheard of in the ranks. In the history of the Peruvian army, it has always
been the under-educated underclasses that have borne the discriminatory burden of
conscription. University students were exempt from military service, apart from
which, as Starn points out, “most families of any means paid off a doctor for a med-
ical excuse or a lieutenant for a deferment. This meant the children of slum dwellers
and peasants filled the ranks” (1999:74). It is therefore not surprising that the chance
offered by D.L. 741 to discharge one’s obligatory military service at home, and close
to one’s family, made participation in local CADs very appealing to young men. (That
said, many of Los Condores were nevertheless also ex-soldiers, having been nominat-
ed by their communities to serve once again in the district’s Patrulla Especial because
of their prior military experience.)
Whatever D.L. 741 meant to its critics and supporters, what was immediately
clear to everyone was that in passing it, the Fujimori government, in effect, was legal-
ly committing the Peruvian peasantry to actively participating in the counterinsur-
gency struggle. Government policy in this regard, combined with local initiatives like
those taken by the DECAS, had the net result of facilitating the rapid proliferation of
CADs during the early 1990s. Totalling less than 700 in 1989, the number of rural
defence committees in the south-central Andean departments of Apurímac, Ayacucho,
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Junín, Huancavelica and Pasco had grown to more than 1,200 by 1991 (Starn ed.
1993:6; IDL 1991b:28). Six years later, their numbers would increase, according to
military sources, to some 2,500 recognised comités de base (village committees), rep-
resenting over 120,000 ronderos, in the departments of Ayacucho-Huancavelica and
the Cuzco districts of Pichari-Quimbiri alone.12
5.3 First steps towards the institutionalisation of the 
Civil Defence Movement in Tambo District
The two most important developments in the institutionalisation of the civil defence
movement in Tambo district took place within the first six weeks of the Comandos
Especiales’ being in the district. The first was the creation of a Junta Directiva to coor-
dinate the district’s revamped defence network of 26 comités de base in what was the
newly constituted Zona Rural de Tambo (CCAD-SJB 1994). The presidents of all the
comités de base nominated from among themselves the members of the Junta
Directiva Zonal (Zonal Directive Committee).
It was perhaps as symbolically fitting as it was a practical choice that the Zonal
Committee’s first Coordinador General, a man known as “Comando Colca,” came
from Ccarhuapampa. To that community belongs the venerated reputation for bel-
ligerent and obstinate resistance to Shining Path in the district. As already noted in
chapter 3, Ccarhuapampa was a settlement populated mainly by displaced peasants
from the punas, many of whom have lived there since its founding in December 1983.
In addition, the vast majority of its desplazado inhabitants were among the poorest
inhabitants of the district, and among them are impoverished refugees from as far
away as the highland Iquichano communities of Huanta.13 The settlement is renowned
for being the first in the entire district to organise community defence in the early
1980s, and remained the bastion of anti-Sendero resistance in Tambo ever since. With
a tone of admiration in his voice, Comando Zorro spoke to me of Ccarhupampa’s cel-
ebrated resilience, even while the civil defence movement in the district experienced
periods of stagnation and demoralisation:
In spite of the fact that all the communities in the district had already
been organised for civil defence, for lack of moral support on the part
of the military, the district of Tambo became disorganised since ’87. It
was a red zone, totally red! The only community which had remained
organised since ’83-‘4 was the community of Ccarhuapampa, and no
other! No other community had resisted the blows of the subversion.
When in ’91 we set out from the selva, the only organisation we found
more or less similar to our own was Ccarhuapampa, because people
who travelled from Ccarhuapampa to the selva came with these ideas,
and vice versa.14
The resemblance in the organisational structure between the civil defence systems of
Ccarhuapampa and of the DECAS may, as Comando Zorro suggests, indeed be a
reflection of the interchange of ideas that accompanied the circular movement of eco-
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nomic migrants between the two settings. The idea makes sense. However,
Ccarhuapampa is not the only settlement in the district where peasants migrate back
and forth between Tambo and the Apurímac Valley. Nonetheless, Ccarhuapampa was
the only settlement in Tambo that consistently remained organised against Shining
Path over the years. Why and how was this possible? What were the motivations
behind Ccarhuapampa’s unremitting attitude of tenacious resistance to Shining Path,
and what sustained its spirit of resistance when all other settlements in the district
seemed to have succumbed to guerrilla domination? The answer may be found in its
socioeconomic circumstances and distinctive past experiences.
Of Tambo’s population centres, Ccarhuapampa was among the hardest hit by
guerrilla violence. As the first settlement to form a civil defence force in the district—
at the behest of the Marines, it should be remembered—it was also the very first to
incur the terrible punishment meted out by Sendero to communities deemed as hav-
ing betrayed the revolution. Eusebio, a long-time resident of Ccarhuapampa, once
remembers his settlement’s painful experiences of violence and terror:
Ccarhuapampa has been despised by the Senderos because it was the
first to rebel against them. For this reason the terrorists always came.
Always the confrontations continued and so died the authorities of
the civil defence. At night they came, they invaded, and they tried to
finish off the people. When they gained entrance into the communi-
ty, the Senderos butchered with axe, with knife. There is one woman,
she’s still alive, whose breast they even cut off. In Ccarhuapampa
when the Senderos attacked, they burnt the houses. Murdered fathers,
mothers, children. They always left people dead, widowed mothers,
orphans.15
Eusebio’s account is typical of many related to me by various inhabitants of
Ccarhuapampa. Embittered hatred is therefore the only way to describe their feelings
for Sendero Luminoso. It was the Marines, let us not forget, who ordered the inhab-
itants to Ccarhuapampa to form a civil defence committee; but it was Shining Path
who continually inflicted terrible violence against the community. It is hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that with so much blood under the bridge, the idea of dialogue or rec-
onciliation with the guerrillas has long been unthinkable for the inhabitants of
Ccarhuapampa.
The inhabitants of Ccarhuapampa also blamed Shining Path for disrupting their
agricultural practices, the consequence of which was to cause worsening livelihood
crisis and deepening impoverishment for the desplazados who live there. “For years,
owing to this violence, we did not return to our fields,” a displaced peasant told me
in 1997. “It was only during the day that we would go to work for four or five hours.
But we always made sure to return by late afternoon to Ccarhuapampa, which is
where we always spent the night.”16 A constant fear had long existed among the
inhabitants of being killed or abducted in the desolate areas of the countryside by
lurking guerrilla columns, and this has served to discourage most of Ccarhuapampa’s
desplazados from even periodically making trips to their villages of origin. This has
stymied the resumption of normal agricultural practices, even as late as 1997, when
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the violence had apparently already subsided. This experience was not endemic to the
people of Ccarhuapampa, and was also evident in other peasant desplazados through-
out the district, and in other parts of Ayacucho. As one displaced peasant from Vicos
once remarked me,
The economy of the peasants has been heavily affected by the subver-
sion because it has not allowed them to work. Before the appearance
of the subversion, the people worked a lot because there were no dis-
placed communities. Now the peasants cannot take their products to
market...because the terrucos have pressurised people [not to do this].
People are permitted to produce only what serves the subversion.17
In the case of Ccarhuapampa, though, guerrilla activity in the countryside meant that
the vast majority of its inhabitants could not even return to or work on their own
lands. For the displaced peasants of Ccarhuapampa, they could never hope to recu-
perate or return to their own lands so long as Shining Path controlled or was active
in the countryside. This fact makes their tenacious resistance to the guerrillas under-
standable.
In spite of such adversities, however, it seems that the effect has been to draw the
inhabitants of Ccarhuapampa closer together in spirit. Their social and economic
hardship, for which they largely blamed Shining Path as the primary underlying cause,
became a bonding experience that merely strengthened their determination to jeal-
ously guard their scarce resources against any attempts by the guerrillas to take or to
steal them. They took pride in pointing out to me that they have consistently resisted
Shining Path’s attempts to turn them into a masa—a mass base of labourers, con-
signed to the drudgery of producing and preparing food for the combatants (the
Fuerza Principal) of Shining Path, and used as a human reservoir from which young
people were drawn to replenish the ranks of the Popular Guerrilla Army.
In the face of Shining Path’s constant attempts over the years to subjugate the peo-
ple of Ccarhuapampa, their primary mechanism of defence was the CDC. Defence
arrangements were always taken seriously in the settlement. For instance, it became
established practice to post lookouts on surrounding hilltops during the day, where
from camouflaged huts they keep vigil, while villagers worked in their small plots on
the hillsides overlooking the settlement from the south and the west. When suspicious
signs of possible guerrilla presence where spotted in the distance (such as smoke from
a cooking fire), the settlement’s defence commanders would rapidly mobilise a patrol
to investigate, occasionally accompanied by a detachment of soldiers from Tambo’s
army base. Upon nightfall, sentries were posted in the watchtowers at each corner of
Ccarhuapampa’s fortified inner enclosure, while others did a weekly turn on the
nightly patrols round the settlement’s perimeter. In the years when they were pro-
hibited from legally using firearms, Ccarhuapampa’s ronderos armed themselves with
farming implements, slings, lances, and homemade guns they called “tirachas” or
“hechizos”. But by the second half of 1989, though, they had managed to purchase a
few hunting shotguns from the DECAS. The close proximity of the Apurímac Valley
to Tambo district made it possible to purchase arms from the DECAS, and was a much
quicker and more secure way of securing firearms than attempting to smuggle
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through police checkpoints all the way from Lima. Evidence that Ccarhuapampa got
its firearms in this way can be seen in a bill of sale, written and signed by Comandante
Huayhuaco himself, which reads:
ON THIS DATE I RECEIVED FROM THE DIRECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY OF
CCARHUAPAMPA, DISTRICT OF TAMBO, THE SUM OF TWO MILLION INTIS (I/
2,000,000)18 AS DEPOSIT FOR THE PURCHASE OF SHOTGUNS
Rinconada, 27 of August 1989.
HUAYHUACO
Presidente-Coordinador de Acciones
Antisubversivas Valle Río Apurímac.19
In addition to strong group solidarity reinforced by a consciousness of common hard-
ship and injustice suffered at the hands of the subversion, Ccarhuapampa’s ability to
maintain the integrity of its civil defence organisation over the many trying years also
owed itself to brave and intelligent leadership. “Ccarhuapampa was well organised,”
recalled Comando Zorro. “They had the good leaders for it. They had people like
Señor Manzanilla...and various other friends who we met when we came in ’91.”20
Despite the risks involved in becoming a CDC member, there were always courageous
men to be found in Ccarhuapampa who were willing to assume the most dangerous
posts of President and Comando (combat commander). Finally, it is also likely that
Ccarhuapampa’s spirit of continued resistance to Shining Path was sustained by the
very fact of its huge population. With more than 1,400 inhabitants, Ccarhuapampa
was by far the largest single population centre in the entire district. As such, this large
population constituted as much an important source of morale for its inhabitants (i.e.
security in numbers) as it was of manpower (i.e. strength in numbers) for the settle-
ment’s defence force.
The second significant achievement of the Comandos Especiales was the creation of a
Grupo Especial, modelled after the Comandos Especiales. Comando Zorro, who said
that the idea came to him while contemplating what would happen after the
Comandos Especiales leave the district, claims the credit for this initiative. 
‘Who is going to remain permanently to control the communities,’ I
asked myself? Will they become disorganised and live alongside
Sendero again, like in ’87? Better to form a special group or patrol, a
special group that can patrol the uplands permanently. In this way, the
communities will stay organised. It was for this reason that I organ-
ised the Grupo Especial in October of 199121
The Grupo Especial was made up of volunteers, one man from almost every organ-
ised village (comité de base) in the district. “It was group of muchachos,” wrote
Comando Zorro in his war diary. 
They received instructions and they decided to fight together with us
for the pacification of their community and their country, armed with
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tirachas, shotguns, and other home-made weapons that each commu-
nity acquired for defending itself; we managed to form a group of 22
personnel from the zone of Tambo.22
Each member was remunerated by his own community, and it was because every
member of the group received a “propina” (“a tip”) of between S/.150 and S/.200
nuevos soles per month that they came to be known as “rentados”—hired guns. “The
rentado is exclusively at the service of self-defence, for the security of each commu-
nity,” Comando Zorro explained to me. “He dedicates himself entirely to keeping
vigil, to patrolling, and verifying other civil defence committees so as always to main-
tain the unity of a comité de base. There are some communities with few comuneros,
so two communities may join together to pay for one rentado.”23 As del Pino has
observed in the case of the DECAS’ Comandos Especiales in the Apurímac Valley, par-
ticipation in the Grupo Especial of Tambo “thus became for the young people a
source of work in the midst of economic crisis” (del Pino 1996:154).
The Grupo Especial was at first dubbed Los Halcones; but its name was later
changed to Los Condores due to a tragic event that is described below. Although the
group received instructions from the Comandos Especiales and was also based at
Qeqra, it nevertheless was free to operate on its own (though always in coordination
with the Comandos Especiales and the local army commander), and was not subordi-
nated to the control of the Comandos Especiales. “This groups followed our exam-
ples and decided to work independently,” Comando Zorro noted in his diary.24 The
Grupo Especial had its own field commanders, and they often worked closely with a
platoon of soldiers from the local army base in providing security to motorists on the
dirt road that snakes across the punas high above the town of Tambo. In fact, the
Grupo Especial was made up of two smaller squads, each of which had its own com-
mander, and performed separate tasks. For example, while one squad was engaged in
guarding the road, the other might be busy patrolling somewhere in the countryside.
When the Grupo Especial took over many of the routine tasks of defence and securi-
ty in the district, the Comandos Especiales were freed up to concentrate on strength-
ening and consolidating the district’s village defence network, in addition to per-
forming the more dangerous job of hunting down the armed rebel columns that were
still operating in the area.
When the Comandos Especiales left Tambo district in September 1992, their for-
mer duties were assumed by the Grupo Especial, which became the new vanguard of
the civil defence system in the district. The group also relocated its base from Qeqra
to Vista Alegre, a desplazado settlement on the east side of town, in order to be clos-
er to the military base. By 1997, the Grupo Especial had grown to between thirty and
thirty-three members, many of them licenciados. It continued to function most of the
time in two squads, with Zorro as the supreme militia commander in the district.
They had modified their mode of operations so that when one squad went off to work
in the countryside, the other was placed in Vista Alegre, where it remained on a high
state of alert, ready to react at a moment’s notice to any emergency. The two squads
(each one is called a Patrulla Especial) took turns patrolling the district for five to fif-
teen days at a time, but would combine into a single unit—the Grupo Especial—for
larger combat operations. The entire group regularly came together on Sundays for
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intelligence debriefings and weapons training at the local army base. The group’s
sense of solidarity and identity became so strong that they even came to have their
own special uniform: a navy blue tracksuit with a red and white stripe (the colours of
the Peruvian flag) down the side of the trouser legs, and across both sleeves. By 1997,
all its members were armed with Mauser rifles.
The creation of the Grupo Especial did not end the general population’s obliga-
tions to perform civil defence duties, however. Each rural village in the district was
still expected by the central committee to maintain a comité de base (the basic organ-
isational level). In addition, ordinary villagers were still obliged to carry out patrol
and vigilance duties within the immediate perimeter of their own villages. Although
in every rural settlement only a few men at any given time would be regarded as
“active” ronderos of the comité de base—they are called “integrantes” (“members”)—
every rural adult was nevertheless still considered to be a rondero. As such, they had
a duty to back up and assist the Grupo Especial when necessary, particularly in the
event of clashes with the guerrillas. Even so, for the rural population at large, the cre-
ation of the Grupo Especial definitely helped to lighten the degree of their active par-
ticipation in community defence. “Previously, when there were no rentados, the
comuneros themselves—men and women equally—they had to go out every day and
night to keep watch in turns,” recalled Vicente Perez Cervan, a desplazado and for-
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mer president of Tambo’s Comité Central de Defensa Civil. “The obligation touched
everyone right down the list. We sacrificed much. We spent a lot of time keeping
watch. Therefore it became more convenient for the peasants once they had appoint-
ed the rentados.”25 With the Grupo Especial and the Comandos Especiales maintain-
ing a constant vigilance in the district, many peasants were finally able to devote more
time to working in their fields, and doing other essential chores during the day and
in the evenings.
In the eyes of their communities, the vigorous and determined young men of the
Grupo Especial embodied their deepest hopes for peace and security in the district.
Trained by and working in coordination with their esteemed DECAS counterparts,
the Grupo Especial was the best the district had to offer, and as such was the pride of
Tambo’s rural communities. No one could have imagined that just three short months
after the group was created, half of its members would already be dead.
5.4 The annihilation of Platoon III
While the Grupo Especial provided security to travellers on the road and to peasant vil-
lagers in the countryside, the Comandos Especiales, for their part, focussed during their
final months in Tambo on consolidating the district’s reorganised rural defence net-
work. “Comando Sombra,” the Comando General de Coordinación of the Comandos
Especiales, regularly dispatched inspection teams to the rural communities to check that
comités de base stayed organised and continued to perform vigilance duties. Security in
the district was enhanced considerably over the course of the year, for while rural vil-
lagers patrolled within their own community borders, both the Grupo Especial and the
Comandos Especiales constantly patrolled throughout the rest of the district. The
Comandos Especiales would occasionally uncover clandestine caches while patrolling
the uplands, or even discover small guerrilla combat units holed up in murky mountain
caves, or camped in one of the many deserted villages in the puna and in the western
half of the district.
On 24 November, Comando Sombra and forty-two members of the Comandos
Especiales set off on a seven-day reconnaissance operation to the remotest areas of the
district. The security of Qeqra was left in the hands of Comandos Zorro and Kipo (Kipo
was the second in command of the Comandos Especiales), and the other remaining
Comandos Especiales. Early the next morning, Zorro and Kipo set out with a small
party, made up of twelve Comandos Especiales and a few of the local ronderos, to lend
the soldiers a hand in guarding the stretch of the main road that ran alongside Toccto
Lake—a notorious spot where guerrillas frequently ambushed passing motorists. They
expected to be back by early evening, leaving a skeleton garrison of a single Comando
Especial, called Pichiclito, and two local ronderos to guard Qeqra. The patrol first
stopped in at the army base in Tambo town “in order to coordinate with Captain
Rancing Lopez,” the local army commander. It was already mid-morning by the time
their meeting with the military officer finished, so they first ate a quick breakfast of
“rancho frío” (cold rations consisting of biscuits, bread rolls, and tinned tuna or sar-
dines) before catching a lift to Toccto Lake in three passing civilian vehicles. They
arrived at their destination at around 11.00 a.m., where they found the soldiers relaxed-
166
From Victims to Heroes
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 166
ly manning a checkpoint they had set up on the road. While some of the soldiers were
busy trying to get a better reception on their transistor radio, others were sitting on the
ground and the sandbag barricade, basking in the intermittent sunshine or taking a nap.
After coordinating with the sergeant in charge, “we decided to continue our patrol by
scaling the rocky heights above Toccto Lake, in the direction of Rasuhuillca [mountain]
and from there to assist in providing security and to search for traces of the Senderistas,”
Zorro writes in his war diary.”26 It was almost 1.00 p.m. by the time the twelve men
reached the peak of the high, craggy ridge. They collapsed to the ground, fatigued by
the steep, breath-shattering climb that had taken them to altitudes of over 4,000 metres.
First rested for a few minutes, they then dug ravenously into their rancho frio, their
hunger making them indifferent to the light drizzle that now began to fall. When they
had finished their lunch, they paused just long enough to chew some coca before set-
ting off once again. They headed east towards the adjacent mountain, where they hoped
to be able to see Ccarhuapampa somewhere down on the opposite side. Along the way,
a 30-year-old rondero nicknamed “Occe,” recalling that when he had gone on patrol
with the Marine Infantry in 1986, they skirmished with guerrillas on more than one
occasion in that very area, warned Comandos Kipo and Zorro to proceed with caution.
It was as though a prophetic warning, for when the approached the next summit they
suddenly encountered “the fresh tracks of Senderistas and scattered leaflets announcing
an Armed Strike [Paro Armado]. A red flag had been planted on the crest of the hill.”27
The rain began to fall once more. It was now around two o’clock. Comandos Kipo and
Zorro divided the group into two squads, and they all began to creep cautiously towards
the fluttering red flag. Comando Zorro narrates in his war diary the sequence of events
upon climbing the hill:
Taking note of the red flag, we saw below us a vast lake called
Yanacocha and a great gorge known as Qenuamonte....We decided to
cross and in so doing arrive at the other mountain where we made use
of a horse trail created by the Senderistas. We spread out and begin
our descent, covering each other two by two. Upon arriving at the
gorge we found a Senderista camp, caverns abandoned just a short
time earlier, the ground littered with animal bones from the
Senderistas’ last meal. Continuing on our way we passed through a
marsh while crossing from one mountain to another. When we
reached the next rocky outcrop, we rested for some minutes. It was
almost 3.30 in the afternoon....It was already late. We continued on
our way. We were already lost in the mountain....Hail began to fall
after a torrential rainfall. And there we were, lost. It was almost 4
p.m. in the afternoon and we continued to scale the rocky slope of
Qenuamonte amidst a shower of hail and lighting flashes. Halfway up
we found another DD.TT. [Delinquent Terrorist] camp with subver-
sive graffiti painted on the rocks saying: “Viva el Presidente Gonzalo”
among others. But nevertheless we decided to forge on through the
ichu grass, the boulders, and the snow, whereupon the two personnel
we sent to scout ahead suddenly signalled to the rest of us to be on
guard...gesturing that they had spotted a group of armed, unknown
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persons....We immediately ordered all our personnel to go to ground
and take cover. The Senderistas passed to the other side of the moun-
tain. They numbered approximately 48 persons and [included] a
group that was carrying water. We could do nothing because it was
already late and, in addition, we were exhausted, and we were few in
number, and we were not familiar with the territory. We decided to
leave them in peace because they were not aware that we were watch-
ing them; and we ended up resting in one of the caves we found. It
was already 5.30 in the afternoon; Kipo and Zorro began to coordi-
nate and then to give orders to the personnel. We proceeded to make
ourselves comfortable and to pass around our rancho frío. Afterwards
we began to plan our attack for the morning of the following day.28
The militiamen were awake before the break of dawn. Most of them had very lit-
tle sleep, if any at all, given the need throughout the night to remain alert, and the
gnawing anxiety they all felt about what the coming day might bring.
We were scared and anxious because we had made the decision to
attack. We were all resolved and with faith in the Lord, we made
ready to go. It was 4.30 a.m. Covering each other two by two, we
headed off towards the summit so we could organise our attack from
there. But when we got there we saw that at the summit was a SL sen-
try smoking a cigarette. Nevertheless, we managed to elude the sentry
and we rapidly organised the attack. We concealed ourselves so as to
study the entrance and to realise our action before dawn broke. We
selected nine individuals and divided them into two groups, among
them Zorro and Kipo as the leaders of the assault, where participat-
ing in the first group were: Comando Kipo, Comando Zorro,
Barantos, Vaqueta, and Maton; and in the second group: Araña,
Angel, Tatung, and Occe, an auxiliary personnel. Meanwhile we left a
third group as our rearguard under the command of Acchi, and two
auxiliary personnel with instructions to climb to the summit of the
hill, where the sentry was.29
The two groups carefully inched forward, like hunters stalking prey. One advanced
quietly along the lower slopes of the mountain, weaving around boulders and clumps
of wild, knee-high ichu grass, while the men of the other group, crouching like apes,
proceeded down a rough footpath they had seen the guerrillas using the day before.
Large snowflakes falling on a light wind worked in their favour to conceal their
approach. Apart from the lonely whistling of the wind, all was quiet. Comando Zorro
sent Vaqueta up ahead to reconnoitre. It was now almost 5.45 a.m., and the eastern
horizon had become visible as a bluish band. From a short distance away, Vaqueta
gave a sign that he was directly above the Senderistas holed up in the cavern.
The five of us took up strategic position from which to attack the
DD.TT....We waited a moment for the second group to catch up so we
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could begin the attack when suddenly we saw two DD.TT. holding
weapons in their hands. [The weapons] were G-3.30 Both DD.TT.
were having breakfast and preparing to relive the sentry, close to
whom our other group later appeared.31
It was now approximately 6.30. When the rearguard had managed to draw up close to
the guerrilla sentry on the mountain peak, and the second group had got to within a few
metres of the two other guerrillas eating breakfast at the mouth of the cave, Kipo and
Zorro gave the signal to attack. An ear-splitting volley of gunfire, like the crack of a
gigantic whip, was simultaneously unleashed on the rebels.
The [guerrillas]...began to shoot at us and there were others who had
been sleeping inside the cave. All were alarmed. Upon hearing the
sound of firing, they started to rush out of the cave. We were busy
with those with weapons and the other group [of ronderos] with those
who were shooting from inside the cave. We started to advance little
by little so as to capture the DD.TT. alive. But they were shooting at
us and so we had to shoot back, shouting for them to surrender. But
some began to escape and at the same time the DD.TT. sentry [on the
peak] began to shoot down at me and my group. I yelled for them to
take cover. Meanwhile the other group [of ronderos] were annihilat-
ing without pity all those who were issuing from the cave including
women and children, and when we were in the thick of the fight, a
boy of almost 8 years old approached me pleading for me not to do
anything to him. I told him to be calm and he wouldn’t get hurt.
When we resumed firing [on the other rebels] the boy started to
escape for fear and I just let him because I had no time to worry
myself about him. The firing continued and one of the SL suddenly
appeared in front of me, firing his weapon, and in order to defend
myself I shot at his head, grazing it. He fell wounded, bleeding. He
dropped his G-3 and I ordered one of my men to get it.32
Taken completely by surprise, the rebels soon found themselves in serious trou-
ble. But the two assault groups of ronderos poised themselves for a final assault on the
cave, they suddenly came under heavy gunfire from the summit above. They were
momentarily pinned down and prevented from taking the cave. Apparently, the rear-
guard had not yet succeeded in taking out the sentinel on the peak, as the ronderos
below had assumed. After a few tense moments, the rearguard finally overpowered
the sentinel, and so began to give covering fire to the ronderos below. Zorro and two
ronderos advanced cautiously towards the mouth of the cave. When they had got very
close, three women suddenly burst from the dark entrance. One blazed away with a
.38 calibre revolver while another rushed forward with a grenade in her hand. At this
critical moment, Zorro’s Mauser rifle jammed. He knew that he had no time to run
away, no cover behind which to turn. As the woman pointed her revolver at him,
however, one of the other ronderos shot her, and covering fire from the ronderos on
the slope and peak above them brought down the other woman with the grenade.
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Both women fell to the ground, and the third turned to run away. The woman with
the grenade had already pulled the pin, however, and Zorro and his men barely had
time to throw themselves on the ground before a deafening explosion convulsed the
earth beneath them. Stunned for a couple of seconds, the militiamen quickly jumped
to their feet and charged forward through the smoke. They found two of the women
alive but badly injured. The third was unhurt but stunned. In the meantime, the sec-
ond squad of militiamen stormed the cave,
...where they found all the [Senderistas] killed. There were 17 dead,
both men and women. It was by now around 7.00 a.m. in the morn-
ing. We began searching carefully through their belongings. We found
military grenades, homemade bombs, electrically detonated land
mines, cassette recorders, walkie-talkies, 1 breech-loading shotgun.
We also recovered 2 G-3, 1 revolver, 1 large binocular, FAL cartridge
clips, munitions, clothes, medicines and other objects....33
During the firefight, three of the guerrillas managed to escape. They were probably
now on their way to fetch reinforcements. (Recall the larger company of guerrillas
spotted the previous afternoon.) The ronderos had been unbelievably lucky, for in
spite of the heavy exchange of gunfire not a single militiaman had been killed or even
wounded. The only problem reported was the disturbing frequency with which their
Mauser rifles jammed during the skirmish.34 Nevertheless, this time the ronderos had
triumphed, having had the advantage of surprise on their side.
Zorro and Kipo walked over to where the guerrilla that Zorro had shot in the
head was lying. He was wounded, but still defiant. The ronderos began to question
him.
...he was the military commander of Platoon III. His nom de guerre
was “MELQUIADES” and the other dead man who was the political cadre
of the same platoon [was] “JAVIER”; we were unable to carry him, [for]
he was grievously wounded. We got some information from him and
later he left us no alternative but to put a bullet in his head because he
spat in our faces and called us “Yanaumas [Blackheads], Miserable
Dogs of the Government.”35
After some minutes, their lookout on the peak sounded the alarm that he had
spotted another group of Senderistas heading their way. The ronderos quickly col-
lected as much of the rebel equipment as they could carry and made a hasty and
orderly retreat back up the footpath, “everyone overjoyed at having triumphed safe
and sound, without a loss on our part.”36 To make it more difficult for their pursuers,
they dispersed into smaller groups of three or four individuals upon entered a wide
valley. They were slowed down somewhat by having to take turns carrying the three
captured women, whom they had decided to take with them. But they had got a good
head start on their pursuers, who were gradually outdistanced by the strong legs and
sure footing of the serrano militiamen. The Senderistas eventually gave up the chase.
The two injured women had already lost a lot of blood, but they managed neverthe-
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less to walk by themselves when the exhausted ronderos were no longer able to carry
them. After walking for more than an hour, the militiamen finally entered familiar ter-
ritory. Seven ronderos went ahead to fetch help from the community of Acco, leaving
the rest of the personnel behind to tend to the wounded women. When they got to
only a short distance away, the ronderos suddenly found they were being fired upon.
They feared at first that the guerrillas had somehow overtaken them. In fact, they
were being shot at from two sides by ronderos from the civil defence patrols of Acco
and Ccarhuapampa, who had come to investigate
...because they had heard gunshots at dawn, besides which they had
been told that we had been lost in the mountains. [Upon seeing our
group and] given that we had 3 women with us, they mistook us for
Senderistas coming down to resupply themselves, and so they had
concealed themselves, ready and waiting to engage us. Furthermore,
we descending wearing ponchos that we had taken from the
Senderistas. At that point, I sent two personnel ahead to identify our-
selves and we all began to shout, “We’re the Patrol from Pichihuillca,
the Comandos Especiales!”37
Upon realising their mistake, the ronderos of Acco and Ccarhuapampa stopped firing
and rushed to assist the Comandos Especiales.
Leaving the rest of the group in safe hands of these ronderos, the advance party
of the Comandos Especiales pressed on ahead. When the seven men reached Qeqra,
many of the comuneros gathered at the entrance of the village suddenly burst into
weeping. For seeing only seven ronderos returning, the people immediately assumed
that the rest of the group had been lost. But their cries of sorrow became tears of joy
upon learning that not only was the rest of the group returning without a single casu-
alty, but that they also had prisoners and a large cache of captured equipment with
them. When the rest of the patrol had returned later that day, the militiamen and the
comuneros of Qeqra celebrated their victory with a party that lasted well into the
early hours of the morning. The next day, Comandos Kipo and Zorro and all the per-
sonnel of the patrol went to the army base at Tambo to receive the personal congrat-
ulations of the military commander. The militiamen turned over to the base com-
mander all the firearms and equipment they had captured—but not their prisoners.
And what became of the three Senderistas captured in battle? In his diary, Zorro
writes:
With regard to the 3 captured girls, we sent the 2 wounded ones to
the Red Cross [in Huamanga] for their recuperation and later they
were returned to our Central Base of Operations. They had grown
accustomed to living with us, cooking, going so far as to help us with
washing our clothes. And we in return bought them their clothes.
Some months later, two of them, Dina and the Gringa came to be
reunited with their relatives....But the other girl (Nancy) was touched
by a bad destiny. In one of the operations she escaped and returned
again to the ranks of Sendero in January ’92; and in the month of
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February ’92 they raided our base, managing to kill one of our per-
sonnel and afterwards we heard nothing more about her.38
5.5 The tactics of the Comandos Especiales
The details of this episode offers insight into how the Comandos Especiales operated
and functioned in the field, particularly their tactics. In most of their routine opera-
tions, the Comandos Especiales worked in small squads. They moved through open
terrain two by two, with sufficient distance between each pair to make it more diffi-
cult for the enemy to ambush the entire party. When contact with the enemy was
made, Zorro and Kipo wisely took into account a number of factors before deciding
whether to attack: the terrain and weather conditions, the deployment and numeri-
cal strength of the enemy, how late it was in the day, the physical condition and
morale of their men, and whether they held the advantage of surprise. Having deter-
mined that their men were too tired, that it was already getting dark, and that the
Senderistas were dispersed into various groups which together outnumbered them,
Kipo and Zorro prudently decided to allow their men to take a few hours of rest in
a cave before attempting a pre-dawn attack, when it would be more likely that the
element of surprise would be in their favour. The next morning, Zorro and Kipo
divided up the party into three separate assault teams, and then simultaneously
deployed each one to positions that would enable them to provide mutual covering
and suppression fire when advancing on the rebel stronghold in turn. Here we have
a vivid example of militiamen using offensive tactics, which, as we saw in the last
chapter, was the tactical trait that distinguished the DECAS from all other earlier or
contemporary civil defence organisations in Ayacucho.
Clearly, the Comandos Especiales understood and systematically used sophisticat-
ed military tactics. In fact, militiamen and guerrillas alike have even remarked to me
that the DECAS consistently employed many of the same guerrilla warfare tactics
used by Shining Path. This was explained to me in 1997 by Camarada Juanita, a guer-
rilla from Viscatán who had been captured by the army and handed over to DIVI-
COTE39: “The ronderos and the Party are almost equal because the ronderos were
once also support bases [“bases de apoyo”]40 and participated in the armed actions [of
the guerrillas]. For this reason they fight in the same manner”41
It was this emergent “professionalism” in the civil defence movement, spearhead-
ed by the DECAS and reflected in the sophisticated military tactics they utilised in the
field, which would prove largely responsible for turning the peasant militias into a
potent counterinsurgency force during the 1990s. Nevertheless, most ronderos also
readily admit the importance of receiving active support and assistance from the mil-
itary as a significant morale factor in the rural population’s resistence to Sendero
Luminoso. When talking about the general combat performance or moral fortitude of
the army, however, many ronderos tend to view their powerful patrons as somewhat
naive, ham-fisted, and occasionally rather less than courageous. And as far as police-
men were concerned, peasants had long ago already dismissed them as cowardly and
corrupt bullies. “The only thing that the police do,” Comando Zorro once remarked
to me, “is practically to dedicate themselves to robbing, no? From each driver they
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extort one sol. There’s no control over such personnel. In this way, when are we ever
going to put an end to the subversion? There are times when a policeman with pri-
vate financial problems would receive a bribe from one of those subversive, and he’d
set them free.42
As we have already seen in an earlier chapter, the popular image of the police as
corrupt, undisciplined, and brutal was an important reason why peasants initially
applauded and heartily encouraged guerrilla assaults on police stations and policemen
in the early years of conflict. Furthermore, when it came to fighting, the popular
opinion was that policemen are vastly inferior to Senderistas or to ronderos. In fact,
for the military strength that Sendero came rapidly to acquire in the early years of
armed struggle, both peasants and external observers more often than not blame the
police (Kuijt 1996:248). As Zorro explained to me,
The subversion armed itself through the police. Because [the police-
men] would come and go without taking care, without exercising
much responsibility and security. They believe themselves to be supe-
rior to us. However, in reality, seeing them in action, they’re not supe-
rior to us. Because we, strategically speaking, are familiar with the
subversive movement or that which the subversion utilises. In a fight,
perhaps [the police] know how to perform certain manoeuvres, but
you can’t use these when the subversion surprises you, for the sub-
version confronts you by surprise, and not as though on a battlefield.43
Similarly, by the mid-1990s, many ronderos in the Ayacuchan provinces of Huanta,
Huamanga, and La Mar genuinely deem themselves to be more proficient and effec-
tive in combat than even the army. Ronderos are not hesitant to state this publicly, and
can be quite candid about it. “[The soldiers] carry out operations constantly, but it
seems they’re not so productive,” CAD president Julio Talavera once told the peri-
odical Ideele.
What happens is that they are not familiar with the zone. They put
people from the coast who are not used to walking [long distances],
and it’s a very difficult zone. On the other hand, the subversion knows
all of this very well and go on ambushing them frequently.
Furthermore, they have radio communications [and can listen in on
army transmissions] and so they know where the soldiers are going.
Those whom [the guerrillas] are unable to locate are the Defensa
[Civil], they don’t know if we’re going or not. They can only find out
about our movements through some informers that they have in the
communities.... There’s a difference between [the Army] and us. They
protect their arms and their people quite a lot. Therefore, they make
their patrols in groups, whereas the Defensa is fluid. That’s to say, in
our patrols we spread out in groups of no more than three or four peo-
ple and so we cover great distances of territory. In this way, it’s very
difficult to ambush us. They can attack one small group, but the oth-
ers will immediately come to their aid. That is our tactic. Previously we
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worked like the Army, that’s to say, we walked together in platoon for-
mation, but we suffered a lot casualties. They detected us, surrounded
us and easily attacked us (quoted in IDL 1996:67).
Comando Zorro deems the counterinsurgency efforts and achievements of the army
to be, for the most part, praiseworthy. Yet, at the same time, he is also critical of the
abuses committed in the past by the military. “The Army has fought considerably,” he
told me. “We have recovered villages with the Army. Therefore I don’t want to say
anything bad about them.” Nevertheless, in the privacy of his war diary, Comando
Zorro expressed his personal disappointment with indolent army patrol commanders
who shirk their duties, and are afraid to clash with the enemy:
The first operations realised with the personnel of the Peruvian Army
did not have a beneficial result because the leaders of the army patrol
put us under their command. And they would even go so far as to
deceive their superiors. Like, for example, the time when we headed
out of Tambo in the direction of [various “red zones”], we only went
as far as the community of Huayao. There [the soldiers] installed their
radio transceiver. Calculating the amount of time it would take for
them to get to the place where they had been ordered to go by their
superiors, they later radioed saying that they hadn’t encountered any-
thing out of the ordinary, nor had they come across any trace of the
delinquent terrorists. Afterwards they called all the comuneros togeth-
er and forced them to butcher their chickens or sheep to feed the sol-
diers. In the meantime, the civil defence personnel have lost time and
the subversion takes advantage of this.... At other times, when [the
soldiers] are about to arrive at a place where they suspect there are
terrorists, they fire shots into the air as if to say “Take off! Here we
come!” and so the terrorists would escape.44
Obviously, the ronderos were comparatively disadvantaged when it came to fire-
power or access to technical equipment, like radios. Nevertheless, when it came to the
intangibles that are crucial to success in battle—courage, cunning, a superior knowl-
edge of the terrain and Shining Path’s tactics, and the will to win—the general opin-
ion among rural people was that the ronderos held a considerable advantage over the
army and the police. And despite their hatred of the ronderos, even the Senderistas
have begrudged them a greater degree of respect as fighters than they do the military
or the police. “It’s true, the Rondas Campesinas have combated Sendero the most,”
Camarada Juanita admitted to me. “The Party has no fear of the ronderos. But yes, it
is more careful of the ronderos than of the government soldiers, or of the police,
because it is the ronderos who persecute them constantly.”45
In recent years, the ronderos’ pride in their proven effectiveness and for the part
they have played in the counterinsurgency struggle has lifted the rural population’s
morale, and raised their self-esteem. “In reality, it has been the ronderos who have
brought about the pacification, it hasn’t been the Army or the Police,” Comando
Zorro told me in 1997.46 In the course of the 1990s, the popular depiction of civil
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defence organisations as those truly responsible for the “defeat” of Shining Path and
the pacification of the countryside helped to foster the a national phenomenon which
can be referred to as “cholo pride.” This greater self-esteem on the part of the indige-
nous population has contributed to growing feelings of “cholo power,” which as we
shall discuss in a later chapter, reached its fullest expression during the general elec-
tions of 2000.
5.6 On reconnaissance patrol with auxiliary ronderos of Ccarhuapampa
While it might indeed be true that ronderos tended to exhibit more courage and fight-
ing spirit than policemen or conscript soldiers and their officers did, it must also be
said that overconfidence and over enthusiasm, particularly among inexperienced or
rash auxiliary personnel, have at times led to disaster. The following episode in our
continuing look at the history of the self-defence movement in Tambo district illus-
trates one tragic instance of this.
Despite the annihilation of Platoon III and the capture of some of its members,
other guerrilla forces in the sub-region nevertheless continued to attack and hijack
private and commercial vehicles, particularly those travelling through the area of
Toccto-Quenuamonte. (The guerrillas who had given chase to Zorro and his group
were probably the ones behind these subsequent actions.) The rebels, in what must
have been meant as retaliation for the assistance that Zorro’s patrol received from
those Acco and Ccarhuapampa, also stepped up raids on the livestock herds of Acco
and Ccarhuapampa. The guerrillas could not afford to be seen as having been crip-
pled by the destruction of Platoon III, though in practical terms they most probably
were. It was in the light of this escalation of guerrilla activity in the district that a
patrol of Comandos Especiales decided to set out in mid-December to reconnoitre the
area along the western border of the district in the hopes of finding and eliminating
more Senderista columns. They were joined on this operation by a group of auxiliary
personnel from Ccarhuapampa.
Once again, the patrollers made the gruelling climb up the rocky heights above
Toccto Lake, where they inspected some caves. The patrol then split into two com-
panies of forty ronderos each, with Comando Zorro in charge of one and Comando
Kipo leading the other. They were supposed to proceed in tandem a short distance
apart, but the two groups quickly lost sight of each other once they entered a thick
shroud of low cloud that enveloped the crest of the ridge. Each company continued
on its own, hoping to link up later in the day at the prearranged rendezvous point at
Vizcacha. But Kipo’s group lost its way and never made it to Vizcacha. It had instead
marched so far as to have crossed over into the district of Huamanguilla, in neigh-
bouring Huanta province. At that time of year, the punas are frequently covered in
heavy, drifting fog that severely hampers visibility. Under such conditions, even sea-
soned guides have been known to occasionally lose their way.
Meanwhile, Zorro’s group trekked on for hours until someone suddenly spotted,
through a break in the fog, a number of dark figures making their way slowly down
the rocky slope of a jutting peak. The individuals were perhaps a couple of hundred
metres away. Judging from the fact that they were travelling in twos and deployed
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about thirty metres apart, there could be no doubt they were Senderistas. Fortunately
for the ronderos, the guerrillas had not yet spotted them.
We hid ourselves and observed where they were heading, so as to cap-
ture them. But in this, the auxiliary personnel of Ccarhuapampa were
excited, and expressed their desire to rush ahead and seize them.
However, the operation was under our control... We waited until the
Senderistas had disappeared. They were approximately 3 women and
9 men. They had not noticed we were following them. We lost sight
of them after they entered the other gorge called Huarmihuañuscca.47
Comando Zorro and four of his Comandos Especiales scurried ahead. They caught
sight of the Senderistas once again, and shadowed them from a distance of about two
hundred metres. The rest of the ronderos followed about a kilometre behind.
This was the first time military operation in which the Comandos Especiales were
accompanied by a large number of ronderos from one of Tambo’s communities. On
this occasion, many of the overenthusiastic ronderos from Ccarhuapampa were prov-
ing difficult to control. It was obvious to Zorro they were spoiling for a fight when
they became terribly disappointed when the Comandos Especiales kept them back
from charging ahead to capture the Senderistas coming down the mountainside.
Stalking the unsuspecting Senderistas, Zorro and his advance party eventually
came to a shallow depression between two hills, in which stood the roofless ruins of
a number of circular stone huts. The area was known as Balcón, and this hamlet was
one of a number that had been abandoned by their inhabitants at the height of polit-
ical violence in the first half of the 1980s. While the guerrillas laughed and joked with
one another as they busily loaded some packhorses and mules, the Comandos
Especiales closed in to ambush. Zorro and Chale crept to within a few dozen metres
of the guerrillas; three other Comandos Especiales positioned themselves behind
some boulders and carefully aimed their Mauser rifles at their selected targets. With
fingers on the trigger, they waited just a few moments longer to allow Zorro and
Chale to get a little closer.
“There they are!” someone suddenly bellowed from behind them, shattering the
air as violently as though it were a gunshot. Startled and thinking themselves being
attacked from behind, the Comandos Especiales spun around, ready to open fire.
Meanwhile the guerrillas in the camp threw themselves on the ground, unaware of
how close they had come just moments before to being killed.
It was our auxiliary personnel catching up. They appeared, charging
and screaming, “There they are!”....The entire group of auxiliary per-
sonnel rushed down the slope with the intention of capturing the
Senderistas alive. They didn’t carry any firearms, for they were serv-
ing only as auxiliary personnel and guides. But the Senderistas started
to shoot without pity. We who were close by also began to fire so as
to give cover to those people. In all of this, one of the DD.TT. threw
a grenade that landed some 3 metres from us. We dove to the ground
to save ourselves but the explosion hurled us on to our sides. We
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thought we were dead. The terrorists were escaping up the far slope.
It was becoming dark so fast. Just then, one of the Senderista bullets
smashed into the body of one of the ronderos campesinos. Wounded,
he fell to the ground. The rest of the auxiliary personnel fled, aban-
doning us. They had run away, frightened by the firefight.48
The Comandos Especiales gave chase to the guerrillas, but the Senderistas had already
vanished into the hills, dragging their precious pack animals away with them. It was
already late in the afternoon, and to pursue them now, into the deepening gloom with
so few men, would be to risk being ambushed. The wounded man lay on the ground,
writhing and howling in pain. He had been hit in the arm close to his shoulder, and
judging from the heavy bleeding the bullet must have hit an artery. Deserted by their
guides and auxiliary personnel, the Comandos Especiales were as good as lost in the
dark. Being unable to return immediately to Tambo town, they could do nothing
more for the casualty than to staunch the wound with a rag and carry him to a cave
nearby. There they all spent a tense and sleepless night wondering if they would be
attacked. Meanwhile the wounded man moaned pitifully and drifted with every pass-
ing hour ever deeper into shock. At dawn, the auxiliary personnel came sheepishly
back to the Comandos Especiales. Zorro ordered them to carry their wounded com-
rade, and the group returned to Tambo town as fast as it could. “We descended the
mountain in the direction of Tambo with misfortune because the casualty was grave-
ly wounded and later died when en route to the hospital in San Miguel.”49
Unlike many Shining Path guerrilla columns, the civil defence patrols lacked
medics in their ranks.50 This small detail is a stark reflection of the social stratum from
which the militiamen were almost exclusively drawn; they were, for the most part,
rural peasants with a little or no education, let alone knowledge of first aid. Unlike
the guerrillas, who have no qualms about kidnapping doctors and nurses, the civil
patrols were not permitted to conscript medical professionals against their will for
their operations and patrols. Moreover, I have never heard any mention of medical
personnel from the local hospital in Tambo ever volunteering to go out on military
operations with the CADs. Lack of adequate battlefield medical care therefore always
posed a formidable disadvantage for the militia patrols. Even the most seasoned and
educated of the militiamen, like Comando Zorro, were still practically ignorant of
basic medical treatment. In fact, the great majority of milita patrols I met in Ayacucho
department were not even equipped with a simple first-aid kit. Therefore, a critically
wounded rondero’s best chance of survival (if unaccompanied by an army platoon,
which were often equipped with basic medical supplies and its own medic) depended
on getting to the nearest health post within the first hours of injury—something that
is virtually impossible when lost in the dark in a remote part of the punas, as Zorro
and his party were that night.
Reckless though it was, the behaviour of the auxiliary ronderos of Ccarhuapampa
during the encounter was nevertheless understandable. Their self-confidence during
the operation was undoubtedly bolstered by the presence of the armed Comandos
Especiales. They probably had also been eager to jump at the chance to equal or bet-
ter the earlier success of Zorro and Kipo’s patrol by also capturing some Senderistas
alive. Their actions, however, suggested that they had little prior experience in com-
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bat operations, and less familiarity with the tactics of stealthy surprise attack. As with
most ronderos in the sierra at the time, these auxiliaries were probably more accus-
tomed to fighting defensively from behind Ccarhuapampa’s fortified ramparts, than
actually going out to hunt down the enemy down. The DECAS’ offensive tactics and
guerrilla-style of fighting were most likely new to them. (It was, after all, the first
combined operation between the Comandos Especiales and the ronderos of
Ccarhuapampa.) In any case, the experience taught them the bitter lesson that against
a mortal adversary like Sendero, zeal without tactics and discipline will almost cer-
tainly result in defeat. Nevertheless, such tragic incidents did not immediately deter
auxiliary ronderos in Tambo district from taking part in future combined military
operations with the Comandos Especiales, for it was only by participating in such
operations that they could learn to become competent and effective militiamen like
the Comandos Especiales.
The rural population in general certainly appears to have accepted reverses and
losses over the years as the unavoidable hazard and cost that came with battling
Sendero Luminoso. As one of Tambo’s ronderos remarked to me in 1997, “We con-
tinued to participate [in civil defence] because we believed that it’s better to die coura-
geously fighting than to passively await our fatal turn, as in the case of others who
have been executed after those so-called people’s trials.”51
5.7 First capitulation of guerrillas to Comandos Especiales
in Tambo District
A most astonishing sight met a patrol of Comandos Especiales one cold and misty
morning in December 1991. While crossing a peasant’s field, they suddenly spotted
an unarmed man standing a short distance away, waving a white rag above his head.
After some minutes, the man began to walk slowly towards them, despite the certain
knowledge that the suspicious militiamen had their rifles aimed at his body. When he
had got quite close, he stopped and announce in a strong voice that his name was
Romulo Cordova Quispe, a political cadre with the pseudonym Camarada Roger, and
that he and his companions wished to surrender to the Comandos Especiales.52 After
receiving guarantees from the patrol leader that they would not be harmed, the
Senderista waved the white rag in the direction from which he had come, in answer
to which four figures cautiously emerged from behind the large cactuses and ichu
grass, and walked slowly towards their captors.
It was the first voluntary capitulation of guerrillas to the Comandos Especiales in
Tambo district, and it immediately raised the spirits of the local population and the
Comandos Especiales. This small band of guerrilla combatants had come from the
“liberated zone” of Sello de Oro, situated northeast of Tambo, in the ceja de selva of
La Mar province. They had deserted while on nighttime patrol duty, and had marched
all night before spotting the milita patrol. With them, the guerrillas also surrendered
the large amount of materiel they were carrying: “home-made bombs, AKM muni-
tions, hand grenades, dynamite and fuses.”53
According to the deserters, the hardships of guerrilla life had become unbearable
for them, and for this reason they decided to surrender to the Comandos Especiales.
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All were suffering from malnutrition and various illnesses owing to hard years spent
alternating so often between the freezing, high punas and the humid, subtropical ceja
de selva. Indeed, the demands of guerrilla life were such that when not engaged in
combat with government troops and civil defence militiamen, one nevertheless had to
contend with a constant struggle for basic existence. Illness, disease, fatigue, poor diet
and even famine gnawed at them every minute of each day. Over the next two years,
survival conditions for the guerrillas and their masas would progressively deteriorate
to a wretched state of hunger and acute shortage as more and more communities in
La Mar and Huanta provinces stopped providing Shining Path with aid and tribute,
and instead organised themselves into village defence committees. Even the lorry
drivers who plied the road between Huamanga and San Francisco formed an
Asociación de Transportistas in the final months of 1992, pooling money together to
hire their rentados to protect drivers and their cargo.54
By 1993, the majority of peasants had already lost their fear of Sendero
Luminoso, and great swaths of an increasingly hostile countryside had already closed
up to the guerrillas. A growing anti-Sendero resistance now hampered their move-
ment in the campo, and with it their ability to resupply themselves with manpower
and resources. Camarada Juanita explained Shining Path’s deepening crisis to me:
From the moment that the comités de autodefensa were formed, the
Party could no longer enter just like that.... They no longer could eas-
ily penetrate the communities because they knew that certain villages
were already organised, and that at any moment, against any threat,
the entire village was prepared to come out fighting, no? That’s to say,
the patrollers, more than anything. Therefore [the guerrillas] were no
longer able to enter. Why [if not for this reason] have [the guerrillas]
abandoned [Support] Base 14? Why have they abandoned Base 21,
and Base 7 too. These were, as they say, “bastions of iron” which were
difficult to move because [Sendero’s] entire force was concentrated
there. But when the moment came for the formation of Comités de
Autodefensa, the Party had to retreat its forces to conserve itself, as
we say; its personnel, the people it had, no? Because in those
moments, when the Comités de Autodefensa were formed, the Party’s
people began to be defeated everywhere—the guerrillas, the platoons
that they deployed, as well as the Fuerza Local, their territorial net-
work. That’s to say, the small organs of the Party that they sent out to
politicise the masses. They could no longer do this political work in
La Mar, neither in the city nor in the countryside, when the commu-
nities began to form Comités de Autodefensa.55
Guerrilla forces in the northern half of Ayacucho thus found themselves pushed
back to more marginal areas of the department. They were forced to relinquish vast
cultivated territories where hitherto their masas toiled to grow food for them. But
rather than allow their unharvested crops to fall into enemy hands, the vengeful
retreating guerrillas sometimes took the trouble to burn and so destroy immense
hectares of food and cash crops behind them, just as Stalin had done to thwart the
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German Army’s rapid and deep advance into Soviet territory in 1941.56 For in so far
as Shining Path was concerned, that they were waging was nothing less than total war.
“The combatants of the Fuerza Principal were forced to retreat to the Ene River
Valley and to the zone of Viscatán—virtually inaccessible areas where they could bet-
ter maintain a secure hold on their masses,” wrote Comando Zorro. The retreat of
Shining Path’s forces from rich agricultural regions, like the Apurímac Valley and the
district of Tambo, intensified subsistence difficulties for combatants and their masas
alike. Based on numerous testimonies collected from surrendered combatants and
masas from three of Shining Path strongholds in Ayacucho, Ponciano del Pino has
been able to describe what daily life was like in the Sello de Oro in its final years:
In contrast to the first years of the war, when the base had been able
to survive without great sacrifices, by 1988 the families were living in
plastic tents, exposed to the weather, and without sufficient clothing.
Nutrition was the most serious problem. In the last few years, the
families virtually stopped consuming salt, sugar, vegetables, and stews.
Their diet was limited to what they produced: yucca and pitus, in
ever-decreasing quantities. Children were the most vulnerable vic-
tims....At the moment that Sello de Oro turned itself in (October
1993), 100 percent [of the children] suffered from anaemia, and many
were afflicted with tuberculosis, acute bronchitis, and malaria....[As]
Senderista forces became more vulnerable, survival more difficult, and
the families more decimated, it was not only mothers who felt the
pain of the children. Even the mandos of the base force eventually saw
reason and lost faith in Shining Path (1998:177; also see del Pino
1995b).
Worsening living conditions and dwindling supplies of food ignited long-simmer-
ing discontentment and internal dissentions within the masas controlled by Sendero.
The Party reacted by tightening its “system of internal control and domination by
increasing punishments and exemplary violence within the People’s Committees” (del
Pino 1998:167). It tried to shore up its image of power and terror by resorting to
increasingly cruel punishments. Yet, as del Pino pointed out, “[more] than power, this
violence reflected fear; more than recovery and strength, it reflected exhaustion and
weakness” (del Pino 1998:168). And even within the privileged Fuerza Principal,
cadres and combatants alike began to nurse serious misgivings about the growing con-
tradictions within the organisation, and the course being taken by the revolution.
Camarada Juanita’s simple account of the onset of her own disillusionment captures
the disenchantment felt by many of the guerrillas themselves:
When I was integrated into the ranks of the Party, they inculcated in
our minds the Party’s political line, which was that, yes, we truly are
fighting for the people. In other words, one organises the people, one
fights in defence of the interests of the people, of the great majority,
which are the peasant masses, no? For, indeed, the force of the peas-
antry is the principal force that directs the people’s war; this is what
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they say, no? Therefore, they always “conscienticise” you. From the
moment they inculcate their politics in you, you get the idea that if
you truly love your family, you must fight for the poor. But they them-
selves have committed abuses and have failed to respect the people,
even though they say: “Fight for justice, fight for the people.” Yet they
have done more to destroy the people than to construct something for
the people. It is because of this that they are constantly clashing with
the ronderos. It’s true; the ronderos loathe the Party because the Party
has caused more damage to the peasants than to the city people. [The
guerrillas] have demolished their crops, annihilated their livestock,
have murdered their children, because the majority of the actions car-
ried out here by the Zonal Committee of Ayacucho have been in the
countryside.57
The capture of Abimael Guzmán in Lima by DINCOTE on 12 September 1992, was
immensely demoralising for the members of Shining Path. It was the most serious
political setback for the movement to date, and accelerated the waning of what
remained of Shining Path’s popular support throughout the country. Yet by no means
did the occasion mark “la derrotta del terrorismo”—“the defeat of terrorism”—as
many of the Lima pundits triumphantly and prematurely were quick to declare; nor
did it end political violence in the country. Indeed, under the new leadership of Oscar
Alberto Ramírez Durand (alias Camarada Feliciano), the Party embarked on an orgy
of violence that approached new levels of madness and cruelty. In Ayacucho, escalat-
ing terror swallowed Shining Path along with their erstwhile victims as the Party
turned ferociously on its own ranks in a purge so terrifying as to cause hundreds of
militants and civilian supporters to desert the organisation between 1994 and 1996.
This dark chapter in the history of Shining Path in Ayacucho remains unknown to
most outsiders.58 The story told within Shining Path, according to Camarada Juanita,
is that the purge began soon after the execution of the political secretary of Base 33
(a village in the Ene River Valley) by his own comrades-in-arms, in 1994. The man
had been accused by Party leaders—it is even said by Feliciano himself—of being a
military agent, an infiltrado who had been plotting to lead the masas under his con-
trol to rebel against the Party. That the man was a licenciado (ex-soldier) provided the
circumstantial evidence for his judges to convict him of having secret contacts with
government forces in Masámari and Satipo. Whether or not he was indeed a military
agent, the case generated within Ayacucho’s Regional Committee a paranoid fear of
widespread infiltration within the organisation. It did not take long for the ensuing
panic to spiral out of control. Suspicion fell first on the licenciados in the rebel ranks,
and Camarada Juanita claims that all were tried and put to death as a precautionary
measure. The terror came to be known within the Party ranks as the “purgación polit-
ica” (“political purge”), and its victims would include not only suspected infiltrators,
but also anyone else who voiced dissent or was suspected of harbouring counter-
revolutionary ideas. “They generalised and linked individual personal problems to all
the other [larger] problems the Party was experiencing during that critical situation,”
said Camarada Juanita. “Within the ranks themselves, they killed anyone who com-
plained or disagreed with the way things were.” Rather than cleansing the organisa-
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tion and restoring it to its former formidable self, the bloody purge served only to
plunge morale and spread panic in the ranks. It encouraged desertion, and, for many
of those who remained, to initiate an intense (and invariably private) self-examination
of their own participation and future in the so-called “People’s Revolution.”
Ever since ’95, the moment that the Party began this “purge” as they
call it within the Party, many people from its very ranks were execut-
ed. Therefore, it caused you to think that you life wasn’t worth any-
thing. All this regardless of the fact that you have served the Party, that
you’ve given it the best years of your youth,...that you’ve invested in
the Party, and have willingly ruined any normal life outside the Party.
Therefore, I began to analyse things from the moment I began to live
certain contradictions. For instance, when they killed the licenciados;
and later when they began to kill, instead of cure, those who were ill.
They even killed people just because they were no longer able to walk.
They killed children, the elderly, women, and men. In addition,
because there wasn’t any more food to eat, nothing, if you were
caught stealing a cob of maize, they’d kill you. If you ate more than
others did, you were also killed. Anyone who did not follow the inter-
nal rules they laid down was put to death. Therefore, from that
moment I started to think, “Why did we assault the vehicles, or attack
a village, then? All of that only served to benefit the leaders. If there
was a little bit of sugar, that was only for the leaders. When you cap-
tured a town, the best things, the best clothes were only for the lead-
ers, for his wife, for their closest friends, no? They have also
announced that the Party is no longer going to kill the people, that the
Party would only request the voluntarism of the people, that they give
assistance voluntarily. But in the end, when you robbed a vehicle and
you threw everyone on to the pavement, you still robbed them of
everything. And so we sometimes talked among ourselves. “What is
going on is not good, one should instead do it like so.” Now, from
[captivity] one sees things in a different way, that it is a struggle that
is totally absurd. It serves only to ruin the lives of the people who are
still in their grip, because everything that one has had to suffer [as a
guerrilla] is not just a trifle, no? To live in extreme poverty, with noth-
ing to eat, nothing to clothe yourself with. All this. And what for?
Only to benefit one’s superiors, the leaders.59
Despite many good reasons to desert the Party, however, the decision to do so was
never easily taken by those who gave the idea serious thought. For vigilance was
always tight,60 and they were deterred by the especially cruel punishments that they
knew would be meted out to recaptured deserters and their kin. “If within a family
one of its members surrenders or deserts the ranks,” explained Camarada Juanita,
“the entire family would be executed. Therefore, one cannot desert. They had to put
up with that life until they died. That’s how things were.”61 Paradoxically, in spite of
its severe shortage of manpower, the Party would rather kill not just the deserters but
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also their entire family, simply to make an object lesson of them. Clearly, in having
relied for so long on violence as the primary mechanism by which it sought to coerce,
dominate, and punish the population at large, the Party could now think of no other
means to tackle internal dissension than with violence. (See the discussion on the
Party’s ideas regarding violence and punishment in chapter 2.)
Regardless of such terrifying deterrents, mass desertions continued during these
years, particularly within the Fuerza Principal. In contrast to the masa, which was
made up largely of families, most members of the Fuerza Principal were young peo-
ple who had no family ties within the “guerrilla zone” where they lived. Many of
these youths had been abducted from villages outside the “guerrilla zones”; others
were orphans taken after Shining Path had killed their parents. Part of their indoctri-
nation involved conditioning them to shed their affective ties to anyone or anything
except the Party (see del Pino 1998:172-174). Camarada Juanita’s experience, for
instance, is typical among many of the young people who ended up in the Fuerza
Principal. She was fourteen and had just finished her third year of secondary school
when she was abducted in 1994 while playing volleyball in a village close to the town
of Satipo.
When you are recently recruited, and they take you away, they do not
trust you. You are always watched, always guarded. But then from the
moment that you give your commitment and you promise to live with
them and to take on that life, everything changes, no? They come
and—it’s always so—they formally present you at a Party ceremony,
as they call it. For instance, the 19th of June, which is the “Day of
Heroism,” or the 7th of October, which is the “Day of the Founding
of the Party.” So they take you to a tent where they have a table
draped in a red flag with hammer and sickle, on which are laying
some tins of red and yellow flowers, everything. During the ceremo-
ny, you have to sign their act [acta], in a large notebook, and by sign-
ing you then pass, or rather, you become incorporated into, the ranks
of the Party. For that reason, it may be said that a person’s admission
into the Party is sealed with a pledge of one’s commitment to it. For
this reason, if they escape...and they are captured, they are killed.
Well, from the moment that I became a Senderista, then, I always read
[the Party’s] philosophy, no? They educate you in that. You had to
know the political line of the Party because [as a test] they would
sometimes ask you to repeat it.62
Ironically enough, this sort of psychological conditioning meant that Shining Path’s
method of discouraging desertion—i.e. threatening to exact revenge on family mem-
bers left behind—may actually have had little effect on many of the young people in
the Fuerza Principal, who either had no family within “liberated zone,” or had shed
all other affective ties except for the Party. On the other hand, those for whom the
punishment of annihilating one’s family members continued to serve as a potent
deterrent were the wretched masas. Even so, in spite of the signs that the Party was
becoming weaker, the persistent and almost paranoid fear of the Party’s omnipotence,
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the fear that Shining Path could and would hunt them down wherever they went, was
often enough to discourage even those without family ties in the guerrilla zone from
trying to escape.
What often came of rebels who surrendered themselves? We should first note that
most rebels were usually reluctant to give themselves up to the police or the military
(who might first torture and then summarily execute them), and preferred instead to
surrender to the rural militias. As we have already noted in the previous chapter, the
DECAS already had their own system of “repentance and rehabilitation” for captured
insurgents. Peasant militias often gave repentant rebels the chance to reintegrate them-
selves into the community and its defence organisation. As we have noted earlier, it was
also from such individuals that the militias got their valuable information about
Sendero’s strength and movements. For this reason, it was important to protect rebels
who had recently surrendered or been captured from the reprisals or rescue attempts
of their former guerrilla comrades. Consequently, these individuals would normally be
lodged at the CDC’s zonal or central headquarters, which were well-defended sites
where they could be guarded well and kept under constant surveillance.
In 1992, the Fujimori government adopted this practice by passing Decreto Ley
No. 25499 “Ley de Arrepentimiento,” or Repentance Law, on 12 May. This piece of
legislation offered arrepentidos (repentant insurgent) certain benefits, including either
(1) a reduction of the sentence for those who voluntarily and definitively sever their
ties with a “terrorist organisation” (i.e. MRTA or Sendero Luminoso), and confess
their participation in “terrorist crimes,” or (2) an exemption from the sentence for
those who, in the course of the criminal trial, voluntarily provides useful and truthful
information which gives authorities the ability to undermine a “terrorist organisa-
tion,” such as information regarding the identity of its leaders or the details of its
future actions, or (3) a remission of the sentence for condemned persons already serv-
ing their sentences who subsequently provide the pertinent authorities with the same
sort of information as for those who qualify for the previous benefit. The legislation,
however, was not intended to extend to national or regional-level rebel leaders, nor
to the mandos militares (military commanders) of the guerrilla organisations. This
was an illogical inconsistency, of course, for it was precisely such individuals who pos-
sessed the greatest amount of vital information about their organisations (Tapia
1997:81, fn.45; Rivera 1992:39). “This was solved,” as Tapia noted, “by making the
application of the criteria flexible in some cases” (1997:81, fn.45).
The Ley de Arrepentimiento was ever only available for a limited time, and was
repealed on 1 November 1994. By then, however, it had served its primary purpose,
which was to substantially weaken the will of rank-and-file militants of the MRTA
and (though to a lesser extent) Shining Path to continue armed struggle against the
State. Official government sources claim that up to five thousand rebels turned them-
selves in under the Repentance Law, although, as Tapia suggest, this seems an exag-
gerated estimate (Tapia 1997:81).63 Even so, the legislation might very well have been
responsible for dealing the deathblow to Shining Forces in the Sello de Oro. Soon
after they killed Elizabet (the leader of the People’s Committee), and some of her lieu-
tenants, the disaffected masa and combatants of the Sello de Oro guerrilla zone sur-
rendered to the Army on 24 October 1993. Thus collapsed what once had been one
of the most important and feared Shining Path strongholds in the region.64
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5.8 The ambush of ‘Los Halcones’
For ‘Los Halcones,’ Tambo’s Grupo Especial, the morning of 26 January 1992 began
just like any other day. Half of the group, twelve Halcones, caught a ride up to the
notorious stretch of highway that ran past Tocctoqocha Lake where, as usual, they
would spend the day assisting a platoon of soldiers at the checkpoint. On that partic-
ular morning, however, the militiamen arrived to find that the soldiers were not there,
having been sent by their commander that day to another zone on a military opera-
tion. The militiamen set up a checkpoint all the same, and worked until about 3.30
p.m. before deciding to pack up and head back home. They hoped to catch a ride back
to Tambo in a passing vehicle, but after waiting for almost an hour, it appeared unlike-
ly that any more vehicles would pass by that day. They had no choice but to walk back
to Tambo. Although it was already beginning to get dark, the militiamen felt no rea-
son to worry. They knew that by going down into the Yanamito Ravine and walking
alongside the Pumascca River, it was possible to reach Tambo town faster on foot than
in a vehicle, which would have to drive slowly down the treacherously narrow switch-
back dirt road above the town. By walking, they could be in Tambo within an hour.
The patrol started down the valley at a brisk pace. The young men were relaxed, lis-
tening to music from a transistor radio and laughing among themselves, unaware that
they were being watched. In fact, a squad of guerrillas had already been observing
them for quite some time, and was now closing in to ambush them. As the militiamen
entered a narrow part of the ravine, their leader, a 34-year-old rentado called Jaibol,
was starting to say something when his head suddenly snapped back, as though reel-
ing from the punch of an invisible fist. Even as he stumbled backwards, with blood
pouring down the side of his face and neck, the ravine was abruptly filled with the
deafening staccato of automatic gunfire punctuated by shotgun blasts. The bodies of
some of the militiamen twitched and contorted grotesquely in the murderous cross-
fire, while others were lifted into the air by the impact of the bullets before dropping
dead or wounded to the ground. A few tried to run away, but the steep slopes of the
ravine on either side of them made for a perfect trap. In less than five minutes, the
cream of Tambo’s civil defence movement had been annihilated.65
Saved by the rapid advance of darkness, one of the militiamen miraculously
escaped from the trap by crawling through the rocks and undergrowth, and his the
dead and dying comrades. Once he had made it out of the trap, he ran down the
ravine as fast as he could, and so brought news of the disaster to the Comandos
Especiales in Qeqra. Despite the risks of setting out in the dark, the Comandos
Especiales requisitioned vehicles from some of the merchants in Tambo town and
rushed as quickly as they could to the ambush site. When they got there, all they
found were the sprawling, broken bodies of los Halcones, strewn about like the car-
casses of slaughtered game. It was, as Comando Zorro describes in his diary, a scene
of gory carnage. Apart from their gunshot wounds, many of the corpses had been
grossly mutilated by the rebels as a terrifying warning to the defence organisations of
Tambo: “The Delinquent terrorists, despite already having killed them, also blew up
many of the bodies with dynamite.”66 The guerrillas had even crushed the heads of
some of the corpses by dropping small boulders on them. They must have done so in
anticipation of the added distress that such gruesome disfigurement would cause to
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the ronderos’ relatives when it came time to bury the bodies. The Comandos counted
nine dead; the corpses of two Halcones were missing. When an extensive search of
the immediate area failed to locate them, the militiamen could only conclude that
they had been taken away, perhaps alive as prisoners. “We pursued them so as to try
to recover the two captives, but it was already night-time and we couldn’t do any-
thing. Their tracks led off in the direction of Rasuhuillca.”
With help from the soldiers of the army base and medical personnel from the
town hospital, the Comandos Especiales and the remaining members of Los Halcones
returned the next morning to retrieve the bodies of the dead men. The tragedy imme-
diately provoked a widespread panic and despondency among the peasants in the dis-
trict, and the Comandos Especiales found themselves faced with a grave crisis of con-
fidence. “It was a huge blow to the [defence] organisations of Tambo,” Zorro wrote
in his diary. “[The peasants] began to lose heart and morale dropped completely
because the Grupo Especial that we recently had formed had failed owing to the infe-
riority of the arms with which they were expected to engage Sendero. It is impossi-
ble to advance in this war with arms such as they were given. [Consequently], the
communities wanted nothing more to do with the organisations.”67 At a general
assembly in Qeqra, the very future and survival of the district’s defence movement
was heatedly debated by representatives of Tambo’s rural villages. The peasants of
Ccarhuapampa desired revenge, and urged the others to assemble a large company of
armed men to hunt down the guerrillas. Most peasants from other villages, however,
had been thoroughly disheartened by the massacre, and many now wanted to scrap
the defence organisations altogether. It was futile and a waste of their lives, they
argued, to try to stand up to the better-armed and better-trained guerrillas. Why did
they ever think they could? Perhaps it was better, many remarked, just to rely on the
local army garrison to protect them. That day, the Comandos Especiales had to do all
in their power to persuade the peasants to continue with the civil defence organisa-
tions. In the end, the assembly agreed to reconstitute the Grupo Especial. It would be
renamed Los Condores, and this time placed under the command of an experienced
Comando Especial called Jergón. Most importantly, the Comandos Especiales had to
promise to find a way to acquire Mauser rifles for Los Condores.
5.9 Mausers 
First manufactured in Germany and first adopted as the standard issue rifle of the
German army in World War I, the bolt-action Mauser Gew98 and its subsequent
model variants is an outstanding rifle, but are today collector’s items and museum
pieces in Europe.68 When I lived in Tambo in 1997, I noticed that the Mausers the
peasants there had bought with their hard-earned cash were all in poor condition.
Many lacked sights, and some even had their wooden stock and barrel held together
by nothing more than scotch tape and string. But whatever their condition, the
Mausers were still highly desired by the ronderos because the firepower and range
(though not the rate of fire) of this weapon is comparable to the modern assault rifles
used by the guerrillas.
There are conflicting arguments as to exactly how comités de autodefensa have
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managed to obtain their Mauser rifles. Comando Zorro told me that in the aftermath
of the massacre of Los Halcones, “the communities began to acquire their firearms by
selling their sheep, their pigs, chickens. Everyone contributed something. They gath-
ered all this money together and bought Mausers.”69 According to him, these rifles
were “contraband merchandise,” bought by the communities from arms traffickers
with whom the DECAS had put them in contact. He said he did not know the back-
ground of these dealers, whether they worked for the military, the narcotraficantes,
or for themselves. On the other hand, Captain César Vásquez, the Jefe Militar
(Military Chief) of the Comités de Autodefensa in the departments of Ayacucho and
Huancavelica, told me in 1997 that it was the State, through the army, that supplied
the comités de autodefensa with Mauser rifles, in addition to their Winchester and
Mossberg shotguns. When I asked him if peasants had to purchase them, he insisted
“No, no, no. All are donations.”70 Could it be that some of the Mausers in the pos-
session of the self-defence committees were donations from the state, while others
were bought from arms traffickers?71 Not in the case of Tambo district, Zorro main-
tained.
The Mausers [we have] are not donations. They are arms that we our-
selves have acquired, that we have bought to defend ourselves. This is
because with those firearms presented to us by the government—that
is to say the Winchester and Mossberg shotguns72 donated by the
Army—we were unable to pursue the subversives because they have a
lethal range of only forty, fifty metres, no more. The weapon that has
benefited us the most has been the Mausers, which are weapons of
war, no?
Julio Talevera Merino, Ayahuanco’s CAD president, told Ideele magazine much the
same thing.
Each village began to form self-defence groups and to arm themselves,
as individuals and also as a village, collecting dues. All the communi-
ties bought firearms. It was only in this way that one has been able to
take out the subversion....Recently in 1991 [the villages received
firearms from the army], but not all. Only six villages received five
Winchester shotguns for each one. They were arms that served for
making ambushes or for guard duty within the community, but not for
clashes with the subversion (IDL 1996:66).
Even though the appearance of Mausers on the black market was counted by the ron-
deros as a blessing, the fact that they have had to pay anything for them at all was seen
by many militia leaders as a disgraceful and an injustice on the part of the govern-
ment. Comandante Huayhuaco expressed indignation to me in this regard:
In 1989, in the month of November, I met with the entire Council of
Ministers principally to request them to supply us with Mauser rifles,
which are already considered obsolete weapons, in disuse. However,
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the result was that they did not want to give me the rifles. Yet when
Alberto Fujimori became President of the Republic, those Mausers—
and I don’t know how—suddenly entered the informal [i.e. black]
market, and been sold to us. Is it just that a civilised country, in cir-
cumstances of social-political crisis, should sell arms to their own cit-
izens? It’s a horrible shame that, as a matter of necessity, so as to
defend themselves from Sendero’s attacks, the communities must sell
their pigs and their cows in order to buy those Mauser rifles.73
Moreover, even on the black market, Mauser rifles are expensive. “Each one costs
S/.1500 nuevos soles,”74 Zorro told me, which was similar to what American anthro-
pologist Orin Starn discovered that villagers in Puros, a community in the punas of
Huanta, had paid for their Mausers (Starn 1994:82). Given the exorbitant prices
fetched by these antiquated and often dilapidated rifles, it is evident that some indi-
vidual or some group (undoubtedly in the government or in the army) had been prof-
iting enormously over the years from the climate of fear; a fear that drove peasant
families to sell their livestock, scarce food supplies, and whatever other meagre pos-
sessions they had in order to pool enough money together to buy a weapon that they
feel gives them better protection. More shocking still, Comando Zorro told me in
1997, “we are obliged by the army to arm ourselves. Obligatorily, each community
must have two Mausers.”75
The arming of the rural militias with Mauser rifles has undeniably transformed
them into a truly potent counterinsurgency force. Even so, it is important to note that
the CADs’ reliance on these weapons has also deepened their dependence on the
army, and, conversely, has strengthened the army’s influence over the CADs. We can
be almost certain that this dependency was intentional on the part of the military. By
equipping them with Mausers, they have helped to turn the peasant militias into an
integral and effective force in the counterinsurgency struggle. But the comparative
obsolescence of these weapons, coupled with the peasantry’s dependence on the mil-
itary as their main supplier of ammunition, all serve to enable the military to control
the peasantry’s capability to become an autonomous armed actor. And such controls
helped to diminish the threat of an armed peasant uprising in the future, which is
exactly what many senior military officers initially feared when the idea of arming the
peasantry was first broached at the end of the 1980s.
Based on the evidence, it is quite certain that the majority of Mausers that were
in circulation for most of the 1990s had originally come from Peruvian military stores
in Lima.76 There is little doubt that some branch of the military or the national intel-
ligence service had been given the green light by higher authorities to place a large
quantity of these weapons on the black market, where they could be sold to peasant
self-defence organisations. The source of these weapons, however, is a question that
is less important than that of exactly how they have ended up in the hands of the
CADs. For at the heart of this matter is the crucial issue of ownership. The issue of
ownership is itself central to the question of what will become of these firearms in the
future. The official position of the military, as explained to me by Captain Vásquez,
is that all of the Mausers, and most of the other firearms in the possession of the
CADs, are all donations on loan from the military. It is for this reason, said Captain
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Vásquez, that they must all be returned to the military once pacification has been
achieved.77 Indeed, in this regard, Decreto Supremo No.077, the piece of legislation
that regulated the organisation and function of the Comités de Autodefensa, stipulat-
ed that upon the dissolution of the Comités de Autodefensa, “the shotguns and muni-
tions that the Comités de Autodefensa may have received shall be returned to the
competent authorities” (El Peruano 1992:110355, Article 80). Clearly, Article 80
referred only to state-donated escopetas (shotguns), and as such makes no reference
to the other types of firearms that have come into the hands of the Comités—notably
the Mausers. What about them? Captain Vásquez insisted that they, too, had one day
to be returned. However, peasant communities in rural districts like Tambo and
Ayahuanco maintained that they have sacrificed too much in order to buy most of
their firearms, particularly the Mausers. For this reason, they expressed that they had
absolutely no intention of relinquishing them. According to the peasant militias, these
firearms may be officially registered with the police and the military, but are consid-
ered by villagers to be community property. “Why are they going to take them away
if we have paid for them?” Julio Talavera asked rhetorically. “They are registered with
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DICAME. I don’t believe that any community would give up the weapon that has cost
it much sacrifice to obtain” (quoted in IDL 1996:68).
Militiamen in Tambo and other rural districts even told me that they were pre-
pared to resist anyone who tried to take away their firearms, for it was only with
firearms that they felt they could defend themselves against those who would other-
wise try to harm or rob them, like the guerrillas or even abusive policemen. “If the
military or the police tries to take away our firearms by force, there may be trouble,”
one rondero in Tambo remarked to me. In 1997, I noted that so long as this issue
remains unresolved, it may loom as a potentially serious problem that could lead to
future confrontation between the peasants and the State. The significant contribution
that peasant self-defence organisations have made towards helping to defeat Shining
Path—or at the very least to weaken it severely—speaks for itself. But by allowing the
fragmentation of its monopoly of the use and means of legitimate force, the State has
perhaps opened a Pandora’s box that in coming years will prove difficult to close.
5.10 The guerrilla attack on Qeqra
Just three and a half weeks after the ambush of Los Halcones, the rebels struck again;
this time, at the very heart of the civil defence movement in Tambo—they attacked
Qeqra itself. Whether it was deliberately planned or merely coincidental, the attack
caught the Comandos Especiales at their most vulnerable moment.
It was the time of Carnival, and it was customary for the comuneros to celebrate
by holding a corte monte—a ritualised tree cutting festival.78 The Grupo Especial had
not yet been reconstituted, so the Comandos Especiales found themselves overex-
tended in their ability to provide security to the revellers, while also guarding a num-
ber of capitulated or captured Senderistas in their custody. And if things were not dif-
ficult enough, the Comandos Especiales received word from Pichihuillca that twenty
of their number were to be discharged because money to maintain them had finally
run out. The fall in the price of coca during the early 1990s, coupled with an intense
military crackdown on the drug trade (including coca cultivation in areas like the
Apurímac River Valley) in accordance with a new anti-drugs accord signed between
the United States and Peru in May 1991, meant loss of vital funds for the DECAS.
“From then on, the [DECAS] organisation could afford to keep only a small number
of personnel,” recalled Zorro.”79 Those Comandos Especiales who had been ordered
to return to Pichihuillca were accompanied back by Comando Sombra. He expected
to be away for a week or two, and he left Comandos Zorro and Kipo in charge of the
fifteen remaining Comandos Especiales in Qeqra. They were now critically under-
manned, and this made Zorro uneasy. “The only thing I could do was to suspend the
night-time corte montes and to redouble the men at the watchtower because it was
known that they were going to attack us at any time, for on one of the operations to
Rasuhuillca the Senderista [Nancy], whom we had captured on the 16th of
November, escaped.”80 The militiamen assumed that she had returned to her old com-
rades with vital information regarding the defences and weaknesses of the Comandos
Especiales in Qeqra.
Late the following afternoon, Comando Kipo set out with four other ronderos to
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help sort out a domestic dispute in the community of Huayao. A man from that vil-
lage had become engaged to a local woman, but the problem was that she was still
married and living with her current husband in Qeqra. The issue had become a source
of juicy gossip and hilarious amusement for the locals of both villages, but it made the
Comandos Especiales worry that it might end in a violent altercation between the two
men. Comando Kipo said that he would not be away for very long, though he also
intended to make a short reconnaissance patrol on his way back to Qeqra. Zorro was
understandably concerned when, by 10 p.m., the patrol had still not returned. He had
just crawled into bed and was listening to his transistor radio when, suddenly, he
heard automatic gunfire. “The [gunfire] was different from ours, because we don’t
have automatic weapons,” he later wrote in his diary. “I immediately jumped out of
bed. I ran to the Command Post to raise the alarm. I ordered all my personnel to man
their posts and the sentries in the watchtower to stand fast.”81
The sound of gunfire outside of the ramparts grew heavier, causing panic among
the villagers inside the encampment. The Comandos Especiales soon began to fire
back. The comuneros were running about the central plaza in terrified confusion, not
knowing what to do or where to go. Eventually, one of the militiamen herded them
together into a safe corner of the square, and told them to stay put until the attack
had finished. As the firefight between the Comandos and the guerrillas intensified, the
missing patrollers unexpectedly burst forth out of the darkness. They threw them-
selves on the ground at the foot of the front gate and pounded on it to be let in.
“They’ve killed Kipo!” one of them cried. At about that same moment, the guerrillas
lobbed a pair of hand grenades over the wall. A terrific explosion destroyed an adobe
building on the far side of the fortified enclosure. The grenades had obviously been
meant for the command post, and it was immediately clear that Camarada Nancy had
given her comrades information about the layout of the buildings, and what was in
them. Fortunately for the handful of captured Senderistas who normally were housed
in the command post, the Comandos Especiales had had the foresight to relocate it
only a few days earlier to another building on the other side of the square—a routine
precautionary measure in case of attack. Had the guerrillas managed to hit the right
building, they probably would have blown up the entire encampment, since the com-
mand post is ordinarily packed with crates of ammunition, dynamite, and hand
grenades.
The sound of battle was heard from as far away as Tambo town, some three and
a half kilometres distant. Immediately realising that the Comandos Especiales were
under attack, Captain Rancing Lopez, the commander of Tambo’s army garrison,
hastily assembled and dispatched a flying column to relieve the defenders. When the
army trucks got to within sight of the village, the soldiers poured out and charged
headlong down the road. They were shouting fiercely and firing rocket propelled
grenades (RPGs) at the flashing gunfire that gave away the position of the guerrillas,
hidden in the dark fields around the protective walls of Qeqra. Upon realising that
army reinforcements had arrived, the militiamen in Qeqra let loose wild shouts of ela-
tion, punctuated with blasts from their Mauser rifles and Mossberg shotguns aimed
in the direction of the guerrillas. But just as the soldiers got to within about fifty
metres of Qeqra’s gate, one of them stepped on a land mine that had been planted
earlier in the road by the guerrillas. The explosion sank hot shrapnel into soft flesh
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and hurled bodies high up into the air. The soldier who had stepped on the mine died
immediately, and four of his comrades were seriously injured. The counterattack was
stopped cold, and the guerrillas took advantage of the ensuing moment of chaos and
confusion to break off their own attack and steal safely away. Leaving a scene of pan-
demonium behind them, they need not worry about being pursued.
5.11 Creation of a CAD ‘Zona Urbana’
The attack on Qeqra dealt another heavy blow to Tambo district’s defence movement.
Following rumours that some of Tambo’s townspeople had participated in the attack,
the Comandos Especiales launched an investigation and took some people townspeo-
ple into custody. “They began to implicate various Tambinos, teachers, electrical tech-
nicians and nursing technicians, but only the two who had participated directly in the
attack were brought to justice.”82 The attack on Qeqra provided the Comandos
Especiales with an excuse to organise the town of Tambo itself. “We eventually dis-
covered that Sendero was in the town, not in the countryside,” Zorro told me years
later.
A strong organisation of Sendero existed in the town itself. There
were sympathisers, mostly teachers, and the intellectuals. When we
organised the district in ’91, we only organised the [rural] communi-
ties, that was all. Therefore Sendero continued to attack us. The mil-
itary base was a neighbour to the [local guerrilla] leaders without
knowing it. When we started seizing the Senderista ringleaders, it was
then that the commander of the military base realised this. He said,
“What? I myself have been living all this time beside Sendero?” This
is what happened.83
To neutralise Shining Path’s presence in the district capital, the Comandos Especiales
organised the town and its surrounding barrios and desplazado settlements into a new
defence zone, designated the “Zona Urbana.” A junta directiva was formed for the
new zone, as were comités de base in all of the barrios and settlements. Thus were the
adult inhabitants of the urban centre incorporated into the district’s civil defence net-
work. “For the first time, even the townspeople had to take their turn on night
patrol,” remarked Zorro.84
The town and its barrios had not suffered any serious guerrilla incursion ever
since the local army fort was built through communal labour, in countless faenas
between 1986 and 1987. Many of the urban inhabitants looked to the soldiers of the
garrison to defend them, and so did not see the need to organise themselves into a
ronda urbana. Consequently, when the Comandos Especiales began to organise the
town, even the urban inhabitants not linked with Shining Path began to resent this
new intrusion on their lives. Consequently, some of the town’s elites, according to
Zorro, brought accusations of rape, assault, robbery, murder, and human rights abus-
es against members of the Comandos Especiales. But the police did not take these alle-
gations seriously, and nothing ever came of them for lack of evidence.
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Why they met with such antagonistic defiance from some of the townspeople was
explained to me by Zorro in rather conventional terms: that perhaps those people
were Senderistas or their sympathisers; or that maybe “those gentlemen wanted to
live untroubled, without having to do vigilance duty, without, perhaps, needing to
perform the obligations of a rondero.”85 But there is possibly another explanation. In
a country where racism and attitudes of social superiority still shape social interac-
tion, two other likely reasons why Tambo’s elites resisted being incorporated into the
rondas campesinas organisation was racism and class chauvinism. In Tambo as else-
where in Peru, the urban elites believe in their intrinsic superiority of status. Firmly
convinced of the superiority of “development” and “modernity” (Western style),
urban elites ordinarily place a higher importance on their own professional or entre-
preneurial occupations over the peasantry’s “backward” rural economic activities of
subsistence cultivation and herding. Even peasants and their children believe this too;
hence, the importance that education holds for them as essential for upward social
mobility. For the child of peasant parents to become an urban professional marks an
important transition from “cholo” identity and culture to that of the “mestizo.” Any
respectable upper-middle or upper class family shuns menial and manual labour
because those with money are expected by their peers to hire persons from lower
classes to do such tasks for them. Consequently, the common view of most urban
elites I asked in Tambo and in other parts of Ayacucho department where I visited was
given that rondas campesinas, or comités de autodefensa are rural in origin, their
membership should likewise remain rural in composition. In their opinion, then,
patrolling is a task that should be delegated exclusively to the peasants. “It’s not for
nothing that they’re called ‘rondas campesinas,’” a hospital nurse once quipped to
me. Indeed, some educated urban people I spoke to even deemed patrolling an activ-
ity that was beneath their social status—akin to doing faena as the obligatory com-
munal labour is known, from which the urban elites are also exempt.
Given its rural origins, it was perhaps inevitable that as the civil defence organi-
sations expanded to include district capitals, new structural conflicts and configura-
tional tensions would begin to emerge between peasants and townspeople. How,
then, were Tambo’s urban elites incorporated into the civil defence organisation? In
what manner did the different classes of Tambo’s urban and semi-urban centre “par-
ticipate” in the organisation? Back in 1997, Zorro maintained that every adult in the
district, rural or urban, is a rondero. That entails, according to D.S. No.077, an obli-
gation “to discharge one’s patrol service in a state of impartiality” and “to participate
in faenas and other communal activities of development” (El Peruano 1992:110352,
Article 19). “In Tambo district, we are all ronderos,” Zorro insisted, “because we all
participate in the organisation. There are no exceptions made for professionals.
Teachers, doctors also, even the priest, everyone. We are all ronderos.”86
If, indeed, Tambo’s elites were ever recruited as “ronderos,” against their will,
when the Zona Urbana was organised in February 1992, then it could only have been
for a short time. For Article 28 of D.S. No.077, which was promulgated some nine
months after Tambo’s Zona Urbana was created,87 clearly states that “The First Level
or Base Committee [Comité de Base] is comprised of persons who freely associate
themselves in order to fulfil the tasks characteristic of self-defence and development
in a community or a congregation of small communities (Pago, Aldea, Caserío,
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Poblado, Asentamiento Humano, Barrio, etc.)...” (ibid.:110352. My emphasis). And
as the title of Article 17—“Those who may become members of the Committees”—
also reveals, participation is not assumed by the legislation to be compulsory or uni-
versal; in principle, membership is not automatic but rather based on voluntary
choice. Through my numerous conversations with Tambo’s townspeople, it became
obvious to me that they were quite aware of these facts, unlike the majority of peas-
ants, who either believed that it was compulsory for them to be ronderos, or were oth-
erwise reluctant to press their right to refuse to participate. During a conversation
with a group of teenagers, I asked why one of them was a militiaman (he was carry-
ing a rifle) while the two others were not. The two replied: “because we’re students.
To become a rondero depends on you, depends on one’s own choice. Sometimes, for
economic reasons, one joins the [rentados] because they can earn something month-
ly.”88
In fact, my own observations did not bear out Zorro’s assertion that even Tambo’s
uban elites could be counted as “ronderos.” In all the months I lived in Tambo town
in 1997, the only individuals I ever saw patrolling the streets at night, or participat-
ing in faenas, were men of rural background from the adjoining barrios and desplaza-
do settlements. The ronderos—that is to say, those who patrolled—never included the
professionals or members of the Tambo socioeconomic elite. When I asked Zorro if
he considered the men of the Cabrera Family—Tambo’s wealthiest entrepreneurs and
traders—to be ronderos, he replied in the affirmative, but qualified his answer thus:
Well, they too are ronderos. They form part of the organisation. Fine,
sometimes they, because of their work, are not able to patrol, no?
Therefore, what they do is give us assistance.... Sometimes they give
us some food; they give us tins of tuna when we go on patrol, candies.
They give us provisions or meals. In this way, they help us. But when
it’s their turn on watch, their obligation is to go on watch. Yet some-
times when they don’t do it, fine, perhaps they hire someone else to
do it, saying: “You know? I’ll pay you a wage if in my place you dis-
charge my obligation.” And that person is then obliged to carry out
the duties of the one who has paid him.89
This statement neatly captures the gap between the belief and the practice, while at
the same time illuminating the class contours of participation and the division of
labour associated with the civil defence endeavour. Whereas the dogma of the civil
defence movement assumes that all adult inhabitants of organised rural villages and
organised urban centres are, by definition, “ronderos,” in actual practice the partici-
pation of urban elites is often mediated and mitigated by their wealth, class status, and
professional backgrounds. The truth in the case of Tambo was that the professional
townspeople and urban elites—entrepreneurs, merchants, etc.—did not carry out
rondero duties as a matter of course (nor were they really expected to), though they
occasionally gave donations or provided the corresponding service of their occupa-
tion to the active ronderos. It also appears that even before legislation was passed that
clearly established the principle of voluntary individual participation, those with
money could buy their way out of having to carry out civil defence duties by simply
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paying someone else to do it for them. As we saw in the last chapter, this was already
a common practice in the Apurímac River Valley. In the end, participation in the
urban defence force of Tambo town was determined along class lines. In contrast to
the principle of universal participation, then, among the inhabitants of the Zona
Urbana, it was only the peasants, the itinerant labourers, the desplazados who live in
the barrios and the desplazado settlements (commonly referred to as pueblos jovenes
or asentamientos humanos)—in short, only the poorer strata of Tambo’s urban soci-
ety—who could, in fact, rightly be called ronderos.
But why, if by law individual participation was to be on a voluntary basis, did one
commonly hear in the countryside and in the asentamientos humanos that “all are
ronderos,” as though people had no choice? To a large degree, it was because most
rural people simply did not know their legal rights. They just took it for granted that
to take part in the local defence organisation—whether it was to patrol regularly or
just to cook and sew for the active ronderos—was to participate in community life.
Anyone who chose to refrain from contributing something to the organisation, how-
ever small, would, in effect, be shunning village society and refusing to share sacri-
fices just like everyone else. That person would then be regarded as an outsider, and
excluded from the benefits of the collective, including mutual defence. What was at
work in these organised village societies, which ensured universal adult participation,
then, was not legal coercion, but tacit peer pressure.
The pressure of public opinion among villagers is great and often confounding. It
can sometimes make an individual decision influenced by subliminal group pressure
seem like the “voluntary” outcome of individual choice. This ambivalence was vivid-
ly illustrated in a statement made to me by a former president of Tambo district’s
Central CDC:
In the countryside, the majority [of the adults] are ronderos; from six-
teen to sixty years old, more or less, they are all ronderos. The women
as well. They, in a voluntary way, in every community, are all ronderos
because self-defence is a common concern. Over there, nobody is per-
mitted to say “I will not take part.” In an assembly, they voluntarily
profess, “We are going to defeat [Sendero Luminoso], we are going to
work.... As regards the individuals who do not want to participate, the
others would say they are terrorists, they are infiltrators, no? [They
would say] “Why can’t they participate?” [Other villagers] would
therefore call them “Senderistas.”90
With social ostracism and denunciation as the likely consequences that non-partici-
pation would attract, it is hardly surprising that involvement in the civil defence
organisation was near universal in the campo and within the pueblos jovenes.
In the end, the definitive answer to my question of who were to be regarded as
CAD members—in other words, who in the population were ronderos—was provid-
ed to me by the military, by virtue of their supreme authority to recognise (and so also
to define) CAD membership. In September 1997, Captain Vásquez came to Tambo
district to register the inhabitants for a “rondero identity card,” which he intended to
issue them eventually. The entire week before his visit, CAD authorities throughout
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the district made certain to notify every person between the ages of 16 and 70 (cf.
Article 17 of D.S. 077) that it was compulsory for them to register; failure to turn up
incurred a fine of S/.5 soles. As it was, each person had to pay Captain Vásquez an
administration cost of S/.5 soles for their rondero ID card. Over the course of three
long days, over 7,000 people in the district out of a total population of approximately
about 13,000 were registered by the military as “ronderos.” As Alberto, the registra-
tion team’s computer specialist explained to me, the identity cards were to be issued
“to those who pertain to the rondas campesinas; that’s to say no-one else but ron-
deros.” With this in mind, the question of whether Tambo’s urban elites and profes-
sionals are also considered ronderos in the eyes of the military authorities was defin-
itively answered for me by their conspicuous absence at the registration desks.91
5.12 Militia-military relations 
The months immediately following the organising of Tambo town witnessed a surge
in counterinsurgency activity, both in the district and in the highland region straddling
the Huanta-La Mar border. DECAS intelligence suggested that Shining Path was plan-
ning to hold a General Assembly or a Congress in the rebel stronghold of Jarjacha,
situated near Rasuhuillca Mountain. Mandos politicos and mandos militares from all
over Ayacucho would be present at such an important gathering. Thus, it presented
security forces a unique opportunity to bag a number of important rebel leaders, per-
haps even “Presidente Gonzalo” himself. Due to the immensity of the Jarjacha guer-
rilla zone, however, neither the army nor the militias could do the job alone. The
army did not have enough men and the militias did not have the firepower to assault
such a strongly defended area, whose broken, rocky features were ideal for conceal-
ment and ambush. What was required was a combined civil-military operation, per-
haps larger than any ever attempted in this region of Ayacucho.
While DECAS chiefs from the Apurímac Valley and the Political-Military
Commander of the emergency zone, General Ronald Rueda Benavides, drew up plans
at Los Cabitos military base for a joint operation, militia committees throughout the
provinces of Huanta, La Mar, and the northern districts of Huamanga set about
mobilising their ronderos. Under the direction of their respective comités de base,
communities throughout the two provinces began to collect the necessary provisions
for what was to be a ten-day operation. In Tambo, donations from every household
in the district produced a small mountain of food supplies and soon a large contin-
gent of militiamen from all the rural and urban defence committees in the district
gathered in the town. In the late hours of an evening in March, they were given the
order to set off, accompanied by a platoon of soldiers from the local garrison.92
Horses and mules carried the heavy sacks and crates of supplies and munitions that
the militiamen and soldiers would need over the coming days. They marched all
through the night and arrived at the fastness of Jarjacha shortly before dawn the next
morning. Numerous other army units and militia groups from all over Ayacucho’s
northern provinces had been arriving from several directions throughout the night.
The officer in charge of the operation deployed his forces in an attempt to create, as
best they could, a cordon around a large area where they suspected various rebel
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groups would be. As the sky grew lighter, the counterinsurgency forces moved for-
ward to tighten the noose. As with all such guerrilla strongholds, however, the natu-
ral barriers and obstacles of rocks and ravines around Jarjacha made their advance
slow and difficult. When the soldiers and militiamen of Tambo began an attack up a
steep ridge, guerrillas interspersed and dug in among the rocky outcrops and ledges
fired down upon them. It was by now around 6.30. The sound of sporadic gunfire
cracking away in the distance signalled that the contingent of soldiers from BCS-42-
Jano had also commenced their assault on Leon Ranra, another of the rebels’ defen-
sive complexes nearby.93
The guerrillas around Jarjacha were dug in so well that even an army helicopter
firing rockets failed to dislodge them. Throughout this and the next day, soldiers and
militiamen had no choice but to engage the guerrillas in nightmarish close-quarters
combat in order to clear them cave-by-cave, tunnel-by-tunnel, barricade-by-barricade.
In his war diary, Comando Zorro refers to these rebel strongholds in the sierra as
“military bases,” but not in the sense of a collection of buildings and other surface
structures guarded within a defensive compound. Rather, Senderista “bases,” as he
explained to me, often consisted of an interconnected network of caves and tunnels
sunk into craggy heights, not unlike the famous Viet Cong tunnels of Cu Chi (see
Mangold and Penycate 1997). These subterranean spaces were used as storehouses,
temporary living quarters, and even as makeshift hospitals and armouries. “The ter-
rucos could travel unnoticed from one place to another by using these underground
tunnels,” Zorro told me.94 The unique feature of Senderista strongholds was that they
were never guarded by static garrisons. In contrast to the foquista strategy character-
istic of Cuban-inspired guerrilla warfare (see Wickham-Crowley 1992), Shining Path
strategy involved never committing its military forces in the defence of fixed posi-
tions. Rather, its military units always remain mobile and never tied down to one
place. Nevertheless, these strongholds—like Viscatán or Sello de Oro—were often
places located in remote and nearly inaccessible areas, and invariably endowed with
their own natural defences. Furthermore, Zorro warned that “in the hills around the
bases, you have to walk very alert because the subversion has utilised formidable tac-
tics: land mines, for example; hidden pits with sharpened [punji] stakes, like in the
Vietnam War.”95
The details of this episode are sketchy and fragmented. Zorro’s war diary is, once
again, my primary source of information. He describes the passage of events as best
he could, naturally limited though he was to his own range of vision and personal
experience of the military operation. Nevertheless, Zorro’s keen abilities of observa-
tion and of writing clearly and with great detail provides us with an insight into the
mechanics of combined militia-military combat operations, which became more com-
mon during this period of the 1990s. Naturally, the overall operation was under the
command of army officers. Yet the militiamen seemed nevertheless to have been given
considerable freedom of action and manoeuvre during the numerous combat encoun-
ters. The impression one gets from reading Zorro’s account is that the militiamen and
the soldiers exercised an efficiently high level of battlefield cooperation and coordi-
nation, providing, for instance, covering suppression fire for one another’s attacking
teams. For the most part, the militiamen functioned as light auxiliary troops. They
operated in small groups, fighting skirmishing actions to keep the guerrillas busy
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while the heavy infantry positioned themselves for decisive assaults. At other times,
agile teams consisting of four to five militiamen would try to outflank the entrenched
rebel positions, while the government soldiers kept the guerrillas pinned down with
heavy suppression fire from their automatic weapons.
Little by little, the engagement intensified. [The guerrillas] did not
permit us to advance. I took 3 of my men to climb up the other side
of the hill while the soldiers covered us. NCO Lobo and Lieutenant
Chaveta of the [Peruvian Army] advanced with a group of [their sol-
diers], along the other flank—a rocky mountain—Comando Sombra
was doing the same to gain altitude. Meanwhile other groups covered
us from the pampa.96
It was perhaps in order to minimise confusion while on the move—particularly in
view of the differences in their armaments and tactics—that army troops and militia-
men fought as separate teams, under their own combat commanders, instead of in
mixed companies. What became immediately apparent to me while reading Zorro’s
account was that during this operation, the militiamen of Tambo executed numerous
important tactical actions under the leadership of their own field commanders. To say
that militiamen were simply “carne de cañón” (cannon fodder)—as human rights
groups so often assumed was their inevitable fate in all such joint civilian-military
endeavours would not only be a gross oversimplification. It would also be a failure to
pay credit to the vital contributions made by militiamen during such operations, and
to their ability to fighting as independent, tactically thinking actors on the battlefield.
Further details of the actual fighting are not important for our analysis. After two
days of heavy fighting—during which the highlights were when an army mortar team
managed (by sheer luck) to hit a tunnel packed with ammunition, killing an undeter-
mined number of rebels holed up inside; and when the guerrilla known as “Estrella
Roja,” the political commander of Platoon XV in the Ene River Valley, was captured
and subsequently killed while “trying to escape”—the main body of guerrillas slipped
away during the night, taking their dead and wounded with them. Zorro recalled that
when they entered the underground complexes of Jarjacha on the morning of the
third day, “we only encountered fresh tracks of blood, FAL and AKM bullet casings
and MAG cartridge belts, clothes, blankets and provisions left by the Senderistas
when they fled”97 For all its logistical magnitude, the operation does not seem to have
produced the results hoped for by its planners. Even so, its double importance to our
historical analysis are that, firstly, it was the first major militia-military combat oper-
ation in which all the comités de base of Tambo district took part, and secondly, it
vividly illustrates the new relationship of cooperation and coordination that was
developing between the militias and the Army in the early 1990s.
The strained and often antagonistic relationship between the civil defence organ-
isations and the Army in the 1980s warmed into a much more cooperative and
accommodating rapport soon after Alberto Fujimori became President. This was due,
for one thing, to a change of personnel among the Army chiefs whereby those were
unreceptive towards defence militias were replaced by others more sympathetic
towards them (see Tapia 1997:49-50). The subsequent change in attitude at the sen-
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ior level filtered down and also influenced the junior officer ranks. In addition, the
sympathetic disposition of the government towards the rural militias also helped to
bring about a reconciliatory attitude on the part of the military, which began to make
greater efforts in fostering a better relationship with the militias and the rural civilian
population as a whole. The Fujimori government’s new pacification strategy placed
greater emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the rural population in order to
harness not only the growing wave of grassroots counter-rebellion against Shining
Path, but also their immense importance as a source of political support. In this new
scheme, the CADs were scripted to play the leading role, as one of Tambo’s militia
documents clearly indicates: “the preponderant role that the State has assigned [to the
CADs] is to achieve in the most rapid way the Consolidation of National Pacification”
(CCAD-SJB 1996:1). But while the government was granting new powers to the civil
defence organisations in the early 1990s, it was also taking parallel measures to
strengthen its power and control over them through the army. We have already seen
examples of these new mechanisms of control, such as the promulgation of new CAD
legislation. There were others.
On 2 June 1993, the military commander of 42nd “Moquegua” Batallion, sta-
tioned at BCS-42-Pichari, issued to the CADs within the zone of his authority a new
standard operating procedure designed to create more accountability by regulating
their actions more strictly during patrols and military operations. It required CADs to
complete, for every settlement they visited, a very detailed official declaration form,
the (somewhat amusing) contents of which are reproduced below.
THE AUTHORITIES AND COMUNEROS OF [state name of community] DIS-
TRICT OF [state name of district] WHO BELOW HAVE SIGNED AND PLACED
[an imprint of] OUR DIGIT FINGER, DECLARE THAT ON THE DAY OF ____
IN THE MONTH OF ____ OF 1,99 __...WE HAVE RECEIVED THE VISIT OF A
PATROL(S) OF THE ANTISUBVERSIVE BASES OF THE SELF-DEFENCE COMMIT-
TEE OF [state name of district] IN THE HOURS OF___ WHOSE MEMBERS
HAVE REALISED ORGANISATIONAL WORK, VIGILANCE AND PROTECTION IN
THE COMMUNITIES AND/OR HAMLET(S) [state their names]. IT WAS SUCH
THAT THE SAID ELEMENTS COMPRISING THE AFOREMENTIONED PATROL(S)
HAD CONDUCTED THEMSELVES CORRECTLY, RESPECTING OUR BELONGINGS
WITHOUT HAVING EFFECTED ROBBERY OF ANIMALS, MONEY OR OTHER
BELONGINGS, THE WOMEN OF THE COMMUNITY(-IES) HAVE NOT BEEN THE
OBJECT OF VIOLATIONS OR ABUSES, THERE IS NO CAUSE TO COMPLAIN
AGAINST THEM (CCAD-SJB 1993).
The introduction of bureaucratic formality such as this into the routine of patrolling
was almost certainly aimed at dampening international criticisms of human rights
abuses directed at Peru’s security forces (including the militias). In the early 1990s,
Peru topped the list of most international human rights groups for having the worst
human rights record. Yet it seems that this regulatory procedure of making militia
patrols more accountable was not only an attempt to pre-empt criticisms from inter-
national human rights organisations. It must have also been related to the military’s
larger aim of winning the hearts and minds of populations that had thus far been
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reluctant to organise CADs or to cooperate with them, such as in the department of
Huancavelica. It is indeed ironic that the army should assume to lecture and instruct
the civil militias on human rights, given its own record of accomplishment. But this
they did, and classified official documents show that throughout most of the 1990s,
the political-military command in Ayacucho-Huancavelica routinely urged CAD
members to eschew committing “excesses, abuses, wrongdoing, against the popula-
tion, because it would be committed against Human Rights” (CCAD-SJB 1996:12).
It is also paradoxical that the military’s ostensible steps towards respecting and pro-
tecting human rights in the declared zone of emergency—it was, at the very least, lip
service—were being made at the same time as democratic rights and freedoms were
being eroded nationally by an increasingly authoritarian civilian government.
“It is the obligation of the juntas directivas of the three levels [of civil defence
organisation] to obtain information and to report it to the nearest Countersubversive
[military] Base,” states another official directive from the army (CCAD-SJB 1996:11).
Through regular meetings and information debriefings with CAD leaders, the military
was able to establish and ensure a close supervision of the militias, and hence a con-
tinuous influx of information about goings-on in the rural countryside. As I observed
it in 1997, it was obligatory for the Patrulla Especial and all the CAD juntas directi-
vas of Tambo district to meet with the garrison commander at the local army base
every Sunday. In addition, the Secretary of the Self-Defence Central Committee was
required to submit a written report every month detailing the activities of, and the
information gathered from, the various comités de base in the district over the past
four and a half weeks.98 In return, the ronderos received new orders and taskings,
weapons training and instruction, and, on occasion, material donations from the
State. Although such meetings invariably took up a good part of the day, the ronderos
did not seem to mind. In fact, many told me they looked forward to it, for, like a
“men’s club,” they enjoyed the spirit of camaraderie, and the sense of official purpose
that it gave them.
The CAD-military relationship was tightened with the creation, in 1994, of the
official military post of Jefe de los Comités Central de Autodefensa de la Sub-Zona de
Seguridad Nacional Centro No. 8—Chief of the Central Committees of Self-defence
in the Sub-Zone of National Security Centre No.8. The purpose behind it was to facil-
itate a more efficient and closer coordination between the military and the CADs in
Frente Huamanga. Equivalent posts were also created in Junín department and the
Huallaga Valley.99 It was during one of my visits to the Los Cabitos barracks, while
requesting a letter of authorisation from the Jefe del Comando Politico-Militar, that I
first met Captain (now Major) César Vásquez Guevara on 27 June 1997. A tall, mus-
cular man with a commanding baritone voice and an overt sense of self-importance,
Captain Vásquez had heard that I wanted to study the CADs. He therefore thought it
only appropriate that he, the Jefe CCAD SZSNC-8 since 1996, should be the one to
inform me of their history. He immediately invited me to accompany him on an
inspection tour of a number of CADs in Huamanga province. We set off soon after
midday in two hired civilian pick-up trucks, with a heavily armed escort riding in the
back, on what proved to be a whirlwind visit of communities in rural districts such as
Acocro-Matará, Chiara, Tambillo and Quinua. As our small convoy bounced and
swayed along like a camel caravan on the potholed dirt road, Captain Vásquez pro-
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vided me with an intermittent commentary that was an entertaining mixture of use-
ful information and public-relations announcements for the Army. It became imme-
diately clear to me that he was keen to demonstrate that the Army (through him) had
established a close rapport with the rural population (through the CADs). I was sur-
prised when he openly admitted to me the impossibility of truly pacifying the coun-
tryside without the help of the comités de autodefensa. “The Army does not have the
sufficient capacity to provide security to all the villages,” he told me. This certainly
made sense. Looking out my window just then and actually seeing for myself the
rugged Andean topography, with its high rocky mountains and equally deep valleys,
with its prickly vegetation and its pitted, winding, treacherously narrow dirt roads, I
realised for the first time how truly difficult this countryside would be to pacify. It
made me think of Afghanistan, and how the Soviets found it impossible to control
that other ruggedly mountainous country. Even if the Peruvian Armed Forces were
five times its present size, with as many helicopters as it could wish for, a doughty
guerrilla adversary like Sendero Luminoso could still make it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the army on its own to control these highlands. “Therefore the peasants them-
selves provide their own security,” Vásquez continued to say.
Besides, who is the terrorist? It’s the peasant who has been duped by
the subversion. And who are the ronderos? The ronderos are also peo-
ple of the village. I, for example, could not spot a terrorist easily. But
the people themselves can. For this reason, the Army needs the help
of the peasants, of the comités de autodefensa, in order to combat and
defeat the subversion. 
I was indeed surprised to be hearing this, for I had not expected to a military officer
give credit to the peasants, even where it is due.
Yet on that as on other occasions I spent in the company of Captain Vásquez, I
gained a deeper insight into civilian-military relations less from the things he told me
(most of which was common knowledge anyway), than from just watching his per-
sonal interaction with CAD leaders and ordinary peasants. On this occasion, his main
reason for travelling through the countryside was to inform CAD leaders and any
group of peasants he encountered of their duty to participate in the military-
sponsored “March for the Peace and Development of Ayacucho” planned for the
coming Sunday. He chatted to the peasants with easy familiarity, though also fre-
quently using paternalistic expressions like “hijo” (“son”) even when addressing older
men. At the village of Matará, after I had finished talking with some of the locals, I
went and found him in a bodega (store) sitting at a table with the CAD authorities and
his sergeant. They were drinking from four immense beer bottles but sharing a single
drinking glass, which was passed from one person to the other. Despite the Captain’s
lack of inhibitions in rubbing shoulders with the locals, the hierarchical relationship
of power and authority between him and them was nevertheless immutable, and
always evident in the constant authoritarian tone of his voice. He permitted himself
to be familiar with them; they were not permitted the same license with him.
Consequently, I noticed that CAD leaders and community presidents doffed their hats
whenever he approached, and they always appended a reverential “mi Capitán” at the
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end of everything they said to him: “Muy buenos días, mi Capitán.” “Pasamos por acá,
mi Capitán.” “Sí, mi Capitán.”
On our return trip to Huamanga later that afternoon, we met the district mayor
of Tambillo, working in a faena with other men to repair an irrigation ditch. Captain
Vásquez rolled down his window and started chatting with him. As we began to drive
away, the Captain reminded the mayor to come next Sunday, with all the comuneros
of Tambillo, to Los Cabitos, the starting point of the big march. The alcalde, clearly
uncomfortable with having to contradict the Captain, began meekly to explain that
the march coincided with the district’s anniversary. He suggested that in amongst the
hundreds of peasants that would attend from all over Ayacucho department, perhaps
the delegation from Tambillo would not be sorely missed. The truck jolted to a halt,
and through the window the mayor undoubtedly saw that Captain Vásquez had
immediately become agitated. Suddenly changing his ordinarily pleasant chat voice
into the monotone drone of a uninterested bureaucrat, he proceeded to sermon the
alcalde at length about his obligation as a representative of the state, and the impor-
tance of showing support for the “lucha por la paz y el desarrollo,” which in his opin-
ion was much more important than a district anniversary. As we slowly drove away,
we could hear the humbled alcalde stuttering a promised to show up on Sunday.
That was not the last time I witnessed what seemed like the Captain’s habit of
brushing off local concerns. While I was interviewing him in his office—the so-called
“Casa de Los Ronderos”—at Los Cabitos one day in November 1997, a group of peas-
ants shuffled up to the open doorway and tapped lightly on the doorjamb. Captain
Vásquez immediately recognised one of them as Anco’s CAD president and warmly
invited them all to come in and state their business. In a meek voice, one of the com-
munity presidents explained that the purpose of their visit was to ask him for assis-
tance in forming more CADs in Anco district (La Mar province). They had recently
suffered some Senderista incursions, and they would be grateful if he could come and
distribute government-donated shotguns. But before the man could finish everything
he obviously had carefully prepared in advance to say, Captain Vásquez interrupted
him to say that he would not give a single firearm, not a single sack of provisions, nor
even visit their district until its communities had organised themselves, and every
comunero in Anco has come to Los Cabitos to register and to pay for his or her “carné
de identificación”—the rondero identity card costing S/.5 nuevos soles. And as if to
entice the peasant delegation, he repeated a number of times that he had fifty shot-
guns stored in the armoury, just waiting to be given away. When the peasants tried to
explain that most families in Anco did not immediately have the money available to
pay for the ID, let alone the bus to Huamanga, Captain Vásquez remained unmoved,
replying something to the effect of: “Too bad! Find the money! If you want my help,
pay for the carnets first!”
In my mind, Captain Vásquez embodies in many ways the very essence of 
civilian-military relations as I witnessed it in Ayacucho in 1997. Of course, the rela-
tionship has greatly improved over the course of the 1990s. Certainly, by now the
Army gave recognition to the valuable contributions made by the CADs in the coun-
terinsurgency struggle. Nevertheless, the Army’s attitude towards the peasantry
remained, to great degree, authoritarian and paternalistic. Army officers in particular
were obstinately convinced that the Army knew better than the peasants what was
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need to improve their lives and their security—an arrogance not so unlike that of
Shining Path cadres, in fact. Had Captain Vásquez bothered to listen a little longer
and more closely to what the peasant authorities had to tell him, then he might have
come to understand that the main reason why Anco’s population was so hard up for
money just then was that blight had decimated their entire potato harvest some
months earlier.100 Then again, perhaps he still would not have cared.
There is a riddle wrapped inside an enigma here. Captain Vásquez himself of
peasant parentage, though, judging from his education and physical appearance, it is
likely that his family was relatively prosperous. He claims to have grown up in a rural
village in Cajamarca, which is known throughout Peru as the “birthplace of the ron-
das campesinas.” He never failed to point out to me every time we met that it was
because of his own “humble” background, as the son of campesinos, raised in the
birthplace of the original Rondas Campesinas, that he understands the CADs better
than most other people do. Moreover, he argued that they, in turn, felt content and
happy to have him as their military jefe, for he is “one of them.” Nevertheless, I
observed numerous occasions when his supposed apathy for the peasants was placed
at such variance with his insensitive disregard for local problems and concerns. His
personal interaction with CAD or community authorities was a portrait of the army’s
“authoritarian tradition” interfacing with what Starn calls the rural villagers’ “culture
of servility” (1999:129). Even so, Vásquez seemed to be genuinely respected and
admired by regional CAD leaders. In 1998, they even petitioned the Jefe del Comando
Politico-Militar to reappoint him as their Jefe CCADD SZSNC-8.101 To the CADs that
did their job well, Captain Vásquez acted like a generous patrón. For instance,
Comando Zorro once told me that “for the good work we have done, like the cap-
ture of various terrorists and the recuperation of good firearms, Major Vásquez pre-
sented us with ammunition, and to each community he delivered donations of track-
suits, donations of shoes, shirts, school packets, sometimes blankets, pillows.”102
Indeed, Captain Vásquez’s tough, macho, authoritarian demeanour was a badge of
authority widely admired by many of his military and civilian subordinates, and CAD
leaders expected nothing less from their Jefe.
Despite appearances, Captain Vásquez was not a “caudillo” in the traditional
sense of the word. He was not, according to my observations, working to build up an
personal power base for his own private ambitions. His own personal success and
professional advancement depended on his faithfully carrying out the orders of his
superiors, who themselves received their directives from an executive branch of gov-
ernment that came to wield near-absolute centralised power (see Cameron 2000,
Mauceri 2000, Youngers 2000). Though it may seem that Vásquez was busily engaged
in cultivating his personal power, he was, in fact, merely an administrative facilitator
within a vast clientalist system being built up ever since the autogolpe of 1992, the
primary purpose of which was to advance the President’s political interests. Garnering
political support, strengthening political control, information gathering and surveil-
lance were foremost among these interests (see Kruijt and del Pilar Tello 2002,
Youngers 2000). Despite appearances, then, Captain Vásquez’s actions cannot really
be said to have been primarily motivated by personal gain. Indeed, his mandate for
most of the things he did and ordered done were explicitly to be found in CAD leg-
islation. Many people in Tambo assumed, for instance, that the entire matter of the
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rondero identity cards was nothing more than a dishonest moneymaking scheme
hatched up by a triumvirate of corrupt civil and military officials. “The Captain, the
mayor, and Zorro, the president of the Self-defence, are doing business,” an exasper-
ated Tambino quipped when I asked what it was all about. “They’re asking 5 soles for
each of those identity cards. What is 5 soles times 9,000 voters? That money, where
is it going to end up?” Whether or not there was a degree of dishonesty in the admin-
istrative process is ultimately irrelevant to the official nature of the project itself. For
Article 56(a) of D.S. No.077 stipulates that all members of self-defence committees
must be issued with an identity card (carnet) signed by the relevant military authori-
ty—in this case, Captain Vásquez.
Whether distributing donations to CADs or ensuring popular participation in
political marches, the implementation of these programmes and activities by the ser-
vants of Fujimori’s government was almost always done in such a way as to behold-
en or to collect debts from recipient sectors. Aid and favours were regularly given out
by the government in return for political support and, at the crucial moment, for
votes. The success of this system of rewards was in the pudding of Fujimori’s over-
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whelming support from the rural masses, which helped to get him re-elected twice
(allegations of fraud aside). That all levels of the armed forces have long played a
direct role in the preservation, administration, and operation of the government’s
clientalist system is yet further evidence of the extent to which the Armed Forces of
Peru had become politicised under the Fujimori regime. At the same time, civilian
society became progressively more militarised. What was ostensibly supposed to be a
“Marcha por la Paz y el Desarrollo de Ayacucho” on 29 June 1997 turned to be noth-
ing less than a massive political rally. Its intention was to show visiting journalists
(who were primarily drawn to Huamaga by the guest appearance of Archbishop Juan
Luis Cipriani at the urban desfile earlier that same day) that the peasantry solidly sup-
ported the Fujimori government. Approximately three thousand members of CADs
and Clubes de Madres (Mothers’ Clubs) from all over the department of Ayacucho—
many of whom were dressed up in distinctive local costumes or uniforms and carry-
ing firearms, tools, and babies—marched in file round and round the Plaza de Armas.
(The coaching they must have received beforehand at Los Cabitos shone through.)
They carried banners and placards on which were written slogans that many of them
could not even read, much less have written: “CHINO! PUQUIO TE AGRADECE POR LA PACI-
FICACION. GRACIAS POR TUS OBRAS,” and “SEÑOR PRESIDENTE ESTAMOS CONTINGO PARA
DEFENDER LA DEMOCRACIA,” or more imaginatively “ABAJO LOS OPOSITORES CONTRA EL
GOBIERNO DEL SEÑOR PRESIDENTE ALBERTO FUJIMORI PARA QUE VIVA LA RONDA CAMPESINA
DEL PERU.” In a move that was undoubtedly calculated to ensure that the entire affair
had the appearance of grassroots spontaneity, the army—the very organiser of the
event—was careful not to be present at the rally.103 For his part, I noticed that the dis-
trict mayor of Tambillo had turned up with his ronderos to demonstrate their desire
for peace and development in Ayacucho. But I did not see the charismatic Captain
Vásquez anywhere.
Besides the large degree of autonomy that CADs enjoyed in planning and executing
their own operations, it was obvious that the army exercised de facto control over
them, the legitimacy for which was largely to be found in the relevant legislation. But
despite the contradictions and potential conflicts within the relationship, the reason
why CADs and the military have nevertheless been able to get along is because most
of the existing problems between them have largely been left unarticulated and undis-
puted. Whereas I perceived the nature of the military’s interface with the CADs to
have been marked by regulated authoritarian control, CAD leaders preferred to view
their relationship with the military as one of “close coordination and cooperation.”
So far, this modus vivendi has suited everyone.
5.13 Ronderos and policemen: tension and antagonism
While on the one hand civilian-military interactions have vastly improved since the
start of the 1990s, the same can hardly be said about relations between the CADs and
the police. I was told by ronderos in Tambo that, unlike with the military, the CADs
did not have much working contact with the police. In fact, they alleged that there
was no cooperation or coordination whatsoever between the two groups on coun-
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terinsurgency matters. This is hardly surprising, given that tense social relationship
between policemen and civilians seems to be the norm in Peru. Many citizens, and
rural people in particular, still regard policemen as generally corrupt and abusive. On
one trip from Tambo to Huamanga, the combi or minivan in which I was travelling
was stopped four times because the driver had refused to pay the bribe at the first
checkpoint. As we drove away from each checkpoint, many of my fellow travellers
muttered insults at the policemen behind their backs, calling them of “rateros”
(thieves) and “perros abusivos” under their breath.
This sort of everyday animosity between civilians and policemen spills over easi-
ly into the interaction between policemen and ronderos. Ronderos claim that they are
often harassed by policemen about such things as firearms permits, or the arrests they
make. “They’re always tying to accuse us of human rights abuses, those hypocrites!”
said Comando Zorro, spitting out the words.
There are a few good ones, but only a few. They are replaced every
three months, and each one has his own way of working. There are
times when we don’t understand each other. Perhaps they envy us.
Other times when we catch a thief or a livestock rustler, and we turn
them over to the police, they set them free. It’s because they believe
themselves to be superior to us. When we try to solve those problems,
they say to us: “That’s not your responsibility.” On the other hand,
some police chiefs come and tell us, “One has to work together,
no?”104
I interviewed a few policemen to get their side of the story. One of them was José,
a policeman at DIVICOTE-Ayacucho and a member of the DINCOTE team that captured
Guzmán in Lima. It caught me a little by surprise when José began by praising the
CADs for their efforts and achievements. Like Captain Vásquez, he too pointed out
the crucial importance of having rondas campesinas, particularly in remote and iso-
lated parts of the hinterland, where neither the police nor the military maintain a
presence. 
Therefore, in so far as they knew those places better [than we do]—
the terrain, the people—they were a great help to us, because they
informed us rapidly, opportunely. They are the ones who fight best
against Sendero, for of those who are members of rondas campesinas,
fifty percent used to be be tucos [terrorists]. For that reason they
know more than we or the Army do.105
Despite such words of praise, José nevertheless listed for me a few of the problems he
saw in the civil defence movement. Firstly, he pointed out that the vast majority of
ronderos fight primarily in defence of their families, their animals, their land. As such,
he contends that they fight largely without any understanding of a higher moral pur-
pose or reason for fighting, such as that Shining Path is “wrong” or “bad.” It is this
lack of a higher moral sense, José argues, that makes it possible for them to be easily
controlled by the army, or even enticed back by Sendero if they should change their
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tactics (which is exactly what Feliciano seemed to be trying to do in 1997). Another
problem, he says, is that when firearms are given to peasants without proper instruc-
tion on how to use them responsibly, these weapons are sometimes used to settle old
scores, such as long-running family feuds, or for criminal acts. “Sometimes there are
ronderos who say: ‘I have a firearm. I’m now stronger, and I can also attack.’ There
was once a case in Huanta where ronderos attacked a vehicle and tried to pass it off
as an attack by tucos [terrorists].” In addition, José also pointed out that sometimes
when a peasant gets drunk, he may remember an old family feud—many are about
land disputes—and then use his rifle to settle it with lethal force. When I was in
Tambo in 1997, precisely such a case had happened in one of the rural villages. As a
result, the local garrison commander confiscated the Mauser rifle used by the accused,
pending a criminal investigation. This problem must have been frequent enough to
cause the military, at a general assembly of CCAD leaders, to issue a directive to avoid
using “the firearm in a state of intoxication and for confrontations between commu-
nities and against the Population because this attitude is at variance with morals and
good behaviour” (CCAD-SJB 1996:12).
Apart from the fact that many rural inhabitants generally dislike policemen, it
nevertheless seemed to me that the CADs of the zone of emergency did not have to
confront many of the same frictions and problems in their dealings with the police
that the rondas campesinas of northern Peruvian departments had encountered—
problems such as conflict of authority, or the legal right to possess weapons and
firearms, or the police’s opposition to the idea of peasants organising themselves into
vigilante groups and creating their own alternative system of justice (see Starn 1999).
There are a number of obvious reasons for this. Firstly, the existence of armed CADs
has, as we already know, was already legally recognised by the government since
1991. The scope of authority given to CAD leaders, the function and tasks of the mili-
tias—all were clearly laid out in the relevant legislation. Secondly, ever since about the
end of the first half of the 1980s, the police no longer had any administrative pres-
ence in the countryside of Tambo, and those in town very rarely ventured into it.
Therefore, the CADs have become the de facto authority in the campo. Questions of
policing and local justice were thus left to the comuneros to sort out for themselves.
If police assistance became necessary, the quarrelling parties had to bring the dispute
to the police post in town. A third reason for the relative lack of conflict between the
CADs and the police since the early 1990s is that the CADs enjoyed the backing of
the military—the political-military authority in the emergency zone—and so were
generally shielded from the more abusive arbitrary acts of police harassment. 
Moreover, their possession of firearms, and the declared willingness of some ron-
deros to use them against abusive policemen, provided many of the CADs with real
power to confront the police if necessary. Illustrating this point is an incident that took
place in the selva town of Sivia, on 26 January 1993. On that occasion, anthropologist
Ponciano del Pino observed for himself the power that CADs could wield with guns in
their hands and the army backing them up. It was while he was at Sivia’s traditional
Monday market that news suddenly arrived of an unspecified number of policemen
having been spotted in the vicinity of San Francisco. Almost immediately, more than
ten armed ronderos issued from Sivia’s Base Civil Antisubversiva, firing into the air as
they rushed to intercept the policemen. Del Pino describes what happened next: 
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After about ten minutes, around thirty ronderos entered the town [of
Sivia] bringing five “captured” policemen. Other ronderos captured
five more policemen along the banks of the river. They led them to
the centre of the plaza through the crowd that struck at them, shout-
ing: “to jail.” The insults and the blows given by the women
increased, giving the sensation that the episode would end in slaugh-
ter. The ronderos argued that the police had neither authority nor
right to enter the zone without permission, either theirs or the Army
commander of the Pichari base. They said that [the policemen] came
only to steal: “habitual thieves”. With the arrival of Commander
“Ronco” and more than 20 military personnel from Pichari, spirits
calmed down. After several hours the policemen were released after
some agreements like the prohibition against entering without the
respective authorisation, because the ronderos would not take respon-
sibility for what could happen to them (1996:170).106
The policemen had come to Sivia with the intention of arresting some narcotrafi-
cantes. What is interesting to note in this anecdote is the configurational alliances
between the army and the militiamen, and, although they do not appear in the
account, the narcotraficantes, whom, according to del Pino, the militiamen were pre-
sumably protecting by ejecting the police from the zone.
This episode is not common. In fact, it seems there was ordinarily very little con-
tact between the CADs and the police. As the ‘90s were coming to an end, I came to
the conclusion that given that the state of emergency would not last forever (it was,
in fact, finally lifted in January 2000), it was likely that neither would the military’s
backing. As I saw it, if the CADs intended to continue into the future as an integral
part of any local system of peasant justice, like the rondas campesinas of northern
Peru, they would have to arrive at some form of cooperative working relationship
with the police, if many the same problems that exist between rondas campesinas and
policemen in the north were to be avoided. As chapter 7 shows, however, these mus-
ing were made purely academic by certain unexpected developments at the close of
the decade.
5.14 The departure of the Comandos Especiales from Tambo District 
and the guerrilla massacre at Huayao
By September 1992, the time had come for the twenty-eight remaining Comandos
Especiales to leave Tambo district and return to Pichihuillca. Over the past twelve
months—undoubtedly the busiest and most testing time in the history of the district’s
militias—the Comandos had succeeded in helping to strengthen Tambo’s civil defence
organisation, while also helping to weaken the power and presence once held by
Shining Path in the area. This is not to say they were leaving behind a civil defence
organisation free of problems and worries. Ever since August, certain members of
Tambo’s Central Self-defence Committee (CCAD) had been experiencing mounting
popular pressure to resign after the Presidente and his Comando General were both
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incriminated in livestock theft in the district. However, the Comandos Especiales
could leave that as a problem for the people of Tambo to sort out for themselves.
DECAS expansion in the sierra was now coming to an end. But its legacy would con-
tinue through young, capable and intelligent commanders like Zorro, for whom civil
defence had become a full-time occupation and a way of life.
A few days after receiving the euphoric news that Abimael Guzmán had been
arrested in Lima, the Comandos Especiales prepared to board a minibus returning to
San Francisco. While the militiamen were saying their goodbyes to the large crowd of
people that had gathered in the central plaza, a combined delegation of civilian offi-
cials representing the town and the rural villages—among them the district mayor and
the governor—walked up and asked Comando Zorro if they might have a word with
him. “They said to me: ‘You know what, Comando Zorro? We can’t be left alone. You
must remain here, in his zone. We will give you a salary. Work and be the command-
er of our Patrulla Especial. Apart from this, I had my beloved. I was already in love
with she who is now my wife, who is from Tambo,” he recalled.107
The minibus drove away without Zorro in it; he found himself standing on the
pavement, waving farewell to his former comrades in arms. Tambo’s civil defence
organisation was now on its own. But Tambo had found their Comando, and Zorro
had found a new home.
If this was a form of adoption, then it proved to be mutual. For his part, Zorro
quickly felt at home in Tambo, settling down with his wife and two children in one
of the pueblos jovenes adjacent to the town. Furthermore, as a full measure of the
popularity and respect he came to receive from the populace, he would go on to
become Tambo district’s longest serving, popularly elected CCADD president. In
March 1993, he retired from his post as Comando General owing to his worsening
arthritis, which made patrolling in the cold and the damp a painful ordeal. But a
month later, he was invited to a general assembly of the entire district, where the peo-
ple of Tambo unanimously elected him as President of Tambo district’s Central Self-
defence Committee. Touched by the outpouring of affection shown to him at that
meeting, Zorro agreed to take up the post. With his education, Zorro proved instru-
mental in drafting the petition and documentation necessary to for the Tambo’s self-
defence groups to obtain legal recognition. Hence in May 1993, Tambo district’s
Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo “San Juan Bautista”—consisting of 
twenty-six bases organised into five zones—received official recognition from the Jefe
del Comando Politico-Militar in Huamanga.108 Zorro became the first and only presi-
dent of Tambo’s officially recognised CCADD before finally retiring in August 1998.
Born in a dusty shantytowns on the outskirts of Lima on 5 May 1970, Comando
Zorro, whose real name is Walter Crisóstomo Ramirez Echacaya, is the son of peas-
ant migrants who had moved from Ayacucho to the Peruvian capital in search of a
better life. Despite having had to face numerous obstacles in his early life that threat-
ened to cut short his education, he nevertheless managed, through hard work and
sheer determination, to complete secondary school, graduating in 1989. His alcoholic
father had abandoned the family five years earlier, leaving Walter to become the sole
provider for his mother and sisters. Yet he refused to leave school for good. While still
a student, he spent his long vacations working in the Apurímac River Valley as a peon,
saving all his earnings to take back to his family. It was in this way that he was exposed
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to the DECAS, in which he participated as a “simple auxiliary personnel” between
1985 and 1987. In 1989 he moved his family to the coastal town of Pisco, where
work was more plentiful and wages higher. He dreamt of continuing his studies—and
perhaps of even entering university—but this was eventually crushed by the reality of
his family’s poverty.109 It was the abduction of one of his sisters by guerrillas in 1990
that made him decide to return to the selva of the Apurímac Valley, where he joined
the DECAS to dedicate himself to the counterinsurgency struggle, and to his contin-
uing search for his sister. In the DECAS, Walter’s diligence and intelligence shone
through. He worked his way up until he became the secretary of the Intelligence
Section of Pichihuillca’s DECAS, the post he held before being sent to Tambo.
A few days after the Comandos Especiales returned to the Apurímac Valley, a man by
the name of Zonobio Anaya Rojas (Comando Vicuña) was elected as the new presi-
dent of the district’s Central Self-defence Committee, with Zorro as Comando
General of the Patrulla Especial. Though fortunately not a livestock rustler like his
predecessors, the problem with the new president, as Zorro wrote, was that “Señor
Vicuña was a person with no experience because he was new to the organisation. The
terrucos took advantage of this situation and once again seized the zone of Yana Orjo,
Jarín Orjo, Sello de Oro, and Rasuhuillca over the months of September and
October.”110 During these two months, the frequency of livestock thefts attributed to
rebel bands rose, as did the number of abductions of peasants and herders from Acco,
Vicos, and Huayao. One of the peasants kidnapped by the rebels, a shepherd from
Vicos, managed to escape and warn Zorro that the guerrillas were mainly interested
in obtaining information: “they asked about the type of arms the Patrulla Especial had
and about the coordinating authorities, and also about the departure of the
[Comandos Especiales] of the Apurímac River Valley.”111 Though it seemed like anoth-
er case of random conscription, the rebels had actually chosen their captives careful-
ly. Unbeknown to the ronderos of Tambo, the Senderistas were busy planning what
was to be one of the bloodiest rebel incursions in the history of the civil war in Tambo
district.
Although the emergence of CADs throughout the provinces of Huanta and La
Mar posed serious logistical and military problems for Shining Path forces in the area,
the small, lethal, mobile combat units of the guerrillas’ Fuerza Principal nevertheless
continued to roam the countryside. They persisted in ambushing CAD patrols and
military convoys, stopping vehicles on the roads and looting their cargo, even occa-
sionally raiding villages deep in areas now considered to be militia strongholds, like
Tambo district.
According to José of DIVICOTE, guerrilla forces always prepared their combat
actions carefully, following a standard and systematic plan of action. The first step,
after the type of action (i.e. ambush, assassination, incursion, etc.) and the partici-
pants has been selected, is to observe or to reconnoitre the target, taking note of its
social and geographical surroundings. It was undoubtedly for this reason that the
guerrillas were abducting and interrogating peasants from specific villages over the
months of September and October. The next step is to decide the means by which to
execute the action; that is to say, determining which sort of weapon is appropriate for
the job. Step three involves planning the order and timing of the various phases and
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objectives of the operation. Guerrilla attacks on settlements, so peasants told me,
were usually executed at night, between 10.00 p.m. and 2.00 a.m., when most every-
one was asleep. “They carry out their actions until about two o’clock at night, because
if they don’t retreat until four o’clock in the early morning, it gives time for neigh-
bouring communities to organise a counterattack and so catch them,” Zorro
explained. “Therefore, at night, after they realise their misdeed, they go far away, into
the dark.”112 And as former CAD president Vicente Perez also pointed out to me, a
favourite tactic of the guerrillas was to attack settlements when they were in the midst
of a fiesta. For in these situations, virtually the entire adult population would be help-
lessly drunk, and therefore vulnerable. “They enter by surprise. They enter with the
intention of killing or capturing the [CAD] leaders in order to destroy that organisa-
tion.”113 Once the operation had been carried out, said José, it would be followed up
by “the assessment, the study that they make after the action, to see what were the
errors they had made so as not to repeat them and so that it would be better the next
time.”114 Such was the careful planning which guerrilla forces made in preparation for
striking at the village of Huayao.
On 10 October 1992, the sounds of festive music, singing and laughter filled the
evening air around Huayao. Everyone in the village, except for the children, had
already been celebrating and drinking continuously since the day before, when the
comuneros attended a wedding in Qeqra. Many of the comuneros had already passed
out, either in their own homes or on the very spot where they had collapsed to the
ground. The two ronderos on sentry duty at the entrance to the village that night were
also drunk. As some of the survivors would later recall, it was sometime between
10.00 and 11.00 p.m., while a few of the comuneros continued to celebrate, that one
of the sentries noticed movement in the gloom. He shouted a challenge. The reply
that came back from the shadows was, “We’re Zorro’s Patrulla Especial,” followed by
a bullet that ripped into his chest. The other sentry shot once and then, perhaps in a
desperate attempt to keep his weapon from falling into enemy hands, hurled his
Mauser into the darkness before he too was shot dead. (The Patrulla Especial later
recovered the rifle lying in a little stream nearby.) A large band of guerrillas then
rushed through the gate. Once inside the compound, they proceeded to shoot, stab,
bludgeon or hack to death anyone they came across. They threw hand grenades and
homemade explosives into houses, killing entire families. By the time the raiders had
left some two or three hours later, forty-three men, women, and children lay dead or
dying. The seriously wounded numbered eleven.115
It was around 5 o’clock the next morning when Zorro was roused from his sleep
by frantic knocking at the door. He had just spent the past two days patrolling the dis-
trict with the Patrulla Especial and was exhausted. They were to resume their
patrolling in another part of the district the next day, so he had allowed all his men to
return to their own homes and billets in Vista Alegre to get a good night’s rest. Upon
opening the door, he was greeted by a sight that immediately drove away the drowsi-
ness from his head. It also left him totally stunned. A small group of people were
sprawled all over the yard or leaning up against his fence. Every one had gaping
wounds, some quite terrible. Straight away, two comuneros began to describe in rapid
speech what had happened, apologising for disturbing his sleep when they had finished
giving their story. They had at first gone to seek help at the army base, but the com-
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mander was asleep and so the sentries would not open the gate. They were told to
come back later.
Zorro grabbed his Mauser and rushed as fast as he could to Huayao, some ten
kilometres away. Along the way, he collected some of his personnel.
Thereupon I arrived at the community and the survivors were weep-
ing. The dead were [lying] here and there, shot on the ground, on the
mud banks where they tried to escape. The charred bodies of children
were among the dead, entire families annihilated in their own homes
with grenades and home-made bombs, while the shoulders, heads,
and stomachs of many other corpses had been hacked open by hatch-
ets, picks, machetes and knives. It was all a disaster. Livestock killed
by the impact of stray bullets and houses gutted by fire. Meanwhile
the DD.TT. had retreated to Sello de Oro.
The peasants and some of the peasant survivors came up to me, weep-
ing, and saying to me, “Comando, it was the fault of you all that they
entered. They have massacred us. You left us alone so that the terror-
ists could carry on killing us.” The only thing I could do was to weep
with them and to help the wounded.116
Soldiers from the garrison arrived at the village later that morning and helped
transport the remaining wounded to the hospital in Tambo town. Bad weather pre-
vented a helicopter from coming to evacuate the casualties to the hospital in
Huamanga, leaving no choice but to transport them by ambulance and other assort-
ed local vehicles. For the wounded, the jolting and gruelling overland journey of over
two and a half hours along a badly rutted dirt road must have been yet another night-
mare. Meanwhile, back at Huayao the sad and gruesome tasks of collecting and iden-
tifying the bodies of the dead continued until dusk.
Both Comando Zorro and the commander of the military garrison, Captain
“Shavor,” noted that throughout the attack not a single CAD from the neighbouring
hamlets came to Huayao’s assistance. The village of Pata Pata is only a hundred
metres away. Captain Shavor wrote in his official report that the “situation became a
little suspicious, seeing the proximity in which one finds both villages practically liv-
ing together” (CCAD-SJB 1992:2). Perhaps he was implying that the guerrillas might
have had the collusion of the comuneros of Pata Pata in carrying out the attack. For
their part, the inhabitants of Pata Pata claimed that they became frightened once they
heard the sound of heavy gunfire nearby, and they fled and hid in the surrounding
hills (ibid.).
News of the terrible massacre spread throughout the country. A month later,
President Fujimori himself paid a visit to Huayao, where he distributed twenty
Winchester shotguns to the CADs of the district. Moreover, as Zorro writes, “upon
seeing the reality in which we lived he programmed the creation of various works in
this community.”117
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5.15 Shining Path into the 1990s: crisis and resilience
The capture of Abimael Guzmán did not appear to have had any immediate disrup-
tive effect on the Party’s operational capacity at the regional level. Indeed, as we have
just seen in the case of Tambo, the rebels were actually able to intensify and to realise
their most audacious and devastating military activities in the area, in spite of the cap-
ture of their paramount leader. That this was possible owes itself to an organisation-
al structure characterised by a chain of executive committees at every level—from the
Central Committee, to the regional committees, right down to local committees at
every base de apoyo—that was designed to withstand the death or capture of its lead-
ers. As Kruijt observed in the aftermath of Guzmán’s arrest, “some sixty percent of
Shining Path’s Central Committee is behind bars.... [But at] the regional level, most
of the fighting machine of Shining Path [remained] intact: only the Comité Norte
[has] been ‘neutralised,’ whereas the four others [are] virtually undetected. The same
[could] be said about the zonal and subzonal committees” (Kruijt 1996:252-253).
After Guzmán’s capture in September 1992, Oscar Ramírez Durand, the cele-
brated Camarada Feliciano, assumed command of all Shining Path forces in the field.
The son of a retired Army general, Feliciano first made a name for himself (and in the
process got a bullet in the leg that has left him lame) as the leader of the audacious
attack on Huamanga Prison, on 2 March 1982. That action succeeded in liberating
around 247 prisoners, 78 of whom had already been accused and convicted of ter-
rorism, including the legendary Edith Lagos. Before he became the new PCP chair-
man, Feliciano was for many years the Committee Secretary of the Comité Regional
Principal, a strategically important zone comprising the departments of Ayacucho and
Huancavelica, and the provinces of Andahuaylas and Chincheros in neighbouring
Apurímac department. Among his enemies and within the Shining Path, Feliciano is
widely known as a man of action, a clever strategist, and an uncompromising ortho-
dox Maoist.
It was yet another triumph for the Fujimori government when, in September
1993, Abimel Guzmán and fellow inmate Elena Iparraguirre produced a handwritten
and signed letter (and televised statements soon after) expressing their new desire to
begin negotiating peace terms with the government. It astounded the nation. The real
reasons why Guzmán decided to make such an abrupt about-turn is known only to
him, though journalist and Sendero expert Gustavo Gorriti was perhaps correct in
saying: “I have to suppose that his decision has to be seen more with his personal sit-
uation than with the war he began” (quoted in Valenzuela 1993:19).
Feliciano showed his utter rejection of Guzmán’s conciliatory overtures to the
government by continuing to carry out armed actions. The so-called “carta del
Acuerdo de Paz” (“letter of the Peace Agreement”) sparked off a heated and virulent
internal debate on the correct strategic line, which in time caused a crippling schism
within the Party. It has been a bitter row in which the Disciple has come to be seen as
more devout to the orthodox faith than the Messiah himself. On one side, the
Guzmán faction comprised the majority of incarcerated Senderistas. Its leadership
took the name “la Dirección Central del PCP,” and denounced Feliciano as a “usurp-
er” and (ironically) a “revisionist” who represents the “Linea Liquidacionista de
Izquierda” (“Left Liquidationist Line”) (DESCO 1996b:9). Conversely, Feliciano’s fol-
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lowers were made up of most of the Senderistas still operating in the field. Most sig-
nificantly, they maintained control of the comités regionales (regional committees)
and the Party’s entire military apparatus. For the Feliciano faction, which called itself
Sendero Rojo, there was no substitute for the primacy of armed struggle in a pro-
tracted people’s war, just as Mao had taught. They designated their leadership the
“Comité Central de Emergencia,” and have condemned Guzman’s position as the
“Linea Oportunista de Derecha” (“Right Opportunist Line”) (ibid.). Although both
sides initially claimed that there was no rupture within the Party, rather simply anoth-
er “two-line struggle,” the intensity of hostilities that subsequently emerged between
the two factions suggests otherwise. For instance, rebel documents captured by DIN-
COTE in July 1994 revealed that one aspect of the Feliciano faction’s imminent cam-
paign, dubbed “En defensa de la jefatura contra la dictatura genocida” (“In defence of
the leadership against the genocidal dictatorship”) was a plan to initiate, at the begin-
ning of November, an armed offensive aimed at liquidating Guzmán’s supporters
(DESCO 1994b:2-3).
It is not necessary to examine this “lucha de dos líneas” (“two-line struggle”)
between the factions of Guzmán and Feliciano in any greater detail here. What is
important for us to recognise is that the capture of Abimael Guzmán and most of the
Central Committee did not immediately bring an end to, or a substantial weakening
of, the Party’s military capabilities, much less its defeat as many observers at the time
prematurely assumed. In fact, Feliciano would continue to direct the armed struggle
until his capture in the town of Cochas-Jauja, department of Junín, on 14 July 1999.
With all the tenacious resilience of a mythical hydra, Shining Path has proven to be a
beast against which lopping off its heads is not enough, by itself, to destroy the body.
Indeed, other heads have emerged to take the place of those that have fallen, and the
body tries constantly to replenish itself through the recruitment and abduction of
young people. When in December 1994 del Pino asked Píter, a 25-year-old combat-
ant who had escaped from Viscatán, what he thought was the future of the guerrillas
in that region, Píter replied: “Well, I see, it appears that they are going to maintain
themselves over there, everything is still normal, they are going to maintain their posi-
tion, obviously they are not going to advance, little by little they are going to break
down....[But no], they are not going to disappear easily....Yes, they’ll continue recruit-
ing in other zones” (quoted in del Pino 1995b:123).
The total defeat of the rebel organisation could only be achieved by destroying its
military and support apparatus piecemeal; and that could only be done by inducing
wholesale desertion within its ranks, or by annihilating its armed columns in combat.
Senderologists had for so long built up the personage of Abimael Guzmán to the
mythical and mystical proportions of their own making that many of them were
immediately convinced that his capture ushered the inevitable end to Shining Path as
a guerrilla organisation. To assume this not only exaggerates the “cult of personality”
at the cost of underestimating, or even ignoring, the resilient ability of the Maoist
organisational structure to survive these kinds of setbacks. It also wrongly presumes
that most combatants were just slavishly following the person of Guzmán, rather than
also fighting because of their own critical consciousness and for ideals such as social
justice. As Gustavo Gorriti astutely pointed out, it is important to recognise that there
exists “a difference between the imprisoned Guzmán Reinoso and the so-called
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‘Guzmán thought’” (quoted in Valenzuela 1993:19). Recognition of these facts helps
explain why many Shining Path combatants (of the Feliciano faction) chose to con-
tinue armed resistance in spite of the incarceration of Guzmán, and in direct defiance
of his exhortations to engage henceforth only in peaceful political struggle. It is my
contention, therefore, that the gradual collapse of the movement since 1992 was
caused not primarily by the capture of Guzmán and most of the original Central
Committee, but rather by a combination of this and other factors. These include (1)
a number of serious mistakes committed by Shining Path itself, which aggravated an
already widespread disaffection among the popular masses as well among many of its
own supporters, (2) improved military and intelligence capabilities on the part of the
State, in combination with ruthlessly effective antiterrorism legislation, and (3) the
extirpation of guerrilla forces by security forces in combat, particularly by the
Comités de Autodefensa.
5.16 The fall of Camarada Benjamin
As Zorro walked across Tambo’s central plaza in the early morning of 2 February
1993, four men approached him. They introduced themselves as peasants from the
village of Mahuayura. They had come to ask if he could give security to the desplaza-
dos of their village who wished to till some of their more distant fields over the com-
ing two days. Zorro replied that the Patrulla Especial could escort them to their
chacras, and that he also would provide additional sentries to guard the village dur-
ing the day while all the men were away. Zorro had to travel to Huamanga that day
to collect army donations of supplies and munitions for the Patrulla Especial, so his
sub-comando, “Tarzan,” was left in charge of making the security arrangements for
the inhabitants of Mahuayura.
Tarzan decided it would be most efficient if the Patrulla Especial spent the next
three nights in Mahuayura, thus making it easier to get an early start in the morning.
It was by sheer coincidence and luck, then, that the Patrulla Especial was at
Mahuayura when it came under guerrilla attack later that evening. Expecting to
encounter only ill-armed villagers, the rebels were surprised and dismayed to find
themselves suddenly up against the seasoned rentados of Los Condores. The attack
was easily repulsed, but that was not to be the last time the militiamen were prevent-
ed from going to sleep that night.
Mahuayura is a large village made up mainly of resistentes and desplazados, with
the Huamanga-San Francisco road running right through it. For this reason,
Mahuayura also serves as a gateway to the district for all traffic coming from the
Apurímac selva. While the nightly, district-wide curfew remained in effect from six
o’clock in the evening to three in the morning, vehicles arriving from the jungle had
to remain on the outskirts of the village, for as a precaution the soldiers and the ron-
deros allowed no traffic to travel during those hours on the stretch of road between
Mahuayura and Tambo. Trucks would continue to arrive outside Mahuayura’s gate
throughout the night, however, and most mornings would find a long queue of
parked vehicles stretching down the road towards San Francisco.
In the early hours of the morning, a distraught driver who had just driven in noti-
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fied Sub-comando Tarzan that a group of guerrillas had been busy stopping vehicles
a few kilometres down the road. He said that they gave political sermons and looted
vehicles, and then headed off in the direction of a hill known as Cerro Yana Orjo
Chico. Tarzan knew the area well and could guess where the guerrilla column was
heading. He ordered the Patrulla Especial and most of the able-bodied men of
Mahuayura to arm up and to move out straight away. They would try to ambush the
guerrilla column.
By taking known short cuts and few pauses, this large company of ronderos man-
aged to reach the intended ambush site just as dawn was breaking. They positioned
themselves among the rocks and waited. A few hours later, the rebels still had not
appeared. It was by now almost 8:30 in the morning. The men were cold and Tarzan
decided it was time they returned to Mahuayura.
At this point the mist began to envelop them and at the same as they
were advancing, passing through the place known as Yawarccocha, the
Patrulla Especial suddenly came, face to face, with the Senderistas,
who were climbing up from Tapuna to Yana Orjo Grande with sacks
of food. Thereupon the engagement began. A group of 5 personnel
[of the Patrulla Especial] had climbed to the top of the hill, and the
rest made their way down the path towards the DD.TT.. Thanks to
these personnel who were situated at the crest of the rocky hill [they
gave] cover to the rest of the personnel. Meanwhile there were
around 20 Senderistas and some began to take cover and others to
escape.118
According to Tarzan, the firefight was fierce and a number of his men were quickly
hit. Nevertheless, having gained the heights faster than their adversaries, the militia-
men held the advantage. They were able to bring heavy suppression fire down on the
guerrillas, which allowed the rest of the ronderos to advance and attack. With five of
their men shot dead, and being unable to hold the ronderos off any longer, the rest of
the Senderistas turned and ran. The militiamen chased after them, shooting down
many more before the few surviving guerrillas finally disappeared into the rolling
mist. One of those trying to escape, but lagging behind, was a wounded guerrilla car-
rying two FAL assault rifles and a walkie-talkie. One of the rentados ran forward to
capture him, but the guerrilla spun around firing his weapon. The other ronderos had
no choice but to shoot him dead. Upon closer inspection of the body, a number of the
ronderos claimed to recognise the man as none other than Camarada Benjamin, the
elusive leader of the Comité Popular “Sello de Oro.”119
Having heard the shooting in the distance, a platoon of soldiers from BCS-42-
Jano came to investigate. They came on the scene just after the firefight finished,
whereupon they proceeded to confiscate the large pile of equipment recovered from
the rebels, on the pretext that civilians are not permitted to keep “materiales de
Guerra” (“war materiel”). To the indignation of the militiamen, they would later find
out that these soldiers turned all this paraphernalia in at the army base in Pichari,
“saying that it was they who had recuperated the mentioned materiel from the
Senderistas.”120 The soldiers may have robbed them of official credit for the captured
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equipment, but the Patrulla Especial and the ronderos of Mahuayura knew the truth,
and were no less proud of the smashing victory they had won that day. As Zorro later
wrote in his war diary, “with the fall of this group of subversives in this zone, Sendero
was given a heavy blow because the ringleader [Benjamin], who during various years
was in control of this zone of La Mar and the selva of Ene, had been deactivated. A
few months later the news reached us that a Senderista known as ‘La Gringa’
[Elizabet] had taken the place of Benjamín, managing to take revenge on the lorry
drivers....and withdrawing to the selva of Sello de Oro.”121
In fact, neither Elizabet nor the “guerrilla zone” of Sello de Oro had very much
longer to live. For the CADs of Tambo district, the mutiny and subsequent capitula-
tion of Sello de Oro’s masa in October 1993 brought one chapter in their struggle
against Shining Path to a close. The conclusive deactivation of that once-feared guer-
rilla zone ushered a comparatively long period of respite from political violence,
enabling the new stage of “Reconstruction and Development” to begin. It is to this
theme that we turn in the next chapter.
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General of Tambo district’s Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo, on 6 November 1997.
113 Author’s interview with Vicente Perez Cervan, a displaced peasant from Vicos, former President
of Tambo district’s Comité Central de Defensa Civil and former Regidor de Desarrollo Rural, on
13 October 1997.
114 Author’s interview with Teniente José (surname withheld) of DIVICOTE, on 24 November 1997.
115 I have reconstructed the details of this massacre based on two sources: (1) CCAD-SJB 1992, the
official report of the massacre written up by the local commander of Tambo military base, and
(2) Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), pp.58-63. The dead include: Virgílio Quispe
Bendezu (65), Mauro Miguel Joras (19), Hipolito Morillaco (20), Freccedes Yauli Soto (38),
Alejándro Navarro Quispe (33), Martín Laurente Lujan (50), Avilio Perez Lujan (14), Faustino
Anyosa Lujan (60), Floirán Curo Quispe, (18), Arturo Elso Torre Miguel (1), Gilberto Malhuayza
Urbano (33), Rubén Iiapa Huicho (7), Mariano Humán Quispe (70), Fortunato Huicho Palomino
(50), Claudio Huamán Huillo (15), Herminía Torres Vela Vargas (53), Lourdes Torres Torres
(12), Elisa Navarro Hualppa (11), Delia Torres Torres (15), Ricarda Sulca Quispe (40), Marcelina
Kiwi Ccancce (20), Sebastiana Ccancce Kiwi (45), Ignacia Quispe Huallpa (33), Rosa Yucra
Vargas (50), Victoria Miguel Quispe (38), Prudencia Cordero Muñoz (35), Dorotea Ccancce Lapa
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(30), Griselda Lapa Mucha (32), Rosa Yucra Lapa (13), Isabela Huicho Mucha (14), Aurelia
Huicho Jeri (31), Ambrosia Mucha Jeri (38), Nelva Perez Mucha (4), María Mucha Joras (33),
Zenaída Palomino Huicho (8), Paulína Medina Navarro (20), Dionicia Aguilar Curo (60), Natalia
Torres Aybar (47), Benedicta Yucra Calle (35), Trinidad Taype Cordero (56), an unidentified boy
(approx 3 yrs.), an unidentified boy (approx 8 yrs), an unidentified girl (approx 1 yr.). 
The wounded survivors include: Marcelina Kiwi Alvarez (50), Martín Gutierrez Guillen (14),
Lucio Joras Rojas (60), Raúl Palomino Juarez (8), Demetrio Huicho Palomino (40), Justina Yauce
Lapa (30), Constancia Gutierrez Estela (35), Agripina Lapa Quispe (45) (CCAD-SJB 1992:2). 
116 Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), p.62.
117 Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), p.63.
118 Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), p.66-67. Based on debriefing of Sub-Comando
“Tarzan.”
119 According to Comandante Huayhuaco, Camarada Benjamín’s real name is Víctor Carbajal
Urbano (in de Althaus and Morelli 1989:6). Based on the testimony of a capitulated member of
the Sello de Oro, del Pino offers the contrary view that Benjamín had abandoned Shining Path as
early as 1989, when he allegedly fled from the Sello de Oro with his girlfriend (del Pino
1998:184; the original testimony of Claudia Vila appears in del Pino 1995b:62).
120 Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), p.69.
121 Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), p.69-70.
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6 Reconstruction and development in the 
twilight of civil war
6.1 The critical turning point in the counterinsurgency struggle
By 1993 rebel forces had suffered crippling political and military setbacks to such a
degree that the Shining Path seemed in the final stages of collapse. The tide had
turned at last. Though Sendero Luminoso would endure into the new millennium—
in part a testament to the stubborn resilience of its few remaining members—it seems
unlikely that it could ever recover the strategic initiative it once enjoyed at the height
of its power in 1990. With the capitulation of the Senderista stronghold of Sello de
Oro in October 1993, there descended in the province of La Mar and in the Apurímac
River Valley a period of relative calm that had not been felt in the region for almost
a decade. Once guerrilla attacks were no longer imminent in Tambo and adjacent dis-
tricts, local populations were finally free to concentrate on the daunting tasks of
rebuilding their broken lives, their dispersed households, and their shattered commu-
nities.
The critical reversal in Sendero’s fortunes was not isolated to just this region,
however. Although guerrilla forced continued to mount military strikes, the power
and influence that Shining Path had previously enjoyed over large parts of the coun-
try now seemed to be crumbling as their remaining forces were increasingly being
contained, eradicated, or driven back to their few remaining strongholds in such
remote areas as the Upper Huallaga Valley. By the end of the third year of Alberto
Fujimori’s first term in presidential office, it was sufficiently clear that the threat of a
revolutionary takeover of the Peruvian state—seemingly imminent in the final months
of the García government—had been conclusively averted.
On 5 April 1992, President Fujimori executed a bloodless self-coup, with the
complicity of the armed forces. He suspended the Constitution, and dissolved a
Congress dominated by his political opponents because, allegedly, its incessant bick-
ering was hindering his efforts to deal effectively with rampant terrorism and the
worsening economic crisis.1 Rather than provoking popular resentment and opposi-
tion, however, the self-coup “proved to be widely popular with most Peruvians, who
seemed to agree that the country needed a stronger government to deal with the
ongoing crisis. Public opinion polls indicated that an astonishing 70 percent of the
population supported the self-coup” (Klarén 2000:413-414). To the millions of ordi-
nary Peruvians who were tired of living in fear of violence, and had had enough of
seemingly incompetent and ineffectual politicians and political parties, it mattered lit-
tle that Fujimori’s dictatorial tendencies were widely criticised abroad.
It was only when important donor countries threatened to suspend economic aid
to Peru that Fujimori was finally pressured into promising to rewrite the Constitution,
and to hold congressional and municipal elections in the near future.
Notwithstanding the promises of change he gave to the international community, at
home he proceeded to rule by decree, backed up by the armed forces (Klarén
2000:414).
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Underpinning Fujimori’s iron grip on state power was his control over the armed
forces, which he achieved by co-opting the upper ranks of the Army, Navy and Air
Force (Kruijt and del Pilar Tello 2002), and the dismissal or forced retirement of sus-
pected political opponents in the upper ranks of the officer corps. In particular, he
and his shadowy intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, head of the Servicio de
Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), took to meddling in the process for promoting regional
commanders and for choosing the chiefs of staff, replacing a time-honoured practice
based strictly on academic rankings with one based on personal appointment. This
was how General Nicolás Hermoza Rios came to be promoted to the post of President
of the Joint Command, which he held from 1991 to 1998. “New appointments in the
upper ranks of the armed forces were made directly by Montesinos, who as a result
inspired both fear and loyalty within the armed forces” (Cameron 2000:4). This
apparent “de-professionalization and politicization” (ibid.) of the Peruvian armed
forces, combined with the perceived “un-constitutionality” of the autogolpe, rankled
some senior military officers. It even provoked General Jaime Salinas Sedó (recently
forcibly retired) to plot a military coup against Fujimori, which was planned for 13
November 1992. This plan failed, however, because the armed forces as a whole
remained loyal to the President and to Hermoza Rios, and because the SIN was able
to discover and arrest the conspirators before they could cause any trouble. Apart
from the formidable mechanisms of internal surveillance and tight control designed
by Montesinos to keep the armed forces in line, it is also important to keep in mind
that Fujimori came to command the support (if sometimes begrudgingly) and loyalty
of most middle and senior ranking officers as a consequence of a number of other key
arrangements. For one, he expanded the political and judicial power of the armed
forces in return for its unwavering support throughout the entire decade he was in
power. In addition, he enacted a series of tough antiterrorist laws, many of which
were promulgated as presidential degrees, which provided the security forces the nec-
essary legal basis upon which to begin tackling the insurgency on their own terms—
something that they have been demanding from government for years. Furthermore,
in response to what had been a notoriously low conviction rate of suspected terror-
ists by civil courts (Klarén suggests a figure of just 10 percent), Fujimori created spe-
cial military tribunals for trying cases of terrorism. These courts were presided over
by “faceless” judges who, in order to guarantee their personal security, were permit-
ted to conceal their identity by wearing hoods over their heads. Needless to say, the
number of convictions shot up immediately, and this pleased the security forces to no
end, for it gave them the feeling that their counterinsurgency efforts were no longer
made in vain. In the months immediately following the autogolpe, the government’s
new pacification campaign gained steady momentum, not only in military terms, but
also in the morale it generated.
Fujimori’s anti-terrorism legislation was specifically designed to undermine the
insurgency by demolishing its organisational and institutional bases of support in
civilian society. For example, Decreto Legislativo No.726 gave the armed forces and
the police legal authority to enter university campuses. This made it easier for the
security forces to stamp out Shining Path in the universities. Prior to this, many uni-
versities function, in Fujimori’s own words, as “true trenches of terrorism,” where the
radicals, despite being the minority, were nevertheless able to impose their will on the
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majority by threatening fellow professors and students with physical violence
(Fujimori 1995:444). In stark contrast to the terrifying and brutal incursions made by
security forces into Ayacucho’s university campus and student residences in 1983-84,
this time military intervention was peaceful. Consequently, the general sympathy of
faculty and students lay with the security forces. As Tapia observed,
Immediately the military effectives dedicated themselves to the clean-
ing of the installations and the painting of walls. The support of pub-
lic opinion facilitated the measure. More than a repressive action that
sought to arrest activists, it was about a typical psychosocial action,
which had as its objective to demonstrate a new governmental will to
combat terrorism. The effects were noticed immediately. After the
bewilderment and the surprise, there consolidated a majority of stu-
dents that, although with serious objections, supported the presence
of the Army on the university campus (1997:78).
Another effective anti-terrorism measure was Decreto Legislativo No.734, which
made it possible for the Ministry of Justice to call for the intervention of the armed
forces in restoring order and discipline in national prisons. This move at first seemed
destined to repeat that earlier, notorious incident of army intervention that ended in
slaughter, scandal, and the martyrdom of dozens of Senderistas at Lima’s El Frontón
prison in June 1986. Whereas then, Alan García had been widely blamed and his
pledge to uphold human rights discredited, Fujimori’s actions now, though similar,
surprisingly met with popular approval (Tapia 1997:77). Perhaps the difference was
that whereas on the one hand, García came to be widely perceived as simply reacting
frenetically to events as they came, without any clear policy, particularly towards the
end of his presidency, Fujimori, on the other hand, always gave the convincing
impression of a decisive man with a real plan. On 6 May 1992, security forces entered
prisons in Lima to quell riots sparked by Senderista prisoners who were demanding
improved conditions, and a continuation of the previous government’s informal pol-
icy of allowing them to administer their own cell blocks. Seventy-two hours of bloody
clashes later, forty rioters lay dead, and the surviving Senderista prisoners were sepa-
rated and transferred to various prisons throughout the country (ibid.:77-78). Thus
was Shining Path’s hitherto formidable political control within the prisons demol-
ished. Until then, the prisons had served as places of indoctrination and, allegedly,
even as strategic command centres.2
In 1995, Fujimori’s pact with the military was further strengthened when the out-
going Congress passed a general amnesty law for all soldiers charged with human
rights crimes. But his crowning glory was, beyond doubt, the capture of Guzmán, for
which he took full credit despite the fact that it was the culmination of an ongoing
intelligence operation brilliantly directed since 1990 by DINCOTE chief, General
Antonio Vidal. On that auspicious day, DINCOTE netted not only the mythical
“Presidente Gonzalo,” but also the organisation’s master computer files. This infor-
mation led to the swift capture of 90 percent of the movement’s highest-ranking lead-
ers (Klarén 2000:415). Perhaps most importantly, Guzmán’s arrest and subsequent
caged exhibition irreversibly shattered his aura of invincibility, and that of his organ-
227
Comittees of Reconstruction and Development
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 227
isation. “Now we have definitely lost our fear,” Tambo’s district mayor once
remarked to me in 1997. “Before it was the time of fear, when no-one was permitted
to say anything bad against Sendero. But now we can freely say that terrorism is not
the way to progress, but to destruction.”3
Like his predecessors, Fujimori promised the nation that he would smite terror-
ism. Unlike his predecessors, Fujimori delivered the goods—and such a prize beyond
everyone’s highest expectations. In the years to come, he would promote a public
image of himself as a strong, undaunted leader, uncompromising in the face of ter-
rorism; a “hard-working” man of few words but of decisive action, whose essential
quality is summed up by the catch-phrase that was to become his campaign slogan
during the 2000 presidential elections: “!Fujimori. Sí Cumple!”
6.2 Reconstruction in the midst of violent upheaval
After personal security, the most important concern in the minds of virtually all the
peasants I spoke to in Ayacucho was socioeconomic reconstruction. But before we
begin to consider the process of reconstruction that followed Peru’s period of pro-
tracted civil conflict, it is first important to recognise that, generally speaking, even at
the height of war, the dynamics at work are not only those of sociocultural, econom-
ic, and political disintegration; conflict also engenders new, enduring patterns of
social living. People adapt to their circumstances even during war, and life goes on. In
this regard, we might even say that in the context of war, reconstruction is an ongo-
ing process that happens alongside social disintegration and political conflict. It is not
something that kicks in only after violence has effectively ended. With this in mind, I
have tried to understand not only how political violence has destroyed ways of life in
Tambo and elsewhere in Ayacucho, but also how conflict and violence have led to the
construction of new social structures and new forms of social interaction. Perhaps the
supreme irony in the case of Peru is that a civil war that has brought a significant loss
of life and property has also given rise to fresh, lasting strategies of adaptation. An
examination of these new processes, strategies, and patterns provides the essential
context for understanding the role that comités de autodefensa have played in the
reconstruction and development of local societies and local economies devastated by
protracted political violence.
6.2.1 FORCED DISPLACEMENT
As the preceding chapters of this book have shown, the process of violence-pro-
voked internal displacement reached its peak in the south-central highlands of Peru
between 1983 and 1984 (INEI 1998b:9; cf. Coral 1994:15). Owing to its magnitude
and prolonged duration, however, no comprehensive or systematic quantification of
the phenomenon was ever attempted. For this reason, estimates of the total number
of “internally displaced” persons vary widely. For instance, the Centro de Promocción
y Desarrollo Poblacional (CEPRODEP) estimated in 1994 a figure of 120,000 as the
total number of displaced families in the whole of Peru, representing at least 500,000
persons (Coral 1994:11). The Programa de Apoyo al Repoblamiento (PAR) put the
number of Peru’s displaced population at around 600,000.4 The Comisión Episcopal
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de Acción Social (CEAS) provided a much lower figure, estimating that as of July
1992, the displaced had reached approximately 311,000 individuals, or 62,200 fam-
ilies (Comisiones de trabajo 1993:34).
It is possible to divide the history of forced displacement in Peru into roughly
three periods (Coral 1994:15, MRSDA 1997:8). The first period spans between 1981
and 1985, when those displaced were predominantly Ayacuchanos fleeing the mili-
tary’s harsh counterinsurgency repression. During this time, many desplazados sought
refuge outside the department, particularly in places like Lima, Ica, and Huancayo.
The years 1986 to 1989 marked the second significant wave of displacements. Those
heavily affected at this time were people in a number of south-central Andean depart-
ments. This was also the period in which forced displacement became most wide-
spread in the country,5 impelled by the violent actions of various armed actors—the
military, Shining Path, civil defence patrols, and paramilitary groups like the Rodrigo
Franco Brigade (Coral 1994:15; cf. INEI 1998b:9). The third and last significant
episode of displacement took place between 1990 and 1992, of which the primary
cause was guerrilla aggression. The vast majority of people displaced during these
years sought sanctuary within their own region, and often just within their own dis-
trict.
The official figures suggest that between 1981 and 1985, as much as 60.4 percent
of all internally displaced Peruvians came from Ayacucho department, with around
39.1 percent originating from the neighbouring department of Huancavelica (INEI
1998b:9). From 1986 to 1990, Apurímac department registered the greatest number
of displaced people. Within Ayacucho department itself, the Mesa Regional Sobre
Desplazamiento Ayacucho estimated the total number of desplazados between 1981
and 1993 to have reached approximately 156,575 persons (around 36,000 families).
Of this, approximately 73,996 (18,048 families) were displaced to zones of refuge
within Ayacucho department, and around 82,579 persons (17,952 families) to areas
outside the department (MRSDA 1997:2). The fact that the department’s population
was 503,392 at the time of the 1981 census, but 492,507 twelve years later, suggests
that almost a third of the department’s total population may have been involuntarily
uprooted between 1981 and 1993 (INEI 1998a:176).
In spite of their superficial similarities, it has been commonly pointed out that
there exists a qualitative difference between the massive economic migrations that
occurred in Peru during the ‘50s, ‘60s and ‘70s, and the “forced migrations” of the
‘80s (Coral 1994:9, Degregori 1993:12). The earlier economic migrations occurred
within the context of a desperate search for employment and a better life, impelled
by the social pressures brought by a demographic explosion. Life in the cities for eco-
nomic migrants coming from rural areas was anything but easy, and was marked by
constant competition with established urban sectors, and with other migrants. There
was stiff competition for scarce jobs, and for access to basic services and sources of
income. There was also intense competition for adequate living space within the
densely populated shantytowns and urban slums, and during the many free-for-all
invasions of vacant land. Yet, in spite of the challenges and hardships, and many dis-
appointments that they encountered along the way, hundreds of thousands of eco-
nomic migrants flocked to cities like Lima-Callao, Chimbote, and Huancayo. They
were led by the belief that they were moving towards progress and more opportuni-
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ties, and a better quality of life. Far from embarking as though on a haphazard adven-
ture, however, most economic migrants planned their journey carefully. They saved
money and resources well in advance of their trip, and utilised whatever personal net-
work was available to them to facilitate their search for a job and their adaptation to
urban life. Isbell observed almost three decades ago that as a survival strategy, most
“migrant must call on a wide network of kin and co-villagers for survival in the com-
petitive urban environment. Furthermore, the threat of failure motivates migrants to
maintain strong ethnic and economic ties with their places of origin” (Isbell
1978:179). Thus many migrants maintained a dual life: working and living in the city,
but also periodically returning to their rural village to tend one’s fields and livestock,
to participate in village festivals, or to get married.
By contrast, political violence was the principal driving force that caused thou-
sands of highland Peruvians to flee from their homes during the turbulent 1980s and
early 1990s. Unlike the economic migrants of previous decades, many desplazados
have had to leave their homes in a hurry, without any prior planning, “untimely
obliged to abandon their villages of origin, without the minimum conditions to begin
a prolonged and uncertain journey, having to locate and to relocate themselves
numerous times” (Coral 1994:9). Forced to flee at short notice and to leave most
their worldly possessions behind, desplazados sometimes arrived at their destination
with nothing more than the clothes on their backs (see chapter 3).
The general pattern of forced displacement in Peru was characterised by (1) relo-
cation from small to larger neighbouring rural communities, and (2) the movement of
individuals from the campo to urban population centres, such as district, provincial,
and departmental capitals. The level of security they expected to find, in addition to
the material and social resources available to them, were what often influenced
desplazados in their initial choice of refuge (Coral 1994:15). Living an existence
fraught with anxiety and uncertainty, many displaced peasants have had to move from
place to place several times before finding a place where they felt safe enough to stay.
Such was the experience of Daniel, a desplazado from the now-abandoned village of
Huancapampa, Tambo district.
In ’85 my family members died. The soldiers killed my godfather and
my brothers, and they carried away our animals. Oh, we were clearly
destitute. We had nothing. We escaped and I went to the selva with
my wife, with my children. We stayed there with my [other] brothers.
In the selva we lived calmly for three months. Then there appeared a
group of Senderistas. They began to kill people. They murdered my
patron. So I fled with my family and two brothers to Pichari. After
two weeks, Sendero appeared again, in Pichari, and so we had to
escape to San Francisco.”6
Of course, not all desplazados were peasants. Also among those displaced by
political violence were urban professionals, including teachers, engineers, and bureau-
crats. Nevertheless, according to the experts, peasants made up around 70 percent of
all desplazados (Coral 1994:15).7 Whatever their social and class background, how-
ever, the condition of life for thousands of Peru’s displaced persons in their chosen
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areas of refuge provides the necessary context for understanding why it is that many
eventually opted to stay (inserción) in their new setting, whereas others chose to
return (retorno) to their rural villages of origin. Such decisions were influenced not
only by the political situation at home, but also by the quality of life one had man-
aged to eke out at their place of refuge. Beginning with the large urban centres, let us
briefly examine what life was like for desplazados living in diverse conditions.
6.2.2. THE DESPLAZADO’S LIFE: LIVELIHOOD CRISIS AND ADAPTATION
IN A CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE AND FEAR
Notwithstanding the apparent numerous advantages of living in or near a large
urban centre like Lima, the quality of life for desplazados in semi-urban areas has not
always better than what it had been at home. Faced with problems like overcrowding,
under nourishment, and terrifying disease epidemics, life in the urban slums and shan-
tytowns for many internally displaced persons turned out to be much worse.
Most of the first wave of desplazados who fled to the cities went directly to the
areas already settled by prior economic migrants from their community, knowing that
these kinfolk and friends could help them. Naturally, like the economic migrants
before them, the desplazados tried to utilise the same support networks to find jobs
and lodgings; and in this, they were largely successful. The problem, however, was
that over the years, as more and more desplazados descended on the cities in the wake
of growing political violence in the highlands, the established support networks, the
adaptation strategies, the existing infrastructure, and the available living space were
all eventually saturated and overwhelmed by new demands. The established strategies
simply were unable to assist, accommodate, and absorb the vast numbers of displaced
persons. Daily subsistence was, of course, everyone’s most important concern. With
no immediate area to cultivate, the majority of urban desplazados had no other choice
but to buy much of their food. Moreover, with hyperinflation soaring between the
late 1980s and the end of 1992, food purchases came to take up an increasingly large
proportion of whatever income they could manage to scrape up.
Coping with life in the city was worse for desplazados who arrived destitute and
with no links to any of the support networks of earlier economic migrants. Their sub-
sistence options were therefore that much more limited. Over time, intensifying com-
petition for scarce material resources and inadequate sources of income eventually led
to conflict and animosity between the established migrants and the increasingly
unwelcome newcomers. As Lima and other cities became saturated with desplazados,
compassion began to dry up even among other popular urban sectors. Moreover,
although urban life seemed to offer the promise of greater possibilities, such as the
chance for one’s children to get a better education than in the countryside, the pres-
sures of everyday survival often rendered such opportunities impractical and irrele-
vant. The Catholic Church and various human rights groups observed, for instance,
that “many children are obliged to go to work as itinerant street hawkers and in the
end to give up their possibilities to study. School absenteeism is high and the children
suffer yet more discrimination for being considered underdeveloped” (Comisiones de
trabajo 1993:35).
In the urban setting, desplazados from Ayacucho had to contend not just with eco-
nomic hardship and hunger. Discrimination and marginality, the distrust and suspi-
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cion of authorities and of neighbours, and even the very stigma of being Ayacuchano
(and so blamed for starting all the current troubles)—all these were additional factors
that made desplazados feel excluded and marginalized. For many, social alienation
simply deepened their longing to return home. The experiences recalled by one
desplazado from Huambalpa is typical enough of displaced persons from other parts
of Ayacucho:
Our arrival in Lima was filled with sadness. Our first attempts to
forcibly settle unused land were repressed, and when we thought we
had found a place, Army soldiers began to follow us and threaten us.
Many of our fellow Ayacuchans had to beg to survive. Others worked
as street vendors and a few in construction. We were accused of being
terrorists in a very dismissive way by Lima people (quoted in Kirk
1995:357).
In the squalid, overcrowded desplazado settlements and shantytowns, where run-
ning water and a proper sewage system are virtually nonexistent, diseases spread rap-
idly. The cholera epidemic that ravaged Peru in 1991 was emblematic of the health
crisis of the nation’s poor, destitute, and displaced. Those hit hardest were the inhab-
itants of shantytowns and of the poorest urban neighbourhoods. Health risks came in
other guises. Whereas respiratory and gastro-intestinal illnesses are extremely com-
mon in the pueblos jovenes,8 the largely neglected (yet no-less-crippling) psychologi-
cal effects of war, such as mental trauma, shock, grief and anguish were also perva-
sive problems among desplazados. In addition, many lived in constant fear of perse-
cution—fear that their name would one day turn up on the blacklist of the police or
of a Party cadre. Still, “[the] highest barrier to dealing with the psychological trau-
ma,” said Ana María Rebaza of the Catholic Church’s Episcopal Conference for
Social Action (CEAS), “is the overwhelming material need for food and shelter”
(quoted in Kirk 1995:362).
For desplazados living in Ayacucho’s rural districts, on the other hand, their condi-
tions of existence exhibited its own characteristics and dynamics. There were, of
course, some similarities with displaced people living in big cities like Lima, but there
were also marked differences.
In the province of La Mar as in Lima, political conflict has clearly been a driving
factor in hastening the pace of urbanisation over the past two decades. The province’s
urban population of 10.8 percent in 1972 had grown slightly higher to 11.8 percent
by 1981. By 1993, however, the figure had jumped to 28.8 percent, and rising steadi-
ly.9 Even so, the increasing pace of urbanisation in La Mar was a misleading indica-
tion of overall demographic trends in the province. For whereas its population had
been growing at an annual rate of 1.7 percent between 1972 and 1981, the subse-
quent years of violence saw the total number of inhabitants in the province fall from
77,477 in 1981, to 72,924 by 1993.10 Hence, whereas on the one hand, some of
Peru’s major cities were undergoing a population explosion that was being fanned or
intensified by political violence, on the other hand, most of its provincial hinterlands
were experiencing an overall population decline, in spite of the growing population
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congestion in many provincial and district capitals.
Another distinctive consequence of protracted violence in predominantly rural
Andean hinterlands, like Ayacucho, was the ruination of an agricultural economy that
was already in a state of crisis even before the outbreak of civil war (Degregori 1986,
Huamaní Oré 1996). Indeed, ever since the 1970s, there has been a marked and
steady decline in the department’s gross internal product, in its overall output of agri-
cultural crops, even in the production of potato,11 the staple food crop of the region’s
inhabitants. Poor soil quality, extensive land erosion and progressive soil exhaustion
were just some of the factors contributing to the agricultural troubles that had already
plagued Ayacucho for decades. In addition, an uncompetitive, under-capitalised, and
largely un-commercialised agricultural sector, coupled with a lack of credit and tech-
nological assistance from the government, were also to blame. In addition to these
long-term factors, the agricultural crisis in the countryside of Ayacucho also owes
itself to the phenomena of population displacement and instability caused by politi-
cal violence.
Taking the example of Tambo district, we see that a prolonged climate of fear had
two immediate effects with regard to agricultural production. Firstly, it caused a dra-
matic drop in the number of individuals actively working on the land, from 3,599
persons (2,746 males, 853 females) in 1981 to only 1,960 (1,751 males, 209 females)
by 1993 (INEI 1983b:436; INEI 1994b:631). Secondly, the severe disruption it
caused to daily work patterns led to a significant constriction in the total area of pro-
ductive land being cultivated for food by the district’s inhabitants. This led to severe
and prolonged food shortage in the district. We have already seen that as guerrilla vio-
lence against peasants intensified in the course of the 1980s, most peasants became
simply too frightened to venture out into the countryside to work. In what became a
common pattern throughout the department, many peasants in Tambo stopped visit-
ing and cultivating their remotest chacras (fields) altogether. According to the
Ayacucho-based development organisation TADEPA, “in 1981 135 thousand hectares
were sown [in the department]; on the other hand in 1985 only 53 thousand hectares
were sown” (1992:20). As can be expected, the disruption caused to agricultural
activity in Tambo effected a sharp drop in food production. The impact this had was
made all the more serious by population pressure arising from the heavy concentra-
tions of displaced people in small areas, such as in nucleated resistente communities
or within the district capital. By the end of the 1980s, most people in Tambo—along
with those in other parts of the department where similar circumstances existed—
found themselves faced with famine and a livelihood crisis that would continue to
well into the next decade. Physical evidence of this was unmistakeable. At the depart-
mental level, official sources estimated that in 1993, at least 67 percent of all rural
primary school students suffered from chronic malnutrition (INEI 1997:81). We may
reasonably infer that the highest levels of malnutrition were to be found in the worst
hit rural areas of the department, like Tambo district. In 1997, the local civilian
authorities of Tambo’s suburban desplazado settlements with whom I spoke all
referred to the critical food shortage and acute levels of chronic malnutrition in their
communities. In addition, although a measurement of malnutrition has, as far as I
know, never been attempted in Tambo, the visibly emaciated and undersized bodies
of the adults and children there was at the time proof enough that chronic malnutri-
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tion had indeed become a severe problem in the district.
How, then, did Tambo’s inhabitants try to adapt their livelihood strategies to their
rapidly changing, adverse circumstances? Let us first begin by looking at the desplaza-
dos that lived in large suburban settlements encircling the town. All of these densely
populated settlements occupy land borrowed from or donated by local small
landowners, or peasant collectives. Ccarhuapampa, for example, has been built on
land owned by a peasant cooperative called Nueve de Octubre, which has its origins
in the Agrarian Reform of the 1970s. In Ccarhuapampa as in most other desplazado
settlements in and around the town, unused land remained scarce, though every
desplazado family was ordinarily allocated a tiny plot by the junta communal of their
settlement. Once a family erected their shelter, there was often very little land left
even for a small garden. There was certainly not enough land within the settlements
to grow enough food to sufficiently feed every household. The gravity of the subsis-
tence problem was exacerbated by population growth: by the mid-1990s, the popu-
lation of each of Tambo’s semi-urban desplazado settlements was between 650 and
upwards of 1,700 persons.12 In addition, the fact that most of the fields surrounding
these settlements remained private property and were still being cultivated by their
original owners meant there was limited opportunity for the desplazados to utilise the
existing arable land around them. With the threat of famine looming towards the end
of the 1980s, many displaced peasants—mainly the men—felt they had no other
option but to risk travelling to their own distant chacras to work during the day. But,
as already noted in chapter 5, they always made sure to return to the safety of their
settlements before dark.13
Despite improving security conditions in the region over the past decade, I dis-
covered in 1997 that most desplazados were still too frightened to spend the night in
their abandoned villages, even if to do so would have made it easier for them to get
an early start on work the next morning. They feared being found and killed in the
night by the “terrucos.” Or worse, by “pishtacos”—terrifying creatures usually in the
form of tall, pale gringos dressed all in black, who are said to be paying off the
nation’s overseas debt by selling the fat extracted from their murdered victims to rich
foreign countries, where it is used to grease factory machinery.14
Those for whom this labour pattern proved as exhausting as it was largely unprof-
itable were peasants with agricultural plots located far away from their desplazado
settlements. Particularly affected in this regard were the inhabitants of
Ccarhuapampa, whose distant, outlying villages are situated in the western half of the
district. By 1997, a road had still not been built through that sloping and rugged area.
Consequently, the villagers of Unión Minas, one of the displaced communities living
in Ccarhuapampa, faced a gruelling four-hour hike uphill, on steep footpaths and
obscure mule tracks, just to get to their fields—and half that time again just to get
back. Although the village lies only 17 kilometres away from Tambo town, the
amount of time it takes to get there on foot is more than the time it takes to make the
80 kilometre journey from Tambo to Huamanga by car. Ccarhuamampa’s other
desplazados, like those from the remote, deserted villages of Paría or Huantaccasa
have had to abandon their fields altogether, being simply too far away to make a
return trip possible in one day. As for those peasants of Ccarhuapampa who were able
to work in this manner, they nevertheless had to spend between four or five hours a
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day walking to and from their remote fields. This often left little time to actually get
much work done upon arriving at one’s chacra, apart from which the peasant would
have invariably arrived already exhausted by the long uphill trek. Moreover, the fur-
ther away the field and the fewer number hands available to help with bringing back
the harvest, the less food a household would eventually have to feed itself.
However, not all desplazados had it as hard as those of Ccarhuapampa. The pueb-
los jovenes situated at the other end of town, like Vista Alegre on the east side, and
El Porvenir, Viscachayocc, Túpac Amaru to the south of the central plaza, are popu-
lated by desplazados from nearby villages, located in the district’s central and eastern
rural areas. Many of those desplazados had fields within comfortable walking dis-
tance. It was even possible for those with chacras in the central part of the district to
hitch a ride for at least part of the way on passing vehicles, for the main dirt highway
to San Francisco runs through that area. Furthermore, many of these desplazados had
relatives still living in rural resistente communities with whom they could lodge dur-
ing planting or harvesting time, thus making efficient use of their time and energy.
Consequently, desplazados from Tambo’s central and eastern were generally at an
advantage as compared with those of Ccarhuapampa. All the same, years of terror and
fear generally deterred most of Tambo town’s desplazados from venturing too often
into the campo.
Those peasants who could afford it preferred to rent nearby fields from the
municipality of Tambo, for which, in 1997, they were paying between 60 to 100 soles
per month for one hectare of land, and an additional 60 soles if it was irrigated.15
Other displaced peasants worked as field hands or sharecroppers in return for food,
or in lieu of paying rent. Given this context of livelihood crisis and labour disruption,
and based on the available data and my own personal observations, it would not be
an exaggeration to say that even as recent as 1997, over 90 percent of all agricultur-
al production in the district was destined for household subsistence consumption,
with very little absolute surplus being produced for commercial sale.16
Before the conflict, it was common for most peasant households in Tambo district
to sell at least a small amount of surplus periodically in the market as a supplemen-
tary way to make ends meet. The women predominantly did the selling. With the
ever-worsening disruption caused to agriculture over recent years, however, petty
commerce and menial wage labour came to replace agriculture as the primary means
of subsistence for many desplazado households. (With this, the role of women as the
principal earners in their household rose in importance.) Worst off among the
desplazados were those who could not produce enough of their own food to feed
their households, let alone a surplus either to provide sufficient seed for next year’s
crop or to sell in the market.
Such were the economic problems and the living conditions of the urban desplazados
as I observed them in 1997. On the other hand, the inhabitants of resistente commu-
nities situated in the countryside itself seemed not to have been afflicted by a subsis-
tence crisis to quite the same degree as those living in or adjacent to the town. For
one thing, many of the rural resistentes were still able to travel regularly to work in
at least some of their fields, though they too always made sure to return at the end of
the day and spend the night in the safety of their fortified multi-community hamlets.
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According to a survey done by CEPRODEP, some of the inhabitants in a few of the
resistente villages were even able to set apart as much as 20 percent of their harvest
for commercial use, which led to regular ferias being held in some of the larger
resistente villages.17 Resistente villagers also had the additional advantage of being able
to sell their produce on the highway to passing travellers and traders on their way to
the ceja de selva, although not always at prices which the villagers considered fair. At
the main Sunday market held in Tambo, however, the resistentes participated only
rarely.
Even though Tambo’s economy remained fundamentally agrarian throughout the
1980s and 1990s, the agrarian subsistence crisis during this period contributed to the
burgeoning of the “informal” commercial sector as an important alternative source of
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livelihood in the district. In previous decades, Tambo’s so-called tertiary sector was
comprised mainly of commercial, entrepreneurial, and mercantile activities dominat-
ed by the town elites—which is to say those who had the requisite literacy and numer-
acy, financial capital, and entrepreneurial sense to engage in business.
As already explained earlier, Tambo had long been an important commercial cen-
tre in the past by virtue of being as an important gateway and resting point between
the ceja de selva of the Apurímac River Valley and the central sierra region of
Ayacucho. Ever since colonial times, itinerant merchants from all over Peru have
come to Tambo’s Sunday market to buy and trade the products of the region (Vilchez
1961:24; Palomino 1971:165). And although the majority of the district’s rural
inhabitants were only marginally involved in the commercial economy, since the early
1970s many of them have nevertheless been selling to the traders at least some quan-
tity of the various kinds of tubers and cereals they grew, these being in great demand
by Andean migrants living in coastal cities. The peasants then used the small amount
of cash they earned from the sale of their produce were to purchase from the essen-
tial manufactured commodities they need: metal pots, soap, cloth, noodles, cooking
oil, matches, salt, and cane alcohol called aguardiente. Among themselves, however,
instead of using cash, the rural inhabitants used trueque (barter), as the common form
of exchange. High-altitude crops, like tubers, were traded by the peasants of the
alturas for vegetables and fruits grown by the lowland valley peasants and by the
farmers of the ceja de selva, thus ensuring a reasonable balance in the diet of people
living in disparate ecosystems.
The past two decades, however, saw the town lose importance and vitality as a
rest station and regional commercial centre. This fact is vividly apparent in the sharp
drop in the number of persons employed in the town’s hotel and restaurant sector:
from 43 individuals in 1981, to only 21 by 1993 (INEI 1983b:437; INEI 1994b:631).
The number of transporters and storekeepers, or their employees, also shrunk by
almost half over this same period (ibid.). Military repression and frequent guerrilla
actions in the district were, as we have already noted, responsible for frightening
away most of Tambo town’s oldest, most prominent families, many of which were
also the local merchants and entrepreneurs of the district. A symbiotic (if not always
fair and equal) relationship had long existed between the town elites and the local
peasantry whereby the peasants provided a source of cheap produce and labour for
the urban entrepreneurs in return for the cash they needed to make basic purchases
of manufactured goods. Civil conflict rapidly ended this relationship, for with the
departure of most of Tambo’s urban entrepreneurs, an important source of cash and
wage labour for the peasants disappeared. In time, the resulting socioeconomic vacu-
um was filled by a new wave of urban dwellers, recently arrived from the countryside.
Unlike the earlier urban economic elites, however, the vast majority of desplazados
who eventually entered the tertiary sector had very little capital. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the service sector of impoverished rural districts like Tambo came to
be dominated in the late 1980s and the 1990s by underemployed and unskilled wage
labourers, and by informal street sellers—the latter being an economic activity that
requires relatively little start-up capital. As Huamaní Oré observed,
The major part of the commercial activities and the presentation of
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services is realised at a micro-enterprise level, without credit assis-
tance or help from the government, with the result that they have lim-
itations in their development and they generate low interest for the
urban population. However, it is the only alternative for the majority
who are unemployed and lack resources, like the migrants from rural
areas, who out of necessity have generated the phenomenon of “infor-
mality” based on self-employment. In this way, the informal sector is
the most important component of the urban economy and with the
greatest potential for future development if favourable conditions are
created (1996:51).
However, in spite of its apparent dynamism, a number of general factors—or
unfavourable conditions—serve to limit the extent to which Ayacucho’s informal sec-
tor can further develop in the future. For one thing, most of the activities which make
up this sphere of the economy—like ambulant peddling, taxi driving and transporta-
tion, unskilled labour and cleaning, etc.—have become saturated over the years.
There are simply too many people trying to make a living out of doing the exact same
thing. Stiff competition caused by under-pricing one’s competitors has resulted in a
buyer’s market, bringing the prices of goods and services down to almost unprofitably
low levels. Every informed consumer knows what the going prices are, and even then,
prices often can still be haggled lower. With so many informal vendors fighting for
the same customer, and only too willing to offer a better price for their goods or serv-
ice than their competitors, anyone wishing to make a living in the informal sector is
forced to price low or risk going completely hungry.
Yet in urban centres as in rural areas, prices (and therefore profits) are kept low
not only by intense competition. Weak consumer purchasing power also ensures that
vendors charge only the low prices that their potential customers can afford, or are
otherwise willing to pay. The problem is that the explosive growth of the “informal”
sector over the past two decades, particularly in Peru’s urban centres, has not been
accompanied by a similar rise in per capita income. This is especially so in impover-
ished rural towns like Tambo, where my own estimate is that the average monthly
household income of desplazados in 1997 was only around S/.80 nuevo soles, or
about $30 American dollars. In Tambo as elsewhere in Peru, an “economy of sencillo
(small change)” is the norm, where only small amounts of money change hands daily,
and little profit is made which can be reinvested to improve the quality or increase
the quantity of the goods sold and services rendered. The vast majority of people in
the district live hand to mouth, and work at subsistence level. The poverty of most
people in Tambo was made evident to me by the fact that vehicles coming from the
ceja de selva of the Apurímac Valley almost always passed through the town, rarely
ever stopping to sell their cargo of fruits. This is understandable, given that few local
people could afford to pay the price that the fruits would otherwise fetch in
Huamanga. For most of the past two decades, lack of money or credit, or low finan-
cial returns for their meagre surplus of poor-quality produce, has left many peasants
in Tambo unable to buy fertiliser, pesticides, or even seeds for the following year’s
planting. This in turn has led to a further deterioration in the quality of their produce,
thus placing them at a disadvantage in the open market, which in turn meant an ever-
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declining cash income and an ever-lessening chance of obtaining the chemicals they
required to improve their crops—and so on in a vicious circle. I heard many peasants
in Tambo complaining that they did not receive fair prices for their produce, and so
would rather just eat what little they produced instead of selling a part of it, even
though they were always in need of money. To state their dilemma simply, Tambo dis-
trict’s peasants (desplazados and resistentes alike) are placed under rising pressure by
the monetary consumption that has become part of the new conditions of their every-
day existence, but they are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain the cash they
need.
In 1997, Tambo’s municipal authorities made an effort to try and revitalise the
moribund agricultural economy by promoting the district as the “papa nativa” (native
potato) capital of Ayacucho department—an allusion to a bygone era when Tambo
was, indeed, renowned for the large variety and high quality of its tubers. However,
a comparison of the quality of produce sold at Tambo’s Sunday market with the agri-
cultural produce on offer at Huamanga’s central market was clear proof of how far
the reality had to come in order to catch up with the marketing image the district
authorities were trying to advertise. In fact, the generally poor quality of agricultural
produce from many of Ayacucho’s rural districts has, over the years, resulted in local
production becoming increasingly restricted to local rural markets, while the largest
and most lucrative urban market in the region—that of Huamanga’s—has come
increasingly to rely on importing better-quality produce from outside the depart-
ment.18
The analysis of commercial traffic demonstrates that approximately
98% of the industrialised products that Ayacucho consumes comes
from other cities; only 2% is produced internally, which means a high
dependence on extra-regional [food production] industry. On the
other hand, the only products for exportation to other departments
are small volumes of agricultural products from the sierra and a con-
siderable quantity of agro-industrial products that come from the ceja
de selva. It indicates that commercial activity in Ayacucho is based on
the movement of merchandise that come from other departments, less
on the employment of internal production which is small (Huamaní
Oré 1996:51. My emphasis).
Given that on the one hand, most manufactured commercial goods and foodstuffs in
the department were increasingly imported throughout the 1990s, and on the other
hand, that locally produced goods were generally perceived to be of comparatively
inferior quality (and thus of lesser value), barter as a common method of exchange
between peasants, or between peasants and traders, has consequently come to lose
much of its viability in the sierra. In most instances, it has been completely replaced
by cash transactions, and this has left desplazados in particular at a serious disadvan-
tage in the following ways.
In the semi-urban desplazado settlements of provincial districts like Tambo, the
“‘monetization’ of needs and obligations,” to borrow a phrase from Stern (1982:186),
has radically altered social relationships and strategies of household production.
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Everyday existence in an urban (or semi-urban) context brought many of Tambo’s dis-
placed peasants numerous essential cash expenses hitherto almost unknown when
they lived in the campo. Most of these cash-based needs were drawn from what Wolf
refers to as the peasant’s (in this case, the desplazado’s) replacement fund, which is the
“amount needed to replace his minimum equipment for both production and con-
sumption,” thought of “not merely in technical terms, but in cultural terms as well”
(1966:6). One notable example is the purchase of school uniforms and supplies for
one’s children. While living in Tambo in 1997, it never ceased to impress me that
come Monday morning, the weekend’s multitude of grimy children in threadbare
clothes were always miraculously transformed into students in crisp, immaculately
clean uniforms. It seemed that every parents’ desire was to be able to outfit all of their
children in school uniforms. At an average cost of about S/.80 soles for an entire set
of shoes, trousers, socks, shirt and jumper for boys, or blouse and pinafore dress for
girls, it is no small accomplishment for those parents who indeed are able to do so.
Besides the fact that school uniforms are mandatory at most urban schools, not hav-
ing a school uniform also causes children to feel socially excluded and ashamed.
Indeed, once while watching a group performance of uniformed school children at a
school anniversary ceremony, I asked some of the students and teachers sitting beside
me why a handful of dejected-looking children were sitting in the corner of the plaza,
not participating in the activities. “Those are children recently arrived from the
campo,” I was told. “They are kept separated for the time being because they still have
to learn to speak Castellano, and they have no uniforms because their parents cannot
yet afford to buy them.” The social pressure placed on parents to provide their chil-
dren with uniforms is greater in Tambo town, where almost all the schoolchildren
have uniforms, than in the countryside, where it is rare to see children in school uni-
forms.
Still other important and unavoidable cash expenses include the cost of medi-
cines, particularly antibiotics. Given the unsanitary conditions and overcrowding of
the suburban refugee settlements, antibiotics have become increasingly in demand.
Intestinal and respiratory ailments are prevalent among the refugee population. In
Tambo town, I often saw young children playing in the water of the very same street
gutters in which I also commonly saw peasants urinating. Women and children regu-
larly bathed and washed clothing in a small, polluted stream that flows between the
barrio of Rosas Pata and Ccarhuapampa, and also drew their drinking and cooking
water from it. A small water reservoir provided piped water to the town and to some
of the pueblos jovenes, but the water was neither filtered nor safe to drink without
first boiling it. After even light rainfalls, mud from surrounding hillsides would flow
down and into the open reservoir, transforming the water into a muddy soup con-
taminated with vegetal debris, human and animal faeces, and tiny, white worms.
People have not learnt to use cloth to filter their tap water. When struck with a bac-
terial intestinal infection, then, a treatment of antibiotics was often one’s only salva-
tion from days of excruciating abdominal pain, dangerously high fever, and life-
threatening dysentery. According to the chief physician in charge of Tambo’s hospital
in 1997, dysentery and subsequent dehydration were the principal causes of death in
the district, especially among children and young people. “It’s because the parents
either have no money for a full treatment of antibiotics, or are reluctant to use what
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little money they have on medicine, choosing instead to wait and see what happens,
or to seek the services of a curandero [curer],” he once explained to me. He went on
to say,
Medical care in Peru is free, but medicines are not. Just the other
evening, a peasant man brought his young wife to the hospital. She
had meningococcal meningitis and was already close to dying when
they came in. We gave her antibiotics in the morning and by the
evening she was walking around again; but she was still very weak. I
told her husband that it was important for her to carry on taking the
full treatment of antibiotics for a few more days, so she can recover
completely, but that the medicine would cost him 18 soles. He said he
would try to get the money, but they never returned. The problem is
that these are ignorant people who don’t understand that antibiotics
must be taken over an entire treatment period, even if the patient
already begins to feel better. If they stop, they will suffer a relapse,
and the bacteria will probably become resistant to the antibiotic,
which can be dangerous for everyone else. We would like to provide
medicine without charge but we are simply not permitted. There’s no
money for it. Even in developed countries like the United States or in
Holland, people have to buy their medicines, no? The only medica-
tion we can use at no cost to the patient are those donated by the
Medicos Sin Fronteras. But they haven’t been back here for months.19
The economic crisis affected the district’s inhabitants not just physiologically, but
also mentally. Most desplazados I spoke to, especially the young, complained that
there were no jobs for them in either the district or anywhere else in the department.
For this reason, they—and especially those lacking education—saw a bleak and diffi-
cult future for themselves and their families. Even the young people with education
were pessimistic about their prospects. Many expected to be underemployed at best,
but more realistically to be forced to return to a life of subsistence farming just to sup-
port themselves and their families. The life story of Pascual Quispe Vargas is typical
in this regard.
My parents and I are desplazados from the countryside, and we came
to live in Vista Alegre in 1987. Through the grace of God, I was able
to continue my studies and even to enter the university in Ayacucho.
I studied agronomy at the UNSCH and graduated in 1992. But after-
wards there was no work, so I worked for a year as a rentado in the
Patrulla Especial here in Tambo. That way at least I could make some
money. That was in about 1994. Then I had the luck to find a job with
CEPRODEP. That was good, the pay was good. Better than what I was
making as a rentado. But then that job ended—maybe the money ran
out, I don’t know. So I returned to Tambo, to Vista Alegre. I got mar-
ried last year, and now we have a four-month old baby. Now I work
primarily as a peasant; I have some fields not far away. There I grow
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my family’s food. Sometimes I drive my sister’s pickup truck, taking
passengers back and forth between Tambo and Ayacucho. Sometimes
the people at CEPRODEP come and hire me to drive them to the
communities in the campo. That can bring me as much as 50 soles per
day. But that doesn’t happen very often. I hope to work for another
NGO like CEPRODEP again in the future so I can put my education
to use. Right now things look bad in Peru. There’s no work. So I’m
back to being a peasant.20
Although not always obvious, the economic and political situation of the past two
decades has caused many people to suffer periodically from bouts of severe depres-
sion. The culture of machismo places added pressure on a man to fulfil the role social-
ly expected of him as the breadwinner of his family. Given the dire economic situa-
tion, however, most men are unable to fulfil this expectation, while women, as I have
already noted, have grown in recent years to become the main income earner in many
households through their resourceful “informal” commercial activities. Yet although
most men recognised the vital importance of women’s contributions to the mainte-
nance of the family, some nevertheless resented this reversal of roles, for they felt that
it diminished their status (especially in the eyes of their neighbours) as the head and
main provider of their household. For many men, their mental anguish led them to
look for comfort in a bottle of aguardiente.21 Many desplazados found in drinking a
means of escaping their problems as well as their obligations. Unfortunately, though,
as various policemen and hospital staff told me, the majority of reported cases of
domestic violence were related to the alcoholism or the heavy drinking of one’s hus-
band or father.
Economic hardship, especially among the desplazado population, has also caused
the break-up of families, and the abandonment of children (see IER “JMA”/UNSCH
1987:13-98). It was not only widows and widowers of political violence, but also sin-
gle mothers, abandoned wives, or destitute couples, left with too many mouths to
feed, who are frequently forced to abandon some of their children. In Tambo, the
more fortunate of these children are taken to the local orphanage—the aldea infan-
til—by their parent(s) or relatives, and left in the care of the nuns and workers there.
And even though the orphanage is small and has limited resources, its staff members
also periodically try to take as many orphaned or abandoned children off the streets
as they can find in Tambo town and in nearby rural communities. Sadly, however, the
majority of abandoned or orphaned children end up on the streets to fend for them-
selves. Many find their way to the cities where they attempt to survive by begging, or
through petty crime. For the duration of what for most of them is often a short life,
almost all street children in Peru can expect to suffer such adversities as sexual abuse,
forced prostitution, substance addiction, physical violence and constant gnawing
hunger.
6.2.3. CULTURAL CONTINUITY AND RECONFIGURATION AMID VIOLENT UPHEAVAL
Political violence has also had a profound impact on cultural activities.
Surprisingly, however, in spite of the population displacements, communal disinte-
gration, the escalating political violence and the deepening poverty over the years,
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traditional festivities and religious rituals have not completely lost their relevance and
importance in people’s lives. As can be expected, in many rural areas violence seri-
ously disrupted the Andean calendar of festivities. Nevertheless, time and again peo-
ple in Tambo, as in other parts of Ayacucho, have shown a stubborn desire to contin-
ue observing, whenever they can, the ceremonial activities which they hold important
for maintaining or strengthening the solidarity of their community. Death has some-
times come with cruel irony at the very moment of ecstatic celebration or profound
worship, such as when eight members of the Presbyterian Church were dragged out
in the middle of a church service and summarily executed by Marines in the peasant
community of Callqui Nisperoc Niyocc, Huanta province, on 1 August 1984 (DESCO
1989:109). Or when peasants were massacred by guerrillas at Huayao while cele-
brating a wedding. Such pressures have made performing ceremonials not only diffi-
cult and irregular, but have also brought the risk of a general crisis of faith and con-
fidence in religion and traditional values. Nevertheless, it seems that many of those
who have suffered most have nevertheless held tenaciously on to the festivities and
ceremonial they deem most pertinent to their lives.
Public festivities and ceremonial activities in the department of Ayacucho can be
grouped into three types: (1) religious fiestas, (2) renewal and fertility-related rites,
and (3) secular village-specific celebrations.22 A number of new village-specific cele-
brations of a secular variety have appeared over the past decade. Of these, what is
particularly important to retornantes is the anniversary of their return to their once-
abandoned villages, for it represents the physical and symbolic recuperation of their
lands and the reconstitution of their communities. In Marccaraccay, a village situated
in the cold punas of Huanta, Orin Starn noted, for instance, that “the anniversary of
the return has replaced the feast of Saint John as the principal date. It is an indication
of how even the ritual calendar can be altered by variable circumstances” (1994:78-
79). Other important dates which were commemorated by communities throughout
the department included the anniversary of the founding of their local Club de Madres
and Comité de Autodefensa, which in Tambo were celebrated on 22 November and
24 May respectively.23 These two new institutions were celebrated because they came
to be associated in the collective consciousness with the people’s triumph over
Shining Path, and were further envisaged to play a significant future role in the recon-
struction and development of the district.
In recent years, school anniversaries have also become important village-specific
celebrations. In Tambo, the anniversary of one the large primary or secondary schools
situated in Ccarhuapampa or Vista Alegre—Tambo’s two main desplazado settle-
ments—is more than just a sentimental exercise to honour the school. A school’s
anniversary also serves to remind the people of how fortunate they actually are to
have the opportunity to give their children an education. For parents (most of whom
are illiterate) as much as for students, schools symbolise modernity and progress, a
hope of a better future for the next generation. The education that schools provide
offers an avenue of escape from the harsh existence of the campesino. Parents in
Tambo realise that had their lives remained in the countryside, their children could
not have received the same level of schooling that they do today, living in a semi-
urban desplazado settlement. It is indeed ironic that in this instance, the situation of
displacement caused by political violence has provided youths of rural origin an
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opportunity that they otherwise would not have received had they continued living
in the campo. Furthermore, the establishment in these desplazado settlements of their
very own school—which, by the way, are not one-room shacks, as in the campo, but
large multi-storey buildings—provides inhabitants with a possible point of reference
around which to begin constructing a broader collective identity for what, in fact, is
a heterogeneous desplazado population made up of households from diverse local
communities.
When I was living in Tambo in 1997, I was once invited by some teacher friends
to join the anniversary celebrations of the Colegio San Isidro, in Vista Alegre. The cel-
ebrations began the evening before the anniversary day with a solemn procession of
students and faculty members, lighted candles in hand, through the streets of Tambo
town and Vista Alegre. Leading the crowd was a brass band and the local Catholic
priest. At the back of the pack, however, a small group of rowdy students lit off fire-
crackers, and called for people to come out of their homes and join in. After walking
a few times round the town, the procession wound its way to the central plaza, where
a live band on a stage began to play huayno music for the large crowd that had gath-
ered. The students and a few older townspeople danced and flirted in the plaza to the
sound of happy music well into the early hours of the morning. The celebrations
resumed early the following morning, which was the anniversary day itself, with yet
another lively parade, this time of the students dressed in their school uniform. Once
again, they marched a number of times around the town plaza before making their
way back to the large football pitch at Colegio San Isidro. A large throng of parents
and other invited guests also filed into the school. On the pitch, the students formed
ranks while the spectators sat themselves down in the stands. The programme got
under way first with the singing of the national anthem, followed by speeches from
the district mayor, the school’s headmaster, and the school’s two best students, a boy
and a girl. The common theme in all the speeches was the end to violence and the
importance of reconstruction. The main entertainment that day, however, was a 
traditional-dance competition, for which students from communities all over La Mar
had come dressed in colourful traditional costumes to perform the folk dances of
their region. Some groups performed dances from the selva, and others the dances of
puna communities.
The event was not only entertaining for the audience and the performers. At a
time when the young people in Tambo and elsewhere were more interested in the lat-
est salsa hits from Lima and abroad than in the cultural traditions of their parents or
grandparents, the dance competition also engaged the students in a piece of their own
cultural heritage. Specially for the occasion, the students had to learn the folk dances
and to don the traditional costumes previously worn only by their parents and grand-
parents. What will probably happen, however, is that in years to come, these tradi-
tional dances, costumes, and music will survive as quaint cultural artefacts paraded
for the enjoyment of cash-wielding tourists. Nevertheless, it would not be surprising
if the ritualised and cultural framework from which they originally derived their
social meaning will disappear as young people increasingly come to embrace the more
valued and attractive “modern” popular culture of Lima and the outside world.
There are also the religious festivities, often held in honour of patron saints, of
which Tambo district’s is San Juan Bautista (Saint John the Baptist). The festival in
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this saint’s honour is celebrated from 24 to 27 June, and his icon is housed the rest
of the year in the town church. Not all icons have been so lucky, however. In the hasty
flight of villagers under attack, religious images were often left behind, and at times
subsequently destroyed by either the guerrillas or the soldiers. The loss of these icons
sometimes meant that the fiestas associated with them were abandoned, or at least
suspended for a time until they could be recovered. Fortunately, such a fate did not
befall the icons of village of Balcón. Despite the devastating guerrilla incursion on 20
June 1984 that finally emptied the village of its remaining inhabitants, its three most
important religious icons—la Vírgen Amparadora, el Niño Jesús, and el Pírso Cur—
were taken by the fleeing desplazados with them to Ccarhuapampa, and thus saved.
In September 1997 I had the opportunity to attend the annual fiesta dedicated to
these three images which, ever since Balcón was abandoned, has been celebrated
annually in Ccarhuapampa amid solemn processions, comical bull-fighting, riotous
music and dancing, and unrestrained drinking.
The district’s other important traditional religious holidays that have come
through the period of violence—disrupted and inconsistently celebrated though they
have been over the years—include Todos los Santos (1 November) and Día de los
Muertos (2 November), Inmaculada Concepción (8 December), Carnaval (in February
or March), and Semana Santa (Easter Holy Week).24 These occasions invariably start
with the parading of religious images in sober procession, and culminate in drunken
revelry.
Given the direct relationship that exists between ecological renewal and fertility
rites on the one hand, and the crucial periods of the agricultural cycle on the other,
the disruption of one necessarily affects the other. When political violence depopu-
lated the countryside and transformed many places into no-go areas, irrigation canals
had to be abandoned for a time, and so too the observance of Yarcca Aspiy, the impor-
tant rite of cleaning the irrigation system in September that signalled the beginning of
the rainy season and the time for planting. Similarly, in some years, the personal risks
placed on peasants during harvesting time left no opportunity for the Trilla, the nor-
mally carefree harvest festival often celebrated in July, in which horses are made to
trample the harvested wheat or maize to separate the grain from the stalk. Other eco-
logical renewal or fertility rites that were discontinued during the years of violence,
but have since been revived in Tambo include the Herranza—the ritual branding of
livestock in August that culminates in offerings being made to the local Wamani or
mountain deity—the Corte Monte (mentioned in the previous chapter), and the Toro
Watay (September).
In the Peruvian Andes, religious festivals have historically been interrelated with
local indigenous prestige hierarchies. Namely, it was the members of prestige hierar-
chies who sponsored the fiestas by footing all costs associated with providing music,
food, coca, and abundant amounts of chicha (corn beer) and trago (cane alcohol) for
the participants. Nevertheless, civil-religious hierarchies were already declining
throughout the Ayacucho region ever since the 1960s, due to the great deal of effort,
goods, and money expended in sponsoring a saint’s fiesta. As noted by Isbell at
Chuschi in the early 1970s, “Migrants and governmental agencies are frustrated by
the amount of time, energy, and resources that are expended in supporting tradition-
al rituals” (1978:220). For these reasons, some of the rural nouveaux riches—Andean
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economic migrants in particular—found conversion to Protestantism to be spiritually
and instrumentally conducive to their interests in as much as it allowed them to
bypass the traditional cultural levelling mechanisms that stood as hurdles in the way
of their social advancement and personal enrichment. “With the Protestant ideology
of personal advancement, comuneros can escape the obligations of participation in
the complex of reciprocity and displays of generosity that consume so much of their
economic surplus,” (ibid.:240). As we have already seen in an earlier chapter, such
self-interested social and cultural distancing by an upwardly mobile and economical-
ly successful minority often provoked social fragmentation, and resentment from
their communal neighbours. This usually resulted in the weakening of community sol-
idarity, which later only played into the hands of Shining Path. Although religious
fiestas are very occasionally still celebrated in Tambo, lean times over the past two
decades have made for fiestas that are much less extravagant than those that were
given in the distant past. It can generally be said that these days, when a saint’s feast
is celebrated, the sponsor does so for personal reasons—such as giving thanks for a
saint’s blessing or so that one’s prayers are answered, or so as to gain votes in a polit-
ical election, etc.—rather than as an obligation associated with membership in a com-
munity’s cargo prestige hierarchy, which have now all but disappeared in Peru.
These examples help to illustrate that individuals are not slaves to their customs
and cultural systems. They often are, in fact, consciously selective and self-interested
when interacting with or adopting cultural identities, cultural symbols and practices.
For instance, Isbell (1978) witnessed how the comuneros of Chuschi voted in 1970 to
abolish the public observance of rituals and of cultural institutions—namely the hatun
varayoq—that did not directly relate to their fundamental beliefs regarding the social
and natural world. Yet a few years later, they voted to resuscitate some of these very
same “obsolete” cultural structures in response to changing political circumstances,
and because it served their new political interests to do so (ibid.:238). Changes to
individual circumstances and socioeconomic context often lead people to reaffirm, re-
evaluate, or to redefine their cultural systems and behaviour. The recent rapid growth
and popularity of evangelical churches in the Peruvian Andes underscores this point.
Although Protestant missionaries have been in Peru ever since the early decades
of the nineteenth century, it was not until the 1980s that the population of Ayacucho
department began converting in large numbers. Comprising only 4.33 percent of the
department’s total population in 1981, by 1993 11.42 percent of Ayacuchanos had
become Protestants, or “evangelicals,” representing a wide spectrum of non-Catholic
sects (Gamarra 2000:279). Protestantism in Ayacucho first established itself at the
beginning of the twentieth century in the department’s principal urban centres of
Huanta and Huamanga, slowly expanding from there into the campo. Starting in
about the 1950s, those most responsible for spreading Protestantism were migrants
from the countryside, who were exposed to these new churches while living in urban
shantytowns. They eventually brought the evangelical message back with them when
they returned to their rural villages of origin. The advance of the evangelicals in
Ayacucho department received further impetus towards the end of the 1960s when
the old order, dominated by the landed regional elite, broke down and finally col-
lapsed. For this demise in the power of the landowning elite also undermined the
power and the privileges previously enjoyed by the Catholic Church, which was itself
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one of the largest and most powerful landowners in the country.
Growing political awareness also took its toll on the public image of the Catholic
Church, causing it to loose much of the popular respect and reverence it had enjoyed
and taken for granted ever since the Conquest. In the politically charged context of
the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, politicised rural activists began to denounce the Catholic
Church as an institutionalised exploiter of peasants. Furthermore, recognised peasant
communities received sympathetic support from the revolutionary Agrarian Reform
Office in their efforts to recuperate communal lands seized in generations past either
by the Church or by encroaching haciendas. In this popular assault on the status quo,
the Catholic Church—one of the pillars of the old order—was not only losing power,
but also fast becoming discredited. As the 1970s ended, the presence of the Catholic
Church in Ayacucho’s countryside became “limited to sporadic visits by priests who
paid privileged attention to the administration of sacraments” (Gamarra 2000:279).
By contrast, many evangelical pastors, most of whom were themselves Andean
migrants, lived and worked with the poor and marginalized sectors of society. In
1997, I was often told by rural people that in the initial years of Sendero Luminoso’s
armed struggle, priests and nuns abandoned the countryside and fled to the cities,
whereas the evangelical hermanos stayed (and sometimes died) with the people (see
del Pino 1996).
Jefrey Gamarra, an academic lecturer at the UNSCH, explains the widespread
religious conversions and the rapid expansion of Protestantism during the years of
political violence as the result of the evangelical churches’ ability to help provide “a
minimum of community cohesion in the exile areas so as to guarantee access to
resources in the expulsion areas” (Gamarra 2000:272). In contrast to the ritual-
orientated practices of Catholicism, the moral code of behaviour preached by the
evangelicals was better suited to the realities of a modern low intensity conflict. In the
words of one of his informants,
...before we celebrated the Feast of the Cross, the feast of
Santiago,...we had bullfights, dances and drank a lot. Sendero took
advantage of that because when we were drunk and fought each
other, the terrorists came and attacked us. They took the old people
and the children away. Now we don’t have those parties anymore. We
don’t drink, we are sober and ready to defend ourselves from the ter-
rorists (“Jacinto” quoted in Gamarra 2000:282).
Furthermore, the emphasis placed by evangelical pastors on Biblical scriptures that
spoke of the trials and tribulations of Israel in exile, its images of violent cataclysms
heralding the apocalypse and Last Judgement, provided their followers with a point
of identification and a relevant meaningful framework with which to render compre-
hensible the chaos and suffering in their own lives (ibid.:282; also see del Pino
1995a:381).
Apart from the functional advantages and material benefits that made joining an
evangelical church appealing, however, we should not underestimate the emotional
sincerity and religious conviction of its adherents. As Ponciano del Pino has argued,
instead of running away, evangelicals in the Apurímac River Valley willingly placed
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their lives on the line by declaring war on Shining Path, which they came to view as
the Antichrist incarnate (1996:167). “The Senderos have persecuted us the most,” the
evangelical desplazado Daniel once said to me. “Do you know why? It’s because the
Senderos do not believe in God. For this reason they hate us, and want to exterminate
all evangelicals. But at this moment God is also protecting us.”25 The evangelicals’
resistance to Shining Path in the valley took on the appearance of a holy war, and guer-
rillas eventually found themselves faced with an undaunted enemy for whom death
held no fear; an enemy for whom, like the most zealous Maoist militants themselves,
dying for the sake of one’s beliefs was not only accepted, but at times even welcomed.
With time, however, the level of political violence in Ayacucho would subside and
everyday life would begin a slow return to normality. According to Gamarra, in the
context of post-violence social reconstruction, the strict social and moral order
imposed by evangelical pastors on their followers—so well suited to survival in times
of war—would prove incongruent with changing outlooks, attitudes and interests.
The totalitarian narrative [of evangelicalism] serves to diminish the
risks of fragmentation in a situation of conflict but not during stable
periods. The evangelical version of the struggle against Shining Path
was effective only to the extent that people were on their guard, and
engaged continually in defensive actions. But with the passage of time,
Sendero platoons became less frequent and so did the intensity of their
attacks.... The returning and resistant communities no longer had to
choose between the Bible of evangelism or the Sendero sword to
ensure their survival and memory.... Everyday life changed gradually.
The feeling of precariousness disappeared...[and the] habit of praying
at night gave way to lively conversations by shop fronts. On week-
ends, music and dancing were the new forms of entertainment for
community youngsters. Life returned to the communities and with it
an enjoyment of drinking—practiced surreptitiously to prevent criti-
cisms from the staunchest converts and evangelical leaders.... As vio-
lence diminished, the communities tended to engage in less religious
behaviour and have now started to draw the line between evangelism
and community interests (Gamarra 2000:284,287).
Among a number of high-Andean communities in Huanta, Gamarra has also observed
professed evangelicals performing or participating nevertheless in non-evangelical
Andean rituals, like the Herranza. Yet such instances, he argues, do not necessarily
mean that evangelicalism was now being rejected by its adherents. Rather, as with
Roman Catholicism that preceded it, within the cultural universe of its adherents,
evangelicalism was simply undergoing that Andean tendency towards syncretism with
pre-existing local indigenous religious beliefs and rituals.
6.2.4. DESPLAZADOS RETURN
When Fujimori became President of the Republic in July 1990, he inherited not
only a critical political situation but also an economy wracked by his predecessor’s
failed heterodox experiment. As an indication of the extent of the economic crisis, by
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1990 the GDP had fallen to the 1950 level, and as much as 80 percent of the nation-
al population was either unemployed or underemployed (Klarén 2000:408). Real
wages had dropped to what it was two decades earlier and poverty levels soared.
Upon assuming presidential power, Fujimori sought to tackle the nation’s disastrous
economic situation. He did this by implementing a severe economic austerity pro-
gramme—“far harsher than anything that Vargas Llosa had contemplated”
(ibid.:407)—that immediately caused unprecedented rises in the price of food and
other essentials, wage cuts, and job losses. Between 1990 and 1992, “a conservative
estimate was that 54 percent of the total Peruvian population were living in poverty”
(ibid.:408). In time, the inflation rate was brought under control as the restructuring
measures of the “Fujishock” took effect. Public sector spending rose as international
financial loans flowed into the country once more. Foreign investment began to
increase cautiously. Although these austerity measures brought new hardships, the
general mood towards Fujimori’s policy solutions remained one of optimistic toler-
ance, undoubtedly sustained by his early victories against the insurgency, and by the
general impression that, for the first time in a long while, here was a government that
was doing what had to be done to resolve the crisis, no matter how painful (Cameron
and Mauceri 1997). Besides, people had grown to expect cumulative problems from
government, and already stoically hardened to it. For solutions to life’s everyday
problems, they turned not to the state but to themselves.
Throughout the south-central Andean departments, one of the most significant
effects of worsening economic crisis in the cities coupled with waning political vio-
lence in the countryside was to encourage large numbers of peasant desplazados to
return to their villages of origin, many of which had lain abandoned for over a
decade. With food prices rising to as much as 500 percent in the wake of “Fujishock”,
returning to the home village to resume cultivating one’s own land was, for many
desplazados, the only possible way of supporting one’s family. Unlike in previous
years, expanding pacification made this option viable. The retornos or returns (also
called “repoblamientos”) were organised for the most part by the people themselves,
rather than by government, and as such may be regarded as the most important spon-
taneous, popular initiatives for socioeconomic reconstruction to occur in the past
decade.
The official government statistics regarding the percentage of displaced persons
who have opted to return home is unclear. Based on its study of 437 districts in the
departments of Ayacucho, Apurímac, Huancavelica, Junín, Huánuco and Ancash, the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática concluded that by 1997 “57.6% [of
the total population interviewed in the districts] declared having changed residence
for reasons of violence and had returned to the place of census as a consequence of
the process of pacification. The remaining 42.4% constituted the [resistente] popula-
tion that did not change their place of residence” (1998b:9).26 What is not provided
in the INEI study, though, is the percentage of the entire desplazado population that
did not choose to return home, deciding instead to remain displaced for the time
being, or to settle down for good in their place of refuge. An indication of this can be
found in other studies. The Mesa Regional Sobre Desplazamiento Ayacucho, for
example, suggested that in 1997, “of the 36,000 families [156,575 persons] displaced
at the departmental level, to date, 8,246 families [approximately 35,864 persons]
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have opted for Return. The absolute majority has opted for insertion (27,754 fami-
lies), especially in the city of Lima” (1997:2). INEI’s findings do, however, provide us
with a more global picture of refugee returns, which is that 59 percent of all retornos
took place in Ayacucho, followed by Junín and Apurímac departments, representing
14.9 and 12.9 percent of refugee returns respectively (INEI 1998b:9). As a national
phenomenon, the number of refugee returns began to pick up in 1991, reaching their
peak between 1993 and 1994, and gradually diminishing thereafter (ibid.:10).
A third of all retornantes interviewed in a government study into displacement
and return cited improved security in the countryside as their main reason for return-
ing home (INEI 1998b:10). Around 33.6 percent indicated their desire to recuperate
their property as their primary reason for returning, and a slightly smaller percentage
said they were motivated to return home by the need to search for work. A lesser
number of people said they returned because of family reasons (ibid.). It is more like-
ly, however, that individual decisions to return were influenced not by one, but rather
by a combination of many of these factors. (It logically follows, for example, that one
cannot recuperate property or attend to family business until the area has been paci-
fied). The level of security in an area, the amount of time away, the distance to one’s
village, the quality of life attained and opportunities found at one’s place of refuge as
compared with what one can expect by returning home—these are some of the key
factors that, over the years, have influenced desplazados’ decision whether to return
or not.
From as early as 1984, internal refugee returns have occurred in response to those
random occasions when political violence appeared to wane. For example, the appar-
ent diminution of guerrilla attacks in the countryside of Huanta province between
1996 and 1997 prompted some alto-Andino villagers—notably those of Huallhua,
Culluchaca, Iquicha, Huaychao—to return home for a time. Their optimism was
dashed, however, when the resumption of rebel activities throughout the entire
region, from 1988 onwards, eventually forced almost every single one of these early
retornantes to flee their homes once more (Coronel 1996:58-61). Besides security,
Flagg et al. (1998:12) have identified other important interrelated factors that have
influenced people’s decisions whether or not to return. These include:
• Extent of improvement/worsening of living conditions in the displacement area
• Extent of social, cultural and economic integration in the area of displacement
• Access to education and other services in the displacement area
• Family linkages in the district/village [of origin]
• Possibilities of social and economic development opportunities in the original vil-
lages as opposed to the area of displacement
• Access to financial aid and other types of support from government by deciding
either to remain displaced or return to their villages
• Geographic distance of displacement area from village of origin & Economic
means at the moment in which the return is considered as an option
• Length of time spent away from the village and age of the potential returnees
With regard to persons who had sought refuge in distant urban centres, the pat-
tern that emerged was that those most recently displaced were also the ones most like-
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ly to return to their rural villages of origin. Or in other words, the longer the time
away, the lesser the likelihood that the desplazado would want to return to his origi-
nal home (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Duration of Displacement of Return Population
One explanation why the majority of long-time desplazados seldom chose to return is
that in most instances, having comer earlier, they were able to secure the best of the
scarce resources, space, and opportunities available at their place of displacement.
The livelihood conditions of most of the earliest, most settled desplazados were there-
fore generally superior to those of more recent refugees. Furthermore, long-estab-
lished desplazados have also had more time to feel settled in their place of refuge. It
is therefore hardly surprising that inserción was often the option of choice for such
individuals. Isabel Coral argues that a large percentage of these people would, under
normal conditions, probably have become traditional economic migrants anyway, had
their lives and plans not been disrupted by war. “The violence expelled them before
their time. In general, definitive insertion is considered by those who have achieved a
certain stability,” writes Coral (1994:29). These were mainly people who possessed
the necessary linguistic skills and education, economic resources, and personal sup-
port networks with which to integrate relatively easily into their host (urban) society.
Consequently, their goals and actions were directed at permanently settling down
where they were, and their global strategy was to promote the general development
of the asentamiento humano in which they lived. By contrast, those desplazados who
failed to adapt to urban life have generally chosen to make at least a partial return.
Predominant among this group were peasants from Ayacucho’s high-Andes region
(puna), and displaced natives from the Amazon.
Another likely reason for not returning was that many desplazados who had been
displaced for 11 years or more simply believed there was probably very little for them
to go back to. They supposed that after so many years away, their homes and all their
livestock and seed stocks would almost certainly have already been plundered or
destroyed. For them, a return was viewed as a waste of effort and resources; besides
which the idea of returning to backbreaking agricultural work held little appeal. For
many desplazados, that it was highly probable they had nothing left to go back to
served to discourage a decision to return.
Many other desplazados, on the other hand, were determined to return and make
a fresh start, whatever the hardships involved. This was apparent to me in 1997 when
251
Comittees of Reconstruction and Development
Duration of Displacement % 
Total 100.0 
Less than 6 years 39.6 
6-10 years 36.6 
11-15 years 22.7 
More than 15 years 1.1 
Source: after INEI 1998b:24
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I visited Unión Minas, a return community in Tambo district. Situated in the frigid
puna at an altitude of around 3,500 metres, the village was considered by the munic-
ipality to be “muy pobre.” However, even that assessment did not fully prepare me
for the appalling living conditions I would find there. Most of the village’s 170 or so
inhabitants lived in a tight cluster of low, damp, turf-walled huts, with roofs con-
structed from the wild puna grass called ichu. Only a very few huts had roofs of cor-
rugated iron sheets. The inhabitants had returned to Unión Minas from
Ccarhuapampa almost two years earlier, and there was still neither a local school nor
a health clinic built in the village. Every single inhabitant was suffering from one form
of health problem or another, from skin infections to a wide range of respiratory and
gastro-intestinal illnesses. As honoured guests, the health worker I was accompanying
and I were served the best food the villagers could offer, which were blackened, with-
ered potatoes. They apologised for the condition of the potatoes, blaming rancha (a
fungus) for blighting their crops. They had no money for fertilisers and pesticides, let
alone for healthy seeds. Yet, in spite of all this, the retornos of Unión Minas at the
time of my visit remained undaunted and optimistic. “At least here we have our own
land,” many told me. Indeed, many of the surrounding hillsides were once again
under cultivation after having been unattended for so many years.27 The men
expressed to me their optimism that the municipality would eventually build a road
to the village; that one day soon it would provide them with electricity and potable
water, construct a school and perhaps even a health clinic. Although secretly I could
not share their optimism that the future would bring the degree of development that
they patiently awaited, I nevertheless wished them the best of luck and left with my
small plastic bag of mouldy potatoes and a great degree of respect and admiration for
their tenacity and hopefulness.
In the department of Ayacucho, the very nature of the cause of displacement also
proved a significant factor in the regional patterns of retorno or inserción. The evi-
dence suggests that the greater part of retornantes came from provinces where inter-
nal population displacement could be attributed primarily to Shining Path aggression;
of these, La Mar and Huanta registered the largest number of returns (see Table 6.2.
MRSDA 1997:3). 
In comparison, the vast majority of desplazados from the department’s southern
provinces—Lucanas, Parinacochas, Huancasancos, Víctor Fajardo, Vilcashuamán,
Paucar de Sara Sara—have chosen for insertion, “owing, among other factors to [the
fact] the Armed Forces, who was the principal cause of displacement in these zones,
remains in control of them” (MRSDA 1997:3).
The vast majority of retornantes were those who had fled only to neighbouring
rural villages, or to district capitals—that is to say, fled to rural places of refuge not
too distant from their home villages. Proximity makes returning to one’s original
home easier, both physically and psychologically. By contrast, the vast majority of dis-
placed persons who fled to Lima and other major cities have not returned.
Generally, more retornantes were male than female, with 25 to 39-year-olds of
both sexes constituting the largest age group (INEI 1998b:43-45). The INEI study
discovered that they also tended to be individuals with only a very basic level of edu-
cation, if any at all: “...85,3% [of the population interviewed] mentioned working in
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occupations connected with agriculture and farming qualifications. As well, 8,3%
declared themselves to be unskilled labourers, ambulant peddlers and such, the other
group of 1,8% claimed to be professionals and intellectuals” (ibid.:51).
Table 6.3: Level of Education of Returnees Interviewed by INEI
A reasonable explanation for this pattern is that there were generally more opportu-
nities for higher-educated individuals in urban centres than for the lesser educated,
and also greater and better opportunities for the higher educated in the cities than in
the campo. Moreover, individuals who already possessed or have recently gained a
comparatively high level of education often regarded themselves as socially superior,
and certainly as belonging to a separate social class from those with much lesser
schooling. Consequently, such higher-educated desplazados probably came to have
the attitude that nothing less than an urban lifestyle befits their social status, and that
a life in the campo is only for the “cholos” and “chutos.”28
Comparatively few refugee returns have been planned and organised with the
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Table 6.2: Internal Refugee Returns, Ayacucho Department, by Province and District,
as of 1997
Province Number of Families Districts Principally Affected 
Huanta 3,575 Ayahuanco, Santillana, Huanta, Sivia, Luricocha,
(13,727 persons) Huamanguilla, Iguaín.
La Mar 2,003 Anco, Santa Rosa, Ayna.
(8,012 persons)
Huamanga 738 San José de Ticllas, Santiago de Pischa, Acocro, Chiara,
Vinchos, Acosvinchos, Pacaycasa, Quinua, Ocros.
Vilcashuamán 625 Umaru, Vischongo, Pomatambo.
Cangallo 275 Icaraccay, Huahuapuquio.
Víctor Fajardo 263 Huamanquiquia, Asquipata.
Lucanas 389 Santa Ana de Aucará, Andamarca, Chipao.
Parinacochas 250 Pacapausa, Upahuacho, Incuyo.
Sucre 188 Chalcos, Pampamarca, Belén.
Source: after MRSDA 1997:3-4
Level of Education % 
Very little or no education 18.5 
Primary education 57.6 
Secondary education 21.4 
Higher education  2.5 
Source: after INEI 1998b:47
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assistance of the government, the army, or non-governmental groups (see Table 6.4).
The government’s Programa de Apoyo al Repoblamiento (PAR) claims that by 1997,
it had assisted in organising 7,723 instances of return.29
Table 6.4: Modes of Return in Ayacucho, Junín, Apurímac, Huancavelica, Huanuco,
and Ancash departments.
The Mesa Regional Sobre Desplazamiento Ayacucho noted, however, that “the return
marches organised from Lima by PAR generally result in failure a few months after
the referred to return” (MRSDA 1997:9). Why? Uncertainty about security and liv-
ing conditions owing to a lack of contact with their home villages, and even distrust
of the government’s motives, were just some of the reasons why many government-
organised returns failed.
In contrast, the vast majority of returns—PAR estimated their number to be
around 50,000—have been spontaneous actions organised by the returnees them-
selves, though always with the authorisation of the local or regional political-military
commander either before or very soon after the return. Retornantes made the return
journey home either as individuals, as separate households, or with other co-villagers
as a group. Moreover, rather than making a total return to the countryside, many
families opted instead for a “partial return,” whereby the family members would
divide their time living and/or working both in their urban asentamientos humano
(human [refugee] settlements) and in their rural villages of origin. Retornantes to vil-
lages close to their asentamientos humanos have been understandably reluctant to
give up the modern conveniences of urban life they have become accustomed to, like
running water, electricity, schools, etc. Such individuals therefore often return to their
rural villages only when they need to work in their fields, and otherwise preferring to
maintain their place of residence in an urban setting.
The decision to return was sometimes literally made “on the spot” by many com-
munities, such as in the case of Huico, a community in Acocro district, whose dis-
placed members “met in Ayacucho on 28 September 1995 and decided to return
together on the very same day” (Flagg et al. 1998:8). Other retornos were achieved
only through the vision, initiative, and vigorous effort of a few individuals.
Few return stories are as dramatic as that of Uchuraccay’s, the alto-Andino com-
munity that achieved widespread notoriety after eight reporters were brutally mur-
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Mode of Return % 
Total 100.00 
Own Decision  88.8 
Organised by Government (PAR)   5.4 
Organised by Armed Forces   3.7 
Organised by NGO   1.2 
Other   0.8 
Organised by the Catholic Church   0.1  
Source: after INEI 1998b:38
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dered there by villagers in January 1983. Throughout the rest of that dreadful year and
into the following one, Uchuraccay and its neighbouring communities frequently expe-
rienced intensely devastating guerrilla attacks for being the first of Ayacucho’s peasant
communities to counter-rebel. The violence took its heavy toll, and by the end of 1984,
Uchuraccay lay completely abandoned. Its villagers had fled to different destinations.
Many went to live in Huanta, Huamanga, and Tambo, while others moved to as far
away as Lima. Wherever they went, the Uchuraccaínos took care to conceal their true
identity in an attempt to escape the stigma of having come to be known throughout
Peru as “los mataperiodistas”—”the journalist killers.” During their long years in exile,
the scattered villagers never attempted to reunite as a community, and very few tried
to contact old neighbours beyond immediate relatives and close friends. Nevertheless,
many often thought back nostalgically to how much better life had been before the
war, before they became desplazados. Many reminisced about their “vida de tranquili-
dad,” when they were able to grow enough food to feed themselves, and had vast live-
stock herds to meet the rest of their subsistence needs.30 Although the so-called
“Iquichan” alto-Andinos were commonly regarded by their fellow Peruvians as among
the “poorest” of peasants (e.g. Degregori 1999a:67), the Uchuraccaínos, for their part,
measured their wealth in terms of the size of their herds, and so had actually thought
themselves quite well-off. However, when their animal herds were annihilated or were
forcibly taken from them by Shining Path guerrillas, and their homes burnt, the
Uchuraccaínos fled and eventually arrived at their various places of refuge completely
destitute. Given that at the time of their displacement the vast majority of alto-Andinos
were virtually uneducated and spoke only Quechua, those lucky enough to find spo-
radic work were limited to performing menial jobs as domestic servants and manual
labour as peons. Even then, such work did not necessarily bring monetary income, as
Elías Ccente, Uchuraccay’s president, explained to me years later. “They didn’t pay us.
We worked for our patrons for nothing. We worked only in return for food, nothing
more. Therefore we didn’t have money to make purchases.”31 Less fortunate
Uchuraccaínos had no other choice but to beg for food or money in the street. Over
the years, however, the desplazados of Uchuraccay learned to speak Castellano. With
occasional help from friends like José Coronel (a Huantino anthropologist and lectur-
er at the UNSCH), and from some evangelical and humanitarian institutions, they
managed to make a new life for themselves. In time, the various desplazados living in
the city of Huanta were able to form, with the assistance of one or two NGOs and a
few sympathetic individuals like Coronel, a self-help organisation that pooled togeth-
er the scarce cash and food resources of its members. Few Uchuraccaínos imagined it
would ever be possible for them to return and, according to Elías Ccente, many no
longer even wanted to. Consequently, organising a return proved a tremendously dif-
ficult undertaking. Not only did he first have to track down his widely dispersed co-
villagers throughout the country; he also had to convince them that it made sense to
return. “It was difficult to reunite my paisanos,” he told me. 
For example, they were very suspicious and very ashamed because of
the problem that had happened in Uchuraccay on 26 January, when
the journalists were killed. Therefore, the peasants didn’t want to
return. And so we have searched for paisanos here and there, even as
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far away as in the city of Lima. I have personally gone to invite [them
to reunite], spending my own money, emptying my own pockets, no?
Therefore, little by little we have reunited, with difficulty. We suc-
ceeded in reuniting only twenty-eight families in ’92 and ’93.”32
The return date to Uchuraccay had been set for 20 July 1993, but this original plan
fell through. “Regrettably the people had not returned, and there on the moor I stood
alone, all by myself,” Ccente recalled with some amusement. It had been arranged
beforehand that the commander of Huanta’s Castropampa Army Base would lend
security by providing the retornantes with a military escort. Rumours, however, trans-
formed this security measure into the very source of their fear as many Uchuraccaínos
came to believe that the soldiers meant to sell them. (Sell them to whom, nobody real-
ly knew.) (It is interesting to note that this fear of bodily abduction is similar to that
which has inspired the pishtaco legend.)
There had been comments, then, which my paisanos heard, that said,
‘Don’t return because there are perhaps bad people who are going to
take you away to sell you.’ Or ‘Anything can happen. You are all fine
here, what do you want to return for? Why do you want to go back?’
That is why my paisanos did not come the first time, then, because
they were thinking that perhaps the soldiers were going to take them
away to sell them, and so it was better [not to return and] to stay
[where they were].
The community that did make a return to the high punas on 20 July was San José
de Santillana Marccaraccay. Pointing to Marccaraccay’s successful return as an exam-
ple, Ccente was finally able to convince many of his paisanos that their fears and
apprehensions were unfounded, and a new date to return was set. And so it was that
on 10 October 1993, around 70 families returned home at last to Uchuraccay, after
an absence of almost a decade. They have since been joined by many others who have
made their way back to the village. As if to break with the bitter events of the past,
the new village is located on a slope some one hundred metres above the old village
square, where the reporters were killed, the site of which is today commemoratively
marked by a single white cross.
Though we may associate refugee returns with social renewal, it is true that in
some instances they have also engendered new tensions, rivalries, and competition. As
such, refugee returns can also be viewed as having a had a disruptive effect on local
social and political relations. Indeed, in many areas of the department where retor-
nantes have come back to live alongside resistentes, ensuing social and political dis-
cord has frequently been reported. Whereas the most common tensions and conflicts
between desplazados and resistentes often involves the issue of land entitlement and
whether desplazados who might never return to the village should be permitted to
retain land, the tensions that have arisen between retornantes and resistentes, by con-
trast, have often been about local political power. For instance, Flagg et al. observed,
“in Pampamarca a certain amount of tension existed between the resistant members
of the community and the returnees, not over land as much as political power.
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Returnees are generally the younger more educated generation who...had been sent
away to the city for their schooling. They therefore tend to have different ideas con-
cerning possible developments for their community vis a vis the resistentes”
(1998:10). The authors also go on to point out that social and political tensions
between retornantes and resitentes were sometimes exacerbated when community
funds were involved: “...in Pampamarca...great disputes arose when the community
tractor was sold to raise funds to buy a parabolic aerial for television (there is no elec-
tricity in the area at the time, although there will be soon). This raised the issue of
who is really responsible for this money and how many comuneros must be present
at the meetings which decide how to spend it” (Flagg et al. 1998:40).
The dynamics of retornante-resistente relations differ from district to district,
although at the root of most tensions and conflicts is contested political power. The
objective of most returnees was not simply restricted to recuperating the material
property they had lost, or to returning to the life they had before their displacement.
Rather, the majority of retornantes brought back with them new ideas and expecta-
tions aroused by their urban experience, and they wanted to rebuild their communi-
ties according to the image they had in mind. It is hardly surprising that problems
arose when the village they wished to transform was inhabited also by resistentes. This
is not to imply that resistentes were against change. Of course, even resistentes who
had never lived outside their community (or have only had limited migratory experi-
ence) also desired material and infrastructure development for their village. The prob-
lems between the two groups usually arose, however, when it came to deciding the
manner and the direction of the community’s future development. Many resistentes I
spoke to in Tambo district maintained that they should have a greater say than recent-
ly arrived retornantes in deciding the affairs of their community on account of the
many sacrifices they had made in defending the village over the years. On the other
hand, retornantes told me that they felt more capable than their “more traditional”
and “less experienced” resistente neighbours in planning, deciding, and managing
their community’s future development.
Resistente-retornante friction can arise within individual village populations, but
also between villages. At the district level, resistente villages in Tambo district have
often appealed to the alcalde that they should have priority over repopulated retor-
nante villages in receiving developmental and reconstruction assistance (CEPRODEP
1997). They maintained that it was not only their due as resistentes, but also that it
was more reasonable to put scarce resources to use in aiding and developing existing
needy villages, rather than reviving those that had long ago been abandoned or com-
pletely destroyed.
I cannot predict how these sorts of conflicts and tensions between retornantes and
resistentes will develop in the future, for these processes are still unfolding. We must
not forget that what are often involved here are communities in the process of becom-
ing, where individuals and households with diverse backgrounds and experiences are
having to used to living alongside one another once again after years of separation
and social disruption. But whatever the outcomes will be, the most encouraging sign
that Tambino society as a whole had made an important break with the past was that
people were keen to make it clear to me that they were determined to resolve their
problems and differences by peaceful means, rather than with violence.
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6.3 The significance of the CADs in the process of return and 
reconstruction
It was the security that village-defence militias were able to bring to many rural areas
that made it possible for displaced people to begin returning and rebuilding their eco-
nomic and social lives. We have already presented numerous illustrations of this. In
the previous chapter, for instance, we saw that the round-the-clock vigilance provid-
ed by Ccarhuapampa’s active ronderos enabled other community members to culti-
vate nearby fields in safety. We have also seen the example of the Patrulla Especial of
Tambo escorting peasants who wanted to work the fields they had in more remote
and possibly dangerous corners of the district. In more recent years, the Patrulla
Especial was also used to provide security for workers on various infrastructure con-
struction projects in the district, such as the new Tambo-Usmay road. In addition, it
was the pacification of vast areas of the emergency zone, achieved through the efforts
civil defence groups, that helped to convince thousands of displaced people to return
and repopulate villages situated in areas that were once considered unsafe.
Apart from the general socioeconomic reconstruction they engendered, refugee
returns were fulfilling another important function. Namely that in as much as they
repopulated strategic areas of the countryside with communities hostile to Shining
Path, refugee returns also served as an effective instrument of pacification. This being
so, the Fujimori government, in coordination and conjunction with local military and
civilian forces, put its full support behind the return process, undoubtedly as much
for its counterinsurgency value as for humanitarian motives.
It is indeed amazing how much military attitudes had changed in less than a
decade. In 1984 the army generally viewed Ayacucho’s peasants with deep suspicion,
and thus adopted a strategy that sought to empty the countryside by concentrating
local populations into clustered settlements—the objective being to deprive the
enemy of its presumed peasant support base. By 1993, however, the government’s
new pacification strategy involved repopulating abandoned areas of the countryside
with communities organised into self-defence committees, and through them expand-
ing the presence and influence of the State.
In Tambo district, the civil defence committees themselves apparently took the
lead in initiating the return process. Comando Zorro writes in his war diary: “We
decided to organise, from the month of December 1993 onwards, in the district of
Tambo, the Repopulation [of abandoned villages], supporting them by offering secu-
rity and organising community works so as to rebuild vanished communities.”33 (See
Appendix A.) Every repopulated village in Tambo district was obliged to form a
Comité de Autodefensa y Desarrollo, and to provide Comando Zorro with a register
of the names of all its members. Over the following months and years, PAR and a
small number of NGOs would lend assistance to Tambo’s retornante communities by
providing them with donations of food, tools, seeds and building materials, like cor-
rugated iron sheets (calaminas). For its part, the army periodically provided humani-
tarian assistance by way of civic action projects, and military assistance by dispensing
shotguns and ammunition. In fact, local army garrisons throughout the emergency
zone were, by this time, making more serious efforts to foster better and closer rela-
tions with the local population. One way was to periodically organise cultural enter-
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tainment and sporting activities, like dances and friendly football matches. In the
province of La Mar, the Pichari garrison’s 35-piece army brass and drum band was a
regular feature at all its acciónes civica, providing music and entertainment as well as
momentary protection to the rural beneficiaries of the army’s goodwill.
Schoolteachers would often also accompany civic action excursions, handing out
school supplies (“paquetes escolares”) to retornante schoolchildren. Usually also on
hand was an army barber or two giving free haircuts, and civilian nurses and doctors
to perform checkups, distribute donated medicines, and to try and educate peasant
men and women about contraception. In fact, civic actions were not unlike fairs, and
on the occasion I was able to participate in one, it was obvious to me that the retor-
nantes present were clearly enjoying themselves.
From 1994 onwards, Tambo’s Patrulla Especial, in addition to routinely inspect-
ing all the rural communities in the district to ensure that they continued to maintain
a functioning self-defence committee, also came to assume the responsibility of organ-
ising and supervising faenas. The task of ensuring that all able-bodied men and
women participated in the faenas comunal fell on the patrol’s members, who pun-
ished absentees and malingerers with a fine of two soles, or with extra work. Just as
participation in community defence had been compulsory, so too was it made manda-
tory to take part in the realisation of community work projects of reconstruction. A
typical CCADD report to the local military commander in Tambo, following a rou-
tine inspection of the communities, would read: “Verified the following: general reg-
istration of the population, armaments, communal faenas, and later proceeded to
sanction the loafers who did not collaborate in the faenas of the programmed tasks,
like cleaning their reservoir and irrigation canal, the construction of their communal
house [casa comunal] and latrines” (after CCAD-SJB 1995:2).
There is little doubt that the degree of socioeconomic and political reconstruction
that has taken place in the Ayacuchan countryside to date would not have been pos-
sible were it not for the increased ability of the CADs, together with the army, to
guarantee a reasonable level of security from about the end of 1992 onwards. Not
only did this process of pacification enable the government to initiate extensive
reconstruction and development projects, it also stimulated the return to the coun-
tryside of NGOs and the crucial aid they bring. In addition, the decline in political
violence in recent years also gradually encouraged local individuals to assume bureau-
cratic offices once again, even in rural areas with little or no police or army presence,
so long as there were CADs. It also helped convince existing district authorities to
return from the urban centres to which they had fled. Ever since the early 1980s, the
threat of assassination by guerrillas impelled most district-level government offi-
cials—like alcaldes, juezes de paz, and gobernadores—to administrate from a distance;
that is to say, from the relative safety of cities like Huamanga or Huanta. With the
gradual achievement of pacification in the surrounding countryside, thanks largely to
the efforts of the CADs, municipal officials began to return to their district capitals
from 1991 onwards, thus effectively undoing the earlier success of Sendero’s cam-
paign to “batir el campo” (see Table 6.5).
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Table 6.5: Deaths caused by Political Violence, according to social category, 1989-
1998
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Presumed
Subversives 553 320 218 377 323 53 152 56 51  20  
Army 95 56 69 181 69 29 71 40 18 17 
Governor  8  5  3  4  5 0 0 0 0 0 
L. Governor 20 12  9 10 11 6 4 5 2 2 
Judge 17  6  2 11  2 0 0 0 1 1 
Prov. Mayor  7  0  2  1  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Dist. Mayor 37 17 16 15 12 4 0 1 1 0 
L. Mayor  8  2  3  5  4 0 1 0 0 0 
TOTAL 1,971 1,477 1,177 1,718 1,129 324 428 211 130 83 
Source: INEI 1999:47
6.4 Agents and visions of reconstruction and development
In 1991, the government took the first steps to trim a bloated bureaucracy by auc-
tioning off state-owned enterprises. The domestic political and economic instability
at the time, coupled with sceptical international opinion about the uncertain fate of
the country, ensured that the privatisation venture got off to a slow start. But the gov-
ernment’s competent and rapid ability to bring both the insurgency and the rampant
hyperinflation problems under control helped to bolster foreign investor confidence.
So much so, in fact, that “[by] the end of 1994, the government had sold or was set
to sell most of the private companies that had been nationalised during the period of
military rule from 1968 to 1980. The total inflow of these revenues to the treasury
exceeded $3 billion by the middle of 1995” (Klarén 2000:418-419). Furthermore, tax
reforms initiated soon after the new government came to power also helped boost the
Central Bank’s reserves, which the García government had left with a deficit of $143
million (ibid.:420). Additional revenues also came in the form of substantial foreign
financing and credit. The consequence of all this was to enviably endow the Fujimori
government with ample, fresh revenues at its discretionary disposal. The President
prudently chose to allocate at least half of this windfall to new governmental social
programmes, ostensibly aimed at improving the lives of the urban and rural poor and
working classes. It was a wise decision given that these classes formed the backbone
of his electoral support. Even before the political opposition even began to thing
about preparing for the next general elections, the Fujimori government was already
fully engaged in waging a calculated political campaign to win hearts and votes.
The way in which the government’s social programmes of reconstruction and
development were applied merely reflected the structure of power laid down by the
autogolpe. That is to say, “budgetary allocations became more concentrated in the
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Ministry of the Presidency.... The upshot was that Fujimori could now effectively
micromanage the government’s social programmes, targeting specific areas and sec-
tors of the population for maximum political impact. In effect, the Ministry of the
Presidency had assumed a monopoly over public works and social projects” (Klarén
2000:420). The mainspring of the Fujimori government’s social assistance and devel-
opment programme was FONCODES, the Fondo Nacional de Compensación y
Desarrollo, financed by the World Bank. FONCODES funded an array of infrastruc-
ture and poverty-focussed initiatives ranging from the construction of roads, water
reservoirs, and public latrines, to projects dealing with health and nutrition matters.
Schools across the country were built with financial aid from INFES, and FONAVI
brought electrification to many asentamientos humanos in the emergency zone. As
has already been mentioned, in the government’s campaign against poverty and
perennial neglect, the army managed to improve its relations with the local popula-
tion—and so too its public image—by conducting an increased number of civic action
initiatives. As I have already explained, these acciones civica put soldiers to work on
infrastructure construction or repair projects, or had them distributing emergency
rations and other basic items provided by PAR, PRONAA (Programa Nacional de
Asistencia Alimentaria), or some other government agency or ministry, to returnees
and to impoverished rural communities. (It should be noted that the army-sponsored
civic actions of the 1990s were by no means original initiatives. It was General
Huamán who had first advocated them in the early 1980s as an important component
of his own counterinsurgency vision.) The military’s expanded civic action role in the
1990s, along with the fact that it came to assume both the tasks of organising most
pro-government rallies in the emergency zones, and of routinely shuttling the
President around the country from one public relations function to another, led many
observers to conclude that under the Fujimori regime, “the armed forces had become
the principle institutional vehicle to deliver these services and the related political
message” (Klarén 2000:420-421).
One of the most important government aid agencies to operate in the conflict-
torn Andean emergency zones was PAR, whose mission was, firstly, to organise and
supply provisions for the return of displaced populations to “areas affected by ter-
rorist violence,” and secondly, to assist in establishing for such retornantes their “basic
conditions sustainable human development” (PAR 1997:4). In the returns organised
under its auspices, the returnees were always provided with a standard donation of
food, tools, clothing, cooking utensils, and provisional identity/electoral cards. Once
on a visit to the peasant community of Trigopampa to inaugurate public works
financed by PAR and the Swiss government, President Fujimori himself handed out
provisional identity documents to the villagers in the presence of visiting representa-
tives of the Swiss embassy. “This action is being made not only in regard to the repop-
ulation, but also to grant identification to each of the citizens who has lost them dur-
ing the time of terrorism or did not have the opportunity to obtain his voter’s card,”
Fujimori then announced to the press. “We calculate that from now until [the year]
two thousand we will be able to give more or less half a million provisional identity
documents, which are later going to result in a voter’s card so that displaced persons
may recuperate their civic rights totally. This is a continuation of the process of paci-
fication....” (quoted in La Calle 1996:4).
261
Comittees of Reconstruction and Development
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 261
There is no doubt that on this as on other similar occasions, the inauguration of
public works and the issuing of provisional identity-cum-electoral cards were inter-
connected events—a “coincidence” calculated for political ends. Beneath the civic-
rights rhetoric expounded for the benefit of the press and the Swiss diplomats, the
President’s political message to the locals, conveyed more by his actions than by his
words, was simple and clear: “The next time you’re at the ballot box, remember what
I have done for you and your community.” Indeed, for most of its ten years in power,
the Fujimori government never permitted local communities to forget what benefits
it had brought them. Throughout Peru, one could not miss the large billboards, paint-
ed in bright orange, which were planted beside every public work subsidised by the
government. These signs not only stated, among other things, the project’s objective,
the sponsoring governmental agency or ministry, and the total cost. They were also
mental markers that served to remind local beneficiaries daily of the government’s
patronage and generosity, and, concurrently, of their moral and political debt to “El
Chino.” On Election Day 1995, Fujimori was not to be disappointed. His landslide
victory that year marked the high-water mark of the symbiotic political relationship
between the populist president and the underprivileged masses, which were his most
numerous political supporters and thus the main beneficiaries of his aid and pork-
barrel projects.
Although in recent years the government came to assume a more prominent role
in the struggle against poverty and underdevelopment in the country’s urban shanty-
towns and in the Andean countryside, it had not always done so in the past. During
the last years of President García’s administration, for instance, the mismanaged, bank-
rupt, and corruption-ridden government was more preoccupied with forestalling its
own disintegration and collapse than with initiating poverty alleviation programmes.
262
From Victims to Heroes
Photo 7. Civic Action at Usmay, Tambo District, 1997
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 262
It was therefore of little surprise that in Peru, “[as] government programs failed to meet
basic needs, NGOs multiplied with special speed..., promising more efficient, innova-
tive, and democratic ways of improving poor people’s lives” (Starn 1999:193). In fact,
many of the projects implemented by foreign-funded Peruvian NGOs and by the
Catholic and Evangelical churches over the years prefigured many of Fujimori’s own
social assistance initiatives. These NGO-supported initiatives included providing vari-
ous sorts of assistance in order to facilitate refugee returns; (re)building local infra-
structure like irrigation canals, potable water systems, health clinics and schools;
donating machinery and tools, setting up orphanages and providing assistance to des-
titute widows and street children; and supporting grassroots movements, like the
clubes de madres and the rondas campesinas of Cajamarca. Yet whereas the govern-
ment’s programme focused almost exclusively on providing material assistance, Peru’s
diverse community of NGOs and church-related groups tried instead to offer a wider
variety of projects aimed not only at meeting basic material needs, but also at address-
ing deeper social issues and promoting social justice. Particular emphasis was placed on
reaching out to the most marginalized and “muted” sectors of society (like orphaned
and abandoned children).
The escalation of political violence during the 1980s created conditions that made
it extremely difficult, and eventually impossible, for NGOs to continue working safe-
ly in the countryside. NGOs offices and personnel throughout the emergency zone
found themselves caught in a vicious crossfire that put them at risk of being bombed,
assassinated, kidnapped or disappeared by one or both sides (see Smith 1992). They
were, on the one hand, denounced as “counter-revolutionary” by Sendero Luminoso,
which regarded the work they did as both diverting the peasant masses from recog-
nising the imperativeness of the “armed struggle,” and serving but to prop up the
“rotten” state and status quo. In addition, NGOs have found themselves assailed on
the other flank by the State. Successive presidents from Belaúnde to Fujimori have
accused NGOs of disparaging the Peruvian government and its security forces, main-
ly about human rights abuses, and of allegedly serving as fronts for diverting funds to
the insurgency movement. In one of his particularly acerbic denunciations of NGOs
and their foreign sponsors, President Belaúnde stated: “Our Police Forces, they are
confronted at the present time...[by] the mistaken ideologies that [the insurgency is]
trying to introduce to Peru, sometimes concealed by pompous names of scientific or
humanitarian institutions which, as we have been able to prove, receive hundreds of
millions of soles not so as to exalt or to raise the standard of life in the country, but
to sow misery and chaos, and to try to drown this nation in a sea of blood and tears”
(quoted in DESCO 1989:402-403).
And so, whereas between 1980 and 1983 there had existed in Ayacucho no less
than twelve non-governmental institutions, by 1984 most had abandoned the coun-
tryside and retreated to Huamanga. The majority of them would eventually close
down, leaving only four NGOs functioning in the entire department.34 Very little
work could be done by the remaining NGOs in the campo during the 1980s, and even
then only in easily accessible areas, close to Huamanga. Moreover, given the hostili-
ty and deep suspicion shown towards advocates of human rights by successive gov-
ernments, NGOs working in the emergency zone prudently restricted themselves to
addressing exclusively technical-economic issues in order to avoid persecution from
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the security forces. As TADEPA points out, “[a]ny ample meeting, in a community or
a hamlet, always has to rely on the previous authorisation of the security forces
(police or army)....” (1992:120). And if an NGO wanted to obtain military authori-
sation to continue working, it had to appear “politically neutral” (ibid.).
Even so, abandoning political work and restricting themselves to technical and
economic tasks was not without its attendant benefit. By focusing their work on
addressing urgent economic needs, some of these NGOs were consequently able to
forge strong links with local communities, and to win the trust and crucial support of
the population (ibid). The progressive pacification of the emergency zones from 1993
onwards brought a concomitant easing of some of the implicit political restrictions on
the sorts of work NGOs were permitted to do by the security forces. Consequently,
many old and new NGOs returned to once again take up the task of informing local
populations of their human rights, which is one aspect that is noticeably absent from
the Fujimori government’s own civilian-led social development programmes—not
surprising, of course, given the regime’s own appalling human rights record.
As the idea of “promoting local government” became a increasingly fashionable
guiding principle of many North American and European humanitarian aid financiers
during the 1990s, NGOs in Ayacucho came increasingly to work closely with munic-
ipal mayors (alcaldes). This situation has, in turn, helped to enhance the social and
political importance of alcaldes, while at the same time serving to offset, to some
extent, the central government’s absolute control over the transfer of state revenues.
Municipal funds are generated primarily by renting out municipal land or
machinery, property taxes, through fines, tolls, and fees for professional services (e.g.
registering births, marriages, and deaths), and by managing wisely whatever other
local revenues and resources are at their disposal. As can be expected, then, the
municipalities of impoverished populations are likewise poor, and must therefore
depend on the central government for financial assistance. Yet this raises its own set
of problems, for reliance on the central government has historically been plagued by
rampant clientelism and political favouritism, which reached new extremes during the
Fujimori era. As Nickson explains,
In 1994, without prior consultation, President Fujimori assumed
direct control of the FPM [Fondo de Promoción Municipal, or devel-
opment tax], the main source of central government transfers to local
government. Henceforth 20 percent of FPM proceeds would be trans-
ferred to provincial municipalities and 80 percent of district munici-
palities, but the allocation among municipalities was left to the discre-
tion of the presidential office (1995:245. My emphasis).35
The alcalde of Tambo district once described to me the government assistance his
district received as a “ridiculous [sum] with which to attend to the numerous needs
of our population” (MDTLM 1996a:1)—a sentiment generally shared by municipal
mayors throughout the country. Fujimori’s self-assumed discretionary prerogative,
while tightening the executive branch’s control over state revenues, was also widely
interpreted by his opponents as a means to keep potential political rivals financially
weak and opposition-controlled municipalities dependent on the central government.
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For this reason, NGO support, when it could be obtained, offered alcaldes a prefer-
able alternative way of obtaining developmental assistance for their municipalities
without having to rely exclusively on currying favour with the Fujimori regime. The
financial assistance provided by NGOs allowed municipal authorities to exercise a
greater degree of autonomy in initiating the development and reconstruction projects
of their municipalities, though the optimal strategy was to obtain a combination of
governmental and private developmental aid. For example, Rubén Rojas Domínguez,
Tambo district’s municipal alcalde from 1996 to 1998, was able to bring electrifica-
tion to most of Tambo’s semi-urban desplazado settlements with financial assistance
from the governmental agency FONAVI. From the Swiss government he was able to
secure funding for the construction of water reservoirs and for the reactivation of irri-
gation canals. And a financial donation from a German organisation—Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau—helped build a road running from the village of Huayao to the
community of Usmay, thus providing many of Tambo’s remotest eastern communities
with easier access to the town and the world beyond (MDTLM 1996a).
In the so-called “Lucha por la Reconstrucción y Desarrollo” of Peru’s war-torn
society, the accomplishments of the central and local governments, in conjunction
with NGOs, had been extensive and undeniably remarkable. By mid-1994, FON-
CODES was funding and managing some 4,760 social assistance projects and 23,000
jobs (Klarén 2000:420). In 1997 it allocated the equivalent of $251,183,279
American dollars to 6,046 projects throughout the country (INEI 1998a:206).
Similarly, PAR could boast of having organised more than 7,700 instances of refugee
returns in Ayacucho by the end of 1997. And a host of NGOs could lay claim to hav-
ing improved the quality of life of country folk through their implementation or
sponsorship of diverse projects, like the construction of irrigation canals and latrines,
the setting up of communal shops and micro-credit schemes, the provision of practi-
cal training and information on issues of health, agriculture, livestock engineering and
family planning, women’s literacy courses, the promotion of gender equality, local ini-
tiative, self-reliance, and so forth (see CIDRA 1996).
However, impressive figures on paper, prodigious activities résumés, and out-
standing progress reports belie the numerous serious problems that have plagued the
reconstruction and development mission as a whole. For a start, most of the govern-
ment’s projects were unmistakably motivated principally by political interests, and
aimed at strengthening the electoral base of Fujimori’s populist regime (see Kruijt and
del Pilar Tello 2002). Furthermore, the central government’s method of dispensing
aid had been harshly criticised over the years, not least by municipal mayors, for sim-
ply handing out goods to politically loyal constituencies rather than providing train-
ing that would be more beneficial to the local populations in the long term. As
Federico Salas, Huancavelica’s alcalde and a future presidential candidate, once
explained to the magazine Debate: “[The] State has the resources, at present it is giv-
ing away food. It is giving them fish but it is not teaching them how to fish. The peas-
ant has the will to work, he does not want too much assistance nor too many gift,
because we know that it is temporary; what we want is the power to develop our-
selves, to produce” (Dávila 1997:9). Government handouts, combined with continu-
ing unemployment, simply promoted political clientalism to the regime, and engen-
dered among local populations both dependency and the loss of the will to find or
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create even “informal” sorts of employment. Many common people I spoke to in
1997 and 2000 believed that the government should not restrict itself only to hand-
ing out goods, but must also help to create jobs and, most importantly, to open up or
to seek out new domestic and overseas markets for local produce and labour.
There were other common problems: the mismanagement of projects and ineffi-
ciency in their execution, the incompletion of work contracts, and, of course, graft
and corruption of public funds, particularly at the municipal level. It was not uncom-
mon to hear stories of mayors who had plundered their municipal coffers, leaving the
next alcalde no available funds with which to start his three-year term in elected
office. In 1997 alone, at least twenty-five serving and former municipal authorities
from various districts and provinces of Ayacucho were either being investigated, pur-
sued, detained, or jailed by the police for embezzling or absconding with municipal
funds originally intended for local social development projects.36 The result was a lack
of public trust in the integrity of political officials—hardly a new sentiment, in fact.
“Most men want to become alcalde only so they can plunder the municipal funds, and
rob from the district,” a Tambino once commented to me. “That’s the way it’s always
been, and that’s the way it will always be.”37
But most frustrating for local populations had been what appeared to be a lack of
general coordination between governmental institutions and aid agencies, different
levels of government, and the various projects they envisaged or were actually imple-
menting. There was no more convincing proof of this that FONCODES, which, as
Nickson points out, “came under direct presidential control, with little involvement
by local government” (1995:245). As regards the central government’s social pro-
grammes, Mayor Federico Salas opined to the magazine Debate that “they are not
coordinated with the [local] authorities or with the local population, they are direct-
ed from its ministries in Lima, and therefore they do not get to satisfy the needs of
the population of the interior of the country” (Dávila 1997:8). Surprisingly, this view
was shared even by some of the programme directors themselves. For instance, Victor
Torres Cornejo, PAR’s zonal director for Ayacucho wrote in an internal report:
Governmental agencies have been created for this purpose: FONCODES,
SIERRA CENTRO SUR, PAR. These Agencies and others of the public sec-
tor still do not articulate their actions organically, acting in practice in
isolated ways, at times duplicating activities, for want of a Plan that
orientates their actions in an organic way. Some 60% of those
[returnees] who with the assistance of PAR returned to their commu-
nities come to abandoned it once again because of the lack of eco-
nomic opportunities that satisfy their urgent needs. This is partly due
to the slowness in the maturation of the projects and to the absence
of decentralization and de-concentration of the state apparatus
(Torres Cornejo 1997:17).
There is little doubt that the absence of a common plan of action when it came to
development strategies in general stemmed from the fact that different state institu-
tions and agencies had conflicting ideas of the best way to “develop” Ayacuchan soci-
ety. For instance, according to a number of army officers I spoke to in 1997, the mil-
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itary intended to assume a leading and directing role in any future process of nation-
al reconstruction and socioeconomic development within the emergency zones.
Rather than providing basic services to every village, however, the military envisaged
a cost-effective plan that would require small, remote rural communities to congre-
gate at a centralised place where they would get road access, electricity, and potable
water. “They will only need to return to their fields to work, but they will live in
nucleated settlements” an army officer explained to me.38 “This is the only way to
develop rural society. There is nothing for them in their abandoned villages, and when
they realise this they will want to live in the nucleated settlements.” This vision of
post-war development seemed to me to be nothing more than a continuation of the
“strategic hamleting” initiated by the military during the 1980s, which had already
succeeded in creating nucleated, semi-urban refugee settlements like the ones around
Tambo town. Moreover, such a plan was obviously at variance with PAR’s mission to
encourage and to assist as many displaced people as possible to return to their rural
villages of origin, no matter how remote. More importantly, the army’s vision was, at
the time, wholly incompatible with the deep desire of many internal refugees to
return home.
Evidently, the true picture of developmental achievements and institutional effi-
ciency was not as bright as the government would have foreign donors and the inter-
national community believe. Yet a similar lack of coordination and common effort
was equally apparent among Peruvian NGOs, in addition to which was the more gen-
eral question of whether the projects executed by NGOs are always compatible with,
and attuned to, real needs and local demands (Foweraker 2001:851-852). TADEPA,
a local NGO, pointed out the subsequent problems that had arisen between non-gov-
ernmental institutions: “The presence of [the ONGs and organs of the State] in the
countryside with distinct methodologies and absence of coordination, in practice,
generates confusion and even conflicts between the inhabitants of the microregion,
even reaching unnecessary internal divisions through parallel projects that weaken
communal development” (1992:122).
Persistent operational inefficiency and the general lack of coordination between
projects and between the organisations themselves leads one to simply wonder
whether these problems were permitted to persist in order to serve particular base
interests. An idealistic though disillusioned NGO staffer once told me in 1997: “The
ideal of desarrollo social of the 1960s and ‘70s has today been replaced by the pur-
suit of desarrollo personal. It seems to me that many aid workers intentionally try to
be inefficient in their work because if they eradicate poverty quickly, they would only
be putting themselves out of a job.” A cynical view, perhaps, but there may be some
truth in it nonetheless. One must face up to the bitter fact that during the course of
the 1990s, the project of poverty alleviation had become somewhat of an industry in
Peru, as in many other parts of the developing world (Foweraker 2001:852, 860).
Thousands of educated, middle-class Peruvians earned their daily bread working for
social development organisations, and, as Starn points out, “To start an NGO was a
way to work on social issues, and even to make a living at it, a matter of no small
urgency for all but the wealthiest Peruvians in the hard times of the 1980s”
(1999:202). During the developmental aid boom of the mid- and late-1990s, it
seemed that the funds flooding in to Peru were limitless. To many people—both aid
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workers and peasants alike—the state seemed to possess bottomless financial coffers.
This, of course, was not true, and became all-too-evident when the Peruvian eco-
nomic bubble burst towards the end of the decade. Unemployment began to rise once
again, and the government began to cut drastically its amount of social spending.
Moreover, on the international priority list, Peru can expect to face stiff competition
from the Balkan and African countries for the developmental aid it will continue to
receive from the European Community from 2000 onwards. That Peru has not been
able to do more with the generous amounts of funding it had already received foreign
donor governments may caused some donors—like the Dutch government—to
reassess the degree of financial assistance it provides to the country.
6.5 CADs in the process of economic development
What, then, has been the role of comités de autodefensa in the complex and prob-
lematic process of economic development described above? Before addressing this
question, I believe it is first necessary to draw a distinction between the so-called
“process of reconstruction,” and the “process of development.” As I have already
argued, the process of reconstruction can take place even in the midst of war, for even
in adverse situations of political violence, people still strive to restore some sort of
normalcy in their lives. Reconstruction in this sense consists mainly of small-scale
local activities which utilise local labour and resources, the objective being to recu-
perate as much as possible that which was destroyed by war. Of course, the rebuild-
ing of such things as sabotaged bridges, bombed power lines, roads, and the like, can
also be defined as reconstruction. But in the case of Ayacucho, which as a department
has suffered decades of chronic underdevelopment and neglect on the part of the cen-
tral government, much of what has been built in recent years never existed before,
and therefore was never previously destroyed. It would thus be more accurate to
describe the recent flurry of infrastructure construction and expansion in the depart-
ment as projects that are a part of the process of development, rather than of recon-
struction.
Based on this rough, conceptual distinction between the process of reconstruction
and the process of development, then, it can be concluded that CADs have clearly
made valuable contributions to the process of socioeconomic reconstruction in the
department. Examples of this were been provided above, in section 6 of this chapter.
In contrast, their role and accomplishments in regard to the economic and infra-
structure development of the department over the last decade is more difficult to
assess, and in fact appears to have been fairly marginal, and certainly much more lim-
ited in scale and scope than their contributions to departmental reconstruction. More
specifically, the contribution of peasant militias in government or NGO-sponsored
development projects has often been limited to providing the unskilled, manual
labour force for construction work. There are, of course, some small-scale communi-
ty development projects that have been organised almost exclusively by the commit-
tees of local defence groups, such as the construction of a “parque de la pacificación”
(“park of pacification”) in almost every village. These simple, dirt plazas (which can
be handily transformed into a football field) not only have the symbolic significance
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of honouring ronderos and soldiers who have been killed in the line of duty. Where
they have been built, they also form the new social and spatial centre of Andean vil-
lages. They are symbolic spaces where community assemblies are held, where the
Peruvian flag is raised and saluted, where the national anthem is sang—where, in
short, the rituals of patriotism are celebrated.
In regard to the larger process of developmental transformations in the depart-
ment, however, the primary directing and managing agents have been (1) the central
and municipal governments, (2) the Peruvian NGOs and their foreign donors.
Surprisingly, apparently included in this group are the clubes de madres, which for
years have dedicated their energies precisely to the tasks of economic and domestic
survival, reconstruction and development, and which are now popularly regarded by
the NGOs as one of the most important grassroots vehicles for channelling aid to
local communities, particularly from a “gender perspective,” which is another of the
fashionable principle among NGOs today. Contrary to what their official title might
suggest, Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo have never played a directing role in
any major development project executed in Tambo district,39 nor in any other
Ayacuchan district for that matter. One of the main reasons for this is that CADs have
been unable to define any meaningful contribution they can make to the process of
development that is not already being done by one organisation or another. Apart
from their proven capacity for organisation, and their proficiency in mobilising the
local inhabitants as a work force, the CADs controlled no other means of production
with which to generate more ambitious development projects on their own. Unlike
district mayors, whose access to various sources of financial assistance gives them the
ability to create new jobs for locals, CAD leaders controlled few locally derived
resources, besides organised labour. Thus in order to execute developmental projects
beyond basic infrastructure construction, CAD leaders “[needed] outside support to
be successful” (Palmer 2000:19). However, CAD commanders had found it difficult
to forge links with NGOs because their subordination to military authority had given
them somewhat of a bad public image in Lima and abroad. The general impression
among foreign donor agencies that finance local NGOs was that the CADs were noth-
ing more than army-manipulated “paramilitary groups,” and as such were almost
never seriously considered as grassroots institutions through which foreign aid could
be channelled to local populations. Foreign-funded NGOs have instead preferred to
work through other organisations and social entities deemed to be civil in nature, like
clubes de madres and municipal governments.40
Another reason for the marginalisation of CADs in Ayacucho’s process of devel-
opment was that in spite of the professed goal of governmental and non-governmen-
tal agencies to promote “grassroots empowerment and participation,” what in fact
has more commonly happened is that agencies continued to practice a top-down
approach. Development aid projects, in other words, were conceived, planned, and
managed by these agencies themselves, with little participation from the local popu-
lation in the decision-making process. This is perhaps not surprising, given that these
agencies and organisations were almost all administered by educated middle- and
upper-middle class professionals from Lima, many of whom still held paternalistic
attitudes towards the peasantry that often manifest itself in what Starn describes as
the “infantilization of villagers” (see Starn 1999:197-198). Thus, local peasant lead-
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ers, including CAD commanders, were almost never given the responsibility of mak-
ing important decisions in development projects, and rarely even consulted. This fact
was brought home to me in 1997 while I was participating in a military-sponsored
civic action in the remote upland community of Usmay. At the site of the old village,
I congratulated the local CAD president on the health post that was being built there
in the puna, with the financial assistance of FONCODES. He replied: “Yes, but
nobody consulted us about the location. At night, we all sleep in the old army base,
half a kilometre away, not here, because the terrucos still move through through these
hills after dark. When this health post is built and stocked, the terrucos will just break
in, steal everything, and burn it down.” Sure enough, six months later, a band of guer-
rillas raided the health post. They painted subversive graffiti on the walls before mak-
ing off with everything of value that was inside.41 Though it was not burnt down, the
hospital remained empty and unused ever since.
Irrelevance and marginalisation was therefore the fate that befell the self-defence
committees in the process of socioeconomic development in Ayacucho. It was possi-
ble, of course, that given time and with skills training for its members, the CADs
might have been able to transform themselves into appropriate vehicles for the pur-
suit of developmental priorities, and so obtain financial and organisational support
from external aid donors and the local non-governmental agencies they sponsor. But
as the decade drew to and end, and the twilight of civil war gave way to a new dawn
of peace on the edge of which dark clouds of uncertainty and crisis still loomed, a
reorientation of sociopolitical and economic agendas, priorities, and strategies would
ultimately bring the story of the CADs to an unexpected ending.
Notes
1 Fujimori’s infamous national security advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, explained to the journal
Comando en Acción (1994:40) the justification for the autogolpe in the following terms: “When
the Executive displayed the required initiatives to implement this new strategic design, it came up
against a negative obstruction from the political opposition that, under the inconsistent argument
that [the Executive] wanted to militarise the country, [the opposition] proceeded to trim or to
repeal the Legislative Decrees issued (....) Faced with this situation of entrapment and mindful that
above all was the interests of the nation, on 5 April 1992, one entered a new stage in which the
Government of National Reconstruction, apart from various important measures, put into effect
the Decrees for National Pacification that had previously been sabotaged (quoted in Tapia 1997:69.
Tapia’s emphasis). For further details and analysis of the autogolpe, see Rospigliosi 1996.
2 According to Tapia, during the clashes the Special Forces sent in to quell the riots killed every mem-
ber of the Central Committee they encountered, except for Osmán Morote (Tapia1997:78, fn.42).
The prison intervention thus gave the armed forces a tremendous opportunity to weaken the rev-
olutionary organisation yet further. During his Independence Day address to the Democratic
Constituent Congress on 28 July 1993, Fujimori had this to say about the judicial and penal sys-
tem that his government inherited: 
Until April 5 we had a national government and a criminal force that was challenging it in an
increasingly evident balance of armed power that we could not allow. Within that context, the
previous judicial branch was unable to mete out justice to the terrorist criminals. Following
legal proceedings that were a farce, the terrorists returned to the streets to rejoin annihilation
cells. For over a decade prisons stopped performing their fundamental duty of confining crim-
inals to protect society. Terrorists enjoyed unbelievable opportunities in jail that allowed them
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not only to train their cadres but also to coordinate from there attacks and other criminal oper-
ations because of the submissiveness and inaction of the authorities (quoted in Starn et al.
1995:439).  
3 Author’s interview with Rubén Rojas Domínguez, Alcalde, Tambo district, on 14 October 1997.
4 Torres Cornejo 1997:3.
5 The peak in the number of internally displaced individuals, however, occurred in 1983-1984.
6 Author’s interview with Daniel, a desplazado living in Vista Alegre, Tambo district, on 3 November
1997.
7 According to Isabel Coral and CEPRODEP, approximately 20 percent of desplazados were from
marginal urban sectors, whereas around 10 percent were from higher classes (Coral 1994:15).
8 The Ministry of Health for the sub-region of Ayacucho lists the top three causes of death in the
department between 1995 and 1997 as (1) respiratory illnesses, (2) intestinal infections, and (3) ill-
nesses of the digestive system (see INEI 1998a:186).
9 OPRLLW 1996:20. 
10 OPRLLW 1996:20.
11 The output of potato production in the department was 70,475 kg in 1962, but this had fallen 17
percent to 58,592 kg by 1991. Between 1983 and 1984, production plummeted to the low points
of 20,502 and 24,933 kg respectively. The only other year that potato production fell to a lower
point in the ‘80s was in 1987, when output dropped to 20,032 kg (Ministerio de Agricultura
1992:281).
12 During the first half of the 1990s, each mother in Tambo still had an average of 5 surviving chil-
dren (see INEI 1994b: 623), a comparatively high figure—the national average for rural women in
1990 was about 4.2 (TADEPA 1992:15)—that was nevertheless confirmed to me by members of
Tambo’s local clubes de madres. Large extended families are common among Tambo’s desplazados,
which also places greater pressure on the producing members of the household.
13 Peasants were not the only ones apprehensive about travelling through the countryside. The med-
ical staff of Tambo’s hospital was also always terrified of having to make trips into the campo. In
past years it was common for the staff of Tambo’s health centre to make regular or emergency vis-
its to the rural communities. However, these visits ended when the political violence escalated in
the early 1980s. The guerrilla incursion on 15 May 1982, the purpose of which was to loot the
hospital, must have only served to heighten the fear felt by the health workers. Furthermore, even
when periodic health visits to rural villages were resumed in Tambo in 1997, the continuing climate
of fear in the district encouraged medical personnel to make the amount of time they spent in the
campo as short as possible. As a result, it became common practice for the visiting health workers
to place one of the village authorities, or even the ill persons themselves, in charge of administer-
ing the medication. The danger, as one retired técnico en enfermería (nursing technician) explained
to me, is that this sort of uncontrolled dispensation and administration of medication—they are
often antibiotics donated by Medicos Sin Fronteras—can lead to the emergence of drug-resistant
diseases, which could have a devastating effect on the local population in the long run. This infor-
mation is based on author’s interview with Miguel Casorla Casorla (retired Técnico en Enfermería
II), Tambo district, on 23 October 1997.
14 For a more detailed discussion of the pishtaco legend, see Ansion 1989 and Weismantel 2001.
When my partner, Jenny, and I first came to live in Tambo in 1997, our identity immediately
became the subject of a variety of aspersions and rumours: we were government agents, human
rights agitators, pishtacos. We heard people occasionally mutter the word pishtaco at us in the street
or at the market, especially during our first weeks. After a time, we were eventually able to per-
suade a girl called Marlena to describe for us what a pishtaco looked like and how it behaved, so
that we could recognise it if we happened to come across one. According to Marlena: “Pishtacos
are often white-skinned, though not always. They wear black clothes and can speak Quechua. [She
did not know why this is so, but she immediately knew that we were not pishtacos because we were
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unable to converse with her in Quechua!] Male and female pishtacos both wear dark sunglasses and
long black skirts [faldas negras]. They carry long knives which they use to kill their victims.” Some
say that pishtacos are always strangers to the communities they visit, and haunt desolate places such
as abandoned rural villages. Others claim that they are known individuals who have somehow been
transformed into the frightening creature. Why should they appear as gringos? An Ayacuchana
friend later suggested that it was because in the late 1980s and early ‘90s, masked Senderistas (many
of whom were Caucasian in appearance) visited the villages periodically and recruited or kidnapped
young people to fill their ranks. According to her, most parents in the highlands of Ayacucho tell
their children that all gringos are pishtacos to keep them from approaching strangers. And the sun-
glasses and black clothing? The most conspicuous wearers of sunglasses and dark camouflaged
clothing are the police and army officers (most of whom are again Caucasian or mestizo). It is hard-
ly surprising to find these latent memories of the horrendous atrocities committed against rural
civilians by the Sinchis (the civil guard’s counterinsurgency unit) and the Peruvian Marines in the
1980s, also incorporated into the image of pishtaco. The legend is undoubtedly pre-Hispanic, but
the hybrid characterisation is unmistakably contemporary. It would appear that parents use the
pishtaco myth as a parable for why one must distrust and avoid all strangers. Each generation takes
the fears and nightmares unique to its own experiences of man-made cataclysms and symbolically
personifies them in the fiend they call pishtaco. It is an example of how the people of Tambo are
using cultural symbols to teach and warn their young about contemporary social dangers.
15 CEPRODEP 1997, Grupo 5, Tema II ‘La situación de la Producción Agropecuaria, el Comercio y
el Empleo.’
16 CEPRODEP 1997. 
17 CEPRODEP 1997, Grupo 3, Tema II ‘La situación de la Producción Agropecuaria, el Comercio y
el Empleo.’
18 Of Tambo’s urban desplazados who have surplus to take to market, almost all sell their produce at
the town’s Sunday market and nowhere else (CEPRODEP 1997).
19 Author’s interview with Jorge, Centro de Salud, Tambo district, on 29 September 1997.
20 Author’s interview with rondero Pascual Quispe Vargas on 17 September 1997.
21 Author’s interview with the Junta Directiva of Comité Distrital del Club de Madres, Tambo district,
on 16 October 1997.
22 A general description of most of the rituals and festivities I mention here can be found in Vilchez
1961, Isbell 1978, Mitchell 1991. 
23 As we have already seen, the self-defence phenomenon emerged in different parts of the depart-
ment at different times, and so it is as if to simplify this varied history that the armed forces has
declared May 28 the official Día del Rondero in the departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica.
Local CADs must celebrate the day at the nearest military base, whereas Sede Central authorities
are obliged to attend more lavish celebrations at Los Cabitos.
24 Most of these traditional festivities and celebrations are described in Vilchez 1961:55-68.
25 Author’s interview with Daniel, an evangelical desplazado living in Vista Alegre, Tambo district, on
3 November 1997. 
26 The INEI (1998b) data is based on a survey of approximately 76, 389 retornantes from these 437
districts.
27 As is commonly known, it is not harmful for agricultural fields to lay unused for many years.
Fallowing is, in fact, an important practice especially in the cultivation of the otherwise unpromis-
ing soil of the Andes. Elías Ccente told me that in Uchuraccay, the peasants there employ a pattern
of what Wolf terms “sectorial fallowing” (1966:20-21), whereby plots are planted for two or three
years, and then allowed to regenerate for another seven before being replanted again. That is why
in these highland communities, agriculture and pastoralism are complementary livelihood activities,
each of which is often insufficient by itself to maintain a family.
28 “Chuto” is a derogatory term sometimes used by lowland peasants and city people to refer to the
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peasant highlanders, particularly of Huanta and La Mar provinces, signifying primitive, uneducat-
ed, and uncivilised. The label “cholo” can be regarded as simply meaning anyone who is non-white,
or an indigenous person of “recent upward social mobility” (Isbell 1978:250), usually of peasant
heritage. Its everyday usage, particularly by “non-cholos,” however, usually contains racist and con-
temptuous overtones. “To be straight with you, the cholo is like an animal for me,” a Lima criollo
and former Marine once voiced to anthropologists during an interview (quoted in Degregori and
López Ricci 1990:345). 
29 Torres Cornejo 1997:3.
30 Sufficient animals and enough food to feed themselves is how Elías Ccente defined the satisfying
condition of “tranquilidad.” Sendero altered their life of “tranquilidad,” he told me. Their source
of cash income came primarily from the sale of animals, rather than of agricultural crops like pota-
toes, in towns like Huanta,
31 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000.
32 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000.
33 Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), p.71.
34 These four remaining NGOs were CEDAP – Centro de Desarrollo Agropecuario, IER – Instituto
de Estudios Regionales ‘José María Arguedas,’ CCC – Centro de Capacitación Campesina, and
TADEPA – Taller de Promocción Andina.
35 For a detailed overview of local government in Peru, or in Latin America for that matter, see
Nickson 1995.
36 See La Calle 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997e, 1997f, 1997g.
37 Author’s conversation with Yuri Calle, Secretary of Acco, a peasant community in the district of
Tambo, on 24 September 1997.
38 Author’s interview with Captain (now Major) César G. Vásquez Guevara of the 2nd Infantry
Division, Jefe Militar CCAD SZSNC-8, Frente Huamanga (Ayacucho and Huancavelica depart-
ments, and the districts of Pichari-Quimbiri in La Convención province, Cuzco department), on 27
June 1997.
39 Author’s interviews with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
General of Tambo district’s Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo, on 6 November 1997 and
on 31 May 2000. 
40 Author’s discussion with Jan Kees Verkooijen, Primer Secretario Cooperación Técnica, Royal
Embassy of the Netherlands, Lima, on 9 May 2000.
41 This guerrilla incursion is reported in CCAD-SJB 1998:1.
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7 Unexpected endings
I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone 
Stand in the desert....
And on the pedestal these words appear:
“My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings.
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
— Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Ozymandias”
7.1 The presidential elections of 2000 and the fall of the Fujimori regime
Falling debris from a government building engulfed in ravenous sheets of flame was
the last image of Peru that I saw on an airport-lounge television screen, just before
boarding my return flight to Amsterdam in July 2000. “What is happening to my
country,” the portly Peruvian passenger standing close behind me whispered to him-
self, in a voice that seemed to echo the nation’s general mood of utter confusion and
despair. In spite of having come through the years of revolutionary terror, when the
sound of exploding car bombs and sudden bursts of gunfire were so common as to
become a part of daily life in what seemed to be a nightmare with no end, Lima and
other Peruvian cities were ablaze once again. And the nation appeared to be heading
once more into the yawning abyss of rampant violence and chaos. It was indeed iron-
ic that the political wildfire that now ravaged and threatened to consume the nation
right down to its very soul had been kindled not by the forces of terrorism, but by
those of democracy. Fire, death, and destruction was the climax of what would per-
haps go down as the most turbulent, controversial, and divisive general elections in
the nation’s history.
Few people expected the April 2000 elections to have to be decided in a run-off,
so entrenched and omnipotent did Fujimori’s power appear. Needless to say, he
strategically campaigned on the twin themes of pacification and public works, which,
of course, were the success stories of his two previous administrations. Although sta-
bilising the economy was also one of his notable achievements, from 1998 onwards
the rising unemployment, underemployment, lack of employment, steadily dropping
income levels and a stagnant job market—in short, a general worsening of the eco-
nomic situation—must have caused him to avoid emphasising his government’s earli-
er fiscal and economic accomplishments as a campaign booster. Nevertheless, few
would dispute that by the year 2000, he had succeeded in substantially improving the
quality of life of many poor Peruvians. For years, his government poured significant
resources into infrastructure development. It had also succeeded in decreasing the
number of Peruvians living in “extreme poverty,” mainly through its extensive food
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aid programmes. As Youngers points out, “...42.5 percent of all Peruvian households
receive food aid. In the countryside, 65 percent of families depend on food provided
by the government. Amongst the poorest Peruvians, the donated food they receive
represents over 20 percent of their per capita income” (2000:14). Furthermore, for
the most part, Fujimori had made good his pledge to crush terrorism and restore secu-
rity in the country. By decade’s end, Abimael Guzmán and Victor Polay Campos were
both languishing behind bars. The vast majority of Shining Path and Túpac Amaru
(MRTA) militants were either imprisoned or dead. The dramatic seizure of hundreds
of hostages in the Japanese ambassador’s home in Lima by MRTA guerrillas, on 17
December 1996, was successfully ended four months later by a highly professional
and flawless rescue operation mounted by army commandos, thus reinforcing
Fujimori’s image as an unflinching and uncompromising opponent of terrorism. The
police captured “Camarada Feliciano,” Guzmán’s controversial successor, in July
1999, just in time to make a calculated impression on the electorate (it did, but
proved short-lived). By the start of the new decade, then, pacification had essentially
been achieved where once there was pandemic political violence; and now Fujimori
vowed to deliver on his promises of shared economic prosperity for the nation,
should the people elect him for an unprecedented third term.
However, the rising public discontent with his leadership manifest itself in an
inconclusive first-round election result that would require a run-off before the out-
come could be decided. Of course, at the outset of voting many people had hoped for
a democratic miracle that would put an end to what they perceived as a corrupt and
increasingly callous dictatorship. The strongest opposition to Fujimori from within
the electorate would come from Peru’s urban classes, particularly the thousands of
disgruntled and disaffected people who had lost their jobs and pensions, and had
become impoverished as a result of “Fujishock” and the government’s subsequent
neo-liberal economic programme. In addition, with internal security largely restored,
a growing number of citizens looked beyond the issue of personal safety and con-
cluded that it was simply time for a political change after Fujimori’s “decenio.” Many
were fed up with Vladimiro Montesinos and his underhanded machinations. They
were sick and tired of his growing influence and power in the political life of the
nation, especially since Hermoza Rios’s retirement in August 1998 “contributed to a
greater concentration of power in the hands of Montesinos and Fujimori” (Cameron
2000:5). Many also had enough of the “dark side” of the Fujimori government, which
Coletta Youngers describes as characterized “by systematic intimidation, harassment
and blackmail in order to maintain political control and eliminate or discredit those
who threaten it,” and “by efforts to manipulate the courts and electoral apparatus”
(2000:41).
Nevertheless, most Peruvians believed that Fujimori was bound to win through a
combination of both “legal” and unscrupulous means. Indeed, ever since the auto-
golpe of 1992, he had been busy stacking all the cards in his favour. Constitutional
rules regarding re-election were bypassed or interpreted to his advantage; the
Constitutional Tribunal was politically manipulated to ensure a pro-Fujimori compo-
sition; Congress repeatedly undermined all grassroots initiatives to hold a referendum
on the “re-re-election” issue. All this helped to pave the way for Fujimori’s bid to
become president for a third consecutive time (see Cameron 2000, Youngers 2000).
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In the months immediately leading up to the elections, opposition candidates com-
plained that despite the government’s advantage of having a formidable electoral
apparatus at its disposal, it nevertheless still resort to “dirty tactics.” These took the
form of defamation campaigns waged through state-owned media, harassment and
intimidation of opposition leaders and supporters by the military and by what were
widely believed to be SIN agents, the falsification of over 1 million signatures in the
registering of Fujimori’s Peru 2000 party, and the withholding of public works funds
from opposition mayors (Cameron 2000:10-12, Youngers 2000, Transparencia
2000a, 2000b). Furthermore, it was also frequently reported that State resources, like
ministry vehicles and food donations, were systematically utilised by pro-Fujimori
authorities in conjunction with Peru 2000 propaganda activities. For its part, the pro-
Fujimori tabloid papers—which is what most poor Peruvians read, if anything at all,
and which are “widely believed to be subsidized and heavily influenced by the intel-
ligence services” (Youngers 2000:66)—waged a relentless campaign to discredit oppo-
sition politicians (see Appendix B).
In reference to the first-round results, I asked Gabriél Carrasco, regional coordi-
nator in Ayacucho for the independent and respected election monitor Transparencia,
to comment on any significant patterns in the voting (See Appendix C). “The first
point,” he said, “is that Fujimori received a greater number of votes in Ayacucho’s
rural zone than in the urban zone, and Toledo gained more of his votes in the urban
centres than in the countryside. On average, the ratio of votes was three for Fujimori
to every one for Toledo.”1 It is worth noting that the Avancemos party gained a sig-
nificant percentage of the rural opposition votes in the department, and Carrasco sug-
gested that this could be attributed to the presence of Susano Mendoza on the party’s
list of congressional candidates. Other possible reasons why some rural inhabitants
who opposed Fujimori may have chosen to vote for Federico Salas’s party instead of
Toledo’s were, so I was told by my desplazado friend Eusebio (who himself had voted
for Avancemos), because of widespread rumours claiming that Toledo was sympa-
thetic to the terrucos (hence red as his campaign colour). Moreover, it was also
rumoured that he intended to disarm the communities and to abolish grassroots
organisations and initiatives, such as the Clubes de Madres (Mothers’ Clubs) and the
Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) programme, should he become president.2 It is, of
course, impossible to ascertain the source of these rumours, though it is not unrea-
sonable that suspicion should fall heavily on the government and its military-
intelligence branch. Whatever the source, the rumours had their probable intended
result of helping to turn rural voters away from Toledo. Another notable pattern in
rural areas of the department was that most of those who voted for Toledo were men,
while women in general tended to cast their votes for Fujimori. As an explanation for
this, Carrasco hypothesised that it may have been a reflection of a fundamental dif-
ference in interests. The men who voted against Fujimori did so, he suggested,
because they felt it was time for a political change, while the women who voted for
Fujimori did so for the pragmatic reason of wanting to ensure the continuation of the
various government-sponsored poverty alleviation programmes that help to feed their
children (eg. the Vaso de Leche programme, PRONAA’s popular kitchens and food
distribution initiatives, the military’s civic action programmes, etc.).
Given that in the past, CAD leaders had grown to play a central role in mobilis-
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ing the population for pro-government political rallies, I expected to find them oper-
ating as key agents of the President’s electoral machinery in the countryside of
Ayacucho. I was therefore surprised to discover that this was not entirely the case.
Numerous independent observers had reported on the prominent role that governors,
lieutenant-governors, and district mayors played in trying to generate political sup-
port in the campo for Fujimori in the months and days leading up to the first round
of voting.3 “Until the middle of March, practically the only source of information for
the orientation of votes in rural districts, in general, were the lieutenant-governors;
and they, for the most part, along with other state functionaries, orientated the peas-
ant votes exclusively in favour of Fujimori,” Carrasco told me. Yet, interestingly
enough, Ayacucho’s CAD commanders, as a group, did not appear to have been
among the incumbent president’s principal electoral protagonists in the countryside.
This may simply have been because the ending of the state of emergency on 1 January
automatically resulted, at least legally, in the simultaneous deactivation of comités de
autodefensa everywhere. However, it was also true that Fujimori did not command
the unanimous good will and loyalty of all CAD leaders and CAD members in
Ayacucho. Indeed, Susano Mendoza, ex-alcalde of Quinua and once the General
Coordinator of the Comités de Autodefensa of Frente Huamanga, was running as a
congressional candidate not on Fujimori’s Peru 2000 ticket, but as a member of one
of his rivals, Federico Salas’s Avancemos party.
What possible explanations are there for this apparent reluctance among some
high-ranking CAD commanders, at least in Ayacucho, to provide active support for
Fujimori’s electoral campaign, especially given that in past years the CADs had served
as the very core of Fujimori’s “grassroots” political support in the south-central
Andean departments? It has been suggested that within the CADs, affection for
Fujimori had already begun to diminish since about 1998, owing mainly to the fact
that the government had, to date, failed to deliver on long-time promises to indem-
nify militiamen (or their widows) killed or made invalid in the line of duty (Chávez
Duran 2001). In addition, Fujimori’s attempt to claim full credit for defeating
Sendero—utilising this as a central theme in his campaigning—generated substantial
resentment among militiamen, like Comando Zorro. “Fujimori was not the one who
brought about this pacification,” he told me with unconcealed indignation. “It was we
who fought and we who died to defeat the terrorists, not he. It was we who have had
to sell our own animals to buy our Mausers.”4
All the same, it was “El Chino” who garnered the most votes out of all the pres-
idential candidates on April 9, just as everyone had expected. Yet even though he had
won re-election in a landslide victory in 1995, this time he unexpectedly confronted
stiff opposition in the figure of Alejandro Toledo, a Stanford-educated economist of
humble rural background, who seemed to come from nowhere in the final weeks
before election day to become Fujimori’s main contender. Playing up his indigenous
ancestry, the anti-Fujimori electorate gradually recognised him as the strongest oppo-
sition candidate in the field, and the one most capable of giving the President a run
for his money. Consequently, Toledo obtained a little over 40 percent of the total
number of votes. In contrast, Fujimori’s tally of votes was a hair’s-breadth short of
the “50 percent plus one vote” needed to declare him the absolute winner with a
majority of votes. To everyone’s surprise, Toledo’s challenge succeeded in forcing
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Fujimori into a second round of voting, scheduled for May 28.
In the weeks leading up to the runoff, enormous street protests and demonstra-
tions rocked cities throughout the country. It was soon apparent that a political cri-
sis, and the most serious democratic challenge to President Fujimori’s power yet, was
rapidly unfolding. Toledo repeatedly rallied tens of thousands of supporters to Lima’s
Plaza San Martin, where he accused the government of running fraudulent elections
and urged the people to boycott the runoff. By now, Toledo’s campaign had become
more than just a bid to become president; it had also shaped up into a personal, self-
declared moral crusade to “restore democracy to Peru.” Although he called for peace-
ful civil disobedience, violent clashes nevertheless erupted between police and pro-
testers in Lima, Arequipa, Iquitos, Chimbote, and other major cities. Government
buildings were attacked and sometimes burned, and opportunists used the chance to
loot and vandalise local shops. In the city of Huancayo, a temporary curfew was
declared and hundreds of violent demonstrators arrested. (Toledo never publicly
denounced any of these destructive acts of mob violence.) In Huamanga, institutions
and organisations like the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho, the SUTE-
Huamanga, and the UNSCH, jointly planned a general strike and civic mobilisation
for 25 May, reminiscent of the massive demonstrations in defence of free education
in ’69. The violent protests literally touched even the President himself: after a cam-
paign rally in Huamanga on 18 May, a few dozen students pelted Fujimori’s jeep with
stones and vegetables as it drove out of the main plaza on its way back to the airport.
The local police, many of whom were also disgruntled with the government on
account of their low salaries, seemed to take their time in chasing the students away.5
Why was it that people had submissively endured an authoritarian regime for
close to ten years, and only now decided to protest so vigorously? There are numer-
ous cumulative and interrelated reasons, of course. One might consider these anti-dic-
tatorship protests as a sort of delayed response, the popular backlash that perhaps
should have materialised in the wake of the government’s emasculation of the
Constitutional Tribunal in 1996, but didn’t. But clearly it was also an outpouring of
anger, pent up for so many years, at frustrated expectations and the progressive dete-
rioration of the quality of life for so many of Peru’s middle and lower-middle classes.
While Toledo cried fraud and boycotted the second round of voting, Fujimori
went ahead with what had now become a farcical one-man runoff, shunned even by
international monitors. Voting in a Peruvian election is mandatory, and failure to vote
incurs a hefty fine. Yet even those of Toledo’s supporters who could not afford to boy-
cott nevertheless spoiled their ballots by casting blank tickets, or by scribbling the
words “No to Fraud” on them. When official reports showed that he had won over
50 percent of the votes with just over half of the ballots counted, Fujimori was
declared the winner. His opponents responded with ever larger street protests, which
culminated with over 80,000 demonstrators converging on central Lima on 28 July,
the President’s inauguration day, in what was cleverly titled the “Marcha de los
Cuatros Suyos,” in reference to the four corners of the ancient Inca Empire.
Clearly, Toledo had astutely recognised the powerful symbolic resonance that his
humble indigenous background could have on the urban electorate, and accordingly
used it to the full. Indeed, he had already become a natural role model for many of
the younger, poorer, urban Peruvians of indigenous ancestry. On the one hand, he
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could lay claim to being the legitimate leader of the Peruvian people by virtue of his
ostensible “cholo” identity; on the other hand, his impressive educational credentials
and professional accomplishments plainly broke the stereotype of the “stupid and lazy
Indian.” Ridiculing Fujimori’s penchant for donning ponchos and chullus (knitted
caps), Toledo once bellowed to a massive crown in Lima’s Plaza San Martin: “I don’t
need to dress up to look a Peruvian. Just look at my face!”6
All the same, at the start of his third term, Fujimori’s hold on power, though shak-
en, seemed nevertheless to be as firm as ever. He had the continued backing of the
armed forces, and his supporters in Congress once again held a majority of seats after
various opposition members defected to the government’s side. In addition, he still
remained highly popular with most peasants and poor shantytown inhabitants.
Despite the persistence for a short time after his inauguration of scattered (though
much-diminished) street demonstrations, the deaths of six employees at the Banco de
la Nación, after it had been set on fire by protesters on July 28, had done great dam-
age to the opposition’s political and moral image. Fujimori’s supporters in Congress
even threatened to lay criminal charges on the organisers of the Marcha de los Cuatros
Suyos, including Toledo, for having “irresponsibly” rallied more than 80,000 pro-
testers to Lima.
In the months that followed, Peru settled down to an uneasy calm, and most
opponents appeared to resign themselves to the political reality. But then the most
astonishing and unlikely sequence of events unfolded. Less than two months after tak-
ing the oath of office, Fujimori made the shocking announcement that he planned to
call early elections in which he himself would not run. Although the ostensible rea-
son he gave for this decision was that he did not wish to make himself “a destabilis-
ing factor, still less an obstacle to the democratic process,” in fact, what had prompt-
ed it was something altogether less altruistic. A most unsavoury scandal slowly came
to light. It turned out that one of the opposition leaders had got his hands on a secret-
ly filmed videotape showing Vladimiro Montesinos handing over a thick wad of
cash—$15,000 to be exact—to an opposition congressman, so as to entice him to
cross over to Peru 2000 during the recent general elections (Faiola 2000:A01).7 In
responding to the public outcry, Fujimori subsequently promised to shut down the
SIN and to put Montesinos on trial, though some time would pass before he finally
ordered the arrest of his former chief of intelligence. That after so many years of
amassing thousands of compromising videotapes and files on prominent Peruvians,
Montesinos himself should be brought down by his own sordid and underhanded
methods was, in the minds of most Peruvians, nothing short of poetic justice.
This bribery scandal not only discredited Fujimori. It also exacerbated what were
already deep divisions within the armed forces, between those who supported
Fujimori, those who continued to back Montesinos, and those who thought the best
thing to do was to get rid of both men altogether and to have new elections.
Furthermore, a number of Peru 2000’s congressmen, extremely disturbed by this lat-
est evidence of deep-seated corruption in the government, began to defect from the
party, and instead sat as independent members of Congress. His own vice-president,
Francisco Tudela, submitted a letter of resignation to Congress when Montesinos was
permitted to re-enter the country in October, after failing to obtain asylum in Panama.
In what would have been an unimaginable scenario six months earlier, the once-
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formidable regime that Fujimori and Montesinos had so carefully built up around
them was now rapidly crumbling down. In anticipation of the President’s inevitable
exit sometime in the near future, various political actors—politicians, senior military
officers, opposition leaders—began to strategically manoeuvre themselves in prepara-
tion for the coming power struggle.
To everyone’s surprise, the final act of this Shakespearean drama was played out
not in Peru, but in Japan. At the Tokyo hotel where he was staying, on what had been
a stopover during a return trip from an Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation summit
in Brunei, a tired-looking Alberto Fujimori announced at a press conference that he
wanted to stay in Japan indefinitely. His Japanese parentage would eventually entitle
him to Japanese citizenship; and Japan’s lack of an extradition treaty with Peru would
ultimately ensure that he remained safe from impeachment and prosecution under
Peruvian law.8 On 20 November, the Peruvian Congress received his official letter of
resignation, and with it a remarkable yet turbulent and thorny era in Peruvian histo-
ry came abruptly to an end.
7.2 “Informal politics” in a post-violence context
What about the peasant militias? How were they affected by the fall of a regime that
had for all practical purposes become their patron during much of the past decade?
Has peasant society merely been reacting to these recent dramatic events, or has it
also been able to design its own processes and outcomes?
In answer to these questions, perhaps it is helpful to turn to David Scott Palmer,
who proposes the useful analytical concept of “informal politics.” Palmer argues that
informal politics offers a way to understand the behaviour of citizens who organise
themselves in search of alternatives to satisfying their fundamental political and eco-
nomic needs when the formal political system becomes unresponsive and falls into
crisis.9 They do this “outside of such formal political entities as political parties,
unions, or government organisations” (2000:7). For Palmer, the formation of peasant
self-defence committees and of mothers’ clubs were initiatives developed by the local
population for “protection, survival, and the advancement of basic needs” (ibid.:6),
and as such are examples of “informal politics.”
Though the armed self-defence committees were widely condemned in the late
1980s as “manipulated” organisations “imposed” by the military on local peasant
populations (e.g. Degregori 1989b), by the mid-1990s most commentators (including
former critics) had turned to praising them. By the second half of the 1990s, it
became common to hear CADs being described as having been “interiorised,” “assim-
ilated,” “integrated,” and “institutionalised” into the social life of the Andean com-
munities from which they came (Starn 1998:245; Coronel 1996:106-109; del Pino
1993b:53). However, given their close working relations with the army, and the exis-
tence of legislation that regulated their organisation and function, one of the main
questions in my mind at the end of my first fieldwork in 1997 was: “If the state of
emergency were to be lifted, would the comités de autodefensa y desarrollo, as an
institution, cease to exist?” At the time, I was fairly convinced that the answer to this
question was “No, they would not disappear.” I believed that, as their very title sug-
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gested, their justification for existence was based on more than just providing securi-
ty. It seemed to me that in addition to the task of civil defence, the government had
envisaged a role for them in the unfolding process of socioeconomic development and
national reconstruction—a process that I reasonably assumed would continue even
after pacification has been achieved. It seemed that this was also the wish of the local
people themselves, many of whom have told me they would like to see the CADs con-
tinue into the future, but free of military control. In addition, I was fairly convinced
that, as with the original rondas campesinas of Peru’s northern departments, the
CADs of the emergency zone would also develop into alternative policing and dis-
pute-resolution bodies to what was still generally perceived as a corrupt police force.
This, in fact, was already happening in many parts of the emergency zone during the
second half of the 1990s. We have already seen in the last chapter, for instance, that
in addition to their defence activities, CADs in Ayacuchan districts like Tambo were
also becoming more involved in such things as sorting out domestic conflicts, dis-
pensing fines to villagers who neglect their communal duties and chores, even organ-
ising and supervising faenas comunales.
Ayacucho was a hive of grassroots activities when I left the field in 1997. I was
therefore stunned upon my returned in April 2000 by the extent of the changes that
had taken place. It was while visiting the local INEI office on Jirón Callao that I once
again ran into Captain—now Major—César Vásquez, military chief of the CADs of
Ayacucho and Huancavelica. From him I learned that the state of emergency was offi-
cially ended on 1 January 2000 (except for a small area around the Huallaga Valley),
and that consequently the CADs had officially been automatically dissolved, as the
relevant legislation stipulated must occur at such time.10 Surely, I thought to myself,
they are probably continuing in an unofficial capacity, so active and immersed were
they in the political life of their communities just short years earlier.
A bigger surprise awaited me in Tambo, where from Comando Zorro I was
stunned to learn that a general decline in the peasant militia movement had occurred
throughout the department. In Tambo district, the CADs had, in fact, already ceased
to function ever since the end of 1998, when he retired and the Patrulla Especial was
subsequently disbanded. Throughout the rest of my short stay in Ayacucho that year,
I observed for myself the clear signs everywhere I went in the countryside of the gen-
eral decline of the peasant militias in the department. Most significant, though, was
the fact that the decline had already set in even months before the government took
the step of officially dissolving them, along with the emergency zone. At Uchurraccay,
I met a polite, young comando who, although he still took it upon himself to check
the identification of any visitors who comes to the community, was in fact only one
of three young men who continued to patrol on a voluntary basis once a month. “It’s
been like this for the past half year, and we no longer assemble the villagers regular-
ly, as we used to,” he told me.11 It was the same story in Quinua, previously a region-
al centre of coordination for the CADs. There former militia members told me that it
had been many months since they last went on patrol, or called a CAD assembly. As
amazing as it seemed, however, this organisational deterioration was not unique in
time and space to the CADs of the former emergency zone. In 1997, Orin Starn
observed a similar thing happening in the Chota Valley, among the original rondas
campesinas of Cajamarca (1999:263-275).
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Was this the end of the story of Peru’s peasant militias? If so, how could the ded-
ication and enthusiasm for it, which I had witnessed just two and a half years earlier,
have dissolved so thoroughly and so rapidly? Major Vásquez, for one, seemed reluc-
tant to close the book on the peasant defence committees. “True, the Comités de
Autodefensa no longer officially exist. But in their place we’re going to create Comités
de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo,” he told me, with all the eagerness of a true zealot.
“But we need funding. Perhaps you can put in a good word for us at the Dutch and
Canadian embassies?” Given that I knew that Dutch and Canadian diplomats back in
Lima regarded the CADs as simply army-controlled “paramilitaries,” I should have
told him not to hold his breath.
Yet, I also doubt that most peasants would share his enthusiasm for a new 
civilian-military project such as the one he envisioned, since inevitably it would once
again subordinate them to the demands and to the authoritarian direction of the mil-
itary. Perhaps the story of the “rondero ID cards” best illustrates why a renewal of
close working relations with the military would, for most of Ayacucho’s peasants,
most likely be wholly undesirable. When I asked him about the cards, Vásquez sadly
replied, “We had to terminate the project when the state of emergency was ended.”
What he didn’t tell me, which I learned later from the Tambinos, was that most of the
people in Tambo (and probably elsewhere in Frente Huamanga for that matter) never
received their ID card, nor were they ever reimbursed the S/.5 nuevos soles that each
of them had been obliged to pay for it in advance. Peasants were therefore under-
standably horrified when I told them Vásquez had told me that the military hoped to
begin a new carné-issuing campaign again very soon—this time to issue peasants with
“Comités de Desarrollo” identity cards, and again at their own cost! If this was a taste
of what they could expect from organising Comités de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo
under the tutelage of the army, then it was hardly surprising that the peasants I spoke
to in Tambo showed little enthusiasm for embarking on such an endeavour.
Whereas the comités de autodefensa began a steady decline in the final years of the
‘90s, the clubes de madres, by contrast, continued to expand, becoming one of the
most important and certainly the largest women’s movement to emerge in Ayacucho
(perhaps even in Peru) in the past two decades. A comparison of these two organisa-
tions thus provides valuable insight into the logic and dynamics of “informal politics”
in Ayacucho. This, in turn, might help us to gain a better understanding of the rea-
sons behind the decline of the comités de autodefensa, and an indication of what the
future may hold for the clubes de madres.
Like the peasant militias, clubes de madres are the products of civil war. For
although men comprise the vast majority of those killed by political violence in Peru,
women were also among the war’s most vulnerable targets. As Isabel Coral reminds
us,
They were victims of physical abuse and psychological torture, they
were obligated to witness alongside their children the executions of
loved ones, and they were raped.... Profoundly affected and sensi-
tized, the women became the principal protagonists in the defence of
human rights. They were spurred not only by the painful process of
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burying the dead, seeking the disappeared, and trying to free prison-
ers, but also by the desire to preserve the physical integrity and lives
of those who remained with the women (1998:355-356).
For peasant women, rising political violence and a deepening economic crisis also
threatened the integrity of their families. At the same time, however, women’s social
roles and responsibilities were also being transformed and expanded in relation to the
changing circumstances. The loss of their menfolk through displacement or to politi-
cal violence forced women to assume “greater responsibility for leading and preserv-
ing their families in a highly destructive context....” (ibid.:356). However, because
they were often unable to shoulder the added responsibilities on their own, many
women banded together with kin and neighbours to share the tasks of food prepara-
tion and childcare. In order to sustain their families, these women relied on their own
initiative and creativity to obtain external assistance and new ways to generate
income. “They implemented food services, workshops to produce commodities, and
communal gardens” (ibid.:357). In rural areas, widows and women whose husbands
had gone away assumed the role of heads of their households, and with it much of
the responsibility for the family’s productive activity as well as the right to take part
in decision-making assemblies. Far from acting as the weaker sex, women toiled
alongside the men at communal work projects; and women grieving over the loss of
their husbands, children, and other family members came together to share informa-
tion and to console each other.
It was against the backdrop of political violence and socioeconomic turmoil that
the clubes de madres gained importance in the 1980s and 1990s. Their two main con-
cerns were, firstly, to defend human rights, and secondly, to “struggle for economic
survival” (ibid.:359). In 1988, the Federación Provincial de Clubes de Madres de
Huamanga was founded for the purpose of linking and coordinating all the existing
local mothers’ clubs in the department. From the original 270 mothers’ clubs that
attended that inaugural event, the organisation would grow to 1,200 affiliated moth-
ers’ clubs, representing 80,000 members by 1995 (ibid.:359). The vast majority of
members were poor, illiterate peasant and shantytown women. Shining Path and the
military, which regarded them as harmless and apolitical, initially tolerated the clubes
de madres. As a result, they were able to consolidate their organisation in peace, such
that when Shining Path finally attempted to infiltrate and gain control of the federa-
tion in 1988, it found itself effectively blocked out by the organisation’s members
(Coral 1998:360).
Over the years, Ayacuchan women have had to struggle against not only political
violence and economic crisis, but also against machismo within their own families and
communities. For one thing, the division of labour between men and women in
household production has come to lose some (or perhaps most) of its pre-war com-
plementariness. As one of the members of the District Committee of Tambo’s moth-
ers’ clubs told me, men have used the theme of political violence to justify their own
idleness during the day, with reasons such as that they are sleeping or resting in prepa-
ration for ronda duties later in the evening; or that they can do nothing but sit around
because the guerrilla threat prevents them from working in the countryside.12
Meanwhile, women were still expected by their husbands to perform the traditional
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tasks of cooking, laundering, cleaning, and childcare in the home—even engaging in
petty commercial activities in order to make ends meet. I was also told by women that
most men still expected their wives to hand over to him all the money she makes sell-
ing produce at the market. “If he discovers that she is secretly keeping a part for her-
self, he beats her,” another member of the mothers’ club told me.13 Domestic violence
is common, and often exacerbated by an explosive mix of psychological trauma, alco-
hol, and access to firearms.
Apart from their own physical labour, creativity, and willpower, the clubes de
madres control few other internal resources. Yet by pooling together their ideas, skills,
and scarce resources, they have been able to initiate fundamental survival activities,
such as the creation of communal kitchens (comedores populares), or of communal
gardens for growing produce that can then be sold to generate income for other sub-
sistence projects. Furthermore, mothers’ club leaders have proven themselves
extremely adept and successful at weaving webs of beneficial contacts with State insti-
tutions and non-governmental organisations, thus securing access to a broad spectrum
of donors and programmes concerning poverty alleviation, food, health, and educa-
tion. The State agency PRONAA, for instance, provided well-organised mothers’
clubs with donations of food for their communal kitchens. In conjunction with
municipal mayors, mothers’ clubs were also the ones that managed the Fujimori gov-
ernment’s Vaso de Leche programme.14 (The district alcalde received special funds
from the central government with which to obtain the milk power, which he then had
to pass on to the president of each community’s mothers’ club.) Furthermore, with
help from NGOs, mothers’ clubs have obtained information and training concerning
micro-development and family health projects, like credit and income generation,
childcare and nutrition. Clearly, their accomplishments in finding ways to feed their
families and to preserve the integrity of their households against adverse odds have
been impressive; and in this sense it may even be argued that in armed conflict situa-
tions around the world, it is organised women such as these that “form the last ves-
tiges of civil society” (RAWOO 2000:9).
In recent years, with the assistance of NGOs, clubes de madres in Tambo district
have organised education seminars on issues such as domestic violence, family plan-
ning and contraception, and women’s rights, in which men are encouraged to partic-
ipate and learn. “It sometimes feels like a daunting struggle, but little by little we are
helping to change men’s attitudes,” a district committee member once told me.15
Throughout their history, peasant militias have always been male-dominated organi-
sations whose governing committees comprised exclusively of men. Even so, we have
also seen that women have made major contributions to the civil defence effort. For
years, they performed a vital (if often uncelebrated) supporting role in maintaining
the comités de autodefensa, by cooking for the active members, provisioning them,
mending and washing their clothes, caring for the ill and the wounded, burying the
dead—all this in addition to their own daily chores. In some zones, women at certain
moments have even shouldered the same responsibilities as the men, sometimes hav-
ing to patrol alongside them, or to guard the community while the men are away.
Even so, the characteristic tasks associated with the comités de autodefensa and the
clubes de madres nonetheless have also served to reinforce stereotyped gender roles
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for both men and women: namely, that men are physically stronger and therefore did
the patrolling and the fighting, while women performed the household tasks and
looked after the children.
In many rural areas of Ayacucho over the past twenty years, the pressures brought
by war have served to disrupt the balance of power between the sexes, sometimes to
the disadvantage of women. In this regard, the civil defence institution clearly creat-
ed and underscored power inequalities between the sexes. Women were excluded
from civil defence committee meetings and therefore had virtually no voice in village
defence matters, thought they were nevertheless expected to abide to decisions made,
such as the common sale of private livestock in order to raise communal funds to pur-
chase firearms. And in so far as the defence committees came to dominate the politi-
cal affairs of their communities during the war years, women often became margin-
alized and, in a sense, socially invisible when it came to discussing and deciding com-
munity issues. But instead of trying to make direct inroads into the male-dominated
political sphere of their communities, women created their own autonomous space of
discussion and action in the form of mothers’ clubs. In so doing, they were able to
respond to the most pressing socioeconomic needs of their families and communities
“without having to rely on the (male-orientated) village authorities” (Flagg et al.
1998:13).
Like the CADs, the clubes de madres are directed by committees (juntas) from the
local all the way up to the departmental level. “Each committee is composed of seven
posts elected every two years: President, Vice-president, Treasurer, Secretary and
three vocals, which in turn co-ordinates with the district, provincial and ultimately
departmental committee FEDECMA (Federación de Clubes de Madres)” (Flagg et al.
1998:38). Unlike the village defence committees, however, which historically owe
their existence either to local initiative or to the active assistance or coercion of the
military or of other defence committees, the clubes de madres were entirely and
autonomously created by women, without any influence or interference from the
army or any other external agent. Even though they depend heavily (though also not
entirely) on outside financial and economic support in order to operate, and though
in the past the army has sometimes exploited their propaganda value by compelling
them to participate in pro-government peasant rallies, mothers’ clubs have neverthe-
less managed to maintain a greater degree of political and organisational autonomy
from the state and the military than the comités de autodefensa. There are, for
instance, no regulatory laws that govern them, or that explicitly subordinate them to
the authority of the state, unlike in the case of the CADs. This has helped to paint an
attractive picture of the clubes de madres in the eyes of foreign funding agencies and
the local NGOs they sponsor, who have consequently come to regard mothers’ clubs
as true grassroots organisations through which to provide aid to local communities.
How, then, does the future look for the clubes de madres? Obviously, they have
been playing an important intermediary role between their local communities and
external aid organisations already for quite some time. They are clearly well suited to
the tasks that lie ahead in what will certainly be a protracted process of post-war
development. Given their institutional strengths—like their positive “grassroots”
image, their extensive networks with non-governmental humanitarian assistance
organisations, and their autonomy from state authority and control—and provided
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that they maintain clear and relevant objectives and do not become embroiled in divi-
sive partisan politics, we can reasonably expect that they will continue as an impor-
tant grassroots-level institution of reconstruction and development for some time to
come.
The example of the CADs and the mothers’ clubs clearly illustrate that self-protection
and economic survival were the overriding logic behind “informal politics” in
Ayacucho, and most probably in the rest of the emergency zone. Yet, changes in 
political-economic circumstances as well as in social configurations have impelled
transformations in the dynamics of informal politics. The disintegration of the village
defence organisations, in stark contrast to the continuation of the mothers’ clubs, is
simply one of the realities of life in a post-war context. By 2000, it was obvious that
the climate of fear that had gripped districts like Tambo for so long had dissipated at
last, and that most peasants were finally convinced that the countryside was pacified
and truly safe to return to. With the threat of guerrilla attack no longer imminent,
rural people could once again dedicate themselves entirely to the livelihood activities
that for years they have had to neglect.
There certainly have been compelling economic reasons why the peasants should
choose to discontinue their militia activities. The peasant militias have been both a
blessing and a burden: a blessing for obvious reasons of security, and a burden for the
financial and economic pressures they have created. We have seen that as guerrilla
attacks on peasant communities intensified from the second half of the 1980s
onwards, everyday life became increasingly orientated around the exigencies of com-
munal defence, to the detriment of agricultural and other livelihood activities.
Villagers have to sustain their own ronderos by provisioning them when they set off
on lengthy patrols and military operations. Additionally, ever since the start of the
1990s, communities were not only forced by necessity to hire “professional” militia-
men (i.e. the rentados), but also to pool their resources together in order to purchase
high-powered rifles (i.e. Mausers)—exorbitantly expensive and antiquated, but con-
sidered essential nonetheless. Moreover, let us not forget that every rondero killed in
action usually leaves a widow and orphaned children behind, often with no one to
provide for them. For almost fifteen years, then, local peasants communities have
been subjected to the financial and economic tensions and pressures produced by the
requirements of civil defence, against which they have had to try to balance their own
subsistence demands. It is in this regard that mothers, being the ones who in wars are
always left to worry about the well-being of their children and the everyday survival
of their families, have been among the most outspoken critics of the burdens that
CADs have brought. Teodora Ayne, president of the Federación de Clubes de Madres
de Ayacucho, once explained the dilemma thus:
I believe that the rondas campesinas keep Sendero away; since we are
already organised we can defend ourselves, they cannot enter. But the
rondas also produce more poverty, for there are many orphans,
women whose husbands have been killed or have been disappeared by
one side or the other [Sendero or the military]. These women cannot
go out into the countryside to work because in the morning they must
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form up, in the afternoon they must form up; so for this reason they
are unable to go to their chacras to work; this is what produces more
poverty, more need and hunger” (1993:54).
The conclusion to which the evidence strongly points is that the CADs had already
declined and disintegrated even before they were officially abolished because in the
context of a post-war society, they were proving to be both redundant and an unnec-
essarily prolonged economic burden on their communities. As we have seen in the
previous chapter, their inability to take the lead or to make fundamental contributions
to the process of development has rendered them virtually irrelevant in this new envi-
ronment. Indeed, it appears that CADs of Frente Huamanga went into decline despite
the fact that in order to secure governmental and non-governmental support for
development projects, it was increasingly becoming necessary for districts and indi-
vidual communities to present an image of themselves as coherently and strongly
organised. This contradictory situation—which the comparison between CADs and
mothers’ clubs aptly illustrates—merely strengthens the argument that their decline
was the direct result of being perceived by the local population as increasingly extra-
neous, inappropriate vehicles with which to pursue developmental priorities. They
were created for a purpose—self-defence—and that purpose has now been achieved.
People thus turned their attention and their energies to other forms of organisation
and to other strategies more in keeping with their changing objectives and interests.
Let us not forget that in spite of all the academic talk of their expanding functions
in recent years, the raison d’être of the CADs had always remained one of counterin-
surgency. It is true that while political violence was prevalent, CAD commanders
came to assume an important leadership role in local governance, so long as everyday
life continued to centre around the task of defence. We have seen that amidst esca-
lating political violence and population displacement, particularly during the period
between 1985 and 1995, militia leaders were frequently the only authority figures
that remained within resistant communities, the bureaucratic state officials having
either fled, been murdered, or renounced their office. In such a situation, it was of
course to be expected that militia commanders should become the dominant author-
ity in their communities, in addition to assuming some of the functions of the absent
civil authorities, like the conflict-resolution role of the juez de paz (justice of the
peace). Civil authorities at that time, if any remained at all, were, in the words of
Comando Zorro, “un rondero nomás,” just another rondero16 But this has changed in
recent years, with the steady advance and consolidation of pacification. Amongst the
thousands of displaced persons returning to their rural villages or district capitals of
origin during the 1990s were many state officials, ready to reassume their posts of
authority. Militia commanders have therefore had to relinquish to their rightful func-
tionaries the responsibilities they earlier had provisionally taken over. Hence, the
importance that militia commanders assumed in the political life of their communi-
ties during the period of civil war subsequently diminished with advancing pacifica-
tion, and with the gradual return of civil authorities. Moreover, the ending of the
state of emergency meant that former militia commanders no longer had the official
authority to order their fellow villagers to do anything, not even to participate in
communal work projects, if it was against their will. Any moral pressure or sanctions
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to induce villagers to engage in cooperative ventures for the good of the entire com-
munity would thereafter have to come from the community as a whole, or its legiti-
mate civilian authorities.
7.3 The end of an institution?
As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, in the transition from a situa-
tion of war to one of reconstruction and development, it was the ability to network
with NGOs and government aid agencies that becomes not only the overriding objec-
tive, but also the criterion by which a local authority’s efficacy and social relevance
were judged by the local population. In this regard, militia commandos and defence
committees found themselves at a disadvantage as compared with district mayors or
local mother’s clubs. District mayors (and to a lesser degree governors and lieutenant-
governors) had generally proven to be more adept than militia commanders at secur-
ing external resources and developmental assistance, and it was therefore natural that
they became increasingly more important than CAD leaders in running the political
affairs of districts.
It is likely that this shift in local power was partly because the majority of militia
leaders were resistetes, with not a great amount of education, with limited network-
ing skills beyond their districts and limited experience beyond the sphere of civil
defence. Consequently, they were often less confident and less experienced in com-
municating and negotiating with external governmental and non-governmental agen-
cies than the new generation of civilian bureaucratic officials, who typically were
young retornantes, fluent in Castellano, with higher levels of literacy and education,
and substantial urban experience and know-how. For instance, Ruben Rojas, 37 years
old (in 1997) and Tambo’s retornante district mayor from 1995 to 1998, has lived in
Lima, Ayacucho, and Trujillo, and was running a small business in addition to study-
ing part time at UNSCH to become a lawyer. He often travelled to Lima to negotiate
with representatives of European aid donors. In contrast, the majority of CAD com-
manders I met in Ayacucho were men who did not possess more than primary edu-
cation, whose primary skill was subsistence farming, and had never even travelled
outside the department.
However, the relegation of the CADs to the sidelines in the unfolding chapter of
post-war development has not stopped certain more talented or educated CAD com-
manders from pursuing a political vocation, and thus a continuation of their political
and social ascendancy. Susano Mendoza Pareja, as we have already mentioned,
became a congressional candidate in the elections of 2000. When last I saw Comando
Zorro, he had hung up his militiaman’s rifle and was instead setting his sights on
becoming Governor of Tambo district. Clearly, the experience of leadership in the
militias has raised the self-confidence and stirred the personal aspirations of some
individuals with otherwise underprivileged backgrounds, like Comando Zorro. Their
participation in community defence, in leadership roles, has thus opened doors of
opportunity that they might otherwise never have had. The rank and file CAD mem-
bers, on the other hand, have generally gone back to their peasant way of life. For rea-
sons already explained, the vast majority of peasants have little time for, and show lit-
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tle interest in, doing what they now perceived to be village defence’s unnecessary and
time-consuming routine tasks, like patrolling. In this new chapter of Peruvian histo-
ry, patrolling and other security-related tasks are no longer the overriding priority.
The decline and apparent disappearance of the peasant militias in departments
like Ayacucho is but another step in Peruvian society’s return to civil society after so
many years of obstructive political violence and living under a state of emergency, and
a decade of anti-democratic dictatorship. With the ending of the state of emergency
and the dissolution of the CADs as a legal entity, the army’s ability to exercise author-
ity over the civilian population or to interfere directly in its daily social and political
affairs appears also to have been substantially weakened, and this can only serve to
invigorate the resurgence of civil society in the countryside.
Are the self-defence committees gone forever? Does their decline and eventual
disappearance in regions such as Ayacucho suggest a story of failure? I should not
think so. Although it has been common for Westerners to view the Andean peasantry
as a repository of timeless traditions, the reality is that peasant institutions are hard-
ly set in stone. As we have seen in our discussion of cultural transformations and con-
tinuities in chapter 6, Peru’s south-central Andean peasants are, in fact, much more
flexible and pragmatic than we often give them credit for. As I contemplate the
decline of the Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo in Ayacucho and Huancavelica in
the closing years of the twentieth century, I arrive at the conclusion that their physi-
cal existence was perhaps not as important as the organisational experience and les-
sons they had embodied, and the self-confidence they had engendered among a peas-
antry whose members had succeeded in transforming themselves from victims to
heroes. For as long as the CADs continue to exist in living memory, the possibility will
always exist for their reactivation. As Comando Zorro reminded me at our final meet-
ing in May 2000, “If in the future we are once again threatened, we will reorganise
to defend ourselves.”
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8 Reflections
This book has explored and attempted to account for the genesis and outcomes of
armed peasant resistance to Shining Path in the Peruvian department of Ayacucho.
More generally, I have tried to use the phenomenon of peasant village-defence groups
as a critical lens through which to examine the impact of sociopolitical violence on
the peasants of Ayacucho, and their varied responses to it.
The detailed information presented in the preceding chapters has admittedly been
thick, and the risk at this point is that the reader comes away with the feeling of hav-
ing by now lost sight of the forest for the trees. The purpose of this final chapter,
then, is to try to balance the perspective by drawing out some of the broader social
and theoretical implications of the story. However, rather than simply presenting a
comprehensive analytical summary of the preceding chapters, I will instead attempt
to offer conclusions by addressing some topics and issues on the subject about which
there presently is little written in what is otherwise a sizeable body of scholarly and
journalistic literature on the Peruvian civil war and its various aspects. In this way I
hope to contribute to filling in some of the gaps within the existing Shining Path/civil
war literature, specifically with regard to more general theoretical debates on (1)
armed revolution and State counterinsurgency, (2) civilian/militia-military relations
under conditions of war, (3) and the interrelated and overlapping themes of post-con-
flict democratic consolidation, civil society, and citizenship.
Before proceeding, however, I would like to enter a cautionary note. Even though
the story I have presented is framed with a specific period, and is tidily wrapped up
with an episodic ending, it would nevertheless be a mistake to assume that the
processes and struggles described here have run their course. The overall impression
I should wish to leave the reader with in this final chapter is not of definitive conclu-
sions, but rather of open-ended processes which will undoubtedly take many surpris-
ing turns as they evolve in the future. Of Peruvian politics and society, Stern once
observed: “[i]mportant events seem to fall from the sky, in an unpredictable yet steady
stream of happenings.... The sense of a chaotic world buffeted by accident and sur-
prise becomes increasingly difficult to resist” (1998:6). On the one hand, the politi-
cal landscape of the country has changed almost unrecognisably since the fall of
Fujimori and his Rasputin-like intelligence chief, Montesinos. On the other hand,
even as the nation sets up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission—hitherto unimag-
inable in the time of Fujimori—in the hopes of identifying responsibilities for atroci-
ties and promoting national reconciliation, unmistakably ominous signs point to a
possible resurgence of Shining Path not only in the Ene, Apurímac, and Huallaga val-
leys, but also in Lima itself.1 Clearly, despite appearances, democratic transition,
peace, and a revitalised civil society all still rest on shaky ground, for the chances of
a durable peace and democratic consolidation are seriously threatened by enduring
and worsening economic problems, which, as a wellspring for resentment and frus-
tration, can all too easily translate into a new round of violence and political turmoil.
293
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 293
8.1 Rethinking Shining Path through peasant counter-rebellion
In the early 1980s, most urban dwellers and external observers held the common and
mistaken view of the revolution waged by Shining Path as an “indigenous peasant
insurrection,” that stood for “Indian revindication.”2 The mistake was understand-
able, given that very little was known at the time about the revolutionary organisa-
tion, and given that “a picture of a peasantry in opposition to the state appealed to
the desire of radical intellectuals in Lima and abroad to imagine the dedication of the
downtrodden to overthrowing the status quo” (Starn 1999:66).
That the Peruvian military also shared this interpretation of Shining Path as a
peasant-based revolution was to have grave consequences for the highland peasantry.3
As we saw in chapter 2, it was this presumption of “indigenous subversion” that
informed and propelled the brutal strategy of repression that the army subsequently
unleashed upon the rural population (see Tapia 1997). As Remy points out, the cam-
paign of indiscriminate repression was also fuelled by paranoia and intense racism:
An indio (and if from Ayacucho, all the worse) was identified as a real
or potential member of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). In this
context the army attacked and occupied peasant population centers.
Fear and distrust of the “other” led any soldier seeing a puna Indian
wearing a poncho to suspect that weapons might be hidden under the
poncho, and would first fire and find out later. The army was an army
of occupation (Remy 1994:124).
Armed with greater information, scholars would later establish that the Shining
Path party and the revolution it was waging were initiated and led by privileged,
urban, middle-class teachers and intellectuals from the UNSCH, none of whom were
of peasant background. In fact, “dark-skinned kids born in poverty filled the bottom
ranks under a leadership composed mostly of light-skinned elites” (Starn 1998:229;
see Chávez de Paz 1989). We have seen in chapter 1 that before initiating armed
actions, Shining Path had “little influence among the regional peasantry” (Degregori
1998:128) owing to the dominance of other, more mass-based Marxist political par-
ties which had stronger links with the peasantry (see Hinojosa 1998; Gorriti 1999).
This is not to say, however, that the Shining Path did not eventually manage to attract
significant support from a number of social sectors, such as the educated rural youth,
or to win at least the passive acceptance, if not the full and active assistance, of much
of the regional peasantry. Fear was certainly a motivating factor that ensured peasant
compliance to guerrilla claims (see Degregori 1996a). However, as shown in chapter
3, to put it all down to fear belies the fact that in the early years of armed struggle,
Shining Path did succeed in finding a reservoir of sincere sympathy and support
among the peasantry. In its early years, many peasants viewed it not just as an arbiter
of local justice and an enforcer of moral order, but also as a viable vehicle for per-
sonal advancement and social change, in spite of its benign authoritarianism
(Degregori 1998; del Pino 1998; Manrique 1998; Starn 1998). At a more psycho-
logical and affective level, Shining Path’s appeal can also be pinned down to the fact
that, like other political parties, it provided its rank and file members with a group
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identity, a feeling of collective solidarity and camaraderie; and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, a sense of higher purpose and a reason for being—and power over life and
death. Even its authoritarian discipline and its insistence on violence and sacrifice
were attractive to those politicised and educated youth and radical sectors disillu-
sioned with the democratic experience and the decadence of the dominant bourgeois-
criollo national culture (see Hinojosa 1998:77).
As the 1980s was drawing to a close, Shining Path indeed appeared extremely
close to toppling the inept and corruption-ridden government of Alan Garcia—a pres-
ident whose various methods of attempting to assert civilian control over the military
only succeeded in disaffecting and alienating the armed forces (Crabtree 1992; Tapia
1997; Klarén 2000; del Pino 1993b). In hindsight, though, it is clear that by insisting
on extreme sectarianism and ideological “orthodoxy” (as defined by Guzmán), and
by completely rejecting the need to forge alliances with what it disparagingly referred
to as the “revisionist” parties of the Marxist left, Shining Path created its own severe
limitations to ever winning power. Moreover, in the rural countryside, Shining Path’s
attempts to apply and expand its strategic blueprint would eventually give rise to an
increasing number of tensions and contradictions in its relations with the peasantry,
as we saw in chapter 3. This Maoist-inspired guerrilla strategy involved breaking the
peasantry’s links of “dependency” on the capitalist market economy by preventing
them from taking and selling their rural agricultural produce in urban centres. Shining
Path’s strategy also required local peasant populations to provision armed guerrilla
units by labouring communally to plant and harvest crops, which were eventually
levied as “revolutionary tax,” often in their entirety, and irrespective of time-
honoured Andean principles of reciprocity or the more practical consideration that
the peasants were then left with less, or nothing at all, to eat. In time, Shining Path’s
revolutionary strategy would also include the assassination of local civilian authorities
if they could not be intimidated to renounce their post, and replacing them with their
own “commissars” appointed by the Party without the prior approval of the local
population. The unpopularity of these policies and actions, due largely to their
incompatibility with peasant cultural values and livelihood goals and practices, bred
intense resentment and disaffection that ultimately erupted into open conflict and
widespread peasant resistance to the revolutionary movement.
It was in the punas of Huanta, among the so-called Iquichano ethnic group of
peasant communities, that violent peasant counter-rebellion against Shining Path was
born. In chapter 3, I described and inferred the possible reasons behind the counter-
rebellion of Iquichano villages, like Uchuraccay and Huaychao. These need not be
repeated here. What is important to note is that apart from the congratulatory prais-
es of President Belaúnde for the villagers of Huaychao, the news that these remote
villages had begun to capture or kill suspected guerrillas was greeted with suspicious
disbelief by most outsiders, including foreign scholars. As Orin Starn once remarked
to me, 
in the mid-1980s, just about no-one, me included, imagined that the
peasants in Huaychao could actually have risen up against [Sendero
Luminoso] more or less of their own accord—and all assumed that
there was some kind of army/government conspiracy to conceal the
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truth.  That failure, exacerbated by the fact that it was almost impos-
sible to get into rural areas to see the truth, certainly reflected the
[academic] assumptions and tenor of the times.4
It was just such an attempt to get at the truth that led eight Lima journalists to
travel to the punas of Huanta, where they were apparently mistaken by the villagers
of Uchuraccay for guerrillas and killed. This tragic event not only focused outside
attention on the political violence escalating in Ayacucho; it also brought awareness,
however incredulous at first, that there indeed were peasant communities that were
unwilling to accept Shining Path, and ready to resist the guerrillas by violent means
(Pease 1983:49). These outbreaks of peasant counter-rebellion would eventually force
scholars and journalists to begin rethinking many of their common assumptions about
Shining Path, its motives and ideology, and its relations with the peasantry. “The few
Shining Path documents that came to light refuted any indigenist [sic] or culturalist
[sic] interpretation: a dogmatic radical Maoism was behind its strategies and objec-
tives” (Remy 1994:124). Later studies of peasant self-defence patrols would reveal
that these organisations were not just products of products of army manipulation,
while also exposing the full extent to which Shining Path actually depended on vio-
lence to secure the compliance of the peasantry (see Degregori 1996b; Coronel 1996;
Coronel and Loayza 1992; del Pino 1996; Starn 1993, 1996).
In the course of nearly twenty years of war, Shining Path would consistently fail
to recognise and rectify its errors, remaining stubbornly convinced that since it under-
stood the “correct line of march” it was therefore infallible. Besides, believing vio-
lence to be the midwife of history, Shining Path’s leaders were certain that final vic-
tory was historically assured, regardless of the tactics employed. The Party therefore
refused to change or revise its unpopular claims, strategies, and tactics, dismissing
mounting peasant grievances as simply “manipulated by the reaction.”5 Thus, seem-
ingly concerned more about ideology than about people, Shining Path eventually
“...delegitimized [sic] itself in the eyes of its own peasant ranks and in the eyes of
those social sectors that potentially could have supported it in the cities....”
(Degregori 1999b:252). All evidence seems to point to the conclusion that Shining
Path did not recognise or adequately respect the seriousness of this intensifying pop-
ular backlash until it was too late for them to change the course that the war had
taken.
8.2 Conceptualising peasant responses to political violence
8.2.1 THE CONCEPT OF RESISTANCE
How can we theoretically approach the phenomenon of peasant counter-rebel-
lion, or other peasant responses to political violence for that matter? In what way can
our findings contribute to theories of mobilisation and revolution?
Based on the evidence presented in chapter 3, it is first important to note that
peasant counter-rebellion was by no means an automatic and inevitable response to
guerrilla pressure by disaffected and aggrieved peasants. Nor would it prove to be the
only way for peasants and other citizens to resist Shining Path. In the districts of
Andarapa and Ongoy in Andahuaylas province, peasants resisted Shining Path by rely-
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ing on their traditions of strong peasant mobilisation and community organisation
(Tapia 1977:35). And in Puno, a constellation of civil society forces—including pas-
toral agents, the Church, political parties, leftist activists, NGOs, peasant leaders and
peasant federations, professional and intellectual sectors—would for a time effective-
ly contest Shining Path’s expansion in the southern sierra, though in the end even this
“third path” would crumble apart due to internal disputes (see Rénique 1998).
In Ayacucho, peasant groups responded to political violence in a variety of ways.
Some communities decided to fight the guerrillas. Many were caught between the
crossfire of State repression and guerrilla violence, and chose instead to flee from
their villages. Yet, others adopted what Degregori (1998) refers to as “resistant adap-
tation” by attempting to comply with the demands of each opposing side, and in so
doing trying to remain however neutral in a war where neither of the two main antag-
onists was prepared to permit neutrality. In actuality, though, the villagers of any
given community usually responded in complex ways, often resorting to or combin-
ing all of these basic forms at different times, as situations changed. In circumstances
of internal political conflict, counter-rebellion will be seen (if indeed it is considered
at all) as simply one course of action out of what Tilly (1978, 1979) calls a “reper-
toire” of perceived possibilities and potential options for individuals under extreme
pressure.
Chapters 3 and 6 established some of the various factors and interrelated condi-
tions that had significant bearing on the way peasants responded to the pressures of
political violence. But whether the response was fight, flight, or resistant adaptation,
what appears to me to be the dominant (though by no means exclusive) concerns for
peasants when responding to a perceived external threat was not only protecting life
and property, but also, whenever possible, creating and defending spaces of autonomy.
Autonomy for action, retaining some control over their lives, for pursuing their own
interests and goals, even while they contend, accommodate, interact with impinging
exogenous forces and pressures. Indeed, that I and others (e.g. Isbell 1978) have
noted that the phrase “we defend ourselves” is one that is commonly asserted by
Ayacuchano peasants reveals this to be an important principle orientating their dis-
position towards outsiders.
A possibly fruitful way to conceptualise such disparate responses as fight and
flight, and the underlying concern for spaces of autonomy, is in terms of resistance. If
we assume the point of view that social practice is always embedded in relations of
power and inequality (Giddens 1979; Bourdieu 1977), yet regimes of power can
never be totalising and wholly determining, nor people completely powerless and
bereft of agency even in the most adverse situations (Scott 1985; Long 1992; Dirks
et al. 1994), then we may suppose that “there is resistance...in places we would not
expect and in forms we would not recognize” (Dirks et al. 1994:19). Power “...comes
from everywhere,” writes Foucault, and “...where there is power there is resistance”
(1978:93). Moreover, resistance in its everyday cultural forms can also be “weapons
of the weak.,” as Scott (1985) argues. Everyday forms of resistance may be subtle, and
embedded in other actions (see Lüdtke 1993). Furthermore, not all practices of resist-
ance immediately threaten—in their effect or in their aim—the stability of existing
hegemonic orders. Neither are all forms of resistance immediately or apparently con-
frontational, nor are all confrontational practices necessarily violent. Actions that can
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be regarded as forms of resistance often vary in their intentions and goals, and con-
cern may simply be limited to “defending spaces of autonomy within oppressive social
orders” (Gledhill 1994:92). Such a perspective on power and resistance makes it pos-
sible for us to consider even the most seemingly abject action, like flight, as a strate-
gy of resistance. Let me present a brief illustration of these points in concrete analyt-
ical application. Population displacement, for instance, seems, on the face of it, hard-
ly to be evidence of resistance, but rather an expression of utter defeat. Yet it is well
known that during the civil war, peasant mothers commonly sent their husbands and
teenage children to live in urban centres to protect them from the risk of being dis-
appeared by the security forces, or being drafted by the guerrillas. This example clear-
ly illustrates how a response of “flight” takes on an aspect of everyday resistance in
so far as it not only checks an immediate threat to personal safety, but also thwarts
both the army’s hunt for “subversives” and the guerrillas’ search for new recruits. In
fact, sending away those of its members who were the most immediate targets of mil-
itary repression and guerrilla violence or abduction became a survival strategy used
by peasant communities in the hope of being left in peace—and sometimes they were.
In recent years, historians and anthropologists interested in Latin America have
turned their conceptual focus on resistance as a tradition or ethos serving as “the basis
for defining an authentic indigenous [Andean] culture” (Poole 1994b:3), particularly
in the light of the region’s historical record of violent conflict and relations of domi-
nation. Poole, however, points out that the problem with this new historiography has
been its tendency to place emphasis “on the ethnic parameters of both the resistant
population and the culture of resistance which their practices presumably reflect,
...[thus reproducing] in disturbing ways [a misleading polarity]...between indigenous
and non-indigenous (or mestizo) spheres of cultural and social interaction” (ibid. My
emphasis).6 Clearly, Poole has identified an important problem in the way some histo-
rians may have characterised and analysed the history of resistance in Peru. As such,
though, it is more a remark about the use which some have made of the concept of
resistance, rather than a reflection of the appropriateness and heuristic usefulness of
the concept as a tool for interpreting analysing human action. Arguably, such problems
can be overcome if we start from an understanding of resistance as “social practice”
(Ortner 1989) rather than as a cultural trait, and if we view abstract terms like resist-
ance not as reified things but “bundles of social and historical relationships embedded
in economic, political, and ideological contexts” (Wolf 1982. My emphasis).
8.2.2 WHY PEASANTS COUNTER-REBELLED
The question of why peasants in Ayacucho counter-rebelled is best tackled in two
steps. The first relates to the question of the social sources of counter-rebellion. Given
that there are so few recorded instances of peasant counter-rebellion, it probably
comes as little surprise that while there is an abundant body of social-scientific liter-
ature on revolution in general—and peasant revolution in particular, also according
to region—there is as yet very little written about the phenomenon of peasant 
counter-rebellion.7 Nevertheless, I suggest that by synthesising and modifying a num-
ber of relevant paradigmatic theses on peasant revolution, it is possible to fashion an
effective theory of peasant counter-rebellion that can account for its manifestation in
Ayacucho.8
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James C. Scott’s thesis, which was largely prefigured in the works of Eric Wolf
(1969) and Barrington Moore Jr. (1966), is that the origins of peasant radicalism lies
in their perception that certain world-historical transformations9 have caused changes
which violate their “moral economy” (Scott 1985:13-26). Furthermore, Scott argues
that subsistence crisis is what lies at the root of peasant revolution; for in his view, the
subsistence minimum constitutes the guiding moral principle according to which
peasants accept or reject the actions of landlords and State officials. Popkin (1979),
who advocates a political economy” approach, criticise Scott by contending that
grievances are a constant factor among peasants, and as such “there is no clear rela-
tionship between subsistence threat (or decline) and collective response” (Popkin
1979:245). Jeffery Paige (1975), who also offers a critique of Scott’s “moral econo-
my” perspective, takes the view that certain agrarian structures give rise to particular
types of peasants—namely landless sharecroppers—who are more disposed than oth-
ers to becoming radicalised and revolutionary, particularly in situations where they
also exist alongside a landholding class that derives its income from controlling land.
Addressing these diverse points of view, Wickham-Crowley points out that there may
be a host of different conditions that produce the same social outcome, and therefore
none of these different scholars of revolution can claim to have unearthed the para-
mount or unique structures and conditions that produce revolutionary peasantries.
“[We] entertain the possibility that our multifarious social life harbours functional
alternatives” (1992:93).
How, then, can theories of peasant revolution help us to understand peasant
counter-revolution? The answer appears to lie with McClintock. Drawing her inspi-
ration from Scott’s theoretical argument that subsistence is the peasantry’s guiding
moral standard, McClintock sets out to demonstrate that a crisis of subsistence among
peasants in the southern Peruvian highlands during the early 1980s was the “sine-qua-
non element” behind the emergence of Sendero Luminoso (1984:82). More specifi-
cally, her contention is that “if a state plays an active part in agricultural policy mak-
ing...and a subsistence crisis occurs, the peasantry is likely to assess the government’s
policies and possibly blame them. These policies thus become an important compo-
nent of the revolutionary equation” (ibid.:49). She maintains that despite their theo-
retical differences, most scholars of revolution and social movements would undoubt-
edly agree that peasants “will consider rebellion when they judge their right to sub-
sistence to be seriously threatened” (McClintock 1984:58. My emphasis). The ques-
tion is, rebellion against whom?
The evidence presented upon which this study rests suggests that Shining Path
generated extensive and considerable resentment when it attempted to impose on the
peasantry, by violent force, a revolutionary strategy (already described above) which
not only threatened personal security, but also exacerbated the very economic hard-
ships that had brought the rebels a large measure of popular sympathy and support in
the first place. We therefore find that McClintock’s theory accounts surprisingly well
for the empirical evidence of peasant disaffection and counter-rebellion in Ayacucho.
By following her logic and modifying her theory, a hypothesis of peasant counter-
rebellion can be stated thus: if a guerrilla movement applies a revolutionary strategy
that includes a major restructuring of the peasants’ livelihood practices, and their
actions and strategy is perceived as critically disrupting and exacerbating the peasants’
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established livelihood strategies and insecurities, thus objectively worsening subsistence
conditions, the peasants will be likely to assess the revolutionary movement’s course
of action and blame it. The actions and strategy of guerrilla movements thus become
an important component of peasant disaffection, and of the counter-rebellion equa-
tion.
Such a response as counter-rebellion is perfectly intelligible when considered
against the backdrop of the peasantry’s distinct conditions of existence. As a social
category, peasantries the world over exhibit a bewildering degree of variation (see
Wolf 1966). That is, peasant households and peasant communities are often differen-
tiated according to such features as community structure, wealth, outlook, access to
education, migration experience, and degree of involvement in the external market,
to name but a few. Notwithstanding such differences, however, what seems “generic”
about all peasants is that their mode of subsistence is a precarious one that continu-
ally exposes them to impinging “differential and differentiating pressures,” which
challenge their very existence and make them vulnerable (Wolf 1966:78). Peasants
consequently tend to gravitate towards livelihood and survival strategies that min-
imise risk and insecurity in their daily lives. It therefore stands to reason (and the
empirical evidence presented in this book appears to back this up) that if the effect of
guerrilla policies and actions is merely to violate the “moral economy” of local peas-
ants by increasing their risks and insecurities without providing transcendent benefits
in return, then such policies and actions will certainly cause disaffection and grievance
among the peasantry (see Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). In the extreme case, they may
even provoke violent counter-revolt.
However, as this study has demonstrated, the transition from the “passive recog-
nition of wrongs” (Wolf 1966:289) to widespread disaffection and, ultimately, to vio-
lent counter-revolution, is neither inevitable nor immediate. Peasants will ordinarily
turn to violence as a last resort, and if they can help it, they will avoid committing
themselves to situations or endeavours that involve a prolonged period of severe trial.
Therefore, it can be argued that when peasants decide whether to avoid or to engage
in political struggles, they do so after a conscious deliberation of the relevant politi-
cal and economic conditions and choices—and always with the goal of defending and
preserving their families and their livelihood foremost in their minds. Peasants live a
vulnerable existence, and “...to survive, peasants are notoriously sensitive to changes
in power balances” (Stern 1982:30).
Another important provoking factor in the counter-rebellion equation was the
execution of common peasants by guerrillas, usually following a so-called “people’s
trial.” Most peasants in Ayacucho will usually cite these extra-judicial killings as the
principal triggering factor behind their decision to counter-rebel. Yet what is often left
unsaid is that common peasants were initially not necessarily adverse to indulging
opportunistically in the physical violence, provided they were the wielders and not
the targets of that violence. As we saw in chapter 3, the summary execution of live-
stock rustlers, thieves, rapists and other “antisocials” were not only tolerated in the
beginning, but also welcomed. Moreover, some of the peasant testimonies I obtained
also reveal that in many districts of the emergency zone, the peasants themselves
attempted to exploit for their own ends—mainly through rumours and denunciations,
and invariably in connection with personal feuds and inter-village conflicts—the vio-
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lence being meted out by either Shining Path or the military.10 In these ways, more
than a few peasants showed themselves to be rather less adherent to the supposed
Andean ethic of “punish but don’t kill” than Degregori would have us believe
(1996b:199). In practice, “kill the rich and share out their possessions” seems to have
been the more common motivation of many Ayacuchano peasants embroiled in the
political turmoil, at least before the escalating violence became more random and
arbitrary. As the violence spiralled out of control, some communities decided to lay
aside their personal feuds and to act collectively on their latent grievances and repu-
diation of Shining Path, using “the killings” to underscore their growing perception
that Shining Path was, in fact, hostile to the interests of the peasantry.
Peasant counter-rebellion would eventually spread throughout Ayacucho, and
even into neighbouring departments. Nevertheless, it was in the highlands of Huanta,
among the Iquichano communities, that peasant counter-rebellion first erupted. Like
peasant communities in other parts of Ayacucho, the Iquichanos also were afflicted by
Shining Path’s “people’s trials” and acts of summary justice. The executions of local
leaders by guerrillas immediately provoked resentment within the “closed corporate”
communities (to use Wolf ’s term) of the Iquichanos. Not only were these victims
regarded as legitimate and highly respected leaders by their fellow comuneros
(Coronel 1996). Within this close-knit ethnic group of highlanders, which to this day
still commonly practice endogamous marriage, the victims had many kinsmen in
other Iquichano communities who were unwilling to let the deaths go un-avenged.11
These killings were not the first or the only incidents to provoke outrage. Popular
indignation within the Iquichano communities was also inflamed when a number of
the young men of the first group of guerrillas (all students from Huamanga), alleged-
ly got some of the local girls pregnant.12 Additional offence was caused by the guer-
rillas’ proclivity for regularly taking and consuming local resources (such as food)
without paying for them.13 But besides these obvious violations of the Iquichano 
peasantry “moral economy,” another significant reason behind their decision to
counter-rebel was that many of the Iquichanos feared that the guerrillas meant to
“collectivise” their plots of land, their harvest, and their livestock herds.14 This can be
understood in relation to the Velasco regime’s agrarian reform.
Concerning the relationship between land reform and peasant radicalism, various
scholars of revolution have noted the importance of agrarian systems as a causal fac-
tor behind rural violence and revolutions. Kay’s view is consistent with Paige’s when
he asserts that “...a highly unequal agrarian system, the associated exploitative social
relations and the exclusionary modernisation processes are important factors, in some
cases the most prominent ones, in explaining conflicts and violence in rural Latin
America” (2001:764). Kay concludes that to resolve the land question by way of a
land reform that mainly benefits the landless and poor peasants is a crucial first step
to defusing or averting rural violence. Wickham-Crowley concurs with the view that
government efforts (or non-efforts) at land reform have an important effect on peas-
ant radicalism, and adds that “the by-now established Marxist fear [is] that a bour-
geois land reform will turn otherwise radical peasants into conservative “kulaks”
(1992:119). Many of these points were clearly understood by the Peruvian armed
forces, and was in fact the driving logic behind why General Velasco and his officers
placed such great emphasis on agrarian reform (Kruijt 1996:243, Kruijt 1994:4).
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That the Party launched its insurgency after a major agrarian reform leads some stu-
dents of revolution to conclude that “Sendero Luminoso, the most profoundly sec-
tarian mass revolutionary movement Latin America had yet experienced, was trying
to overthrow a state and a series of elected governments in the wrong nation at the
wrong time” (Wickham-Crowley 1992:298).
How, then, did the consequences of Velasco’s land reform relate to the outbreak
of peasant counter-rebellion among the Iquichanos? As I have explained in chapter 3,
the Iquichanos’ determination to defend their property can be traced back to the fact
that they were relatively recent recipients of their land, being among the very few
peasants in Ayacucho who benefited from the Velasquista agrarian reform. The agrar-
ian reform of the 1970s had transformed them from hacienda serfs to owners of their
own land, and they were now fiercely determined to defend it. It is also significant to
note that during their land reform adjudication, the comuneros of Uchuraccay
opposed the idea of receiving property in common, and instead demanded to be
awarded individual parcel holdings.15 In the light of this evidence, it is therefore quite
obvious why Shining Path’s perceived attempts to collectivise individually held land
and livestock herds was aroused the suspicion of the Iquichanos, and promptly resis-
ted.
In rounding up this section, we can revisit the question: How can peasant count-
er-rebellion contribute to existing theories about peasant revolution? Based on the
discussion thus far, I would argue that to approach the topic of peasant revolution
from the opposite perspective of peasant counter-rebellion is to reassess the common
though mistaken assumption. Namely, that self-declared “popular” revolutions are
ordinarily waged by the “revolutionary proletarian vanguard” in a way that advances
the interests of the peasant masses they purport to represent, as the peasants them-
selves define those interests to be. This error appears to be an inevitable corollary to
the fact that many scholars of revolution (e.g. Wolf, Skocpol) have long taken for
granted that peasants, when roused to political action, will almost invariably take the
side of a revolutionary movement in opposition to the State. The phenomenon of
peasant counter-rebellion in Ayacucho clearly shows otherwise. The Iquichano high-
landers, who anthropologists and historians have described as possibly the poorest,
most “traditional” and “backwards” of Ayacucho’s peasants, proved neither to exhib-
it the “collective” ethos nor the “natural” affinity for the armed communist revolu-
tion that Senderista leader and ideologue Osmán Morote had expected. Instead, they
turned out to be the most conservative and belligerently anti-revolutionary peasants
in the whole of Ayacucho (Coronel 1996:43).16
8.2.3 HOW IQUICHANO PEASANTS COUNTER-REBELLED: 
MOBILISING FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
The mere resolve to counter-rebel is, by itself, insufficient to translate into action.
This relates to the general problem of mobilising collective action, about which the-
orists have suggested various models (Tilly 1978; Pinard 1975; McCarthy and Zald
1977; Olson 1965). Borrowing eclectically from these theories, let us consider how
Iquichano peasants were able to mobilise counter-rebellion by analysing the phenom-
enon in terms of (1) motivating factors/interests; (2) conducive factors, like the struc-
ture of social organisation; (3) resource mobilisation; (4) facilitation or the absence
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of repressive external control; or in other words space for autonomous action.
Motivating factors. So far, we have already reviewed the main grievances that
would eventually lead to resentment of or armed resistance to Shining Path. In the
specific case of the Iquichanos, they perceived a threat to their personal security, to
their property, to their kin, and their way of life (see chapter 3). However, there are
two other important internal motives to consider. Firstly, the evidence suggests that
that the Iquichanos as a whole perceived no other viable alternative to responding to
the guerrillas other than with violent defensive action. Alternatively, to put it in
Tillyan terms, their “repertoire” of viable responses was extremely limited, as will be
explained in detail shortly. The second important motivating factor was that the
apparent physical and military weakness of the first group of ill-armed, adolescent
rebels they came in contact with led the Iquichano peasants to believe that they could
easily kill or capture these “muchachitos,”17 and so put an end to the disruptions to
the “tranquilidad” in their lives. Furthermore, they were also encouraged in this
course of action by the Sinchis, an elite anti-terrorist police force, who visited them
periodically by helicopter. To their eventual detriment, the Iquichanos did not realise
the full power of Shining Path when they embarked on their counter-rebellion.
Conducive factors: Social Structures and Available Resources. Based on the evi-
dence presented in chapters 3 and 4, it is my contention that the structural and organ-
isational characteristics of the Iquichano communities facilitated their ability to
mobilise counter-rebellion. This organisational structure resembled what Wolf termed
as “closed corporate” peasant communities, in contrast to those which could be
described as “open non-corporate” communities. Wolf ’s conceptual model is helpful
for two reasons. Firstly, it corresponded closely to the empirical realities of rural soci-
ety in Ayacucho, as it existed before the massive social upheavals of the mid-1980s.
Secondly, it also derives analytical usefulness and flexibility of application in its treat-
ment of peasants as actors whose dialectical interaction with exogenous forces is
influenced not only by cultural referents, but also by the kinds of resources which
they have access to. The model defines different types of peasant communities not in
terms of cultural characteristics, but “in relation to market and state” (1986:325).
Of the assorted structural variables to consider, the scope of economic and social
resources—and therefore alternatives—available to a community and its members
must be counted among the most important ones affecting the manner of response,
and the ability to organise counter-rebellion. The Iquichano communities were
peripherally located. Their members were mainly monolingual Quechua-speaking
members who had very limited intercourse with the cash economy, and little if any
migratory experience. Consequently, there was little wealth-based class differentia-
tion between individual Iquichano peasants that the rebels could have exacerbated. It
is important to note that at this early stage in the civil war, the guerrillas had not yet
heavily attacked the Iquichanos. Therefore, the idea of abandoning their villages and
displacing to a town or city was an unappealing option, particularly in light of the fact
that the vast majority of Iquichanos lacked the skills, education, and other resources
(e.g. bilingualism, some degree of literacy, cash) necessary to survive in urban society.
Though they had relatively few resources, the Iquichanos nevertheless possessed
that which is most crucial to mobilising counter-rebellion—strong social solidarity.
This owes itself primarily to the fact that the “closed” Iquichano communities
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retained many “traditional” cultural practices and values,18 which merely contributed
to the maintenance of a strong sense of community solidarity (Coronel 1996:47).
That the various Iquichano communities agreed to put up a unified resistance to
Shining Path must have also bolstered the general morale of the villagers. Each com-
munity knew it was not alone, and could count on the assistance of its neighbours.19
In contrast, “open” peasant communities, such as those found in the Pampas sub-
region of Ayacucho, exhibited a marked degree of socioeconomic stratification, and
were wracked by private quarrels. It was owing to such chronic internal cleavages that
these communities proved too internally divided to organise a common defensive
response to guerrilla abuses and incursions. Moreover, age-old resource conflicts
between peasant communities—the rivalry between Chuschi and Quispillaccta is the
quintessential example—initially precluded the possibility of intra-communal cooper-
ation. Instead, the members of such internally fragmented communities tended to
respond to the escalating political violence in individual ways, according to the par-
ticular social networks and economic resources available to each family (see Flagg et
al. 1998; Isbell 1988).
Facilitating conditions. In addition to the organisational and social structures that
facilitated its actuation, the ability to organise collective resistance also depended on
freedom from repression, which depended on the intensity of guerrilla presence in the
area. It is almost impossible to mobilise for action under the close vigilance of one’s
overseers or enemies, as Wolf argues is the reason why landless wage labourers being
watched closely by their employers are unable to mobilise politically (1969:290). In
the case of the Iquichanos, the sporadic presence of the guerrillas in their communi-
ties, coupled with a virtual absence of teachers and students, meant that Shining
Path’s “one thousand eyes and ears” were largely absent in their communities. This
space for autonomous action, which communities in other parts of Ayacucho did not
have, enabled the Iquichanos of dispersed villages to hold meetings to plan and organ-
ise a common course of action.20
In sum, the material presented in chapter 3 suggest that peasants may consider
violent counter-rebellion not only when they sense their welfare and physical securi-
ty threatened. They will also consider it when they feel they have no other viable
alternatives for response (owing to the limitations of their social and economic
resources), and can expect that their attempt to resist that threat will be successful.
The irony is that while it was the poorest and most “traditional” of Ayacucho’s peas-
ant communities that were most likely to rise up in counter-rebellion, in the long run,
it was they who were also least able to absorb the economic costs of counter-rebel-
lion.
8.2.4 POLITICAL TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE
The Iquichanos may have been the first to rebel against Shining Path. But when
guerrilla abuses, pressures, and aggression assumed intolerable levels, other peasant
communities in Ayacucho would eventually also rise up spontaneously against Shining
Path (chapter 3). Shining Path’s reaction to this growing, spontaneous, popular resist-
ance was not to change its unpopular strategy, but to mete out ever-greater extremes
of violence and brutality.
It is indeed puzzling why revolutionary movements often use violence against the
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very people they purport to represent. One is thus led to ask, What is the place and
role of physical violence and political terror in guerrilla warfare, particularly in rela-
tion to the very masses the revolutionary movement purports to lead? Greene right-
ly points out that “[w]hatever its range or intensity...violence is a common thread run-
ning through all revolutionary movements, whether on the left, center, or right”
(1990:105). Not just an abstract theory, Greene’s observation is confirmed by the
words and actions of guerrillas themselves. For Abimael Guzmán, the periodic appli-
cation of physical violence against the masses was essential for keeping them under
control. Taking his lead from Lenin, Guzmán also acknowledged that “excesses”—i.e.
massacres of civilians—may be committed justifiably by the revolutionary armed
forces in certain circumstances, and as such are a necessary and acceptable price of
People’s War.21 On the other hand, “Tayacán,” author of the CIA’s instruction manu-
al for the Nicaraguan contras entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare,
takes a more prudent view on the use of terror in guerrilla warfare. Tayacán makes a
crucial distinction between implicit and explicit terror.
A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the pop-
ulation, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be
used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit,
positive results [i.e. support] can be expected.
In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of physi-
cal damage. If the government police cannot put an end to the guer-
rilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the government,
which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of citizens.
However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an explicit ter-
ror, because this would result in a loss of popular support (Tayacán
1985:51-52. My emphasis).
This fundamental conceptual distinction between implicit and explicit terror is
based on the understanding that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is, first and foremost,
political-psychological warfare, with its primary targets being the minds of the popu-
lation, the enemy’s included (Tayacán 1985:33; Greene 1990:106; Bulloch 1996). As
the above passage suggests, the implicit terror generated by the mere threat of violence
may be used to influence the attitudes and behaviour of the population such as to fur-
ther one’s strategic political objectives. The key, according to Tayacán, is not to over-
step the fine line between implicit and explicit terror, the consequences of which are
sufficiently clear in the Peruvian example. In retrospect, one can say that Shining
Path’s leaders had seriously miscalculated the peasants’ capacity to accept and endure
“excesses.”
Reality, however, is not so clear-cut, and immediate actions on the ground cannot
always be informed with the benefit of hindsight. Guerrilla movements will invariably
need to exercise some degree of explicit terror (however small) in order to generate
the myths that underpin its requisite fearsome reputation, and thus its intimidating
aura of implicit terror.22 As Greene points out, however, insurgents “must choose their
targets with care in order not to alienate the very sectors of the population essential
to the further development of the movement” (ibid.:107). In other words, guerrillas
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must take care not to become too much of an explicit terror, for this will invariably
result in a loss of popular support. It is the apparent or the foreseeable social impli-
cations of violent actions, of course, which determine what, exactly, amounts to “too
much” explicit terror. It can therefore be said that Shining Path began its armed strug-
gle as an implicit terror in the eyes of the peasantry, executing only very specific
“enemies of the people,” particularly unpopular policemen and thieves. The Party
turned into an explicit terror, however, when it escalated its violent tactics from 1983
onward by starting to massacre entire peasant communities, mainly as punishment for
yielding to pressure from the military to form civil defence committees. In time,
Shining Path guerrillas also began targeting the leaders of peasant unions and other
leftist organisations, which they denounced as “revisionists.” Thus, in contrast to the
strategy that propelled the Sandinistas to power in Nicaragua in 1979 (Wickham-
Crowley 1992; Greene 1990), Shining Path has adamantly eschewed forging func-
tional alliances or a broad popular front with other organisations and forces of the
political left (see Stern et al. 1998). In the long term, Shining Path’s sectarian intoler-
ance and increasingly indiscriminate violent actions resulted in an almost complete
loss of popular sympathy and support, especially from the very peasantry in whose
name it claimed to be waging “people’s war.” Stern sums it up best when he writes
“Sendero Luminoso demonstrated an astonishing capacity, in its political practices, to
blend extreme astuteness and extreme ignorance” (1998:471). Thinking that they
could pound a passive peasantry to their will by means of “violent dramatic deeds,”
the rebels were in fact unwittingly sowing the seeds of their own destruction.
By contrast, the Peruvian military raised political terror to new levels by unleash-
ing a ferocious campaign of indiscriminate repression in 1983. In the course of two
decades of war, however, it would gradually make a surprising shift towards a more
moderate strategy of targeted killings, combined with a greater emphasis given to
intelligence work and civic action programmes (Starn 1998; Rénique 1998). What is
more, there is evidence to suggests that by the early 1990s, a number of senior mili-
tary commanders had become greatly worried that accusations that the army had per-
petrated “genocide” against the Andean peasantry during the 1980s was progressive-
ly tarnishing the professional image of the armed forces. Consequently, they began to
give explicit orders to forces under their command to uphold standards of human
rights.23 It can be argued, then, that the military’s transformation from explicit to
implicit terror caused an improvement in its relations with the civilian populace of the
emergency zone, which in turn helped to bring greater popular support for the State’s
counterinsurgency programme during the course of the 1990s.
On the face of it, it indeed seems astonishing that that the indiscriminate brutali-
ty of army repression in 1983 and 1984 did not drive Ayacuchano peasants into the
ranks of the guerrillas on a large scale. Rather, throughout the history of the civil war,
the most common reaction of the peasants to State terror was massive population dis-
placement to the relative safety of urban centres. There are several possible explana-
tions for this. Firstly, it is well to bear in mind that peasants, like us, make informed
decisions based, among other things, on their interests and power in relation to other
actors. Most peasants in the emergency zone were immediately awed by the army’s
immense firepower and unbelievable ferocity, and so initially thought it quite unlike-
ly that the guerrillas—armed mainly with edged weapons, a limited number of light
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firearms, and dynamite—could ever be capable of bringing down the Peruvian State.
Given the glaring disparity in power and military capability between the two oppos-
ing forces at the outset, peasants immediately realised that it was suicide to make an
enemy of the army by actively supporting the revolution. Thus most peasants sought
to remain neutral if they could (they were frequently denied this freedom both by
Shining Path and the army), or, if forced to, then to side with the State in spite of, or
perhaps precisely because of, the ferocious military repression and the terrifying psy-
chological intimidation it effected. It may even be argued that the logic behind the
peasantry’s gravitation towards what they perceived as the stronger party is not so
unlike that which generally underlies relationships of patronage (see Davis 1977:132-
150). Indeed, in time the relationship between the peasant militias and the army (rep-
resenting the State) would develop many characteristics of patronage, in the course of
the 1990s (Starn 1998, 1994). Secondly, the guerrillas’ tendency to avoid head-to-
head confrontations with superior enemy forces, or to defend “fixed positions” (like
rural villages) against army attacks—both are standard Maoist guerrilla tactics—gave
peasants the impression that the guerrillas were afraid or unwilling to defend them as
they had promised. This merely confirmed their assessment of Shining Path as mili-
tarily weaker than the Peruvian armed forces (Degregori 1998:141; cf. McClintock
1999:227). A third probable reason is that while on the one hand, peasants are gen-
erally not adverse to agrarian revolts or other movements advocating reform and the
recognition of their rights, on the other hand, they are in general much less frequently
in accord with the more radical idea of toppling the State through armed struggle (see
Paige 1975). Peasants are quite aware that revolutions have uncertain outcomes, and
may simply bring a worsening of their livelihood conditions and leave them poorer
than before. Furthermore, it is also not unlikely, given the Peruvian Andean peas-
antry’s long-held tradition of respect for higher authority (Starn 1999:103), that the
majority of them also thought of revolution as “incorrect” conduct.
For all its rhetoric about the utopian “new society” it would create, it soon
became obvious to most peasants that Shining Path was unable to present an alterna-
tively viable and preferable society to the one they were presently living in. In fact, as
has already been suggested, Shining Path’s policies did much more harm than good to
the subsistence and security conditions of the peasantry. For thousands of peasants,
Shining Path’s “people’s war” was only making them poorer or destitute, and as such
was inadvertently creating a window of opportunity for the State to beginning win-
ning the peasantry over to its side.
8.3 Counter-rebellion and counterinsurgency
For years the peasant self-defence committees were depicted in much of the academ-
ic, journalistic, and human rights literature as entities concocted by the Peruvian mil-
itary, and subsequently imposed on a largely unwilling peasant populace (Degregori
1989b:29-30; Amnesty International 1991:21-22; Americas Watch 1992:9; Isbell
1990:8-13). On the contrary, we have seen in chapters 3 and 4 that independent peas-
ant initiative was also responsible for the emergence of village defence groups in var-
ious districts of Ayacucho at different times. In fact, many of the earliest village
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patrols were formed without the direct influence of the military, and often even
before government soldiers arrived in the area (Coronel 1996:50-51, 1993:49; see
Starn 1993; DESCO 1989:110). An interesting contrast can be made in this regard
with the Guatemalan case. According to Remijnse, there, the military took the lead in
creating the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PAC) in the countryside (2001:456).
But despite the fact that many of the earliest self-defence patrols emerged in
Ayacucho out of spontaneous peasant initiative, it is indeed true that the military has
also played a crucial part in the creation and proliferation of peasant defence com-
mittees, just like in Guatemala. In fact, ever since the introduction of Peruvian troops
to the emergency zone at the start of 1983, the military encouraged—even actively
compelled—peasant communities in general to organise what were dubbed as “civil
defence committees” (CDCs). These, along with any pre-existing anti-guerrilla village
defence groups, were all placed under the authority of the military.
The army’s initiative in forcing communities to create CDCs provoked an
extremely vicious reaction from the guerrillas, who made it a point of launching puni-
tive attacks against villages and rural refugee settlements that had obeyed army orders
and formed civil defence patrols. In some cases, these guerrilla attacks merely rein-
forced the peasants’ will to resist the guerrillas, resulting in a vicious circle of more
civil patrols being created, and more punitive guerrilla attacks in response. In other
instances, fear of attracting guerrilla attacks caused peasants to tread a fine line
between Shining Path and the military by adopting a survival strategy of “resistant
adaptation,” such as, for instance, deferring to Shining Path guerrillas when they were
present in the area, and reactivating their CDC only when army patrols came to visit
(see Degregori 1998:142-143).
That peasant self-defence organisations in Ayacucho have come into being either
through independent peasant initiative or through the instigation or compulsion of
the military underscores the need to make a crucial distinction between counter-
rebellion and counterinsurgency. Characteristically, peasant counter-rebellion in
Ayacucho was localised in scope, encompassing only a few neighbouring villages or
those of a single district at most. In the process of organising themselves, counter-
rebellious peasant communities often referred to existing indigenous organisational
structures, such as the junta directiva, comité de administración and comité de vigi-
lancia; as models for their self-defence committees; they did not need to depend on
the army to provide them with an organisational model, or with guidance on how to
organise themselves. It was also noted in chapters 3 and 4 that many of the earliest
village defence committees to emerge in Ayacucho consciously drew inspiration from
the montoneros tradition of peasant guerrilla resistance to foreign invaders (i.e.
against the Chileans in the War of the Pacific) and abusive gamonales (i.e. the 1923
peasant uprising in La Mar province, Ayacucho), which survives in the collective
memory of rural inhabitants throughout the central and south-central Peruvian high-
lands.  It is also possible that, as with the rondas campesinas of northern Peru (Starn
1999:75-80), the Ayacuchan communities situated on former haciendas borrowed the
idea of a village defence patrol from the hacendado’s armed retainers and hacienda
patrols of old, though I did not find evidence of this in the living memory of any of
my informants.
The principal concern of peasant counter-rebellion was, pragmatically enough,
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one of self-defence. Hence, the sole objective of patrollers (ronderos) was to protect
the lives and property of community members, not to take chances with their lives.
(The abstract notion of the “patriotic defence of democracy and the motherland” was
certainly not one of the foremost initial motivating factors behind peasant counter-
rebellion, if indeed it ever entered their minds.)
For much of the 1980s, peasant counter-rebellion in Ayacucho was militarily
weak. They were also not particularly effective in preventing guerrilla attacks, and
exhibited a tendency towards inertia which was manifest in the inclination to fight
defensively, preferably behind protective village ramparts, instead of acting offensive-
ly and going out to attack, to ambush, or to hunt down guerrilla columns. There are
two major reasons that account for the counter-rebellious peasantry’s initial disincli-
nation for offensive combat tactics. The first was their severe disadvantage in weapon-
ry as compared with the guerrillas; the second, their lack of offensive tactical knowl-
edge and experience. Moreover, peasant counter-rebellion was often vulnerable to a
rapid disintegration of morale—a common occurrence particularly in the aftermath
of devastating guerrilla attacks (see chapter 5). For these reasons, sustaining a peasant
counter-rebellion was an extremely difficult undertaking, especially without the assis-
tance of a powerful patron, such as the army or the highly organised and well-armed
peasant militias of the Apurímac River Valley—the DECAS. In the end, the survival
of peasant counter-rebellion in Ayacucho depended on cooperation and efficient
coordination between neighbouring communities or districts, on securing both a
powerful patron and effective weaponry, and on competent leadership.
Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, refers to the State’s strategy and opera-
tional methods, military or otherwise, for defeating an insurgency movement (Bulloch
1996; Fall 1998; Wickham-Crowley 1992:60-91). A counterinsurgency programme
tries to link local level operations with national-level strategic and security objectives,
and in this regard, its organisational and operational scope will ordinarily be wide-
ranging and multi-levelled. Generally speaking, the goal of counterinsurgency is to
isolate, destroy, and/or convert the insurgents, and to discredit the political message
that the revolutionary movement presents (Greene 1990:112-116). There are differ-
ing ideas as to how this is to be achieved, however (Bulloch 1996; Greene 1990:112-
116). In the case of Peru, the three successive governments from 1980 to 2000 each
formulated and implemented its own distinct approach to counterinsurgency, achiev-
ing varying levels of success or failure. In turn, a brief summary provides the back-
drop against which to reflect, in section 8.4, on how peasant-military (or militia-
military) relations have changed over the past two decades.
8.3.1 THREE STAGES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PERU
Counterinsurgency during the administration of President Fernando Belaúnde
Terry placed emphasis on all-out repression—an approach known as the “attrition
theory” of counterinsurgency (Bulloch 1996:4). The notion of winning “hearts and
minds”—the golden rule of modern counterinsurgency thinking—was completely lost
on Belaúnde and most of his field commanders.24 Rather, the “gentleman” president
ordered the army to the emergency zone, where it then sought to crush the Maoist
insurgency through a murderous cocktail of “surveillance, disappearance, torture,
massacre and arrest without charge” (Poole 1994c:261). Thus began a “dirty war”
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that would continue in varying intensity for the rest of the decade.
Without deeper research into the question, we can only speculate why it is that
the Peruvian armed forces opted for this particularly brutal approach, in spite of there
having supposedly taken root within the institution since the early 1960s a new
strategic doctrine “which linked internal security with national development” (Klarén
2000:320; Kruijt 1994). One possible explanation is that after his return to presi-
dential power in 1980, Belaúnde immediately sought to replace from positions of
active command many of the (progressive-minded) Velasquista officers, whom he
blamed for having played a key role in ousting him in 1968. (In fact, a shift towards
right-wing conservatism within the military command already began earlier under
General Morales Bermúdez, Velasco’s usurper and successor.) President Belaúnde’s
new commanders, those whom he deemed to be more loyal, were possibly also more
concerned with currying his favour that with pursuing military doctrine. For
Belaúnde, the measure of success in putting down what he regarded were mere “ter-
rorists,” “livestock thieves,” and “bandits,” was the body count.
To be sure, absolute repression has at times been effectively employed in certain
conflict zones in the world, such as in Iraq, where it has been Saddam Hussein’s strat-
egy of choice for quelling the uprisings of the Kurds in the north and of the Marsh
Arabs in the south of the country (Bulloch 1996:4). However, in general, military
force can never be the solution to political war, for it does nothing to address the
social and economic grievances that are usually at the root of the popular support that
revolutionary movements are sometimes able to garner. Absolute repression certainly
did not work in putting an end to Shining Path.  For unlike the Kurds and Marsh
Arabs, Shining Path forces were not concentrated in one discrete geographical loca-
tion. Rather, they were dispersed throughout a wide area. In addition, because the
majority of guerrillas were from the region, they could inconspicuously mingle freely
and easily with the civilian population of the emergency zone. Contrary to the
Peruvian army’s stereotyped preconceptions about what guerrillas should look like,
the Shining Path rebels did not dress in military fatigues (except for the purpose of
deception), like the guerrillas of Cuba, Colombia, or Chiapas (Gorriti 1999:52). The
Senderista guerrillas were therefore difficult to spot simply on the basis of their cloth-
ing or physical appearance.
To adopt a strategy of straightforward attrition in the absence of a clear target car-
ries with it the high risk of causing harm to large numbers of innocent civilians, in
addition to guerrillas. This is precisely what happened in Ayacucho, where it soon
became painfully obvious that the security forces neither knew nor understood their
enemy. They did not know the identity of many of Shining Path’s principal cadres and
leaders, not the way in which it was politically and militarily organised, nor its tactics
and method of operation. Moreover, the soldiers and policemen proved thoroughly
incapable of distinguishing between their guerrilla enemy and innocent peasants, and
were often unable to pin down the elusive and highly mobile guerrilla columns, which
in comparison seemed capable of ambushing them at will and then slipping away with
ease. As their feelings of apprehension and frustration mounted, government troops
began to lower their criterion for the application of lethal force, becoming increas-
ingly indiscriminate and arbitrary in their killings. Not surprisingly, it was in the first
two years of military intervention that the number of victims claimed by political vio-
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lence reached its peak. While it is true that Shining Path’s forces suffered their heav-
iest casualties during this period, the human, social, and political cost of the military’s
campaign of repression nevertheless proved counterproductive in the end, for it
resulted in the alienation of the bulk of the rural population. (It is important to note,
however, that this alienation did not necessarily translate into greater support for
Shining Path.)
The election of Alan García as president in July 1985 opened a new and very dif-
ferent chapter in the counterinsurgency campaign. At the outset, the Aprista president
made it clear that his government intended to deal with the insurgency problem in an
altogether different manner from what had gone on before. García chose to follow
what is known as the “developmentalist” approach to counterinsurgency. His vague-
ly conceptualised plan was to focus on initiating economic development programmes,
in addition to putting an end to the Argentine-style “dirty war” by restraining the
armed forces and upholding human rights. However, for all the popular optimism
with which these proposals were greeted, in the end they would prove of little sub-
stance, and not much more successful in undermining the revolutionary movements
than Belaúnde’s repressive crackdown had been. For one thing, the government did
not, or could not, follow through on most of its promises to provide socioeconomic
aid to the poorest departments. This was due mainly to the failure of García’s “het-
erodox” economic programme, the consequences of which were a rapid deterioration
in the national economy and a sharp rise in inflation during the second half of his
administration. Moreover, García’s attempts to reassert civilian control over the
armed forces—one of his first action in this regard was to dismiss a number of senior
commanders for the army’s role in a massacre of peasants at a rural village in
Ayacucho—merely caused heightened tensions between his government and armed
forces commanders. The military establishment came to perceive him more and more
as an unsympathetic and unsupportive president who, on the one hand, was keen to
tell them what they could not do, yet on the other hand, was incapable of formulat-
ing a coherent and comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. The armed forces
protested their dissatisfaction by becoming increasingly apathetic and idle in their mil-
itary functions (del Pino 1993b, 1996), drastically reducing their patrols and opera-
tions in the countryside for fear of being accused of human rights violations.
Consequently, the earlier counterinsurgency momentum of the Belaúnde period was
lost, and morale plummeted among the officers and men (Tapia 1997:39; Strong
1992:158-160).
There is little doubt that Shining Path’s organisational recuperation and steady
operational expansion during the García years owed itself as much to the govern-
ment’s neglect of the military dimension of the counterinsurgency struggle, as to the
Party’s genuine military successes. Nevertheless, vital advances were happening with-
in certain quarters of the security forces that would bear fruit in the following decade.
For one thing, greater budgetary assistance from the Aprista government enabled the
intelligence branch of the national police force to continue enhancing its intelligence
gathering capabilities. By the end of the 1980s, police intelligence felt that it had
enough information to set its on capturing Shining Path’s principal leaders. Within the
armed forces, the Army General Staff embarked on a profound process of introspec-
tion and analysis to try to extrapolate fundamental lessons from its past tactical,
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strategic, and conceptual errors. The result was the creation of a manual that laid out
a sophisticated, new counterinsurgency concept whereby carefully aimed military
actions would be coordinated and consolidated with social, political, economic, and
psychological lines of operation (see Tapia 1997; Ejército Peruano 1989). Once the
new counterinsurgency approach had been formulated, all that was left for the mili-
tary chiefs to do was wait for favourable political conditions so they could put it into
action.
The election of the political neophyte Alberto Fujimori to the Peruvian presiden-
cy marked a watershed in the history of the country, and a turning point in the coun-
terinsurgency struggle. As explained in chapters 5 and 6, most Peruvians tired of elit-
ist, inept, and constantly squabbling politicians immediately found Fujimori’s direct,
pragmatic, neo-populist and no-nonsense style of government, along with his image
as a political and ethnic outsider (i.e. non-criollo), refreshing and appealing (Oliart
1998). His determination to cut through partisan politics, together with his resolve to
unwaveringly support and defend the conduct of the armed forces in the face of
increasing international human rights criticism, cemented the crucial backing from
the military establishment that would be the underpinning of his regime for the rest
of the decade (Tapia 1997:60; Obando 1998).
The counterinsurgency vision that Fujimori was responsible for putting into
motion made full use of existing advances in the intelligence work and strategic think-
ing of the military and the police. The shrewd president also took advantage of the
political space for unbridled political action, which was made possible by his self-coup
in April 1992 and by his high approval rating among ordinary Peruvians, which he
continued to enjoy despite the hardships caused by his economic austerity package.
The new counterinsurgency doctrine emphasised, for the first time in a decade of civil
war, a unity of effort in the coordinated employment of both military and civil
actions; and its essence was captured in the army’s new slogan: “Más Desarrollo,
Menos Represión.”25 Military force—so abusively employed under Belaúnde, and cur-
tailed or applied in erratic fashion under García—was now to be used “softly” in a
controlled and selective manner, and always in conjunction with mutually supportive
socioeconomic and psychological measures carefully designed to create the political
conditions for the insurgency’s political defeat.
In addition to the military and socioeconomic measures, the government also
introduced new, draconian anti-terrorism laws that were applied mercilessly by “face-
less” courts. The aim was to break down the guerrilla rank and file by sealing off the
possibility of judicial acquittals of captured “terrorists” (a common complaint made
by security forces during the García period). Furthermore, the limited offer of a
repentance law in the mid-1990s served to encourage the capitulation or defection of
large numbers of guerrillas in the field. What is more, the maximum use of intelli-
gence yielded the capture of many important insurgent leaders in the first half of the
1990s, including the paramount founding leaders of both the Shining Path and the
MRTA.
On other fronts, Fujimori’s success in re-establishing economic stability in the
country through a harsh yet effective austerity programme resulted in the revival of
foreign investment. This, along with the generation of comparatively vast revenues
through the privatisation of unprofitable State-run companies, and a fundamental
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reform of the tax system, provided Fujimori with the sufficient resources to finance
and sustain the “developmentalist” component of his counterinsurgency strategy
(Klarén 2000:418-421). The new plan involved a combination of civic action and
social assistance programmes designed to address many of the underlying sources of
support for the revolution, and to begin winning hearts and minds, particularly the
peasantry’s.
Perhaps most importantly, instead of just handing out social assistance to the peas-
antry, the Fujimori government proceeded to incorporate the peasantry officially into
the counterinsurgency struggle by providing statutory recognition to the peasant self-
defence groups, thereafter known by the official title of Comités de Autodefensa y
Desarrollo. It was a pivotal step that would change the entire complexion and direc-
tion of the war.
8.3.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COUNTER-REBELLION TO COUNTERINSURGENCY
It is by recognising guerrilla warfare as political warfare that the vital significance
of counter-rebellion to counterinsurgency becomes clear. As political warfare, then,
the first objective of a guerrilla war is not to militarily destroy the armed forces of the
State, of which a guerrilla movement is initially thoroughly incapable. Rather, it is to
“establish a competitive system of control over the population” (Fall 1998:46),26 espe-
cially in parts of the countryside where guerrilla action has succeeded in all but neu-
tralising the State’s political presence. If we understand this, then it becomes clear that
the central importance that peasant counter-rebellion has to counterinsurgency is not
in terms of military power (peasants are initially almost always militarily weaker than
guerrilla forces), but rather in its ability to contest with an insurgency for political and
psychological control over the population. As illustrated in previous chapters, count-
er-rebellion’s unparalleled advantage over government and guerrilla forces is that as
an “indigenous” force generated from within the population itself, it was much less
likely to be regarded by locals as illegitimate and so rejected as a “foreign” presence.
Moreover, in contrast to government forces, counter-rebellious villagers were invari-
ably more likely to possess superior knowledge of the terrain, of the habits and tac-
tics of the guerrillas, and sometimes even their identity.
In theory, as far as the State is concerned, the peasant militias represent the “active
minority” with which it can attempt to instigate and foster general counter-rebellion
within the rest of the population (Tapia 1997). To this end, an intelligently formulat-
ed counterinsurgency strategy will attempt to incorporate this “active minority” into
the broader counterinsurgency activities of the State, using it, in addition, as a bridge
for fostering mutual trust and improving relations with the local population. It will
also charge this “active minority” with the main task of mobilising and organising the
“reluctant (or neutral) majority” so as gradually to create a hostile environment for
guerrillas everywhere they operate. Furthermore, as far as it is often logistically
impossible for security forces to occupy every single village or to maintain a constant
presence in every part of the countryside,27 it falls on peasant defence groups fill the
security and governance vacuum caused by political violence and population dis-
placement. 
In ten years of civil war, Fujimori’s government was the only one that fully under-
stood and appreciated the value of incorporating peasant counter-insurgency into a
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counterinsurgency campaign, making the military and financial support of the peas-
ant self-defence militias official government policy. Nevertheless, as will be further
explained below, the process that transformed parochially orientated peasant count-
er-rebellion into an effective counterinsurgency force was instigated not by Fujimori
or the military, but by the indigenously generated Defensa Civil Antisubversiva del Río
Apurímac, or DECAS. Civil defence groups in the Ayacucho-Huancavelica emergency
zone became truly potent, effective counterinsurgency vehicles only after they adopt-
ed a number of fundamental tactical ideas and organisational structures first devel-
oped by the DECAS. Namely, (1) the use of firearms; (2) the creation of a hierarchi-
cal, three-tier “segmentary” command structure that integrated and coordinated the
actions of defence committees from the local level all the way up to the sub-regional
level; (3) the adoption of offensive tactics, using the same tactics of stealth and
ambush employed by the guerrillas themselves; (4) the formation of elite “special
commando” groups in every zone or district, consisting of a score or more young
men, most with prior military experience, and every one armed with a Mauser rifle.
For its part, the Fujimori government adopted and included most of these features in
its CAD legislation, and by so doing merely legalised a situation that already existed.
8.4 The shifting configurations of militia-military relations
Throughout the 1980s, the attitude and the behaviour of the army towards the peas-
ant self-defence groups vacillated between support and antagonism, and not always at
times and in ways one would expect. Even while the Belaúnde government exercised
brutal repression, the formation of CDCs by Ayacucho’s rural population was actively
encouraged—in many instances even coerced—by the military. In this period, howev-
er, the objective seems to have been more symbolic than strategic: to exact from a sus-
pect peasantry an explicit declaration of their patriotism and loyalty to the State. In
addition, knowing full well that peasant communities with CDCs were especially tar-
geted by Shining Path for their perceived collaboration with the security forces
(Americas Watch 1992:9; Isbell 1990:8-12), the army’s intention by impelling the lat-
ter to form civil defence committees it may very well have been to polarise the Shining
Path and the peasantry (Americas Watch 1992:9). Even so, no attempt was made by
the army to train, provision, mobilise, or to utilise the CDCs in any systematic way for
a larger counterinsurgency role. Rural defence groups were sometimes forced to patrol
with army units, poorly armed though they were with makeshift weapons (Isbell
1990:12). They were used simply as a sort of carne de cañón—made to march a short
distance ahead of the troops in order to flush out any rebels possibly waiting in ambush
(del Pino 1993). Beyond this, the army did not see it worth their time and effort to
develop the capabilities of the CDCs, nor to create more sophisticated mechanisms of
control over them. In the eyes of the army, the CDCs were simply a way of establish-
ing a rudimentary and tentative control over the rural population as a whole. Because,
however, the government did not completely trust the peasants to begin with, the
army’s preferred way of controlling the peasantry was by concentrating dispersed rural
populations into large, strategic settlement clusters—“strategic hamletting,” as it has
sometimes been called—where they could more easily be placed under the supervision
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of a local military garrison. Thus, the CDCs remained militarily insignificant through-
out this early period, and their counterinsurgency potential went untapped.
The García government promised to pursue a more humane counterinsurgency
approach, yet the pendulum swung to the other extreme as relations between the
CDCs and certain branches of the armed forces progressively soured. Indeed, a num-
ber of Army political-military commanders became openly hostile to the defence
groups, and some officers even attempted to disband them. This deterioration in mil-
itary-CDC relations was partly fallout from the larger row between García and the
armed forces (particularly the Army). However, it must also have been motivated by
a crisis of morale within the armed forces. The existence of the CDCs must have
caused resentment among some military officers, who were reminded by their exis-
tence of the army’s inability to protect the State and its citizens.28 As public opinion
began to grow that peasants were perhaps more capable than soldiers of providing for
their own defence, and as the government began to consider ways of facilitating this,
certain military commanders became concerned that the result would be an erosion
of some of their prerogatives—a typical militaristic fear (Fitch 1998; Stepan 1988).
Foremost of these was their monopoly of the legitimate means of violence. Small
wonder that officers like Army general Howard Rodríguez were among the
staunchest opponents of the government intention to begin providing firearms to the
peasant militias at the end of the 1980s.
Chapter 4 shows that the Army’s withdrawal to the sidelines of the counterinsur-
gency struggle, and its growing capriciousness towards the civil defence groups par-
ticularly during last year of the García presidency, caused many rural communities in
the sierra to disband their CDCs. After reassessing the situation, most peasants con-
cluded that the prevailing winds of power now blew in the direction of Shining Path,
and thus reacted accordingly by opting to accept or to accommodate the insurgency
into their daily lives.
Paradoxically enough, it was during this period of crisis that the DECAS rose to
become the most organised, most sophisticated and militarily powerful of civil
defence organisations. It is not surprising that the DECAS emerged and developed in
the Apurímac River Valley, the most highly commercialised agricultural sub-region of
Ayacucho, where peasant federations, like FECVRA, had previously been most active.
By the mid-1980s, however, the valley’s peasant federations had all disintegrated, and
most of their leaders had fled or disappeared owing to both military repression and
guerrilla violence. Even so, the legacy of the federations was the organisational expe-
rience they left behind, and which lived on in their former members. This would later
manifest itself in the sophisticated organisational character of the DECAS.
In the later-Garcia period, the DECAS sought an alliance with the Colombian-
linked drug traffickers in the valley who, in return for protection from the police and
the guerrillas, provided the DECAS with money and guns (del Pino 1996, 1993a).
(Similarly, in the Huallaga Valley Shining Path forged a lucrative, symbiotic relation-
ship with the narcotraficantes.) In addition, the DECAS also managed to forge an
especially close working relationship with the Marine Infantry detachments in the val-
ley, who in spite of having been incongruously described by various writers as the
most “racist” branch of the armed forces, nevertheless came to act as a kind of pro-
tector for the DECAS against the hostile actions of the Army. 
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“Configurational” alliances are not always based on commensurable interests. In
this case, the goal of the peasant members of the DECAS was to overthrow Shining
Path domination in the valley in order to recuperate their farmlands. Conversely, the
focus of the Marine Infantry command was to destroy rebel forces, pacify the area,
and thus restore national security. In spite of their differing motivations, then, both
the DECAS and the Marines nevertheless shared a common goal in neutralising rebel
forces in the Apurímac Valley.
Actively supported and even supplied with limited amounts of modern weaponry
by their Marine Infantry allies, the DECAS developed into a powerful and effective
counter-insurgency organisation in the second half of the 1980s. Enjoying relative
autonomy of action, and jurisdictional protection provided by local Marine Infantry
political-military commander, DECAS leaders were able not only to pursue their own
counterinsurgency activities (though always in coordination with the Marine Infantry
commander) and to develop their own strategies and battlefield tactics. The also cre-
ated their own internal norms and rules designed to enhance the security of their local
communities. Through the strength of their arms, the astuteness of their leadership,
and their advantage in having the support (military and moral) of their Marine
Infantry allies, the DECAS were eventually able to push Shining Path out of the entire
Apurímac River Valley in an epic process that is poetically referred to by montoneros
as the “Reconquest.” The result was that the DECAS became the first rural militias to
achieve a coordinated network of defence that encompassed an entire sub-region (i.e.
the valley). Their effective control of this economically productive region of mar-
ketable cash crops—particularly coca—provided the DECAS with the unique ability
to finance the expansion of their organisation into other regions of Ayacucho, which
they achieved by dispatching small, elite units or grupos especiales to carry out organ-
isational and counterinsurgency work among the peasant communities of the
Ayacuchan sierra. The “Reconquest” was the DECAS’ high water mark, and their
decision to throw their political support behind the presidential candidacy of Mario
Vargas Llosa in 1990 provides graphic evidence that they were also beginning to
realise their own political potential.
The proven success of the DECAS, together with a fundamental change in the
military’s appreciation of the counterinsurgency potential of the self-defence groups,
would bring yet another shift in military-militia relations in the 1990s. Not only did
the Fujimori government finally sanction the militias’ legal use of specified firearms
(thereby creating a new source of dependency), it also passed legislation that clearly
outlined the rights and obligations of the CADs vis-à-vis the military, which con-
comitantly also formalised and tightened the military’s control over them.
Apart from harnessing the power of counter-rebellion for the purposes of his gov-
ernment’s counterinsurgency strategy, it is not unreasonable to suggest that by insti-
tutionalising the military’s authority over the militias, Fujimori was attempting to hin-
der the emergence of caudillos or “warlords,” a tendency that was already apparent
among DECAS leaders (recall Comandante Huayhuaco, chapter 4). In addition, plac-
ing the militias under strict military authority was certainly also a control measure
designed to prevent the armed CADs from possibly falling under the control of polit-
ical rivals, particularly political parties, as had happened in the case of the rondas
campesinas of northern Peru (Starn 1999). 
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We have seen throughout this book that the military has always exercised varying
degrees of control over the militias. In this hierarchical relationship, the military
invariably claimed superior status, justified by the conviction that they are the “pro-
fessionals” when it comes to the art of war, whereas the peasant militiamen are mere-
ly laymen.29 Militia members and leaders frequently received direct orders from mil-
itary officers; yet, for a militia commander to give an order even to a private soldier
was unthinkable. In any joint civil-military patrol or combat operation, military offi-
cers were always the ones in command. Furthermore, it was the military, in accor-
dance with legislation, that in practice defined the many details regarding the com-
position and functioning of the civil defence patrols, such as membership and
weaponry. However, the State’s control of the CADs existed not only in statute, it was
also inscribed and underscored through routine actions. CAD commanders, for
instance, were obliged to liaison with higher military authorities, and to coordinate
their actions closely, particularly with the special officer designated as the Jefe de los
Comités de Autodefensa of the emergency zone. In recent years, the military also
began to create a detailed register of CAD members, in addition to compiling a com-
puterised catalogue of the quantity and types of firearms and ammunition in the pos-
session of the militias.
As Peru entered a tentative phase of “post-violence” reconstruction and develop-
ment in the second half of the 1990s, the Peruvian army’s  “new professionalism”
(Stepan 1978, 1976) moved to assert itself in the new social processes beginning to
unfold. It began by symbolically declaring a “Lucha por la Reconstrucción y
Desarrollo.”30 Like other so-called “political armies,” the Peruvian armed forces exhib-
it an ethos of “professional militarism.” That is to, it has ascribed itself the providen-
tial mission—or “destiny,” they might say—to take charge of nation-building by virtue
of their belief that they are the only institution with the expertise, the vision, and the
“competence” to assume political and administrative responsibilities for the purpose
of solving the nation’s greatest problems.31 It was of little surprise that in the second
half of the 1990s, the political-military command began to voice its intention of play-
ing a leading and directing role in the process of “post-violence” reconstruction and
development within the zones of emergency (see chapter 6). In this, however, they
were hindered by their own lack of resources and institutional autonomy, given the
hegemonic power that the Executive had come to assume in national government and
politics.
As we also saw in chapter 6, the military’s attempt to realise its unique vision of
post-violence rural development was also stymied by the conflicting interests and
visions of other State organisations, like PAR and FONCODES, which came under
the direct control of the President himself. Any realistic intention the military might
have had to steer the process of rural development in the former war zones was also
complicated by the reappearance and proliferation in recent years of NGOs, whose
foreign funding provides them with a large measure of autonomy from both the State
and the military. Overall, however, the military in Ayacucho showed a willingness to
try to cooperate with NGOs and with governmental reconstruction and development
organisations. During the Fujimori era, the army, besides providing security to people
at civic action events, also became a sort of conveyor belt within the government’s
vast clientalistic web for distributing handouts to strategic sections of the electorate.
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Within the zones of emergency, the army was the dominant actor in civil-military
relations. The supreme political authorities in the emergency zones, we should
remember, were military, not civilian, administrators. Even so, a more detailed exam-
ination of military-militia relations over the years reveals that in spite of extensive,
formal military control, the CADs and their communities were nevertheless able at
times to influence a reconfiguration, a reshaping, a negotiation of power relationships
with the military. Over the course of this relationship, its internal dynamics of con-
trol and autonomy, have varied and shifted, not just geographically, but also at each
separate phase of counterinsurgency struggle, according to the degree of importance
attributed to the militias within the context of the larger counterinsurgency vision.
What is important to understand is that the military’s control over the peasant mili-
tias, though sometimes very great, was never ubiquitous, nor completely dominating.
The militias were not always the helpless marionettes manipulated by the military,
which many outsiders have assumed them to be. Despite their great dependence on
the military for many things, peasant militias nevertheless also sought autonomous
spaces, both spatial and mental, to expand, defend, reshape, and construct. This can
be seen in the belief that many militiamen came to have of their superiority over the
army and the police when it came to combating Shining Path. The example of the
DECAS also vividly illustrates peasant agency and ingenuity at its most creative and
dynamic. Indeed, that the organisational structure of the DECAS became the proto-
type of the CADs, and not the other way around, is graphic evidence enough that
rural communities in the Apurímac Valley had sufficient power and space to develop
autonomously from military influence (see chapter 4).
In spite of the army’s close control over the CADs throughout the 1990s, and
despite their reliance on the material and moral support of the State, what is impor-
tant to recognise is that Fujimori also came to depend on the continued goodwill and
loyalty of the CADs—at least for as long as he continued to need the peasantry as the
backbone of his political and electoral power. The necessity to transform his own
need into their dependence, was probably one of the underlying reasons why Fujimori
took such great efforts to deepen the counter-rebellious peasantry’s social, material,
and military dependence on the government. Consequently, Fujimori’s need to main-
tain the political backing and indebtedness of the peasantry empowered the latter
with at least some degree of leverage to make certain demands (or at least petitions),
pertaining mainly to the reconstruction and development of their rural communities.
The military’s domination and control over the peasant militias should not be
exaggerated, however. Actually, the daily administration and control of the CADs and
their communities were ordinarily left in the hands of the local or zonal CAD com-
manders, not the army. The army, whose presence in the countryside was mainly con-
fined to periodic patrols or to small, fortified outposts in a few of the more strategi-
cally important district capitals, had neither the manpower nor the interest in con-
trolling the day-to-day affairs of the local population (Degregori 1998:147).
The peasant self-defence organisations of Peru bear a number of striking similarities
and contrast with the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PAC) of Guatemala. Given the
limited space remaining, I will touch on only a few points of comparative interest.
First, whereas in Peru spontaneous community initiative and army instigation have
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both played a part (sometimes simultaneously) in the emergence of the village defence
organisations, the evidence suggests that in Guatemala the military took the lead in
creating the PAC (Remijnse 2001:456). In other words, it appears that the phenome-
non of peasant counter-rebellion did not take place in Guatemala, and that the emer-
gence and spread of the PAC can be explained exclusively as one of the State’s coun-
terinsurgency initiatives. That is not to say, however, that military control meant that
the PAC and their commanders could not exercise any degree of agency; rather, as
Remijnse noted, “they evolved over time into a local power player in their own right”
(2001:454). That the civil defence patrols of Guatemala were a result of imposition
by the military perhaps goes to explain why local people have been, and still are, so
frightened of them. By comparison, many of the village-defence patrols in Ayacucho
were generated by the population itself, and as such are partly the product of inter-
nal, local initiative. This explains, firstly, the widespread acceptance they had among
the local communities, when they were not the  result of external imposition. It is
interesting to note that whereas in places like the northern provinces of Ayacucho, the
rondas campesinas were widely embraced by the peasantry as its venerated institu-
tional mechanism for self-defence, in Guatemala, by contrast, people are generally
frightened of “a possible return to the violent past, through the revival of the civil
patrols....”(Remijnse 2001:467-468).
In both national contexts, self-defence organisations have been linked to human
rights abuses. Yet in the Peruvian case, most of these occurred in the first half of the
war, and “to a far lesser extent that those carried out by the civil patrols in
Guatemala” (Degregori 1999b:256). Unlike in Peru, an ethnic dimension also seems
to have played a part in fuelling local level political violence. That is to say, in
Guatemala, the ladino-dominated PAC operated as part of the State’s terror appara-
tus, tacitly encouraged by the military to kill and sow terror among the Maya ethnic-
ities.32 In Peru, by contrast, the civil war never assumed the same kind of ethnic fea-
tures that it did in Guatemala, between the ladino and the indigenous Maya popula-
tions. The fact is, the majority of the combatants on either side of the conflict in
Peruvian departments like Ayacucho were culturally and racially indistinguishable
from each other. The Marine Infantry unit that was initially dispatched as “shock
troops” to Ayacucho in 1983 was, indeed, composed mainly of coastal criollos. But
the rank and file conscripts of the 2nd Infantry Division, the principal military force
stationed in Ayacucho, were themselves mainly youths of peasant parentage, though
from other Andean departments. Similarly, the rank and file of Shining Path and of
the village-defence committees were completely from the same social and racial back-
ground. Furthermore, in stark contrast to Guatemalan security forces (Schirmer
2002), Peruvian soldiers actually came to exhibit “greater respect for human rights”
over the course of the 1990s (McClintock 1999:242). Ironic though it seems, we saw
evidence in chapter 6 that the Peruvian military in provinces like La Mar eventually
even took measures to ensure that the peasant patrols would not violate human rights.
Another interesting point of comparison concerns the creation or defence of
spaces of autonomous action. In the Peruvian case, village defence initiatives were
commonly directed towards corporate, collective goals. Furthermore, though in the
early years many civil defence authorities were selected by the military from among
comuneros it regarded as loyal, as time went on it became the norm for communities
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to elect their own militia leaders at a general assembly. Moreover, the goal of civil
defence in Peru was not only to provide immediate security to one’s community, but
also to society as a whole so as to enable the return of much-sought-after aid and
development institutions—such as NGOs—to the countryside. In contrast, through
the lasting fear they engendered, the PAC helped to sow popular distrust towards
NGOs and their initiatives (ibid.). In addition, Remijnse tells us that PAC command-
ers—many of whom were unpopular, violent men to begin with, and thus resented by
the rest of the local population—were ordinarily hand-picked by a military officers,
instead of chosen by their fellow villagers (ibid.). This obviously must have had an
important influence on the degree of legitimacy with which their communities
regarded such leaders, which in turn helps to explain the lingering climate of fear for
such men. Moreover, the PAC example seems to suggest that the principal concern of
many patrol leaders was to create autonomous space in order to enhance their own
personal power at the local level (Remijnse 2001:461). Indeed, many former PAC
commanders have literally transformed themselves into local caudillos by expanding
both their power base and the fear that this inspires among their neighbours
(ibid.:465-466). To be sure, the Peruvian civil defence organisations also had their
share of “bossism” (Starn 1998), yet not to the same degree as in Guatemala, it would
seem. We have already noted some of the reasons that account for this. Appointment
by election was one way to prevent the rise of caudillos among the Peruvian civil
defence groups. Another reason was the strict controls and legislated measures taken
by Fujimori’s government to ensure that the CADs did not become politicised, or
develop into a political movement, or give rise to local “warlords” that could chal-
lenge State power at the local level.
These features have resulted in a significantly distinct legacy in the two country
contexts. Since the widespread demobilisation of the CADs at the end of the 1990s,
former CADs and their rondero members have apparently not attempted to perpetu-
ate themselves by turning into criminal gangs, or into private “armies” for local power
holders (cf. Schirmer 2002). Nor does it appear that former CAD leaders have sought
to become new, mafia-like violent strongmen, or leaders of criminal gangs, as has hap-
pened in El Salvador and Guatemala. As a possible reason for this, Degregori suggests:
“The former rondas members did not find a market for their newly acquired military
skills, given the social structure in the countryside of the Peruvian Andes where no
large landholders exist; land reform and the peasant movements themselves had put
an end to them” (1999b:255). Yet I saw no evidence that former ronderos were even
looking for a market for their lethal skills within the post-conflict context. Rather,
what I observed was that once the need for village defence no longer took prece-
dence, many CAD leaders and ronderos were generally eager to return to their more
pressing task of subsistence farming.
8.5 The challenge of democratic reconstruction: 
between civil society and armed actors
By their efforts to secure pacification and guarantee security in the countryside, CADs
may be said to have made significant contributions to a transition from a war to a
320
From Victims to Heroes
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 320
post-war scenario. How, then, might we appreciate the contributions and the place
that CADs have had in these processes of democratic and civil-society reconstruction?
It is to this question that we now turn.
8.5.1 DEMOCRATIC RECONSTRUCTION AND ARMED ACTORS
In the mid-1970s, the bulk of Latin American countries still languished under mil-
itary dictatorships. By the end of the decade and into the next, however, these “polit-
ical armies” had already begun a collective retreat to the barracks, thus setting the
stage for a promising transition from authoritarian to democratic governance for the
entire region (O’Donnell et al. 1986; Silva 2001; Koonings and Kruijt 2002a, 2002b).
Nevertheless, in most countries, this fundamental shift was far from smooth, and
the consolidation of democracy remains, in most instances, incomplete. As a number
of scholars have recognised, although these newly democratising countries have
assumed a written constitution and an electoral system, the consolidation of political
democracy rests on more than its trappings (Pinheiro 1997). For as Bollen suggests,
political democracy refers to “...the extent to which political power of the elites is
minimised and that of the non-elites is maximized....Where the non-elites have little
control over the elites, political democracy is low. When the elites are accountable to
the non-elites, political democracy is higher” (1991:5). The legacies of the authori-
tarian past; the persistence of elite privileges and a clientelistic political style; corrup-
tion and a lack of accountability; enduring social and economic discrimination; lim-
ited citizenship participation and representation; the State’s failure to control illegal
violence—all constitute not just formidable obstacles to creating an open, unrestrict-
ed democracy (Pinheiro 1997; Stavenhagen 1990), but also serve to erode democra-
cy’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population. It is likely that their distorted taste of an
unresponsive, poorly performing democratic system is what has led electoral majori-
ties, such as in Peru and Venezuela, to seek an alternative by supporting neo-authori-
tarian, populist, civil-military hybrid regimes, whose political and economic agendas
would ultimately prove hostile to the fundamentals of democratic civil society
(Cameron 2000; Koonings 2001a).33
Pinheiro (1997:263) and others also point out that beyond such structural and
institutionalised obstacles, democracy may also flounder in societies without a demo-
cratic tradition which respects values like the formal separation between State
finances and private expenses, or the resolution of disputes and conflicts through the
rule of law rather than with brute force (O’Donnell 1994). The case of Peru seems to
bear this hypothesis out, for of the 74 Peruvian government between 1821 and 2001,
only 26 were the results of pure elections, of which only 5 (beginning in 1980) were
carried out under conditions of universal suffrage (see Kruijt 1994:181-182). The vast
majority of Peruvian governments were formed through military coups and rebel-
lions, and it is not surprising that Peru is among the Latin American countries with a
strong “authoritarian tradition” that pervades politics, society, and culture (Palmer
1980; Larraín 1999; Silva 1999).
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, democratic transitions have also been jeopar-
dised by the continuation or outbreak of political violence and armed revolutionary
opposition (Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Kay 2001), as well as by inter-institutional
power struggles between civilian governments and the military. These two problems
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often come hand in hand because the perceived threat or the actual presence of
sociopolitical violence invariably provides justification for the persistent interference
of political armies in the affairs of government and internal policing on the grounds
of “national security” (Fitch 1998; Zagorski 1992). In declared situations of “nation-
al emergency,” political armies invariably exhibit a tendency to take charge of pro-
tecting the nation by subordinating civil rule—a logic that combines the “competence
principle” with the “national security doctrine” (Koonings 2001a; Koonings and
Kruijt 2002a, 2002b). Nowhere is this sort of scenario more evident that in Peru,
where Shining Path’s initiation of armed struggle on the eve of elections provoked a
repressive reaction from the government and the military, the overall consequences of
which were to derail the nation’s transition to a viable democratic system.
Where democratic governments fail not only in their ability to control both the
proliferation of illegitimate violence and its own repressive apparatus’s arbitrary use
of violence; where democratic governments fail to maintain public order and to guar-
antee the safety of its citizens; when democratic governments fail in these respects,
one can expect to see the emergence of extra-legal, non-legitimate “armed actors”—
death squads, self-defence militias, private armies, vigilante groups etc.34 The expan-
sion of violence that accompanies the proliferation of such armed actors serves to
erode yet another cornerstone of democracy: the monopoly of violence (Pinheiro
1997:263; Koonings 2001a). In such situations, militarisation subordinates democra-
tisation, “uncivil” society supplants civil society, and frontier justice takes the place of
the rule of law (Payne 2000; Huggins 1991; Koonings 2001a:404). Even the rhetor-
ical phrase “rule of law” is often perverted and used by security forces and vigilantes
as a pretext for using violence in the pursuit of private interests or extra-legal goals
(ibid.). What usually occurs is that both formal armed actors (i.e. the army or the
police) and pro-State informal armed actors end up forging a “symbiotic relation-
ship,” as has happened in countries as diverse as Peru, Guatemala, the Philippines,
Kosovo, and East Timor .
Ayacucho’s peasant militias are a clear example of armed actors. But, theoretical-
ly and philosophically speaking, what sort of status did they have as armed actors vis-
à-vis the State? As we have clearly seen, the outbreak of peasant counter-rebellion was
the direct consequence of the State’s inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to protect
peasants from guerrilla violence. To say that in this sense, peasant counter-rebellion
has contributed to the erosion of the rule of law belies the fact that they were not only
encouraged by the police to kill or capture presumed subversives, but also praised by
President Belaúnde himself when they actually did so (see chapter 3). In other words,
by virtue of the instigation given by the State to the peasants to use violence against
Shining Path, such violent actions on the part of the peasants cannot therefore be
completely regarded as “unlawful.”
Peasant patrols and individual ronderos have also been accused of committing
crimes and human rights abuses (Amnesty International 1991:21; Americas Watch
1992:9), but certainly not to the extent attributable to the security forces and to
Shining Path (Starn 1998:244-247). Moreover, the State has not hesitated to lock up
self-defence patrollers for crimes committed in the course of carrying out their duties.
Yet members of the armed forces have generally enjoyed the impunity afforded to
them by military courts, or by threats made to public prosecutors and human rights
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groups (Amnesty International 1991), and by a general amnesty law enacted by
Congress in 1995.
In addition, although the military had played a key role in the creation and pro-
liferation of many civil defence groups throughout the militarised emergency zone all
through the war, that opposition was nevertheless voiced by some senior officers to
the idea of distributing firearms to the peasant patrols reveals a hypocritical contra-
diction in the understanding that certain senior officers had of the State’s monopoly
on violence. That is, it is fine and well for authorised peasant militias to kill presumed
“terrorists,” so long as it was not carried out by means of manufactured firearms. If
this was indeed the position held by individuals such as General Howard Rodríguez,
then it sees the state’s monopoly on violence as pertaining principally to the means of
inflicting violence, and not necessarily with the subject of violence itself. Accordingly,
the rule of law can be bent and manipulated to justify the extra-legal or abusive use
of violence in the interests of “protecting society,” whatever that may be convenient-
ly taken to mean (see Pinheiro 1997; Huggins 1991).
As armed actors, what status did peasant self-defence organisations have in rela-
tion to the State and the military? As we have already seen above, their status
throughout the 1980s was semi-formal, and their relationship to the military was
often wrought with ambiguities and contradictions. Chapter 4 has clearly shown the
“schizophrenic” pendulum swings of an army that at one moment was assuming an
active role in creating and giving encouragement to peasant civil defence committees,
and at another had plainly become hostile to such groups. Ambiguities concerning
their status and place in the counterinsurgency struggle were resolved once and for
all in the 1990s, when the Fujimori government passed legislation that formalised
their status as the “fourth branch of the armed forces,” (Kruijt 1996:246), legally per-
mitted to use specified types of firearms. In this way, they came to assume a military
status akin to that of reserve or National Guard forces existing in many developed
countries; and their hitherto extra-legal, vigilante form of violence was transfigured
into “legitimate violence,” at least in the eyes of the government (cf. Amnesty
International 1991). Finally, it is important to clarify that unlike the Rodrigo Franco
Command (CRF), the peasant patrols were not politically motivated “death squads.”
The CRF was a shady, clandestine organisation, allegedly created by APRA and ele-
ments of military intelligence, “with the aim of revenging murdered military and civil-
ian officials,” and used terrorist tactics (Amnesty International 1991:20; Obando
1998:391, 407 n.15). In contrast, peasant militias were “public” entities created pri-
marily for defending their communities.
Obviously, the violence utilised by the rondas campesinas has certain justifica-
tions—self-defence is the strongest—and its institutionalisation by the State placed
them in the category of armed actor belonging “squarely in the public domain”; and
as such a tool “of the use of legitimate coercion” (Koonings 2001a:404). The next
question, then, is whether we can conceptually situate these peasant patrols in the
realm of “civil” or “uncivil” society.
8.5.2 CIVIL AND UNCIVIL SOCIETY
Numerous theorists consider civil society to be a prerequisite for democracy, as
well as constituting a counter-hegemonic check to State power and militarism.35 Civil
323
Reflections
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 323
society is the organising domain in which diverse, pluralistic public interests are put
forward.36 Civil society makes claims on the state, and operates within a legal order
guaranteed by the State; but—and this is the crucial point—civil society is
autonomous from the State (Diamond 1999:221-233; Koonings 2001b). Dagnino
(1998:51) recognises the importance of civil society as a “crucial [space] of political
struggle for the building of citizenship.” Extending Dagnino’s point, Baierle
(1998:118) makes the complementary observation that “popular movements,” which
are of course one of the constitutive elements of civil society, are “strategic spaces
wherein different conceptions of citizenship and democracy are debated.”
According to Radcliffe (1999:204-205), a number of characteristics distinguish
social movements from other political groups, like unions and political parties. Firstly,
they have a cyclical and transitory character. They may even disappear once the
goal(s) of the social movement has been achieved. Their permanence lies not in insti-
tutional structure, but rather in “the formation and transferral of collective memory
of practices, discourses and meaning [which] may serve as a resource for later social
actors and their movements” (Radcliffe 1999:204; Alvarez et al. 1998). Secondly,
social movements do not utilise the same institutionalised channels as political parties
and unions, but rather use “social mobilisation as power” (Radcliffe 1999:204-205).
Sociopolitical changes may blur the boundaries between these groups, however.
Thirdly, “in whatever context, social movements need to define their terms and agen-
das, and provide some closure around their projects.... Such closure is provided by the
movements’ cultural resources, as well as by the political, economic, and social con-
text in which they operate” (ibid.:205). Furthermore, through self-reflection, the
original central concern of a social movement may, and often do, grow into wider
concerns and objectives. Along with these characteristics, however, what is central
about social movements is that they exist within civil society, organising and mobilis-
ing people certain interests and demands.
Given these concepts, can we relate peasant self-defence organisations to the
realm of civil society? Given that their existence has come about through a combina-
tion of grassroots initiative and government intervention, can we regard Ayacucho’s
peasant self-defence organisations as having been a “social movement,” as defined
above? Or were they simply an extension of the armed forces? According to
Foweraker, “[m]ost studies of social movements explain them in terms of civil socie-
ty and confine them to civil society. But, in fact, social movements have developed in
continual and intimate interaction with the state” (2001:842). This can certainly be
said about the peasant militias. However, intimate interaction does not necessarily
mean the loss of autonomy, does it? Looked at from Foweraker’s and Radcliffe’s per-
spectives, the rondas campesinas of the emergency zone would appear, at first blush,
to meet the criteria for a social movements. On the other hand, Dagnino (1998:)
would probably not agree, for she asserts that the basic reference of social movements
is the democratisation of society as a whole. This certainly was not the principal
objective or motivating factor behind peasant counter-rebellion.
Can we not argue that it was the actions and internal dynamics of the CADs,
rather than their overt characteristics, that reveal them either to be a new social move-
ment or not? Is it not so that they made valuable contributions to an apparent rebirth
of civil society in war-torn areas such as Ayacucho, as we saw in chapter 6?
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Let us consider the evidence. A notable aspect about the CADs is that they ever
fully became a political movement, with a political agenda. There were a number of
reasons for this. The most influential was Fujimori’s efforts to crush traditional civil
society, partisan politics, and the power of the traditional parties and unions, partic-
ularly within the militarised zones of emergency. In fact, the Comités de Autodefensa
were explicitly forbidden by the special CAD legislation from engaging in partisan
politics.37 Even the northern Rondas Campesinas, which had long been associated
with various leftist parties, were brought by the Fujimori government under the same
prohibitive controls as the CADs through the promulgation of D.S. 002-93-DE/CCF-
FAA.38
What is important to understand, however, is that even before the advent of
Fujimori, the combination of political violence and the Belaúnde government’s deci-
sion to impose a state of emergency (the consequence of which was to suspend rights
and freedoms within its ambit) already did much to demolish civil and political soci-
ety, almost in its entirety, within the militarised emergency zones. In south-central
Andean departments like Ayacucho, the demise of traditional civil society can square-
ly be put on the shoulders of the two main protagonists of political violence: the
Armed forces and Shining Path. On the one side, Shining Path increasingly targeted
popular leaders, grassroots unions, and parties of the legal left, in accordance with
their strategy “to eliminate competing organizations and forces in the national arena
of popular and left-wing political struggle and to polarize the political situation such
that the only two political agents are the PCP-SL and a militarized Peruvian state”
(Poole 1994c:255; see Burt 1998). On the other, security forces automatically
assumed that all leftwing parties and popular organisations were Shining Path sym-
pathisers or front organisations, and did not hesitate to attack any group or individ-
ual they deemed “subversive.” The result of this crossfire on civil society was the
demise and virtual disappearance of hitherto powerful peasant federations, peasant-
orientated political movements, and traditional political parties in the department of
Ayacucho, all before Fujimori assumed power and administered the coup de grâce
(Smith 1992; Kruijt and del Pilar Tello 2002).
Consequently, the self-defence organisations of this region have developed, for
the most part, without collaborating with or being influenced by political parties.39
With the brief exception of the DECAS at the close of the 1980s, the peasant militias
of Ayacucho-Huancavelica remained un-politicised and un-partisan throughout their
entire history.
Rather than attributing it all to the act of one man, or as entirely the consequence
of political violence, however, the “de-politicisation” of society is in fact a larger
process that has been unfolding over the entire region over the past two decades.
According to Silva, the de-politicisation of a growing number of Latin American
countries can be traced back to the population’s political experience of the former
authoritarian regimes, when physical repression was employed for the purpose of
“forced depoliticization.” (Silva 1999:54). Military governments in a number of Latin
American countries “attempted to convince the population that ‘politics’ was syn-
onymous with subversion, chaos, decadence and corruption” (ibid.). This certainly
describes what the military did in Ayacucho, particularly during the first half of the
1980s. Silva goes on to say, however, that the military governments were only tapping
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into a popular disenchantment already existing among the population, “as a result of
the general political and economic crisis which preceded the arrival of the military to
power” (Silva 1999:54). After the transition to democracy in most Latin American
countries which had military regimes, the impunity afforded to the military by the
new civilian government as a condition for regime transfer, coupled with a deepening
economic crisis which traditional politicians and political parties seemed incapable of
solving, served merely to exacerbate the depoliticisation of society (ibid.:55).
The past two decades have certainly seen a dramatic decline in the importance of
political parties, peasant organisations, and labour unions in Peru (Palmer 2000:5-6;
Mauceri 2000:29). In the midst of a political and economic crisis, the focus of a vast
majority of the peasants shifted from political issues, like land, to issues concerning
livelihood and everyday survival and livelihood (Klarén 2000; Palmer 2000).
As we already discussed in the last chapter, Palmer (2000) suggests that the emer-
gence in recent years of often-autonomous and self-generated citizen responses, with-
out the mediation of parties, can be characterised as the new phenomenon of “infor-
mal politics” (see chapter 7). From about the second half of the 1980s, traditional
civil society in places like Ayacucho has largely been replaced by what Palmer and oth-
ers describe as “new, non-traditional civil society,” made up of community-based
organisations like Mothers’ Clubs, Glass of Milk committees, neighbourhood organ-
isations, and Self-Defence Committees. What characterises this new civil society is
that its constituent entities engage in “informal politics” (Palmer 2000:6). Consistent
with the de-politicisation that Silva has observed taking place throughout Latin
America, Palmer notes that what is distinctive about these non-traditional entities is
that they tend to shun formal politics and political parties. In Tambo, for instance, he
discovered that as far as many people were concerned, “from their perspective, polit-
ical parties, far from being relevant or responsive to their needs, are seen as serving
only to sow divisions within the communities of the district” (ibid.:13). For these rea-
sons, along with the fact that the “dirty war” taught people not get involved in any-
thing that seems even remotely “political,” much of the grassroots mobilising in
Ayacucho over the past decade fifteen years has focused on the politics of civil defence
and on practical livelihood issues, while avoiding altogether conventional political
issues, like human rights issues and partisan politics (see chapter 6).40
De-politicised though the landscape of Ayacucho has been over the years, some
scholars have argued that we nevertheless have seen a gradual re-emergence of civil
society. According to this argument, the most significant contribution that peasant
militias have made to the resurrection of civil society has been to restore a sufficient
degree of security in the countryside such as to enable apparent civil society entities,
including civic-orientated NGOs, to return and forge ahead with much-needed recon-
struction and development initiatives (Palmer 2000:12-14; Starn 1998:245-247). As
we have also seen in chapters 5 and 6, the peace that peasant militias helped to restore
over large areas of the emergency also helped to encourage municipal authorities to
return to outlying district capitals, and comuneros to begin taking up posts of local
authority once again. Ever since the early 1990s, militias had also been instrumental
in organising and/or facilitating locally sponsored refugee returns to abandoned rural
communities. In addition, where the militias had established a prominent presence in
the emergency zone, they often assumed a key role in local reconstruction activities
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(Starn 1998:245). In the second half of the 1990s, Tambo’s elite group of patrollers
(called “patrulla especial”) became a standard feature of civil-military sponsored civic
actions, along with representatives of NGOs, government aid agencies, and local mil-
itary and civilian officials.
Can it therefore be argued that the peasant militias, rather than “thwarting” the
“build-up of grassroots civil structures” and contributing to an “uncivil society”
(Koonings 2001b:19), have not only played an indispensable part in resuscitating and
strengthening civil society in many war torn areas of Peru. In fact, they have also been
an integral component of that civil society.
The debate on civil society is large, and often quite convoluted. Nevertheless, I
would argue that the crux of the question in this case depends, in fact, on the ques-
tion of whether the peasant militias can be said to have existed in a context of a func-
tioning civil society, as I have defined it above. The answer, as is the evidence clearly
show, is no. Arguably, the continuation of the state of emergency, which suspended
rights and freedoms, and instated a military officer as the maximum political author-
ity in the region, effectively obliterated the “autonomous public space” required for
the existence of a true civil society.41 The apparent resurgence of civil society entities
is perhaps better described as taking place within a liminal phase, whereby an unruly,
chaotic society at war is being left behind, and a society at peace, in democratic tran-
sition, with a functioning civil society is being approached.42
I contend, therefore, that although the peasant militias appeared to exhibit cer-
tain characteristics that liken them to a social movement participating in civil society,
the context of a militarised emergency zone, in addition to their close relationship
with the military and the government, ultimately typified what Payne (2000) has
described as an “uncivil movement” in an “uncivil society” (see Koonings 2001a:404-
405, 2001b:19).
Obviously, all this is theoretical. In reality, no one can deny that their actions have
contributed invaluably to social reconstruction, and so have facilitated the transition
towards democracy and civil society. This journey took a gigantic step forward when,
on 1 January 2000, the state of emergency was finally lifted for the first time in almost
two decades. Unfortunately, though, by that time, the peasant militias had already
begun to disband on their own, and so it now remains to be seen whether they might
return in some altered form in the future, as a social movement, integral to a healthy
civil society.
8.6 The legacy of civil war and the peasant self-defence experience 
8.6.1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE, CHANGES AND RENEWAL
A notable feature of the contemporary Peruvian civil war is that it has impelled
contrary social processes. Ironically enough, the forces of disruption and destruction
have also been responsible for inadvertently accelerating many of the most significant
processes of social transformation of preceding decades. Massive population dis-
placement due to political violence hastened and escalated the process of urban
migration that had already been taking place for decades. The result was a dramatic
growth in the marginal urban population of major Peruvian cities as thousands of
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rural refugees flocked to shantytowns, where they swelled the ranks of the pre-war
economic migrant population already living there. In the Andean provinces, sleepy
district capitals like Tambo literally burgeoned overnight as huge numbers of peasants
fleeing military repression or guerrilla violence built new, suburban refugee settle-
ments on the outskirts of town. In the countryside by contrast, disperse villages were
forced to cluster together for safety, and in doing so not only created new communi-
ties, but also initiated a process of proto-urbanisation in the rural areas themselves.
Such dramatic demographic shifts have intensified the process that over three
decades ago Cotler described as “urban ruralization [sic] and rural urbanization.” This
process is characterised by the reciprocal flow of people between the coast and the
highlands, the urban centres and the rural areas, giving birth to new ideas, cultural
forms, identities, aspirations and expectations, and patterns of political and social
behaviour (1970:432-435). In the process, urban-rural relations have become more
fluid, less deeply delineated, and traditional social hierarchies have been transformed.
The growth of the marginal urban population of major Peruvian cities in recent
decades has been accompanied by the dynamic phenomenon of “cholification,” which
refers to the cultural, socioeconomic, and political process by which members of the
indigenous population assume new economic and social roles, and become upwardly
mobile (Isbell 1978:20; Oliart 1998:413-415). According to Cotler, the growing
“cholification” of the indigenous peasantry through the decades has been one of the
significant factors behind the deterioration of the indigenous peasantry’s “structural
and normative dependence” on the mestizo, and the elimination of long-established
patterns of caste-like social stratification (1970:436-440). Furthermore, cholification
has also engendered its own heterogeneous popular culture known as “chicha”
(Degregori 1999c:166), which is the dominant cultural form in the urban pueblos
jovenes.
Until recently, though, the social relevance of the identity of “cholo” was more at
the level of the individual, than at the level of an entire population (Isbell 1978).
However, this has changed significantly over the past decade. For one thing, the elec-
tion of a nisei president in 1990 had a profound effect on the psyche of common
Peruvians (Oliart 1998). In other words, the election of Fujimori, a non-criollo, to the
position of president contributed to the general perception among the nation’s
excluded and marginalized social strata that the structures of power in the country
were indeed opening up, and that the ascendance of the masses who had long been
outside mainstream politics finally becoming a reality.
In Ayacucho, the achievements of the peasant patrols over Shining Path forces
have helped raise the pride and self-esteem of a population in which the boundaries
between the categories of campesino, cholo, and mestizo have become increasingly
blurred owing to the profound social changes of the past two decades (Starn 1998;
Degregori 1999c; Remy 1994). As various authors have pointed out, despite the large
indigenous population of the country, it is only very recently that “indigenousness”
has become a basis for mobilisation and organisation, principally in the “Inca heart-
land” of Cuzco (Remy 1994:107). To date there is no evidence of popular indigenous
activism, or of a pan-indigenous discourse or movement. Unlike in other countries
such as Ecuador or Colombia, Peru’s indigenous people have historically not valued
“indigenousness”; neither have peasants shown much enthusiasm for the State’s “indi-
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genista” policies, such as education in Quechua or Aymara (Remy 1994; Degregori
1999c; Assies et al. 2000:8). In the past, especially during the era of General Velasco,
the notion of “indio” was given expression in purely class terms as campesino (peas-
ant). Consequently, given the pejorative connotation associated with the term “indio,”
it is perhaps not surprising that the rondas campesinas have never assumed the image
of an indigenous movement.
Nevertheless, in spite of blurring sociocultural borders in general, the civil
defence experience has also served to underscore identity and social boundaries, such
as the rural urban dichotomy; and the politics of categorisation has “fortified a sense
of peasant identity” (Starn 1999:147). In Ayacucho’s CADs as in Cajamarca’ rondas
campesinas, active participation was generally viewed as “the mark of membership in
the peasantry” (ibid.:147), and the issue of the “rondero identification card,”
described in chapter 5, serves to illustrate this point. In some parts of Peru, as in
Cuzco or on the island of Taquile on Lake Titicaca, indigenous communities have, in
recent decades, begun to recognise the benefits of emphasising their indigenous iden-
tity, especially in relation to tourism. This reveals a conscious understanding of the
strategic and selective uses of ethnic symbols in pursuit of socioeconomic interests
(Baud et al. 1996).
In Ayacucho, however, community identity continues to define one’s ethnic iden-
tity. In cultural terms, this is often expressed in distinctive ways of dress (though per-
haps less so today, given the growing popularity among peasant men for Western-style
clothing). In social and emotional terms, it is with one’s fellow community members
that the strongest sentiments of affinity, the deepest feelings of affection, and the most
personal relations of consanguinity and reciprocity are established. Individual peasant
communities compete with one another to secure scarce resources, and petitions for
material and financial assistance are made to the municipality on behalf of one’s com-
munity. In this regard, the peasant militia experience, given that its raison d’être has
always been defence of community, has certainly served to strengthen village identi-
ties and loyalties.
Even so, context is key to understanding ethnic identity in Peru. In the second half
of the 1990s, the controversy surrounding Fujimori’s place of birth, and therefore his
true nationality, developed into a larger public debate on Peruvian national identity.
The subsequent emergence and rise of a disturbingly nationalistic and racist discourse,
which celebrated the “indigenous authenticity” of cholos to the exclusion of non-
indigenous Peruvians (the Japanese immigrant population in particular), helped to
elevate even more the self-esteem and social relevance of cholos. This was undoubt-
edly one reason why Toledo’s tactical decision to emphasise his “cholo-ness” did have
widespread resonance among the literate, urban, politically conscious cholo electorate
(see Appendix C).43 We may even surmise that by the time Toledo became president
in 2001, “cholo-ness” had become, at least in the collective psyche of the majority of
the population, the basis for a new definition of the Peruvian nation.
Traumatic though the displacement of rural people to urban centres has been, it
has nevertheless had the unforeseen beneficial consequence of providing young peo-
ple of peasant parentage more opportunities to gain better education, and to extend
services such as healthcare to a wider population. And for better or worse, disruptions
caused to agricultural activities impelled people in urban and rural areas to learn new
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skills and to search for new, creative livelihood strategies in the “informal” sector,
thereby increasing their integration into a market economy that, even in war, contin-
ued its steady penetration into the nation’s hinterland. What the evidence suggests,
then, is that the peasantry’s involvement and active participation in civil war has
resulted in their far greater integration into the national framework than perhaps
would have been possible had they just been left in peace.
8.6.2 FROM VICTIMS TO CITIZEN-HEROES
The various evidence we have seen of accelerated social, cultural, and attitudinal
change in Peru over the past two decades suggest that a profound citizenship revolu-
tion has been gradually unfolding. That the ronderos have come to be portrayed, in
both popular literature and scientific discourse in Peru and abroad, as “patriot-citi-
zens who defend Peru and their community” (Stern 1998:475, caption) is compelling
testimony to the extent to which peasant militias had come to be seen (by outsiders
as much as by the peasant participants themselves) as platforms for claiming political
citizenship.
De-politicised though much of Peruvian society has become over the past two
decades, this has not stopped peasants from first petitioning, and later making
demands and claiming rights. These included, in more or less chronological order,
guarantees for safety, which would later develop into the language of human rights
(Muñoz 1998); the right to defend themselves, which was first confirmed and
endorsed General Huamán, a political-military commanders of indigenous back-
ground (see chapter 3); the right to the means to defend themselves, which President
García not only articulated, but also validated in action by distributing shotguns to
the DECAS (see chapter 4); claims for economic and material assistance to ronderos
and their families; and more recently, of financial compensation. Drawing an idea
from Dagnino (1998:48), it may argued that for peasants in Ayacucho and elsewhere,
one of the significant consequences of the common experience of political violence
and civil defence has been a perception of themselves as subjects bearing rights.
Recognising their own invaluable contributions to the counterinsurgency struggle,
CAD leaders from Ayacucho mobilised in April 1999 for the explicit purpose of
claiming the compensation they had been promised by Fujimori and the CAD legisla-
tion, and in so doing were attempting to stake out a political claim to citizenship.
What precipitated this action was that some months prior to this, the government had
promulgated Decreto Supremo No. 068-DE/SG, which stipulated the eligibility con-
ditions, the requirements for making a claim, and the amount to be paid as indemni-
ty to ronderos crippled or killed in the line of duty. However, many of the require-
ments were unrealistic and impossible for individual ronderos to satisfy—like having
to secure a certificate of autopsy, which is especially difficult in remote areas where
there are no doctors, let alone a health post. This condition was also impractical given
that the bodies of ronderos killed in ambush were sometimes never recovered (see
chapter 5). “Because of this situation,” Comando Zorro wrote in his war diary,
a commission of 80 ronderos was formed from the districts of Tambo
(La Mar) and Santillana (Huanta) to travel to the city of Lima with the
objective of asking the Government to enlarge this Supreme Decree,
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and the reduction of the requirements, and the recognition of the
[current] commanders and the former leaders, many of whom are
now to be found abandoned and psychologically ill as a result of this
dirty war.44
Their effort was partially rewarded by the creation, on 8 May 1999, of a draft pro-
posal to modify the indemnity law, for which they obtained the support of
Congresswoman María Jesús Espinoza Matos.45 With their objective apparently
brought to a successful conclusion, the elated ronderos returned to Ayacucho, and the
commission was dissolved. It was not kept together to press for other rights, and it
did not become the basis for a future social movement of ronderos.46 When I returned
to Ayacucho in April 2000, however, not a single indemnity payment had yet been
paid, and the draft proposal was still entangled in bureaucratic red tape. Meanwhile,
the ronderos continued to wait patiently for positive developments.
Given the change of government in 2001, however, it is likely that the new
Congress has scrapped the proposal, along with the other legislative flotsam of the
discredited Fujimori government. With the CADs now officially dissolved, ronderos
like Zorro will find it more difficult to press their case with the present government
of Alejandro Toledo. Furthermore, in so far as the resurgent and worsening econom-
ic crisis in Peru has left rural people with little time for anything other than trying to
eke out a living, it seems unlikely that former ronderos and CAD commanders will
devote any more time or their scarce personal resources to pursuing this issue.
However, in this, only time can tell.
For most of the history of Peru as a modern nation-state, its indigenous popula-
tion has been denied many of the political rights of citizenship. For instance, it was
only at the very end of the 1970s, when the discriminatory electoral regulation stip-
ulating that “only literate individuals [had] the right to elect or be elected” (Cotler
1970:422) was abolished, that the vast majority of peasants were finally entitled to
vote. Prior to this, the overall electoral irrelevance of the peasantry meant that most
of their claims on the State were ignored, or repressed when they resorted to direct
action. Very few peasants understood the abstract political principle of a Peruvian
nation, and even fewer felt a part of it.
The contributions that CADs have to the citizenship revolution goes far beyond
the role they have had in facilitating the peasantry’s access to the political and mate-
rial trappings and practical benefits of citizenship. It may, in fact, be argued that the
greatest contribution of the peasant militias—and thus quite possibly their most pro-
found legacy—has been to bring an unprecedented level of awareness whereby they
now see themselves, and are conversely seen by the government and the rest of soci-
ety, as Peruvian citizens with rights. In my view, the starting point of this journey was
peasant counter-rebellion, and the point it has reached is the retrospective recogni-
tion that as Peruvian citizens, peasants have the right to organise and defend them-
selves. And if it is true that overt demonstrations of patriotism serve as a moral indi-
cator of one’s deservedness of citizenship, particularly in times of crisis, then it may
be further suggested that the direct military participation of peasant militias in the
counterinsurgency struggle has, at least in their own eyes, proven their patriotism—
and consequently their right to citizenship—beyond all doubt. This, in turn, has
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prompted peasants to demand that the State give official recognition to their contri-
butions and sacrifices in the form of rewards and benefits which they feel they are
entitled to as citizens: schools, hospitals, and roads for communities in war-torn
regions where peasant militias were most active, or more poignantly, financial com-
pensation to ronderos or their families, as mentioned above. Just as important, the
success of the peasant militia experience, and the growing perception among peasants
that it was they who were principally responsible for the counterinsurgency victory,
has helped to engender a greater sense of self-esteem.
This dramatic process whereby citizenship has been extended to the lower class-
es, or other hitherto excluded social strata (including women) through participation
in military service, is by no means unique to Peru. In fact, military institutions have
played a central role in the evolution of parliamentary democracy in many of the
developed nations of the world, and military service has correspondingly been an
integral component of citizenship. As Janowitz observed, “From World War I onward,
citizen military service has been seen as a device by which excluded segments of soci-
ety could achieve political legitimacy and rights” (1975:77-78). An interesting paral-
lel in this regard may be made between the case of indigenous people in Peru and that
of African-Americans in the United States.
During World War II...blacks continued to serve in segregated units,
performing primarily quartermaster, construction, and transportation
functions. Even the black combat units that did exist were used large-
ly as a source of unskilled labor. The demand for recognition of the
“right to fight” became a major slogan of black organisations that
wanted the willingness of the black community to fulfill [sic.] citizen-
ship obligations demonstrated (Segal and Segal 1983:243. My empha-
sis).
The gradual racial integration of the American armed forces prefigured the gains that
the civil rights movement would eventually achieve “towards racial integration and
equality in American civil institutions” (ibid.:244).
The success of the peasant militia experience, when considered against the fact
that the long-established practice of conscription was recently abolished in Peru, rais-
es the possibility (or is it more of a certainty?) that in the future, recruitment for
Peru’s armed forces will be based on voluntarism, as occurred in the United States in
1973. It is also possible that Peru’s armed forces will become a defence organisation
consisting of a core group of professional soldiers, supplemented by citizen militias,
as in the case of Canada’s armed forces. If so, this may have significant consequences
for the way the Peruvian military defines its professional qualities and mission, and
for the way the armed forces as a whole comes to perceive its relationship with civil-
ians and civilian institution.
The implication of these two profound developments—(1) “cholo” as a new def-
inition of Peruvian nationality, and (2) the unprecedented and uncontested extension
of citizenship to the peasantry by virtue of their patriotic defence of the Republic—is
that the indigenous peasantry of Peru are more integrated into Peruvian national iden-
tity and culture now than at any other time in Peruvian history. The extent to which
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they have become integrated, however, remains to be seen.
My observations suggested to me that most former CAD leaders and ronderos
have generally returned to their pressing task of subsistence farming. A talented few,
however, have set their sights on pursuing political careers, or on obtaining local gov-
ernment and civil service positions. This fact constitutes not only incontrovertible
proof of new opportunities opening up to Peru’s rural citizens; it also shows that these
children of the disenfranchised are themselves now becoming part of the system.
Poverty has by no means been eradicated in places like Ayacucho. Yet the extent to
which Peru’s enduring economic problems constitute fertile ground for future revo-
lution is tempered by the important fact that citizenship incorporation and enlarged
democratic participation mean that peasants today have a greater stake in preserving
and defending the system more than ever before.
As I think back to my personal experiences in Peru, to all I’ve seen and to all the
Peruvians I’ve met, I can think of no-one who epitomises the profound processes of
change, renewal, and heightened self-esteem described above better than my charis-
matic friend and key informant, Comando Zorro. The last time I saw him in
Huamanga in May 2000, he was no longer Comando Zorro, just Walter Ramirez, an
ordinary citizen. He was on his way to the Prefecture to submit his application for the
post of Governor of Tambo district, and had stopped at my hotel to bid me farewell,
and to give me the most precious parting gift I could have wished for. As we sat in
the courtyard of Hotel “La Colmena,” sipping from our bottles of Inca Cola, Walter
suddenly placed a plastic bag bursting with sheets of paper on the stone table.
“I thought this might be of some use to you, hermano,” he said in his soft, raspy
voice, through that perpetual grin.
I rapidly flipped through the thick block of papers and immediately realised what
it was I held in my hands. My look of surprise must have amused Walter. In any case,
he continued to grin, and for my own joy I couldn’t help but grin back an even wider
grin.
“This is the complete archive of Tambo’s Sede Central, including my diary I told
you about when we first met [in 1997]. I took these documents with me when I
retired [in 1998] and the Patrulla Especial disbanded. I could not give this to you back
then because, well, we didn’t know you well enough yet, and because of the, you
know, political situation, with the military security and all. Anyway, you’ve come
back, like you promised, and now we’re friends, no? So I thought that this might be
helpful to you, when you’re writing your book about the ronderos of Tambo, the
Committees, no? It’s important that people don’t forget what happened, that they
don’t forget what the Committees had achieved for Peru and for the peasants. Write
this history down in you book, in English so they can read it in the United States and
in Europe. Who knows, hermano, perhaps my kids will learn English one day, no? It’s
important for them to know their history, what their father and their uncles did in
defence of the Patria. When we are old or dead, hermano, it is important for them
and their own children to remember that we defeated Sendero.”
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Notes
1 There is speculation that the Shining Path was behind the bombing that took place on 23 March in
a shopping centre across from the American embassy, just three days before American president
George W. Bush’s visit.  See The Economist 2002a.
2 One of the earliest writers to depict Shining Path as a “peasant rebellion” is American scholar
Cynthia McClintock (1984); and one of the last is British journalist Simon Strong (1992). A cri-
tique of this early view of Shining Path as an “organic indigenous peasant insurrection” appears in
Starn (1991).
3 See, for example, the statement of General Jorge Fernández Maldonado, co-founder of military
intelligence, in Kruijt 1994:55, or the testimony of Sub-lieutenant Telmo Hurtado Hurtado, head
of the army patrol that massacred 69 peasants at Accomarca, Vilcashuamán province, Ayacucho
(DESCO 1989:128). 
4 Author’s email correspondence with Professor Orin Starn, on 26 August 2002.
5 Clear evidence of this stubborn and arrogant indifference to peasant concerns can be seen in
Abimael Guzmán, “Entrevista del siglo. Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio.” El Diario, 24 July,
1988. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New Flag
(http://www.blythe.org).
6 It would appear that Poole is directing her criticism at historiographies that postulate “enduring
forms of cultural community as an ethnically defined tradition of resistance” (1994:4) at writers
such as Flores-Galindo (1987), Larson (1983, 1988), Stern (1982), Stern ed. (1987).
7 For a recent scholarly study of peasant counter-rebellion, see Viola 1996.
8 Wickham-Crowley (1992) and McClintock (1984) provide good, clear, concise overviews of the
different “schools” of thought on the social sources of peasant revolution. In regard to revolution-
ary theories put into practice, the two contrary pillars of thought are, on the one hand, Ché
Guevara’s famous foco theory of revolution which holds that popular forces operating from rural
areas can create the conditions for revolution, and on the other, Mao’s dictum that revolution must
proceed as a “protracted people’s war” from the countryside to the cities.
9 The reference here is principally to capitalist market penetration into the countryside.
10 It is well not to forget that violent conflicts, often over land boundaries and water rights, though
also disputes over issues such as inheritance, existed and were relatively common before the out-
break of political violence (e.g. Isbell 1978; Palmer 1973:198). I also discovered ample evidence of
such violent disputes in the archives of the Ministry of Agriculture, in Huamanga. See Reference,
primary sources.
11 Based on author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of
Uchuraccay, Huanta province, on 26 May 2000, and conversation with José “Pepe” Coronel on 25
April 2000.
12 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000.
13 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000.
14 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000. Degregori has made the general observation that “Shining Path
privileged collective forms of organizing production,” and provoked resistance, particularly at har-
vest time, when peasants “found out that collectively produced crops were destined for the party”
(1998:133). A similar complaint was made to José Coronel by Pablo Pariona, an ex-president of
the community of Chaca (Coronel 1996:46).
15 The relevant archival documents are cited in the reference section at the end of this book.
16 Some might speak of a “conservative tradition of rebellion” or “culture of resistance” in reference
to the Iquichanos. During the War of Independence, the Iquichanos of Huanta-La Mar took the
side of the Royalists, while the Morochucos of Huamanga-Cangallo sided with the Republicans
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(Degregori 1990:98-99; see Mendez Gastelumendi 1996).  Husson argues that the conservatism of
the Iquichanos was the result of their having politically assessed the situation, and concluding that
the “liberal discourses, proclamations of reform, projects of social transformation” of the
Republicans might only deepen their poverty and exploitation (1986:167). During the Rebellion of
1826-28, the Iquichanos allied with defeated Spanish royalists in Ayacucho; during the rebellion
against the salt tax some 70 years later, the Iquichanos sided with Miguel Elías Lazón, a Cacerist
caudillo and the most important landowner in the region (Degregori 1990:99; Husson 1983,
1992).
17 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000, and informal discussion with José ‘Pepe’ Coronel on 25 April
2000.
18 Like endogamous preference in marriage, the wealth-levelling cargo system and its varayocc
authorities.
19 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000.
20 Author’s interview with Elías Ccente, president of highland peasant community of Uchuraccay,
Huanta province, on 26 May 2000, and informal discussion with José ‘Pepe’ Coronel on 25 April
2000. See Coronel 1996.
21 Abimael Guzmán speaks very candidly about the need for “excesses” as justification for the guer-
rilla massacre at Lucanamarca, in 1983, in “Entrevista del siglo. Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silen-
cio.” El Diario, 24 July, 1988. Translated by the Peru’s People’s Movement (MPP) and The New
Flag (http://www.blythe.org).
22 “The principal function of terror,” Greene writes, “...is to convince people that the revolutionary
movement is powerful and that the power of the state is weak. Terror is designed to increase the
individual’s feeling of isolation and helplessness, thereby enhancing his or her susceptibility to the
appeals of the revolutionary movement” (1990:106).
23 This is what retired General Rodolfo Robles, former commander of Región III (Arequipa), told
Dirk Kruijt during a private interview in June 2002. What is more, Robles stressed that during his
time in command, numerous regional commanders agreed among themselves not to transfer cap-
tured Senderistas to the SIN, where they would certainly be tortured. Author’s discussion with
Professor Dirk Kruijt on 16 July 2002.
24 First articulated in this way by General Sir Richard Templer in 1952 during Britain’s counterinsur-
gency campaign in Malaya, but prefigured in terms of actual tactics over a century earlier by the
French in Algeria in the 1840s  (Bulloch 1996:4). 
25 More Development, Less Repression.
26 See Ejército Peruano 1989; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Tayacán 1985; Tapia 1997; Greene 1990.
27 The military predicament became particularly acute in Peru when the army, already overstretched
in its war against subversion, was suddenly confronted by a new border war with Ecuador in
January 1995, followed by sporadic border tension ever since. In 1997, elements of the 2nd
Infantry Division stationed in Ayacucho and Huancavelica prepared to deploy to the Cenepa bor-
der area, which, had it happened, would have left, according to Infantry Captain (now Major)
César Vasquez of the 2nd Infantry Division, much of the defence of the two departments in the
hands of the CADs.
28 Author’s interview with Walter Ramirez Echacaya (Comando Zorro), Presidente and Comando
General of Tambo District’s Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo, on 6 November 1997.
29 Author’s interview with Captain (now Major) César G. Vásquez Guevara of the 2nd Infantry
Division, Jefe Militar CCAD SZSNC-8, Frente Huamanga (Ayacucho and Huancavelica depart-
ments, and the districts of Pichari-Quimbiri in La Convención Province, Cuzco Department), on 20
November 1997.
30 Translated as “Struggle for the Reconstruction and Development.” 
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31 See Stepan 1976; Kooning and Kruijt 2002; Kruijt and del Pilar Tello 2002; Fitch 1998; Silva
2001; Huntington 1968; Nunn 1992, 2001.
32 For more literature on the PAC, see Remijnse’s references (2001:468-469).
33 We cannot assume that the vast majority of common people in developing countries have a natural
sympathy for democracy, for as Pinheiro notes, “[i]n December 1993, in a national survey taken by
the daily Folha de S. Paulo, 54 per cent of Brazilians agreed that ‘democracy is always better than
any other form of government’—the highest percentage registered in the ten times the question has
been asked since September 1989” (1997:269). 
34 See Koonings 2001a; Kruijt 2001; Glebbeek 2001; Remijnse 2001; Wouters 2001; Fumerton
2001; Huggins 1991; Pinheiro 1997; Koonings n.d..
35 See Biekart 1999:30-31; Gramsci 1971; Diamond et al. 1989:35.
36 I am grateful to Kees Koonings for clearly articulating for me these crucial points concerning civil
society, social movements, and their theoretical relationship. Based on author’s conversation with
Koonings on 12 September 2002.
37 Article 19(f) of D.S. 077 states that it is a duty of CAD members “not to realise partisan or reli-
gious politics that may align the Committees on a course of action that divides or weakens them
(El Peruano 1992:110352).
38 The preamble of this piece of legislation describes the original Rondas Campesinas as “organisa-
tions assigned to the service of the community and that contribute to development and social peace
without political aims,” and as an “Institution devoid of partisan purposes” (reprinted in SER
1993:40).
39 This presents a striking contrast to the history of the original rondas campesinas of northern Peru
(Starn 1999).
40 Chalmers (1997) considers this new modality of participation and representation—in other words,
Palmer’s “informal politics”—as a phenomenon that is expanding throughout Latin America. These
developments will certainly lead us to rethink our notions of civil society, and the importance of
political parties within it.
41 I owe these insights to Kees Koonings. Based on author’s conversation with Koonings on 12
September 2002.
42 I owe these insights to Kees Koonings. Based on author’s conversation with Koonings on 12
September 2002.
43 In reinventing himself, Toledo even changed his Castellano accent from the affected Americanised
one with which he spoke five years earlier as an “ethnically neutral” presidential candidate, to a
more “provincial” one in 2000.
44 Walter Ramirez Echacaya, n.d., (Private Papers), pp.92-93.
45 The result of these efforts was the drafting of Proyecto de Ley No. 4833/98-CR.
46 This episode, combined with the discussion thus far, provides graphic evidence of Wolf ’s percep-
tive observation that the two outstanding characteristics of peasant social organisation are: “first,
the strong tendency towards autonomy on the part of the peasant households; second, the equal-
ly strong tendency to form coalitions on a more or less unstable basis for short-range ends”
(1966:91).
336
From Victims to Heroes
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 336
Abbreviations
AP Acción Popular
APRA Alianza Revolucionaria Americana
ARI Alianza Revolucionaria de Izquierda
BCS Base contrasubversiva
BR Bandera Roja
CADD Comité de Autodefensa y Desarrollo
CAEM Centro de Altos Estudios Militares
CAPS Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción Social
CCADD Comité Central de Autodefensa y Desarrollo
CCC Centro de Capacitación Campesina  
CCP Confederación Campesina Peruana
CDC Comité de Defensa Civil
CEAS Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social
CEDAP Centro de Desarrollo Agropecuario
CEPRODEP Centro de Promoción y Desarrollo Poblacional 
CRF Comando Rodrigo Franco 
DECAS Defensa Civil Antisubversiva del Río Apurímac
DESCO Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo
DINCOTE Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo
DIVICOTE División Contra el Terrorismo
ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional
FECVRA Federación Campesina del Valle del Río Apurímac
FEDECMA Federación Departmental de Clubes de Madres de Ayacucho
FENCAP Federación Nacional de Campesinos del Perú
FER Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario
FONCODES Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo
FPM Fondo de Promoción
GRFFAA Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas
IDL Instituto de Defensa Legal
IER Instituto de Estudios Regionales ‘José María Arguedas’ 
ILA Inicio de la Lucha Armada
IU Izquierda Unida
MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
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MRTA Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru
PAC Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (Guatemala)
PAR Programa de Apoyo al Repoblamiento 
PCP-BR Partido Comunista del Peru-Bandera Roja
PCP-SL Partido Comunista del Peru-Sendero Luminoso
PCP-Unidad Partido Comunista del Peru-Unidad
PRONAA Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria
PSR Partido Socialista Revolucionaria
PUM Partido Unificado Mariáteguista
SAIS Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social
SER Servicios Educacionales Rurales
SIN Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional
SINAMOS Sistema Nacional de Movilización Social
SUTE-Huamanga Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación-Huamanga
SUTEP Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú
SUTE-UNSCH Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación-UNSCH
SZSNC-8 Sub-Zona de Seguridad Nacional Centro No.8 (Ayacucho-
Huancavelica)
TADEPA Taller de Promocción Andina
UDP Unidad Democratica del Perú
UI Unidad de Izquierda
UNIR Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria  
UNSCH Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga 
VR Vanguardia Revolucionaria
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Appendices
Appendix A: Displacement and return in the rural communities 
of Tambo District
Name of community Year(s) displaced Cause of displacement Status Year of return
Acco Antiguo 1984 G A –  
Acco Nuevo – – Rs –  
Anccascocha 1984 M+G A –  
Ayapampa 1984 G A –  
Balcón 1983–84 M+G Rt 1997  
Ccachubamba 1983 M A –  
Ccancca 1983 G A –  
Ccatupata  1983–84 M Rt 1994  
Ccayllurumi 1983–84 M A –  
Ccescce 1985  M  Rt 1996(?)  
Ccochcca – – Rs –  
Chacabamba 1983–84 M+G A –  
Chacco 1984 M Rt 1996  
Challhuamayo–Alta – – Rs – 
Challhuamayo–Baja – – Rs –  
Chupanhuillca 1987 M A –  
Churrulla 1983 M Rt 1995(?)  
Huancapampa 1985. See Tinyas M A –  
Huantaccasa 1983–84 M+G A –  
Huarmihuañusja 1983 M A –  
Huayao – – Rs –  
Huiska 1984–85 G Rt 1996  
Huito 1984 G Rt 1993  
Marcaruccay 1983–84 G A   
Marcobamba 1983 M A –  
Marcopata 1983 M A –  
Masinga – – Rs –  
Mahuayura Rural refuge formed in – Rs –
1984–1985 by desplazados 
from Tapuna, Huiska, Anccascocha 
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Name of community Year(s) displaced Cause of displacement Status Year of return
Mauca – – Rs –  
Michcapampa 1983 G A –  
Millpo – – Rs –  
Mincay 1983 G A –  
Moya – – Rs –  
Osno – – Rs –  
Pacccha – – Rs –  
Pallccacancha 1983 M+G A –  
Pampa Hermosa 1983–84 G Rt 1994
Pamparaccay 1984 M Rt 1996  
Paria 1983 M+G Rt 2000  
Pata Pata – – Rs   
Patapata – – Rs –  
Pinchin – – Rs –  
Polanco 1983–84 M+G Rt 1993  
Pucrura 1984 M A –  
Qeqra Resistente until  G Rt 1996  
displaced in 1992
Ranra 1983 – Rt 1998  
Rayanccasa 1983 M A –  
Roccchas – – Rs –  
Rodeopampa 1983–84 G A –  
Rudio 1983–84 M+G Rt 1995
Santa Rosa 1984 G Rt 1996  
Saytahuaylla 1983–84 G Rt 1993  
Tanahuasi 1983–84 M Rt 1995(?)  
Tantaccocha 1983–84 M+G A –  
Tantar 1984 M A –  
Tapuna 1984–85 M+G Rt 1996  
Tinyas Together with Huancapampa, M Rt 1993  
formed desplazado community 
of Chupanhuillca in 1985 
Toccto 1984 G Rt 1993  
Tucuhuillca 1983–84 M+G Rt 1995  
Unión Cristal 1983–84 M+G Rt 1995  
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Name of community Year(s) displaced Cause of displacement Status Year of return
Unión Minas 1983–84 G Rt 1995  
Urmay 1984 G A –  
Usmay 1984 M Rt. Site of military 1995
garrison for
6 months in 1997
Ventanayocc 1983 M A –  
Vicos – – Rs –  
Yuracctullo 1983 M A –  
Sources:Concejo Municipalidad Distrital de Tambo, CEPRODEP 1997, and personal interviews with Walter Ramirez
Echacaya, Ruben Rojas Dominguez, and Eusebio and Felix (surnames withheld).
A – Abandoned to date (May 2000).
Rs – Resistente (resistant) community.
Rt – Retornante (returnee) community
G – Displaced by Guerrilla violence.
M – Displaced by Military violence.
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Appendix B: Total number of times presidential candidates mentioned 
on the front page of tabloid press
The table below shows how often each of the four presidential candidates were
depicted in particular ways on the front page of the popular tabloid papers,
between 11 January and 10 March 2000.1
Notice how Alejandro Toledo, as the only “cholo” in the group, is portrayed exclu-
sively in terms of long-established racist stereotypes of Indians are crooks and liars.
Andrade Castañeda Toledo Fujimori
Antagonistic towards the poor  51 30  0  0  
Emotional disorders    1  39  0  0  
Dubious economic income    0  26  0  0  
Agitator and violent  21   0  0  0  
Pro-terrorist  14   1  0  0  
Snob (“Pituco”)   13   0  0  0  
Swindler    0   0 10  0  
Connections with Alan García    1   5  0  0 
Associated with homosexual surroundings    0   9  0  0  
Liar    0   0  5  0  
Benefits the most needy    0   0  0 31  
Public works    0   0  0 10  
Against terrorism    0   0  0 12  
Others    0   0  0  8  
TOTAL 123 116 19 61  
Source: after Transparencia 2000c:1
1 These tabloids are popular not only because of the sleazy articles and smutty photos they pub-
lish, but also because they all are cheap at a cost of less than one sol per newspaper. They
include El Chato, El Chino, El Chuchi, El Mañanero, El Diario, Más, El Men, and El Tío
(Transparencia 2000c).
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Appendix C: Results of first round of voting for 
Ayacucho Peruvian general elections, april 2000
Presidential Votes
Huamanga  Huancasancos La Mar Huanta V.Fajardo Vilcash. Total  
Alianza Electoral Perú 2000 19,001  1,276 1,792 3,093 1,769 1,180 28,111  
Partido Perú Posible 16,770  1,270 1,362 2,466 1,482 566 23,916  
Movimiento Independiente 616  36 66 83 61 251 1,113  
Somos Perú 
Partido Politico 461  236 189 97 62 122 1,167  
Solidaridad Nacional 
Agrupación Independiente 900  22 121 124 41 20 1,228  
Avancemos
Frente Popular Agrícola 321  12 32 26 154 37 582
FIA del Peru 
Partido Aprista Peruano   155  40 32 98 49 18 392  
Agrupación Independiente 86  23 31 17 23 7 197
Unión por el Perú 
Partido Acción Popular 80 12 20 11 17 6 146  
Frente Independiente 5  0 1 3 0 21 30
Moralizador
Blank votes 2,714  634 1,067 789 993 534 6,731  
Null votes 1,088  170 158 145 339 159 2,059  
Impugnable votes 18  1 0 1 0 0 20  
TOTAL VOTES CAST 42,215  3,732 4,788 6,953 4,990 2,931 65,692  
TOTAL VALID VOTES 38,395  2,632 3,338 6,018 3,658 2,238 56,882  
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Congressional Votes
Huamanga  Huancasancos La Mar Huanta V.Fajardo Vilcash. Total  
Alianza Electoral Perú 2000 15,356 798 1,385 2,497 1,581 1,152 22,769  
Partido Perú Posible 9,430 568 1066 871 1,371 415 13,721  
Movimiento Independiente 2,291 35 66 127 71 185 2,775
Somos Perú 
Partido Politico 694 1,114 203 80 60 99 2,250
Solidaridad Nacional 
Agrupación Independiente 1,967 14 455 143 55 146 2,780
Avancemos
Frente Popular Agrícola 398 15 37 27 122 33 632
FIA del Peru 
Partido Aprista Peruano   1,207 39 45 1,618 77 20 3,006  
Agrupación Independiente 326 19 28 77 20 8 478
Unión por el Perú 
Partido Acción Popular 189 17 28 24 26 8 292  
Frente Independiente 2,175 13 25 64 20 9 2,306
Moralizador
Blank votes 2,996 5 58 884 562 1,050 458 6,508  
Null votes 4,209 541 566 803 527 330 6,976  
Impugnable votes 30 0 0 6 0 0 36  
TOTAL VOTES CAST 41,268 3,731 4,788 6,899 4,990 2,931 64,529  
TOTAL VALID VOTES 34,033 2,632 3338 5,528 3,658 2,238 51,009  
Source: Transparencia
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands
(Summary in Dutch)
Toen in 1980 de communistische partij van Peru – Lichtend Pad – in naam van de boe-
renbevolking en het proletariaat, een gewapende revolutie lanceerde tegen de
Peruaanse staat, werd deze door verscheidene wetenschappers al snel betiteld als een
boerenopstand, en daarom een geschikte case om zich toe te leggen op de vraag waar-
om boeren in opstand komen. Maar zelfs terwijl de opeenvolgende onderzoeken over
de zich steeds verder ontwikkelende Peruaanse burgeroorlog een overvloed aan lite-
ratuur voortbracht, waarvan men de relevantie verkondigde als zijnde een voorbeeld
van een boerenrevolutie, vonden geweldadige confrontaties tussen de guerrillastrij-
ders en de boeren, die zij beweerden te vertegenwoordigen, steeds vaker plaats. De
wijdverspreide verbazing en verbijstering die deze gewelddadige botsingen veroor-
zaakten was misschien tekenend voor de mate waarin wetenschappers al lange tijd de
vraag hadden genegeerd wat boeren ertoe bracht actief en geweldadig contra-revolu-
tionair te worden. Het voornaamste belang van het fenomeen boerenverzet is zijn
cruciale relevantie voor het begrijpen van de wetenschappelijke theorie over revolu-
tie en voor het begrijpen van de dynamiek in de relatie tussen boeren en revolutio-
naire groepen.
Dit boek probeert het wetenschappelijke begrip van oorzaken, structurele vormen
en dynamiek van de geweldadige boerenverzet te vergroten, door een case-studie te
presenteren over boerenzelfverdedigingsgroepen in het Peruaanse departement
Ayacucho gelegen in het Andes gebergte, geboorteplaats van zowel de revolutie van
het Lichtend Pad als het boerenverzet. Daarnaast onderzoekt dit boek ook de geschie-
denis van de Peruaanse burgeroorlog vanuit het relatief verwaarloosde perspectief van
het boerenverzet in een poging de dagelijkse ervaringen van de boerenbevolking met
politiek geweld en hun reactie daarop te begrijpen.  
De thesis van dit boek is dat het boerenverzet een vorm is van verzet tegen exter-
ne krachten en zijn primaire motivatie voortkomt uit de bescherming van het leven,
bezittingen, levensonderhoud en vrijheid van handelen. Onderkennend echter, dat
boerenverzet tot grotere gevolgen leidt en nieuwe sociale vormen van interactie en
veranderingsprocessen voortbrengt, beoogt deze studie ook een meer gedetailleerd
begrip te verkrijgen over, ten eerste, hoe het boerenverzet heeft bijgedragen aan de
Staats counterinsurgency acties tegen Lichtend Pad, en ten tweede, hoe deze contri-
butie veranderingen hebben bewerkstelligd in de sociale omstandigheden en sociale
positie van de boerenbevolking in de Andes. Ten slotte, tegen de achtergrond van de
burgeroorlog, verkent deze studie de wijze waarop geweld, racisme, macht en over-
heersing hebben geleidt tot gewijzigde sociale relaties en culturele indentiteiten in
Ayacucho en in Peru als geheel in de laatste twee decennia.
Het onderwerp wordt vanuit drie onderling verbonden manieren benaderd. Als
eerste wordt er een poging gedaan de sociale, structurele en historische omstandig-
heden die de zelfverdedigingscomités deden ontstaan in het departement Ayacucho te
identificeren. Het doel is hier te verklaren hoe en waarom dit fenomeen zich ontwik-
kelde en uitbreidde in het departement en om de regionale en locale verscheidenheid
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in hun oprichting en organisatorische vorm uiteen te zetten. Ten tweede wordt er
onderzoek gedaan naar het belang dat de zelfverdedigingsorganisaties kregen in het
dagelijks leven in de gemeenschappen op op het platteland. En ten derde zal een
poging worden gedaan om de wederkerige relaties te indentificeren, die zelfverdedi-
gingscomités in verband brengt met grotere sociale transformaties en veranderings-
patronen in de bredere regionale en nationale omgeving. Eén van de leidende con-
ceptuele veronderstellingen in deze studie is dat het fenomeen van de zelfverdedi-
gingsgroepen op het platteland moet worden begrepen binnen de context van zowel
de lokale gemeenschap als de gehele maatschappij. Er bestaat een grote hoeveelheid
literatuur over de burgeroorlog in Peru. Maar het is pas betrekkelijk recent dat een
aantal wetenschappelijke studies hebben geprobeerd de meer op macroniveau gedane
analyses te integreren met micro-analyses over grotere gebeurtenissen en sociale
transformaties en hoe deze zijn opgenomen in het leven van locale gemeenschappen,
en er een sociale betekenis aan te geven.
De opbouw van dit boek is als volgt. Het introducerende eerste hoofdstuk handelt
over de meer praktische kwesties als het belang van het project, de aanpak, de metho-
dologie, de bronnen en veldonderzoekservaring. Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft het ontstaan
en de ontwikkeling van Lichtend Pad. Het laat zien hoe de door Mariátegui en Mao
geïnspireerde kijk van Lichtend Pad op de sociaal-economische kenmerken van de
Peruaanse boerenbevolking en de nationale agrarische structuur de veronderstellingen
en doelen vormde van haar revolutionaire strategie. Ik betoog dat het extreme geweld
dat het Lichtend Pad in de daaropvolgende jaren heeft uitgevoerd tegen de boeren
begrepen kan worden vanuit haar unieke verontstellingen en overtuigingen. Ten eer-
ste, dat zij de voorhoede is van de oorlog van het volk en de bevoorrechte eigenaars
van de Waarheid (d.w.z. Marxisme-Leninisme-Maoisme-‘Gonzalo Gedachte’). Ten
tweede, haar strikte trouw aan het orthodoxe Marxistisme-Leninisme dat dicteert dat
“contra-revolutie” en “revisionisme” nooit mogen worden getolereerd, en moeten
worden uitgeroeid, onmiddelijk en meedogenloos, waar zij verschijnen. Deze discus-
sie verschaft ons een achtergrond waar vanuit we het daaropvolgend gedrag van
Lichtend Pad ten opzichte van de boerenbevolking kunnen bekijken, en daarmee een
bijdrage aan het begrip waarom Lichtend Pad niet, in tegenstelling tot haar claims,
kan worden gezien als een voorhoede van een boerenrevolutie, maar meer als een
object van boerenverzet.
Hoofdstuk 3 vangt aan met het begin van de gewapende strijd van Lichtend Pad.
Het vervolgt dan met het onderzoeken van de eerste effecten van de militaire tactie-
ken en strategie van Lichtend Pad, niet alleen op de boeren maar ook op andere soci-
ale groepen, zoals de politie. Het is op dit punt dat we al de eerste breuken zien in de
relatie tussen Lichtend Pad en de boerenbevolking. Dit gebeurde toen Lichtend Pad
verder ging met haar unrealistisch optimistisch avontuur om de realiteit in de Andes
van gedaante te veranderen – met alle middelen indien nodig, met een totale onver-
schilligheid ten aanzien van bestaande culturele waarden in het Andes gebergte, over-
levingsstrategie?n van de boeren of structurele relaties – in een “hyper-realiteit’’ zoals
deze gezien wordt binnen de rigide vorm van het Maoistisch-Mariateguista dogma.
Door haar acties, ontlokte Lichtend Pad afvalligheid en rancune die uiteindelijk zou
leiden tot het uitbreken van boerenverzet in bepaalde berggebieden in Ayacucho.
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Niettemin wordt er ook aangetoond, dat toen de militairen een “uitputtingsoorlog”
startten, zij ook een actieve rol gingen spelen in het aanmoedigen of dwingen van de
boerengemeenschappen om civiele verdedigingspatrouilles te vormen. Tegen de bre-
dere achtergrond van de aanpak van de Belaúnde regering ten aanzien van counter-
insurgency worden de structurele en functionele kenmerken van deze eerste boeren
civiele verdedigingspatrouilles geanalyseerd en hun effectiviteit beoordeeld. Het
onderliggende argument in dit hoofdstuk is, dat inachtname van de organisatorische
kaders van diverse boerengemeenschappen en hun verband met grotere economische
en politieke terreinen, een beginpunt geeft voor het proberen te begrijpen van de
diversiteit aan reacties van de boeren op het toenmalige politieke geweld in de Zuid-
Centrale hooglanden van Peru. De vorming van zelfverdedigingscomités is slechts één
van de reacties van de boeren op het politieke geweld.
In hoofdstuk 4 verplaatst het verhaal zich naar het dal van de Apurímac rivier
waar, als gevolg van een aantal specifiek regionale omstandigheden en de dynamiek
van het politiek geweld dat zich daar openbaarde, de meest geraffineerde en effectie-
ve counterinsurgency milities - de DECAS – werden geboren. Tegen een achtergrond
van zowel geweld door de guerrillastrijders als de onderdrukking binnen de “vuile
oorlog” door de militairen (eerst onder de regering van Belaúnde en later die van
García), bekijkt dit hoofdstuk hoe de DECAS probeerden te overleven door wisse-
lende allianties en door het verdedigen of bevechten van vrijheid van handelen tegen
de guerrillastrijders, het leger, de politie en drugshandelaren. Daarnaast volgt dit
hoofdstuk de opkomst en ondergang van Comandate Huayhuaco, een legendarische
militieleider, die niet alleen meehielp met de ontwikkeling van DECAS geavanceerde
tactieken, maar ook het symbool werd voor de “donkere zijde” van de boerenmilities.
Ook belangrijk in deze periode was het debat of boerenmilities in het algemeen hun
wapens zouden moeten krijgen van de staat voor de verdediging van henzelf en de
staat, wat hen zou veranderen in een andere ’’gewapende actor’’. Gearchiveerde gege-
vens geven ons een inzicht in hoe de DECAS als gewapende eenheid in het veld func-
tioneerden. Deze informatie toont aan dat zij veel meer waren dan simpelweg een
bonte verzameling van “gangsters” of “kanonnenvoer”, het stereotype beeld van een
aantal externe waarnemers. De militaire vuurkracht van de DECAS (mogelijk
gemaakt door drugsgeld), haar duidelijke organisatorische structuur en de verschil-
lende strategische allianties die het kon smeden met andere machtige locale actoren
(zoals de drugsbaronnen en de mariniers) zouden, uiteindelijk, beslissend blijken in de
bijdrage aan de pacificatie van vrijwel het gehele dal van de Apurímac rivier. In het
het grotere sociaal-politieke landschap wordt voorzien door in te gaan op de opkomst
en val van het García-regime, en hoe een politieke crisis die gedeeltelijk werd ver-
oorzaakt door zijn onorthodoxe economische beleid, aanzette tot een crisis in de
counterinsurgency en de relatie tussen milities en militairen.
In hoofdstuk 5 keert het verhaal terug naar het berggebied van Ayacucho waar de
DECAS zich uitbreiden. Deze werd bereikt door elite groepen van militieleden uit te
zenden naar gemeenschappen in de hooglanden waar zij de locale patrouilles training
en instructie gaven in de strategie, organisatie en tactieken van de DECAS. De nadruk
ligt hier op de uitbreiding en institutionalisering van het fenomeen van de boerenmi-
lities zoals deze zich ontwikkelde en hoe deze werd ervaren door de inwoners van het
Tambo District. Een andere belangrijke ontwikkeling beschreven in dit hoofdstuk is
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de opkomst van Alberto Fujimori tot president. Met name wordt er aandacht
geschonken aan de onderling afhankelijke relaties die zich ontwikkelden tussen
Fujimori, het leger, de inlichtingendienst en de zelfverdedigingscomités, die het nieu-
we counterinsurgency-beleid van de regering moesten onderbouwen. Het oorlogs-
dagboek van Comando Zorro bepaalt het verloop van het verhaal in dit hoofdstuk.
Samen met met andere informatiebronnen, zorgen de levendige details van het dag-
boek ervoor dat we het sociaal-politieke geweld in menselijke bewoordingen zien,
zoals de mensen het beleefden en ondergingen. Dit hoofdstuk tracht ook vaak ver-
waarloosde, ontastbare kwesties die betrekking hebben op de dynamiek van het feno-
meen van de zelfverdediging te behandelen, zoals de kwetsbaarheid van het moreel
waarop de wil om zich te blijven verzetten rustte. Bovendien worden in dit hoofdstuk
ook de belangrijke ontwikkelingen en transformaties binnen de revolutionaire bewe-
ging eind jaren tachtig en begin jaren negentig onderzocht, met de nadruk op zowel
de scheuren, geschillen en conflicten binnen het Lichtend Pad als op de veerkracht en
continuiteit. Gebaseerd op gegevens van verschillende belangrijke ongepubliceerde
studies en eigen interviews met gevangen genomen rebellen, geeft dit hoofdstuk een
inzicht in hoe het dagelijks leven van een guerrilla van het Lichtend Pad, alsmede van
de boeren onder de macht van Lichtend Pad, in de afgelegen door guerrilla gedomi-
neerde gebieden van de noordelijke provincies van Ayacucho, eruit zag. De vernieti-
ging van een belangrijke guerrillacel door boerenmilitieleden aan het einde van 1993
sluit dit hoofdstuk af, en symboliseert het aanbreken van een nieuwe periode van een
onzekere vrede in deze subregio van het departement Ayacucho.
Hoofdstuk 6 heeft een andere toon en tempo. Het handelt vooral over de pro-
cessen aangaande de terugkeer van vluchtelingen, de wederopbouw en ontwikkeling.
Het belangrijkste argument in dit hoofdstuk is dat, omdat mensen zoeken naar enige
mate van normaliteit in hun dagelijks leven, zelfs in ongunstige omstandigheden, we
moeten erkennen, dat zelfs in oorlogstijd sociaal-economische wederopbouw plaats-
vindt. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de rol en bijdragen van zelfverdedigingscomités aan
het proces van wederopbouw en gaat in op hun mogelijke bijdrage aan het ontwik-
kelingsproces. 
Hoofdstuk 7 is gebaseerd op mijn persoonlijke waarnemingen van de chaotische
en ernstige politieke situatie die het land overspoelde gedurende de controversiele
presidentsverkiezingen in 2000. Het was, zoals de titel suggereert, een tijd van onver-
wachte einden. Niet alleen stortte het Fujimori-regime en haar inlichtingenapparaat
in binnen slechts enkele maanden nadat Fujimori zijn derde presidentstermijn had
“gewonnen”, ook werd de staat van beleg uiteindelijk bijna overal opgeheven waar hij
was uitgeroepen en hiermee werden ook de zelfverdedigingscomités officieel gedeac-
tiveerd. In feite echter, waren de boerengemeenschappen in een groot deel van
Ayacucho, op eigen initiatief sinds eind 1998, al begonnen met het ontbinden van hun
zelfverdedigingscomités toen algemeen werd aangenomen dat pacificatie was bereikt
en er niet langer een serieus risico was op guerrillageweld. In samenhang hiermee, was
het niet langer zelfverdediging – die van zichzelf al een financi?le aderlating was van
tijd en materiele bronnen – maar het herstel en de reactivering van verwaarloosde
agrarische en andere aan levensonderhoud gerelateerde activiteiten, die de voor-
naamste prioriteit hadden voor de bevolking.
Hoofdstuk 8 probeert een begin te maken met een theoretische analyse en dis-
366
proefschrift mario  12/11/02  10:45  Page 366
cussie op basis van de voorafgaande hoofdstukken. Sprekend in het algemeen, zijn de
belangrijkste punten van discussie het fenomeen van boerenverzet in relatie tot de
counterinsurgency politiek van de staat, het belang van boerenmilities in civiel-mili-
taire relaties en de invloed van dit fenomeen op de onderling gerelateerde problemen
van democratische consolidatie, natievorming en staatsburgerschap. 
Op basis van de bewijzen en analyse zoals weergegeven in de voorafgaande hoofd-
stukken van dit boek, kom ik tot de conclusie dat het Lichtend Pad omvangrijke en
aanzienlijke weerstand opriep toen het haar revolutionaire strategie (reeds hierboven
beschreven) met gebruik van geweld poogde op te leggen aan de boerenbevolking. Dit
bedreigde niet alleen de persoonlijke veiligheid, maar verergerde ook de economische
tegenspoed die de guerrillastrijders nu juist een grote mate van sympathie en steun
van het volk hadden opgeleverd. De afvalligheid en weerstand die dit veroorzaakte
onder de boeren resulteerde, in sommige gevallen, tot een reactie van verzet tegen
Lichtend Pad. 
In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteer ik ook dat de belangrijkste bijdrage die het boe-
renverzet tegen Lichtend Pad heeft geleverd aan counterinsurgency niet voornamelijk
ligt aan hun militaire kracht (boeren zijn aanvankelijk militair bijna altijd zwakker dan
de guerrilla-eenheden) maar eerder in hun vermogen te strijden tegen een guerrilla-
groepering voor de politieke en psychologische controle over de bevolking. Boven-
dien geeft hun superieure locale kennis van de bevolking hun de mogelijkheid te zijn
in counterinsurgency dan de veiligheidstroepen van de overheid. 
Gedurende de jaren tachtig werd de relatie tussen de zelfverdedigingsorganisaties
van de boeren en de militairen gekenmerkt door dubbelzinnigheden en soms tegen-
strijdigheden en vijandschap aan de kant van de militairen. Dubbelzinnigheden ten
aanzien van hun status en plaats binnen de counterinsurgency strijd werden voor eens
en altijd weggenomen in de jaren negentig toen de regering van Fujimori wetgeving
aannam die hun status formaliseerde als de “vierde tak van de strijdkrachten”(Kruijt
1996:246) en gerechtigd maakten om vuurwapens te gebruiken. Op deze wijze werd
aangenomen dat zij een militaire status kregen verwant aan die van Reserve of
Nationale Garde-eenheden zoals die in veel westerse landen voorkomen. En hun tot
dusverre “extra-legale” waakzame vorm van geweld werd veranderd in “legitiem
geweld”, tenminste in de ogen van de staat.
De veiligheid waarin de zelfverdedigingsorganisatie van de boeren konden voor-
zien moedigde de terugkeer of verschijning van de civiele autoriteiten, NGO’s en
hulporganisaties van de regering aan in delen van het platteland die zij eens door het
guerrillageweld hadden verlaten. In dit opzicht lijkt het erop dat de boerenmilities
niet alleen een belangrijke rol speelden in het herstel en de versterking van de bur-
germaatschappij in vele door oorlog verscheurde gebieden in Peru, maar bewezen ook
dat zij zelf een integraal onderdeel uitmaakte van deze burgermaatschappij. Echter,
gegeven het feit dat de omgeving waarin deze boerenmilities opereerden was gemili-
tariseerd en er sprake was van een noodtoestand, waarbinnen rechten en vrijheden
waren opgeschort, kan worden gesteld, dat de ”openbare vrijheid van handelen” ver-
eist voor het bestaan van een echte maatschappij, in feite was vernietigd. In deze con-
text, kan de ogenschijnlijke heropleving van maatschappelijke groeperingen misschien
beter omschreven worden als plaatsvindend in een tussenfase, waarbij een onstuimi-
ge, chaotische maatschappij in staat van oorlog wordt verlaten en een vreedzame
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maatschappij, in overgang naar democratie en met een functionerende maatschappij
wordt benaderd. Daarom kan gesteld worden, dat hoewel de boerenmilities bepaalde
karkateristieken lijken te hebben die hen vergelijkbaar maken met een sociale bewe-
ging, de context van een gemilitariseerd gebied waarin de noodtoestand geldt, naast
haar sterke relatie met de militairen en de overheid, typeren hen uiteindelijk toch als
een ”onbeschaafde beweging” in een “onbeschaafde maatschappij”.
Gebaseerd op bewijzen wordt er in dit hoofdstuk ook betoogd, dat de verande-
ringen veroorzaakt door het politieke geweld, en in het bijzonder de betrokkenheid
en actieve deelname van de boerenbevolking aan de burgeroorlog, hebben geresul-
teerd in een veel grotere mate van integratie van de inheemse bevolking in het natio-
nale kader dan waarschijnlijk mogelijk was geweest als ze gewoon met rust waren
gelaten. Derhalve opper ik, dat tegen de tijd dat Alejandro Toledo in 2001 president
werd, de inheemse volksindentiteit van ”cholos” de basis was geworden, in ieder geval
in de collectieve psyche van de meerderheid van de bevolking, voor een nieuwe defi-
nitie van de Peruviaanse natie. 
De gevolgen van deze twee diepgaande ontwikkelingen – (1) “cholo” als de nieu-
we definitie van de Peruaanse nationaliteit, en (2) de niet eerder voorgekome en onbe-
twiste uitbreiding van het staatsburgerschap van de boerenbevolking krachtens hun
patriotistische verdediging van de Republiek – zijn dat de inheemse boerenbevolking
van Peru nu meer is geïntegreerd in de nationale identiteit en cultuur van Peru dan op
enig ander moment in de Peruviaanse geschiedenis. De mate waarin zij zijn geïnte-
greerd moet echter nog maar worden afgewacht.
Dat de boerenmilities zijn afgebeeld, in zowel gewone literatuur alsmede weten-
schappelijke verhandelingen in Peru en daarbuiten, en zij zichzelf zijn gaan zien, als
“patrioten die Peru en haar samenleving hebben verdedigd”, is overtuigend bewijs van
de mate waarin deelname aan de boerenmilities de betekenis heeft gekregen (evenzo-
zeer bij buitenstaanders als bij de deelnemende boeren zelf) van platforms voor het
claimen van politiek burgerschap.  
Voortdurende economische problemen in Peru vormen misschien een vruchtbare
bodem voor een toekomstige revolutie. Maar de kans hierop is aantoonbaar afgeno-
men door het belangrijke feit, dat opname in het staatsburgerschap en de toegenome
democratische participatie betekenen, dat vandaag de dag de boeren een groter aan-
deel hebben in het behoud en de verdediging van het systeem dan ooit tevoren. 
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